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Full text of "Development of Soviet maritime power."



DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MARITIME POWER 
by 
Nicholas George Shadrin 




s 



DUDLEY KNOX LIBR >K . 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEBEY. CALIFORNIA 8394Q 




Till- GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
Washington, D.C. 20006 




THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 

of 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

announces the 

Final Examination 

of 

Nicholas George Shadrin 

for the degree of 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

Tuesday, July 11, 1972, at 2:00 P.M. 

in 

The Conference Room, Bacon 201 

2000 H Street, Northwest 

Washington, D.C. 



/ 83 G 17 7 

/ 

■ l r 



Ill LD OF STUDIES: International Relations 

DISSERTATION: "Development of Soviet Maritime Power" 

DIRECTOR OF THE CANDIDATE'S RESEARCH: 
Vladimir Petrov, Professor of International Affairs 

EXAMINING COMMITTEE: 

Andrew Gyorgy, Professor of International A fjairs and Politica. Sen n 

Charles Fox Elliott. Associate Pro/essor of Political Sciem jnd 
International Affairs 

Carl Arne Linden, Associate Professor of Internationa! Affairs and 
Political Science 

John Hardt, Senior Specialist on Soviet Economics, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress; Research Consultant in s >viet 
Economics and Comparative Economic Systems, Graduate Sell . if 
Arts and Sciences 

Thomas William Wolfe, Senior Staff Member, Social Sciences Depart- 
ment, Rand Corporation 



Vladimir Petrov, Advocate 



The Dean of the Graduate School ol Arts and Sciences, presiding 



ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
Development of Soviet Maritime Power 

The development of Soviet maritime power has been an uneven and 
complex process closely associated with the level of Soviet industry and 
supplemented by skillful utilization of foreign technology. The Soviet 
government inherited a relatively strong maritime tradition and a substantial 
number oi Tsarist specialists. During the restoration stage, 1921-1927, the 
shipyards were put back into operation, and construction of a number of 
ships, laid down prior to the Revolution, was completed. Toward the end of 
the 1920's. the construction of naval ships, particularly submarines, started. 
Primary attention up to the mid-1 950's had been given to the Navy. The 
development of merchant marine, fishing fleet, and river transport had been 
exercised mainly on a residual basis. A number of naval programs, approved 
and partially implemented during Stalin's reign, resulted in a numerically 
sizable Navy. Rapid development of all aspects of the Soviet maritime 
power, which started in the mid-1 950's, was the result of a major revision of 
policy, particularly with respect to naval construction. The USSR decided 
not to build aircraft carriers, not to fight its major opponent with his 
weapon system, but, instead, to build a Navy whose striking power would 
he concentrated in new weapon systems-missiles, which can be launced by 
various carriers from the surface, in the air, and under water. Consequently. 
j number of classes of Soviet ships have no equal among the major naval 
powers at this time. The Soviet Merchant Marine presently occupies sixth 
place in the world. It is capable of satisfying the needs of rapidly growing 
Soviet foreign trade, domestic sea transportation, and military and 
economic aids; and it plays a significant role as an auxiliary of the Soviet 
Navy. Soviet shipbuilding is well developed, utilizing advanced methods of 
construction. Foreign deliveries played an important role, and permitted 
concentration on naval shipbuilding. In oceanography, the Soviets are one 
of the leaders in the world. During the last decade, considerable attention 
has been devoted to the exploitation of mineral resources from the sea. The 
appearance of the Soviet fishing fleet in remote areas of the world's oceans 
preceded that of the Soviet Navy and Merchant Marine. Presently, both the 
fishing vessels and the gear they employ are among the most advanced in the 
world. The role of the Soviet fishing fleet in foreign aid is substantial and 
growing. 

The vastness of the Soviet Union's territory and its poorly developed 
land transportation made inland waterways indispensable for the transpor- 
tation of goods, raw materials, and people. Efforts to master the Northern 
Sea Route, which is destined to play an important role, continue. The 
Soviet maritime power of today is the result of more than 50 years of the 
Soviet Union's development as a state and represents to a large degree the 
realization of t tie long-cherished Russian dream to be a great maritime 
nation. In May, 1972, Admiral Gorshkov emphasized the peacetime role of 
navies as "political force at sea" which "continues to have paramount 
importance as an instrument of policy of great powers." The upward trend 
m the development of all aspects of the Soviet maritime power should 
continue, creating greater capabilities and permitting more flexible appli- 
cation of it in the interests of Soviet policy. 



/ S-3C177 

/ 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

Born in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 19, 1928 

B.S. 1952, the Naval Academy 

M.E.A. 1964, George Washington University 

Department of Defense, 1960- 



CONCERNING PERIOD OF PREPARATION AND 
GENERAL EXAMINATION 

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE: 

Benjamin Nimer, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, 

Chairman 
Kurt London, Professor Emeritus of International Affairs 
Wolfgang Herbert Kraus, Professor of Political Science and International 

Affairs 
Franz Henry Michael, Professor of International Affairs and Far Eastern 

History 
Burton Malcolm Sapin, Professor of International Affairs and Political 

Science 
William Reid Johnson, Associate Professor of History 

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS: 

English passed: October, 1964 
Polish passed: September, 1968 

FIELDS OF STUDY: 

International Politics 

Political Theory 

Soviet Economics 

Far Eastern International Relations 

Soviet Foreign and Military Policy 

TIME IN PREPARATION: September, 1964-February, 1970 

GENERAL EXAMINATION PASSED: July, 1969-February, 1970 



Development of Soviet Maritime Power 

Volume I 
By 

NICHOLAS GEORGE SHADRIN 

B.S. 1952, the Naval Academy 
M.E.A. 1964, The George Washington University 

A Dissertation submitted to 

The Faculty of 

The Graduate School of Art and Sciences 
of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor c-i: ^..xlosophy 

Juae, 1972 

Dissertation directed by 
Vladimir Petrov 
Professor of International Affairs 



i to 



DUDLEY KNOX LIBR'*RY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 9394Q 



To those at sea 



83 617 7 

- i c 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 

Most of the research material for the dissertation was 
derived from Soviet sources. Some German and Polish language 
publications were also used. Use of American and British sources 
was limited primarily to naval matters. Soviet specialized 
periodicals (particularly journals and transactions) , as compared 
to books, were found most useful, and provided historical 
data based on the Soviet archives, most of which is unavailable • 
in the West. These periodicals have presented a detailed picture 
of current trends in the development of the civilian branches 
of Soviet maritime structure. 

There are many to whom the writer is indebted for various 
degrees of assistance and encouragement. The idea to study the 
subject of Soviet maritime development in a broader scope was 
born during many prolonged discussions of naval development 
with Robert W. Herrick and a number of mutual friends. In 
spite of often profound disagreement over various aspects of 
the subject matter, those discussions were extremely stimulating 
and contributed heavily to the decision to write. 

In addition to the many faculty members of the George 
V/ashington University, whose efforts and patience are deeply 



appreciated, I wish to express my particular gratitude to 
Professors Wolfgang H. Kraus, Kurt Loudon, Franz Hv Michael, 
Benjamin Nimer, Vladimir Petrov, and also Charles F. Elliott, 
John Hard and Thomas W. Wolfe. I would be remiss if the 
contribution of my wife Eva, who even found time and patience 
to read a portion of this paper, were not acknowledged. 



IX 



TABLE OF CONTENTS '"--. . 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i 

LIST OF TABLES * vii 

VOLUME I. 

INTRODUCTION 1 

Chapter 

I . NAVY . . . 7 6 

Heritage 6 

From the Revolution to World War II .... 28 
The Soviet Navy During World War II 61 

The Baltic Fleet 

The Black Sea 

The Northern Fleet 
The First Post-World. War II Period 

to the mid-1950s 79 

Military Theory 89 

From the Mid-1950s to the Beginning 

of the 1970s 110 

Development of Forces 131 

Submarines 

Surface Ships 

Naval Aviation 

Shore Defense Forces and Naval 
Infantry 

Science and Armament 

Party Control and Personnel Policy 200 

Forward Deployment 224 

Medite rranean 

Indian Ocean 



aval Exercises 



Conclusions 25S 



iii 



II . MERCHANT MARINE • 231 

t 
History of Development, Plans and their 

Implementation 231 

The Need for the Merchant Marine 304 

Shipping Policy 309 

Fleet Composition 320 

Organization and Management of t.he 

Soviet Merchant Marine 326 

Personnel Policy, Educational and 

Research Institutes 335 

Shore Facilities 347 

Containerization 358 

\/ Some Economic Aspects of the Soviet 

Merchant Marine 364 

1/ Conclusions 372 



VOLUME II. 



Ill . SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 3S0 

General Development and Yards 330 

Research and Development 392 

Shipbuilding Methods Employed 393 

Propulsion Systems and Their 
Development 404 

Diesels 

Steam Turbine Propulsion Systems 

Gas Turbines 

Nuclear 



/ 



/ 



Automation of Propulsion Systems 
Soviet Hydrofoils 
Air-Cushioned Vehicles (ACV> 



Hovercraft) 
Some Factors Determining Designs and 

Construction 434 

Conclusions . . . . 449 



IV 



IV. OCEANOGRAPHY ' 451 

t 

The Development and Major Work of Soviet 

Oceanography 457 

Oceanographic Vessels 472 

Underwater Research and Equipment 479 

Research and Plans for the Exploitation 

of Minerals in the Sea , 491 

The Organizations 498 

Conclusions 502 



V. FISHING INDUSTRY 504 

General Developments 504 

Research and Development 522 

Fishing by Kolkhozes and in Inland 

Waters 534 

Organization 545 

Problems, Trends of Development, Plans . 551 

Conclusions 561 



VI . RIVER TRANSPORT 565 

Organization and Control Structure 5S9 

Natural Waterways and their 

Navigability 573 

Soviet Canals and the Artificial 

Waterways 575 

Mixed, River - Sea, Transportation 578 

New Ships of the Soviet River 

Transport 582 

Plans for the Future 584 

Military Role 587 



VII . NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 589 

Icebreakers 595 

Legal Aspects of Soviet Arctica and 
Northern Sea Route 603 



v 



EPILOGUE '. ( 612 

APPENDIXES . . 633 

I . Warsaw Pact Countries 633 

II. Soviet Foreign Trade, Economic and 

Military Aid ! 654 

III. Some Aspects of the Maritime Law, 

International Cooperation 682 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY " 702 

GLOSSARY . 707 



vi 



LIST OF TABLES ~~ ~\ 

Page 

Amphibious Landings During World V/ar II *. 177 

Statistical Table of Soviet Ships 298 

Soviet Foreign Trade Shipments 307 

Economic Performance of Various Soviet Tankers 436 

Major Characteristics of Soviet Tankers 433 

Soviet Icebreakers 597 

Navies of East European Countries, Members of WTO 652 

Postwar Soviet Foreign Trade 659 

Soviet Trade with Developed Countries 660 

Soviet Foreign Trade , 1965 - 1970 664 



VII 



INTRODUCTION ~^- ~ 

Many scientists have pointed out that a more appropriate 
name for our planet would be the Ocean and not the Earth, for close 
to three quarters of the planet surface is covered by the water. 
Historically, a maritime or sea power has played an important 
role in international development. Quite often naval power has 

— \ 

been associated with such terms as sea power or maritime power, 
but such important elements as merchant marine, fishing fleet, 
oceanography, shipbuilding, and associated research and development 
have been overlooked. Recently, the traditional importance of the 
sea and its use for communication and application of power or 
power-in-being has been elevated, and it is rapidly becoming an 
important source of minerals and food. Post World-War-II changes 
in the world's socio-p'olitical structure, particularly the 
formation of opposing blocs of nations and the emergence of 
numerous newly independent states, have provided conditions for 
the more intensified use of the sea for development, competition, 
and containment. A pattern of world trade creating a certain 
interdependency of nations is substantiated by transport, of which 
the merchant marine is a most vital part,, and thus, of great 



importance to national economies. Internationally, there is 

a tendency to solidify maritime nations in a regulated approach 

i.e. peacetime mutual protection in the sphere of economics and often 

in military alliances. Continents which have oceans between 

them are no longer divided by their expanse but rather are joined 

by them. 

In the post World-Y/ar-II period, the originally undisputed 
and unquestioned capability of the US to control the sea has been 
gradually contested, particularly in the decade of the 1930' s, 
and the main challenge has come from the nation whose maritime 
power had not been felt for a long time, and which the West was 
accustomed to treat as a classical land power, the Soviet Union. 
Growing Soviet political, economic, and military involvements 
around the world have recently been practically without exception 
associated with maritime power. The analysis of this power, its 
development, internally and in the relation to other states, and 
the nature of the challenge is of obvious importance. 

Not long time ago, one US Air Force general, arguing for 
a greater budget appropriation for his service vs. the US Navy 
requirements, expressed what well might have been a widespread 
feeling: "To maintain a five-ocean navy to fight a no-ocean 
opponent is a foolish waste of time, men, and resources". Today, 
no one would seriously support such a statement. But presently, 

-t 

I 

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the mightiest military power ever assembled can hardly be put 
to the test, particularly in the form of open warfare. Economic 
competition, on the contrary, is less constrained, and, being one 
of the constants of foreign policy, can, under certain circumstances, 
assume a form of economic warfare with maritime power being an 
essential element of its implementation. • 

The very size of the Soviet Union makes certain of its 
regions dependent on maritime transportation. It is transportation 
in general, more precisely poorly developed transportation, which 
has kept the rich resources of Siberia, the Far East, and the 
North, from being utilized in the Soviet economic development 
up to a recent time, and still handicaps the development of an 
integrated economy. But it seems that the more unfavorable is the 
geographic location of a country with respect to the sea, the 
more mobile and numerous must be her maritime power in order to 
satisfy internal needs, and to be able to make a bid equal to 
that of a possible opponent. 

Y/ith due recognition for the prevailing interest in the 

present and the future, the past, however, cannot be ignored, 

for there lies the foundation of the development. For this reason, 

the development of the Soviet maritime power, the analysis of 

which is undertaken in this dissertation, is examined in a 

historical context. All significant facets of Soviet maritime 

•? 



power, naval, merchant marine, fishing fleet, river transport, 
shipbuilding, oceanography, and the mastering of world's unique 
Northern Sea Route, will be examined in connection with the 
political, economic, and military aspects of the country's recent 
historical process. In addition, there will be a brief analysis 
of the post-war maritime development in Eastern 'Europe, as well 
as of Soviet Union foreign trade, economic and military aid/ 
and of certain aspects of maritime law. Combining the historical 
method with functional analysis, it is still necessary to make . 
considerable use of statistics and limited technological data 
and considerations, for they appear to provide a better guarantee 
against arbitrary conclusions. Scenarios have become a fashionable 
approach in analyzing complex socio-economic and military-political 
problems. But too frequently constructed on the basis of liberally 
exercised assumptions, and often without consideration of essential 
factors, many scenarios proved nothing and confused greatly. 
Dealing with a long neglected and still weakly researched subject, 
and forced to rely on scarce sources, which obviously do not 
provide complete information, it was found advisable not to employ 
the scenario approach at all. 

In the process of collecting research material for this 
dissertation, the main emphasis was on the Soviet sources. 
Western sources were used when the desired information was not to 
/ ■ . 



be found in Soviet sources, as frequently occurred in matters 
associated with the Soviet Navy. While tradition has played an 
important role in the development of all aspects of Soviet maritime 
power, it has been particularly important for the Navy. For 
this reason, a brief outline will be provided of Russia's naval 
development in the continuum of history. The leaders of the Soviet 
maritime establishment have been using Russian maritime tradition 
not only for indoctrination of personnel, but to justify Soviet 
maritime expansion. The West is being frequently attacked for 
portraying the Soviet Union as a land power. Commander-in-Chief 
of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov has labeled that 
alleged practice as a "diversion", a subversive act of psychological 
warfare emphasizing that the Soviet Union did not build its maritime 
power, "from scratch". 

The importance of the ocean to mankind in the future will 
certainly grow. Many scientists predict that a great age of the 
oceans is upon us. New factors of a political, military, economic 
and scientific-technological nature unknown or unforeseen by the 
classical figures of sea power are now operating. Regardless of 
wbich school or theory of international relations one subscribes, 
the combined effect of these factors exercises a profound influence 
upon international relations. The share of Soviet maritime power 
in this influence appears to warrant examination.- 



CHAPTER I ' * 

NAVY 
Heritage '-. 

The naval tradition which has been vigorously 
portrayed in pre-Revolutionary Russia and in the Soviet 
Union became part of the Russian heritage. The extensive 
Russian naval histj^qy which dates back more than a 
thousand years was initiated with a drive to have access 
to the open sea. From the 9th to the 11th centuries 
inclusive, the Kiev princes initiated nine sizeable sea 
expeditions in the Black and Caspian Seas in order to gain 
access to the trade routes. The largest was the expedition 
of 907 led by Prince 'Oleg, in which an 80,000-man army 
supported by 2,000 boats participated. Oleg's expedition 
culminated in the capture of Constantinople, where the 
decisive role was played' by a well prepared and skillfully 
executed landing. 

In the Baltic Sea successful expeditions against 
Sweden were initiated by Novgorod (1188 and 1191) . A 



pence treaty with Sweden concluded in 1201 guaranteed 

Novgorod secure trade routes in the Baltic Sea. > 

i 
The disintegration of the state of Kiev in the 

12th century, the advance of the Mongols, continuous wars 

with German Orders and Sweden forced the Russians to 

retreat from the sea. In the 14th century all 'trade 

routes in Black, Caspian, and Baltic Seas were lost, 

although Novgorod continued to navigate the White Sea. 

In the 16th century, particularly during the reign of 

Ivan IV (the Terrible) , the drive to gain access to the 

sea became one of the major goals of Russian foreign 

policy. V/hile Ivan IV opened access to the Caspian Sea 

but failed to in the Baltic, Peter the Great succeeded. 

As a result of prolonged wars with Sweden "the 
window into Europe" was opened at the beginning of the 
18th century and Russia established a stronghold in the 
Sea of Azov where the first flotilla of ships was organized 
in 1696, the year considered to be the year the regular 
Russian Navy was born with Peter the Great as its creator. 
The first major battle was won by the young Russian regular 
navy in 1714 at Gangut against the Swedish Navy. 

During the reign of Peter the Great not only 
extensive ship construction but the construction of fleet 



/ 
/ 

/ 



bases as well was initiated. In 1700 the Admiralty was 
organized, and in 1701 a nautical school, the forerunner 
of the Naval Academy, was established in Moscow. The 
development of the Russian Navy after the death of Peter 
the Great in 1725 depended to a large degree upon each 
ruler's attitude toward it. Its fortunes fluctuated, but 
in general it was an important element of Russian military 
power up to the Revolution. 

During the reign of the Catherine (1762-1796) the 
Russian Navy was active in the Mediterranean and Black 
Seas. The Baltic squadron dispatched to the Mediterranean 
in 1769 won a victory over the Turkish fleet at Tchesme 
(June 24-26, 1770) which, together with the Battle of Gangut 
and Sinope (1853) , has been viewed as a most important 
event in the history of the Tsarist Navy. A number of 
victories were achieved by Admiral F. F. Ushakov in the 
war with Turkey (1790, battle of Tendra) and in joint 
actions with Turkey and the allies against Napoleon's 
fleet in the Mediterranean (Battle of Corfu, February 1799) . 
Admiral D. N. Sinyavin also won an important victory at 
Afon in June 1807. 

The covenant of 1780, known as armed neutrality, 
was a Russian attempt jointly with other European nations to 



8 



restrict the British application of sea power and to protect 
neutral merchant shipping. 

■ The beginning of the 19th century was marked by a 
number of scientific and commercial cruises, including 
Krusenstern cruise to circumnavigate the globe. In 1814 
the Russians made an appearance on Kauai Island, Hawaii. 
A ship belonging to the Russian-American fur company which 
had control of the Alaskan fur trade and a base in 
California was wrecked off the coast. During the following 
year another ship was dispatched to the island to recover 
the cargo and possibly set up a trading post. Outposts 
were set up in Hanalei and Waimea. Kauai's king, Kaumaulii, 
agreed in writing to place himself and his kingdom under the 
control of the Tsar and to permit the Russians to establish 
factories and plantations and export sandalwood. The 
documents also gave half of Oahu, then ruled by Kamehameha I, 
to the Tsar. The expedition was recalled in 1819 because 
of political complications with England. 

The success of the Battle of Navarino Bay in 1827 
in which a Russian squadron participated on the side of 
allies in the war against Turkey for Greek independence 



1 Neighbor Island News, April 12-8 and 16-12, 



1971, Hawaii. 



3 



was not followed up, due to British opposition to the 
Russian plan to attack Constantinople. 

The first half of 19th century witnessed the ' 
beginning of the gradual replacement of sailing ships by 
steamships, a process which in Russia was delayed by 
technological backwardness. The first armed steamship, 
Izhora, was built in 1826 and the first steam frigate, the 
1,340-ton Bogatyr 1 ,' armed with 28 guns, in 1836. The 
first screw driven steam ship was built in 1848 but 
construction of ships of the line started just prior to the 
Crimean War, for which Russia was poorly prepared. Mines 
were also developed during the first half of the 19th 
century, and Russia v/as well advanced in this development. 

The year 1853 produced two important events: (a) The 
first battle between Russian and Turkish steamships on 
November 5, as a result of which the Turkish ship was 
captured. The Russian ship v/as under command of Lieutenant 
Butakov, a future admiral and author of the first tactics 
for the steam fleet. (b) The Battle of Sinope of November 
18th, during which eight Russian ships under Admiral 
Nakhimov attacked a Turkish squadron of 16 ships and, using 
explosive shells, destroyed all but one Turkish ship. 

The Crimean War (1854-1855) did not produce naval 



/ 



10 



battles, for vastly superior British- French fleet was in 
complete control of the Black Sea. The defense of 
Sevastopol' for eleven months by the Russians has been * 
glorified since, with the Navy given the major part of 
the glory. In the Baltic the allied fleet made an attempt 
to attack Kronstadt, but the strength of the defenses and 
the first use of mines (contact and controlled) by Russians 
changed the plan. Defeated in the Crimean War, Russia 
was denied sizeable naval forces in the Black Sea under 
the 1856 Paris Treaty. The main goal of the war - to 
prevent Russia from free access to the Mediterranean 
through the Straits - was achieved by the allies. 2 

Soon after the Crimean War Russia began an intensive 
modernization of its navy. Several types of armored 
ships - ironclad, armored steamers, large gunboats - were 
built. Russian preoccupation with mine-torpedo warfare 
resulted in the const-ruction of the first minelayers and 
steam boats carrying torpedos. The intensive shipbuilding 



2 The above historical period of the Russian Navy 
is described in (1) Istoriya Voyenno - Morskogo Iskusstua 
(History of Naval Art) . Textbook for higher naval schools 
edited by Admiral S. E. Zakharov, Moscow, Boyenizdat, 1969 
pp. 20-69. (2) David Woodward, The Russian at Sea (New 
York, Praeger, 1965) pp. 40-69, 95. 



11 



program resulted in a rather strong naval forces toward 
the mid-1860' s. 3 > 

In 1863 Russia dispatched two squadrons of its ^liips 
to the U.S. The motives behind the move remain controversial, 
but the Russian version, recently reinforced by the Soviet 
Press, goes as follows: "The Lincoln Administration does 
not feel too strong: The Southern Confederates are 
attacking and Great Britain and France are about to give 
them direct support by intervening in the war with their 
navies. On 24 September a Russian naval squadron, under the 
command of Vice Admiral S. S. Lesovskiy, entered the mouth 
of the Hudson in New York .... Then Secretary of War 
of the United States Wallace, exclaimed: 'God bless the 
Russians!' New York authorities expressed the same 
sentiment in a different way: a lavish reception, a "soir'ee 
Russe", was held for the officers of the squadron. 

Why did a Russian squadron come to New York? Vice 
Admiral S. S. Lesovskiy had his orders: in event of 
recognition of the Southern Confederates by Great Britain 
or some other European power, place a squadron at the 
disposal of the government of President Lincoln. In U. S. 



History of Naval Art, pp. 71-72. 



12 



diplomatic documents of the period there is the following 
message of the U. S. envoy from St. Petersburg: . . . it 
cannot be doubted that knowledge of this fact by the French 
and British Governments was the bridle which kept them on 
a leash." 4 

Modern American writings, while recognizing the 
existence of speculation in 1863 that the visit of the 
Russian squadron was the expression of support for the 
North, emphasize that the real motive was the Russian 
desire to save the ships in case of war between the European 

powers and to employ them against the enemy from the American 

5 

ports, thus downgrading the visit to a sort of deception. 

During the 1877-1878 war with Turkey, the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet was still weak in contrast to a strong 



4 

Izvestiya , 7 October, No. 236, and 18 October, No. 

247, 1969. The article by Sagetelyan, " In Neutral Waters ", 

described the cruise of Soviet squadron in Atlantic and its 

visit to Cuba. Unfriendly remarks of the American press 

to the presence of Soviet ships in proximity of the U. S. 

were given in contrast to the described visit of Russian 

squadron in 1863. 

William E. Nagengast, "The Visit of the Russian Fleet 
to the United States: Were Americans Deceived?" The 
Russian Review, January 1949 pp. 14-19. 



/ 

/ ' 13 



Turkish fleet, which had many new heavy armored ships. 
The round ironclads designed by Admiral Popov (called 
Popovki) , although well armed and protected by heavy armor, 
could not be used at sea owing to their poor seaworthiness, 
and hence were employed only for off-shore (coastal) 
defense. Mines were widely used for defense in the Danube 
and in the Black Sea. On the initiative of Lieutenant 
S. 0. Makarov a faster steamer carrying four torpedo boats 
was used for torpedo attacks. The war ended victoriously 
for Russia, but. the Berlin Treaty of 1878, while removing — 

restrictions on Russia's Black Sea Fleet, did not change 

6 

the Straits situation. 

During the last two decades of the 19th century 
the Russian Navy was reinforced with a considerable number 
of newly built ships including battle ships and cruisers. 
The theoretical search for modern naval tactics and employment 
of naval forces produced a number of major works by the 
Russians, particularly the works of Admiral Butakov, ( New 
Basis of Steam Navy Tactics 1874 ) , and of Admiral 
Makarov ( Discourses on problems of naval tactics 1896) . 

At the end of the 19th Century more than 200 years 



6 

History of Naval Art, pp. 75-77. 



/ 

/ " 14 



of a struggle to have direct access to the Mediterranean 
Sea with the desire to control the Turkish Straits ended 

i 

in vain for Russia, mainly because of the opposition of 
the European States, particularly England. While militarily, 
all wars with Turkey were won by Russia, the desirable 
outcome was not achieved by diplomacy, although* the degree 
of access as defined in various treaties fluctuated. 
The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) opened the Straits^ 
to Russian commercial shipping. During 1807, at the 
Tilsit meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I, an 
attempt was made to determine the boundaries between the 
spheres of influence of the East and the West. The Tsar 
claimed Constantinople, but Napoleon exclaimed, "no, never 
Constantinople, that would mean world dominance!' 

The 1329 Treaty of Adrianople opened the Straits 
to commercial ships of all nations. In 1833 the Sultan 
was forced by circumstances (advance of rebellious Viceroy 
of Egypt) to accept a Russian offer of assistance consisting 
of a Russian warship at anchor in the Bosphorus supported 



7 

Cited by Dr. Egmont Zechlin in awe 11 docuinented 

lecture delivered at the meeting of the Joachim Jungius 
Society for Science, Hamburg, 31 October and 1 November 
1963, Goettingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1964, p. 1. 



15 



by a 13,000-man army ashore. Under pressure from Western 

powers, however, the Russians moved off, but only after 

» 

securing their position by a new Unkiar-Skelessi Treaty,* 
guaranteeing Russians the right of passage of their 
warships through the S.traits and thus into the Mediterranean 
The French and the British protested the treaty, supporting 
the protest with a naval demonstration at the Dardanelles. 
The London meeting of the Concert of Europe resulted in 
a different rule (the Covenant of the Straits of 1841) , 
which prohibited naval ships from transiting the Straits 
in peacetime. This rule was reaffirmed in the Treaty of 
Paris (1856) and of Berlin (1S78) , and remained in force 
until World War I. While offering Russia a safeguard 
against an attack from the Mediterrannean, it made her 
"prisoner" of the Black Sea, which proved to be true during 
the war with Japan, 1904-1905. As a member of the Entente, 
Russia continued her 'effort to gain control of the Straits. 
According to the 1915 London agreement, the Allies agreed 
that the Straits should go to Russia after World War I. 
The agreement was nullified by the October Revolution of 
1917 and the Soviet government's repudiation of all Tsarist 



s Ibid., p. 11. 



IG 



treaties. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne demilitarized 
the Straits and provided for free passage for warships of 
all nations with some limitations imposed on the total 
strength of the transiting naval force. 

The Montreaux Convention of 1936, which is in force 
at the present time, permitted Turkey to fortify the 
Straits again and made passage of Black Sea power warships 
practically unrestricted, though limiting passage of 
non-Black Sea power naval forces to size and cruising 
time. The last time the Turkish Straits became an international 
issue was in the middle of the 1940's, when the Soviet 
Union tried unsuccessfully during the Yalta and Potsdam 
Conferences to obtain support of the Western allies for 
control over the Straits, and/or to obtain rights for a 
naval base in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union tried 
to apply direct pressure against Turkey in 1946, which met 
United States opposition and contributed to Turkey's 

entering NATO. In May 1953 the Soviet Government formally 

9 

withdrew the demand. 

At the beginning of the 20th century growing Russian 
influence in the Far East (Manchuria and Korea) and her 



9 

Ibid. , pp . 45-56 



17 



possession of Port Arthur (since 1S98) worsened Russo- 
Japanese relations. When war broke out with the Japanese 
attack of Port Arthur (February 1904) , Russia had considerable 
overall numerical superiority in ships but qualitatively 
many of the Japanese ships were better. But the major 
factor was geography, for most of the Russian ships were 
in the Baltic, and the Black Sea Fleet was useless. 

In the strategic sense, the problem of war was 
centered in the control of the sea, and the Japanese Navy 
which was superior to the combined strengths of the Port 
Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons, exercised that control. 
In order to reverse it, the Russian government decided to 
send to Port Arthur the Second Pacific Squadron, which was 
formed in the Baltic. The squadron consisted of a mixture 
of new as well as old ships and it had to make an 
unprecedented 18,000-mile cruise. There were no bases on 
the way, and replenishments, repairs, and combat training 
presented the squadron with enormous difficulties. The 
Second Pacific Squadron left Libau in October 1904 and 
reached Madagascar, in December where it spent almost 
three months waiting for the formation of the Third 
Pacific Squadron, which was being organized in the Baltic 
from old, slow and mainly obsolete ships. The Third Pacific 



18 



Squadron left Libau in February 1905 and in May joined 
the Second Pacific Squadron at Cam Rahn Bay (French 
Indochina) . With the fall of Port Arthur, Commander of 
Joint Squadron Admiral Rozhestvenski decided to break 
through to Vladivostok. In the middle of May the joint 
squadron reached Korean Straits, where it was ciet by the 
Japanese Fleet. In the Battle of Tsushima (14-15 May 1905) 
the Russian Squadron was destroyed. Of the 37 Russian ships 
only one cruiser and two destroyers reached Vladivostok. 
Five ships escaped and were interned in foreign ports, 
and five other ships carrying the wounded Rozhestvenski 
and the Commander of the Third Squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, 
were captured by Japanese. The defeat was disastorous 
and among other things demonstrated Russia's backwardness 
and unpreparedness for the war, the lack of talented 
leadership at the top, mistakes of the command, the low 
level of readiness, and the poor tactical training of the 
Russian Navy. In spite of numerous examples of valor on 
the part of the Russian crews, the extensive use of mine 
warfare, attempts to employ submarines, and delayed and 
adventuristic decision to reinforce the Pacific naval 
forces with the Baltic squadron, the main objective to gain 
command of the sea was not achieved, and the war was lost 



19 



10 
by Russia. 

The war clearly demonstrated the importance of the 
navy. If Russia would control the sea or at least have ' 
superior naval forces, Japanese would have little chance 
for success in Manchuria. The defeat was particularly 
bitter to the Russian navy for it was the first large 
scale battle it lost in its 200-year history. 

While at the turn of the century the Russian Navy 
ranked third after Great Britain and France, the war 
reduced Russia to the sixth place as a naval power. The 
defeat did not discourage the Russians, for soon a new 
program of navy modernization and build-up was launched. 
The semi-official naval officers "League for Fleet 
Renovation" demanded the construction of the most powerful 
ships. The naval build-up among leading maritime nations 
of the time clearly demonstrated the increased role of sea power, 
and hence, helped to -ally various elements of Russian society 
favoring shipbuilding porgrams in spite of strong opposition 
in the newly created Duma. 

In 1906 the naval general staff was organized and 
in addition to other functions charged with developing the 



10 

History of Naval Art , pp. 92-93. 

I 

i 

I " 20 



shipbuilding program for fleet restoration. The staff 
worked out four variants of the program of which the last 
was approved and accepted in 1908 as a minor program. In 
1910 a new major shipbuilding program was worked out under 
which instead of the 1,125 million rubles required for the 
program, only 787 million v/ere allocated. The. government 
appropriation for shipbuilding and reconstruction of 
shipbuilding yards grew steadily, however, prior to 
World War I; in 1908 it was 36 million rubles, in 1908, 
35 million rubles, in 1910, 50 million rubles, and in 1912", 
114 million rubles. But those amounts v/ere too late 
and too little, and, when war started, the Russian navy 
had a preponderance of old ships, repeating to a large 
degree the sad experience of the war in 1904-1905, and not 
a single ship visualized by the large shipbuilding program 

A 12 

was ready. 

In 1910 the naval general staff made an attempt to 
introduce a Navy Bill visualizing the construction of a 
very powerful navy. Accordingly, in the Baltic Sea alone, 



"^Shipbuilding No. 7, 1966, pp. 71-72. 

12 

"Floty v pervoy mirovoy Voyne" , ("Navies in the 

First World War"), v. I - Actions of the Russian Navy, 
Military Publishing House, Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 
Moscow, 1964. 



21 



24 battle ships, 12 battle cruisers, 24 light cruisers, 
103 destroyers, and 36 submarines were visualized , by the 
end of the 1920 's. The execution of such a program would 
require tremendous appropriations which Russia could not 

afford and, instead, the socalled major shipbuilding 

13 

program of 1911-1915 was approved. • 

The backwardness of her industry forced Russia 
to place many orders for ships, and particularly ship 
machinery, in foreign countries, including Germany. In 
1909 began the build-up of a modern Russian navy; four 
dreadnought type battleships were laid down in Petersburg 

for the Baltic and two years later, three more battleships 

14 
for the Black Sea were laid down in the Nikolaev shipyards. 

The increased role of torpedo armament was reflected 

in the construction of the Novik-class destroyer, the best 

15 
ship of its type in its time. The first detachment of 



TO 

M. A. Petrov, "Podgotovka Rossi i k pervoy mirovoy 
voyne ha more " (Preparation of Russia for First V/orld War 
at Sea) Voenizdat, 1926, pp. 98-100, 133-148. 

l4 Sudostreniye No. 10, 1971, pp. 60-62. 

■*•* In 1911 Novik had most powerful torpedo armament 
(15 tubes) , and during a test in 1913 set a world speed 
record of 37.3 knots. The shin, modernized in 192S, served 
the Soviet Navy until 1941 when she took a torpedo intended 
for the cruiser Kirov and was blown up. . Military Historical 
Journal No. 12, 1970, pp. 109-110. 



22 



torpedo boats was formed in the Baltic and was composed of 
several Nixon patrol boats. The prototype was bought in the 

U. S. in 1906 and produced in one of the plants in southern 

. 16 
Russia. 

The Russian navy built the world's first minelayers and 

minesweepers (Zapal class) during 1910-1912, as was the world's 

first submarine minelayer, Krab. Under the major program of 

1912 four Ismail-class or Borodino-class battle cruisers, 

32,000-ton capital ships combining the speed of the cruiser and 

ft 

armament and protection of battleships, were laid down. This 
ambitious program had no paralled in any other navy. For 
example, it visualized the construction of most powerful 
battleships, "monsters, larger and more powerful than anything 



sought theretofore". 



„ 17 



'>-> 



The Baltic and Black Sea battleships were completed 



Sudostroeniye No. 4, 1967, pp. 75-76. 

17 

David Y/oodward, pp. 161-162, described the ships as 

follows: "They were to have an armament of twelve sixteen 

inch guns, equal in power to the armament of nine eighteeen 

inch guns, which was the main armament of the biggest and most 

powerful battleships ever built, the Japanese giants Yamato 

and Musashi which, were laid down twenty years after the 

Russian ships were designed." 



■.* 



23 



during the war, but the majority of the planned ships were 
either never completed or even started. The prolonged 
construction of ships was explained by a shortage of material, 
a weak industrial base and great dependence upon foreign 
deliveries some of which were obviously stopped as soon as 

hostilities commenced and some purposely delayed prior to the 

18 
war. 

The Russian Navy started experiments with what might 
be termed- shipboard aviation at the turn of the century. 
Experiments with ballons were followed by man-carrying kite 
systems, one of which was installed in a torpedo gunboat in the 
Baltic in 1903. A number of seaplane models were designed by 
D. P. Grigorovich, and the M-5 model was built in considerable 
quantity. A design of aircraft carrying ship was proposed 
in 1909 and 1913, both with catapults and speeds up to 30 knots. 

The lack of shipbuilding capacities and delays in 
construction of warships of other types precluded the Tsarist 
Navy's utilization of such concepts. The ships assigned to carry 
Planes were in the majority obsolete and ill-fitted for the job 
" a blunder typical of the Tsarist Navy of the period, in which 

18 
two li ,f hlS WaS thG ° ase With machi °ery for a battle cruiser, 
Sm>ri~in~?r iSerS ' a f' V° Str ° yerS Winery ordered in Germany. 
Belli t* S Y ' a soraeivhat Similar picture, though on a smaller 
-cau., was repeated at the beginning oi World War II. 



24 



technical genius was often thwarted by criminally incompetent 

19 

administration" . 

i 
l 

Nonetheless, just prior to World War I, the Russian Navy 

had aviation schools on the Baltic and on the Black Sea. .^~ 

Naval aviation was widely used during the war, particularly in 
20 

the Black Sea. When World War I started, the Russian Navy 

consisted of nine battleships (pre-dreadnought type) , 14 " 
cruisers, 62 destroyers, and 15 submarines. In addition there 
were under construction 7 battleships (dreadnought type) , 4 
battle cruisers, 6 cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 18 submarines. 21 

Theoretically facing a vastly superior German Navy in the 
Baltic, the Russian fleet received the defensive task of 
holding the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and assuring 
the defense of the Petrograd from the sea hy fighting a 
mine-artillery position prepared in advance in the narrowest 
part of the Gulf. m reality, however, the German navy was tied 

19it 

Early Russian Shipboard Aviation", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, April 1971, pp. 55-61. Institute 

20 
nnm . J? 1917 > the Russian seaplane carrier force was 

numerically the second largest in the world. U.S. Naval 
inst itute Proceedings . April 1971, p . 63 . ~ ~~ 

21 

History of Naval Art , p. 104. 



25 



up by a vastly superior British navy and could spare little 
to fight Russian navy in the Baltic. The main task on the 
Black Sea was said to maintain control of the sea. There was 
not a more detailed plan for the war. But in the Black Sea; 

the Russian navy was a superior force and was more active 

22 

during the war. 

During the course of war, mine warfare was extensively 
used in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the North Sea. Mines 
used by the Russian Navy were quite advanced and effective 
for the time. In addition to employment of mines in the central 
mine-artillery position in the Gulf of Finland, they were used 
in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, in the blockade of the 
Bosphorus in the Black Sea and for the protection of sea 
communications in the north, resulting in a number of losses 
to the German Navy, including the damaging of the Goeben and 
the Breslau. 

The Russian Black Sea Fleet was also active against 
lines of communication, particularly against the Zonguldak 
coal traffic. Both the Black Sea and the Baltic fleets were 
also active in supporting the army's maritime flanks. Starting 
in 1015, the Germans became more active against shipping in the 



99 

Ibid. , p. 106 



2G 



north, and the Northern Flotilla was organized to protect it 
in July 1916. Ship traffic in the north was quite extensive; 
in two years, 1915-1917, 1,800 ships delivered 5 ,475,000 ' tons 
of various cargo and 1,780 ships departed Arkhangelsk and ■ 
Murmansk carrying 4,463,000 tons. In addition, 36,000 Russian 

expeditionary corps troops -were delivered from 'Arkhangelsk to 

23 

France. 

The combat activity of the Russian Navy continued even - 
after the first revolution, in February 1917, in spite of the 
fact that the command of the navy was gradually disintegrating 
and was being replaced by committees consisting of elected 
commissars. The 1917 October Revolution put an end to the 
Russian participation in the World War I. 

By way of summary it can be stated that at the time of 
the 1917 October Revolution, Russia had a well established 
naval tradition and a sizeable navy, which although not 
distinguishing itself' in a major sea battle, managed nonetheless 
to fulfill the basic tasks assigned to it. The first world war 
interrupted the planned development of the Russian navy. More 
than 200 years of Russian naval history up to the time of the 
Revolution had to its credit a number of considerable 



23 

History of Naval Art, p. 128. 



27 



achievements as well as disappointing failures, of which 
Tsushima was the major one. The pre-Revolutionary Russian 

t 

Navy had traditionally combined the innovativeness and ingenuity 
of seme of its officers with the backwardness of the economy 
supporting it and the incompetence and corruption of the 
administration. The established naval tradition served the 
future Soviet navy well, and represented a powerful base upon 
which the navy was restored, rebuilt, and developed. 

From the Revolution to World Wa r II ' ^ 

During 1905-1906, mutiny and revolutionary movement , 
infected the Russian Navy, m addition to well known mutiny on the 
battleship Potemkin, there were mutinies on other ships of 
the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. The revolutionary movement 
intensified again in 1911 and 1912, when attempts to organize 
sailors rebellions were uncovered in the Baltic and Black Sea 
Fleets. 24 

At the time of the February 1917 Revolution, the influence 
of various leftist parties in the Russian Navy was quite strong. 
The period between February and October 1917 witnessed the 
gradual disintegration of organized command in the navy and the 

24„ _ .. 

Academ* *i I' - Nayda « Revolutiona ry Movement in Tsarist Navy 
academy of Science of USSR, 194S, o. &^~ > ' ■' 



I 28 

/ 



further growth of leftist influence. The Communists skillfully 
used the confusion created by the February Revolution and 
indecisiveness of other parties and considerably increased their 
influence and the number of party organizations under their""" 

control in the Navv At th^ +-;™~ ^ u., 

*<*.vy. az tne time of the October 1917 

Revolution, a great number of sailors sided with the Communists. 
.Many naval units, particularly from the Baltic Fleet, actively 
participated in the revolution on the side of Communists. 
During the civil war which broke out soon after the October 
1917 Revolution, the Navy was active again. Although some- 
combat actions took place at sea in the Baltic, the Black Sea, 
and the North Sea, which have been treated by Soviet historians 
as important military contributions of the Navy, helped to 
resist intervention and thus to protect the Young Soviet 
Republic, the sailors ashore acting as commissars, commanders, 
members of the newly organized secret Police, and agitators 
Played a much more important role. But the Red forces did 
*>t enjoy a monopoly of the sailors' affection, for some 
supported social revolutionaries and some joined the anarchists, 
m general, Communist influence was considerably stronger in ■ 
the Baltic Fleet then in the Black Sea Fleet. 25 



23 



The Council of People's Commissars decree 29 January 
1913 signed by Lenin announced the disbanding of the Tsarist 
Navy and the creation of new, workers-peasant Red Navy, based 
on volunteer service and elected commanders. In addition to 
the position of People's Commissar for Naval Affairs, occupied 
by sailor-Bolskevik P. E. Dybenko, the position, of Commander 
of Naval Forces of the Republic was established in September 
1918. Rear Admiral of the Tsarist Navy V. M. Al'fater, was 
appointed to be the first commander of the Soviet Navy. In 
December 1918, the Naval General Staff was organized. 

During the winter of 1917-1918 the majority of the v 
Baltic Fleet ships were at Revel (Tallin) and Helsinki. In 
February 1918, the Soviet government ordered all ships of 
the Baltic Fleet to be transferred to Kronstadt in order to 
prevent their capture by the advancing Germans. Initially, 
all ships were concentrated in Helsinki, and from there they 
were moved in three detachments to Kronstadt during March-April 
1918. The event known as "the ice cruise" undertaken under 
severe winter conditions with the Gulf of Finland covered 

by thick ice, resulted in the arrival at Kronstadt of 236 

27 

combatant and auxiliary ships of the Baltic Fleet. 



26 I-Iistory of Naval Art , p. 142. 

27 

History of Naval Art, pp. 144-146. 



30 



During the summer of imo 

of 1918 somewhat similar situation in 

the Black Sea had a different outcome Th. 

outcome. The spring 1918 advance 

of the Germans threatened to occupy Sevastopol', .here ' 
practically the whole Black Sea Fleet was stationed. The 

Soviet government decided to transfer ^ *i 

XraQSfer the fl ^et to Novorossiysk. 

Because the Bolsheviks ' ^-pt,, 

V1 " S influence in the Black Sea Fleet 

.as considerably weaker than the Baltic Fleet, the execution of 

the order was delayed until April 30, 1918, when finally 

.est of the ships, including two new battleships, sailed for ' 

Novorossiysk. The Go-mon tr-,-~u r> 

Geiman High Command, however, demanded Ihe 

return of fleet to Sevastopol'. The Soviet ^^ ^^ 
agreed to satisfy the demand hut secretly ordered the scuttling 
of the fleet. The order again was not executed immediately, and 
the fate of each ship was decided hy a hailot of all the memhers 
o* the crews. As a result, one battleship, one cruiser, and 6 
destroyers returned to Sevastopol- and the rest of the ships 
were sunk by their crews. 28 

The civil war was fought on land, and naval forces under 
the command of the Soviet Government were employed exclusively 
to assist the ned Army maritime flank and also, as was the case 
^the^ster^part of the Gulf of .inland, to protect the 

28 

Sudostrenive No p. tq^o ^^ 

gavalj £ t ? p. 1477 ~ °' 19 ° 8 ' pp ' 62 - QQ '> ^£jiistorv__of 



3± 



maritime approaches to the main centers. Many specialists 

of the former Tsarist Navy were employed, and during 1918-1920 

29 

7,605 mines were sown in extensive mine warfai*c. * 

A number of river flotillas formed and manned by sailors 
of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets took an active part in the 
combat. At the beginning of 1921, when the civil war was 
practically over, the Soviet Navy presented a sorry spectacle. 
In the Black and the North retreating White Guards and 
intervening foreign powers took away three battleships, 10 ' 
cruisers, 64 destroyers, 30 submarines, and many auxiliary" ships 

and transports. Actually, the fleets in the Black Sea, the, 

30 
Pacific, and the North ceased to exist. The Baltic Fleet 

represented a "gathering of lifeless ships" moored to the docks 

31 

and manned at only 20-40 % of strength. 

Most of the ships were badly in need of repair, but the 
Navy's supply of spare parts was exhausted. There was no fuel 

and the greater portion of ship repair facilities were damaged, 

I 
destroyed, or deteriorated. Added to the Navy's desperate. 



29 History of Naval Art , pp. 166-167. 

30 

Boyevoy put' Sovet skogo voyenno-inorskogo flota (Combat 

Path of the Soviet Navy, hereafter referred to as Combat Path) , 

Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p. 590. 

Ibid., p. 147 



/ 



32 



material condition was the problem of ideological reliability 
and the regime's trust in the Navy. 

The sailors, particularly from the Baltic Fleet, became 
"the glory and the pride of the Revolution". Accustomed to 
having their own organizations such as Baltic-Revvoensovet 
(Revolutionary Military Council) and Tsentrobalt, the sailors, 
particularly those in Kronstadt not only continued to enjoy - 
a degree of revolutionary independence but represented a force 
to be reckoned with. The number of Bolsheviks among the ■ 
sailors during the civil war was considerably reduced, for many 
of them left the ships to fight ashore, later to be appointed 
to party and government positions throughout the country. 
Measures initiated in 1920 by the Party to tighten political 
control in the Baltic Fleet (which for all practical purposes 
meant Kronstadt) was met with great criticism by the sailors. 
This coincided with the profound disappointment of the 
Petrograd workers, leading to large-scale disturbances which 

were ruthlessly suppressed by the regime. 32 

i 
The sailors in Kronstadt proclaimed their support of 'the 

i 

Petrograd workers, and in early March 1921 the Kronstadt 

mutiny began. It lasted 18 days and was crushed by a direct 



32 

Sounders , pp. 89-91. 



. • ; / 

33 



attack over the ice by Red Army units, with the participation 
of a few hundred delegates to the Tenth Party Congress which 
started its work in March 8th in Moscow. Thus, the revolutionary 
activity in the Navy was ended and the "wings" of the "eagles 
of the revolution" clipped. 

Suppression of Kronstadt mutiny was follqwed by the 
purge and the "filtering" of all Navy personnel. These measures, 
coupled with the discharge of personnel in the course of 

demobilization, reduced the Navy's manpower from 180,000 to ■ 

33 

39,859 men by the end of 1921. 

The Tenth Party Congress resolved "to undertake measures 
for the restoration and strengthing of Red Navy" subject to 
the "general conditions and material resources of the country". 
The Congress also decided "to strengthen the Navy with 
political workers, and to return to the Navy all Communist 
seamen working in other fields." The decree signed by Lenin 
ordered the salvage of repairable ships sunk during the civil 

war and the repair of available ships. 34 The intensity of 

/ 

, i 

the 1922 ship repair program, according to Lenin, had to be 

i 

defined by "the size of the Navy which was necessary to keep 



33 Combat P ath of the Soviet Navy , pp. 148-149. 

34 

History of Naval Art, pp. 168-169. 



/ 



3't 



35 

for political and economic reasons". During the 1921-1924 

period, two battleships, two cruisers, and a number of destroyers 

36 

and submarines underwent major repair and entered the service. 

The first All-Union meeting of Communist seamen to 
discuss the problem of restoring the Navy was called in 
Moscow in April 1922. While they discussed the nature of the 
future navy, participants rejected proposals of two opposing 
groups: one headed by a former Tsarist navy specialist demand- 
ing construction of "an open sea fleet", e.g. in general a 
balanced navy built around super dreadnoughts, for "lack of 
money, production capacity, and human resources", and the 
socalled "young school", demanding const rua-ti on ox a light 
navy, a "mosquito fleet", submarines, and aviation for its 
one-sided emphasis. It was stressed that a navy incorporating 
all classes of surface ships, submarines, and aviation and 
"acting aggressively in cooperation with the Red Army" was 
needed for the country's defense. A resolution also 

recommended the sale of old ships and the use of the money thus 

37 
obtained for the speedy restoration of usable ships. 



°° The Combat Path , p. 148. 

History of Xaval Art , p. 169. 
37 The Combat Path, pp. 149-150. 



35 



During 1921-1922 all shore fortifications were taken away 
from the navy and subordinated to the army. 

The Fifth Congress of Komsomol (Young Communist League) 

q o 

in 1922, acting on Party orders assumed the role of Navy patron. 
In addition to sending thousands of its politically reliable 
and hard working activists for Navy service, the Komsomol 
conducted an effective pro-navy propaganda campaign and organized 
socalled "The Navy Week". As a result in 1922-1924 over 
10,000 young Communists joined the Navy and more than a 
thousand of them entered the Navy's educational institutions. 
A considerable amount of money and goods, including clothes,- 
were collected and sent to Navy units and many enterprises, 
districts, and cities, became patrons of individual navy units. 

Certain measures to train future command personnel, as 
officers were called at that time, were undertaken as early as 
October 1918, when an eight-month officer training course was 
organized. In 1922 a number of preparatory schools (some with 
three-year programs) were opened to train future cadets of the 
naval school, which at the same year switched over to a four-year 
program. In February 1922 the naval academy for the advanced 



38 

The Komsomol has continued this role of patron of the 

Navy from 1922 up to the Present. It sends its "best 

representatives" for service in the Navy. 



3 r - 



o 



training of senior naval officers resumed operation. In 

addition, a special school to train political officers for the 

, 39 , 

Navy was also organized. 

In 1922 ship exercises were resumed in the Gulf of 

Finland and in October 1923 Baltic and Black Sea naval units 

held maneuvers with the participation of Red Army units. In 

1924 the number of ships in commission increased considerably, 

and in addition to regular exercises the training detachment 

of the Baltic Fleet (cruiser Aurora and training ship 

Komsomolets) performed a 47-day cruise from Kronstadt to 

Arkhangelsk and back with calls at Bergen and Trondheim 

(Norway) . In the same year the Soviet ship Vorovskiy was 

transferred to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope. The 

ship stopped in Canton where it was visited by Sun Yat-sen. 

The appearance of a Soviet ship in China resulted in considerable 

40 

pro-Soviet propaganda. 

In 1925 Soviet 'ships visited Norway, Sweden, Italy, and 
Turkey, those visits helping the Soviet government to strengthen 
its position in foreign relations. During the same years 
extensive minesweeping was conducted, and in 1925 the approaches 



o9 .Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1971, pp. 16-19; Combat Path 
of the Soviet Navy , pp. 153-154. 

40 

Combat Path, pp. 155-157 



37 



to the Soviet ports were declared to be clear from nines in 

41 
the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. 

In 1924 the first stage of the Red Navy restoration was 
completed. In addition to the Baltic and Black Sea, modest 
naval resources, primarily patrol ships, appeared in the 
Caspian Sea, the Far East, the Amur River, and the North. 

The second stage of the Red Navy development and the final 
stage of its restoration started in 1324. The years 1924 and 
1925 are known as a period of "military reform" worked out by 
Frunze, who replaced Trotsky as chairman of Revvoensovet and 
the People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. Approved 
by the April 1924 Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the 

military reform influenced the organization, personnel policy, 

4: 
training and hardware development of the Red Navy and Red Army. 

Fleets, shore defense systems and naval aviation were 

united into the Naval Forces under a single chief. The 

military lav/ approved 18 September 1925 established compulsory 

military service, and the duration of conscript service in the 

Navy was set at four years. Starting in 1925 the gradual 

transformation to the one-man command system to replace the 



41 Ibid . , p. 158. 

42 

Sudostroycniye No. 2, 1970, pp. 52-55. 



38 



dual commander-commissar system was initiated in the Soviet 

Armed Forces. In the Navy the process was particularly slow 

43 
and exercised with great care, continuing until 1933. 

The October 1924 decision of the Council of Labor and 

Defense approved a shipbuilding program, authorizing major 

repair of a battle ship, cruisers, and destroyers, as well as 

completion of construction of ships laid down prior to the 

Revolution and found suitable for completion. Thirty-five 

million rubles were appropriated for ship restoration in 1925, 

44 
and 64 million rubles, in 1926. The year 1925 was marked 

by more extensive combat training. For the first time, a 

squadron of ships headed by the battleship Marat with Frunze 

aboard entered the Baltic Sea and sailed to Kiel Bay where it 

anchored. During the year, Soviet Navy ships sailed a total 

of 260,000 miles, 159,000 in the Baltic Sea, 49,000 in the 

45 
Black Sea, and 24,000 in the Far East. 



43 

The number of socalled old specialists, former Tsarist 

naval officers, in the Navy was considerable and proportionally 

higher than in any other services. On the other hand, Party 

members represented only 27% of the naval officers. The special 

nature of the service was also taken into consideration. Combat 

Path of the Soviet Navy, p. 196. 



44 



45 



Shipbuilding No. 4, 1971, pp. 45-4S. 
Combat Path, p. 160. 







The first Soviet six-year (1926-1932) shipbuilding 
program authorizing the construction of 12 submarines, 18 
patrol ships, and 36 torpedo boats was approved and successfully 
fulfilled. 

When the second period of development ended in 1928, the 
Soviet Navy in general had recovered from the ordeal of the 
Revolution, the civil war, and the Kronstadt mutiny; there 
was an established system of organization and command; a 
number of documents defining principles of combat training 
and combat employment of the ships were produced; the majority 
of ships suitable for restoration were repaired and in 
commission; the gradual construction of new chips- had begun. 
The Soviet Navy had in commission three battleships, five 

cruisers, 24 destroyers, 18 submarines, and a considerable number 

46 
of smaller combatant and auxiliary ships. 

Rapid industralization of the nation, initiated in 1928 
with the launching of first Five Year Plan, was an important 
factor in future naval development. 

The construction of first Soviet naval units commenced 
In 1927, when the first D-class (Dekabrist) submarines were 
laid down in Leningrad. In the Black Sea, the first Soviet 



46 

History ox Naval Art, p. 169. 



no 



.pedo boat, Pervenets, was built in the same year, to be 
•allowed by the construction of the G-5 series of torpedo 
ts (Tupolev's design) and later the D-3 class. The 

struction of escort type ships of the Uragan class (also 

47 

nown as the "bad weather" class) was initiated in 1923. 

During the years of the second Five Year 'Plan, naval 
construction not only intensified quantatively but became 
:-.oi*e diversified and sophisticated qualitatively. While the 
construction of L and Shch classes of submarines initiated 
during first Five Year Plan continued, the Soviets started to 
build railroad transportable submarines of the M class. 
Construction of more sophisticated submarines of the P and 
S classes was also started. In 1936 the first X-class 
submarine, the largest and most powerful for that time, was 
laid down. The development of surface forces was accelerated 
concurrently. In 1932, the destroyer leader Leningrad was 
laid down, followed by Minsk (Baltic Fleet) , Moskva and 
Kharkov (Black Sea) , Baku and Tbilisi (Far East) . During 
the same period construction began of a large series of 
destroyers (Project - 7 ) Gnevnyy-class) and of the cruiser 



47 

*' Sudostroyenie No. 4, 1971, p. 47, Combat Path , p. 165, 
and History of Naval Art, p. 170. 



41 



virov. A considerable number of minesweepers, coastal patrol 

48 
boats, and torpedo boats were also built. 

I 

When the second Five Year Plan was completed, the * 
Soviet Navy had in commission more than 6 times as many 
submarines, twice as many destroyers, 6 times as many aircraft 

and 3.5 times as many torpedo boats as in the last year of 

49 
first Five Year Plan. 

The Soviet Pacific Fleet was organized in 1932 and the 

Northern Flotilla in 1933 (since 1937, the Northern Fleet) , ' 

ft 

thus establishing the Soviet naval forces in all four major 
theaters. 

The Spanish Civil War (1936-1937) clearly demonstrated 
to the Soviets the need for stronger naval power. They did 
their best to provide assistance to the republican government, 
but could not convoy their merchant ships delivering the war 
material. They also could not produce any convincing show of 

naval strength which would restrain the activity of the 

i 

i 

Franco Navy, patently supported by German and Italian forces; 

i 
/ I 

a few Soviet "merchant ships were sunk or captured. As Admiral 



Ibid . , A short review ox the development of individual 
types of ships by the Soviet Union will be presented later. 

49 

S. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1963, pp. 9-18. 



"T 



42 



,. G. Kuznetsov noted, "At that time it became particularly 

apparent how important the sea is for us and how we need 

50 
a strong navy." i 

A separate Commissariat of shipbuilding was organized 
and a new shipbuilding program worked out toward the end of 

1937 was approved in 193S - Whii^ +u 

aydB. ,ir hlle the program visualized the 

continued construction of submarines and destroyers, it placed 

heavy emphasis on building battle ships, heavy and light 

cruisers, and minesweepers. 51 

V/hile the events in Spain had definitely contributed to 

the size of the approved program and speed with which the * 
Soviets began to execute it, the Soviet awareness that a larger, 
.ore balanced and modern navy was needed had existed before. 
But the extremely l imit ed resources and industrial capacity 
had excluded the initiation of any sizable shipbuilding 
Program. ln 1935 , then Soviet industrial ^ 

on a visit to the Black Sea Fleet, predicted the construction 
Of larger ships of "any type" in the not so remote future, but 
■Kphasized "the difficulties with ^ ^ ^ ^^^ 

°* large turbines". 52 i n Januarv 7Q o r c . „ 

in January 19o6 Soviet President M. I. 

50 v 
n ' G * Kuz hetsov, Nakcnrno fn^ + --.^ r? \ 
Voenizdat, 1936, p. 257. ^^^^-A^il^^^^ve^ , Moscow, 



^£*±™yevSyc No. 4, 1971, p. 47. 

5? 

^akanuno . p. 94 

/ • 

U 



linin, when presenting medals to a group of naval officers, 

stated that the "time had come for the Navy to take a greater 

53 i 

part in the country's defense". Ordzhonikidze also stressed , 

the necessity to count on Soviet production capacity alone; ■ 

a statement which requires some qualification. The Soviet 

Union had tried hard for years, and not without some success, 

to receive foreign assistance to its naval construction. In 

1026 there were official contacts between representatives of 

54 
German and Soviet navies to that end. The Soviets desired 

German cooperation in the reconstruction of their navy, 

particularly in submarine construction. In spite of German 

reluctance, plans for a submarine were purchased. Consequently, 

the modified and improved version of the German B-3 submarine 

designated Type-S by the Soviets was built in a large series. 

Many Soviet ships of the pre-Y. r orld Y/ar II period showed many 

sisns of foreign design (particularly Italian and some French) . 

One destroyer leader,' Tashkent, was even built in Italy and 

blessed by a Catholic priest. Machinery for some propulsion 



53 

Ibid. , p. 103 



54 

D. Woodward, p. 202; The visit of a German naval mission 

to the Soviet Union led by Admiral Spindle r mentioned in the 

book was actually preceded by the March 1926 Berlin meeting 

between Germans and a group of high-ranking Soviet naval 

officers. 



illi 



installations, particularly for Pro.jcct-7 destroyers, was 

bought in England, but the American government rejected 

55 

requests for capital ship designs. ' 

After the 1939 German-Soviet Treaty was signed, the 
Germans were asked for blueprints of a battleship (Sharnhorst 
class) and an aircraft carrier (the Graf Zeppelin class) . 

The request was turned down, but a deal to buy the cruiser 

56 

Lutzow was concluded. The Soviet spy apparatus was also 

57 

involved in obtaining the blueprints of new foreign ships. 

The knowledge of foreign ship designs and construction 
methods had certainly helped the Soviet shipbuilding industry. 
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the foreign 
assistance and/or information was crucial, for the bulk of the 
weapon systems and main propulsion and auxiliary machinery had 
been Soviet designed and built. The decisive factor determining 
the Soviet shipbuilding output and the quality (or lack of it) 
of Soviet ships was the industrial capacity (volume output) and 



55 D. Woodward , p. 203. 

56 

D. Woodward , p. 207-211, and S. Breyer, " Guide to the 

Soviet Navy ", United States Naval Institute, 1970, pp. 21-37. 

57 

For example, the blueprints for a new Italian 

submarine were obtained by master spy Krivitsky. ' W ashington 

Post, February 13, 1966, "Who Killed Krivitsky?". 



45 



the precision in production of machinery and armament systems. 
Many quite advanced systems were designed which could not be 
produced for lack of the same production capacity, materials, 
and experience. In 1937 when two Five Year Plans of 
industrialization, with the great emphasis on heavy industry, 
were fulfilled, the Soviet Union managed, despite the great 
strain on its economy, to increase naval construction. The" 
decision to develop a "large sea and ocean navy" and to 
start the construction of ships of all types was made in 1937. 
The 1938 shipbuilding program was prepared in the typical" 
Stalinist style manner, i.e. in great secrecy, without 
consultation with the top naval leadership. Execution of the 
program started before it was formally approved by the 

CO 

government . 

Realization of new naval development program generated 

events Jf'thl KUZne f-° V ' Nakahune > PP- 221-226. Other important 
evenrs ol the period were: 

M* 1Q j 1} June 1933 " Naval development program for 
iyjJ-1938 approved. \ 

ars, nf Pi , ^tober 193S - After clashes with Japan in the 
aiea of Lake Khasan (August 1938) decision to accelerate the 
development of Pacific Fleet was made. ' 

Sea Fleet 3> ^ ^ ^ " DeciSion to strengthen the Black 

the ^ ( t\ 19 ° Ctober 1940 - A decision of CC of CPSQ and 
the Soviet Government to "accelerate construction of light 
naval forces". Combat Path , p. 582-583. 






46 



a shipbuilding boom. Throe new battleships of the Sovetskiy 
Soyuz-class, and a number of Chapaev-class cruisers were 
laid down. Construction of improved destroyers (Project-7U) 
and of submarines was accelerated. As a result, the total 

tonnage of the Soviet Navy surface fleet grew by 108,718 tons 

59 
and submarines by 50,385 tons from 1939 to June 1941. As 

early as 1939 the Soviet Union had more submarines than any 

other country in the world. In fact, the Soviet submarine 

60 

fleet was larger than those of Germany and Japanese combined. 

The task to build "the open sea and ocean navy worthy of Soviet 
Union as a great sea power" was proclaimed. Molotov's 
statement to the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR that the "mighty Soviet state should have an open sea 
and ocean navy corresponding to its interests and worthy of 
its great tasks" became a slogan. Minister of Shipbuilding 
Industry, I. Tevosyan, writing in Pravda 5 promised to move 
his industry from 6th place in the world in 1939 to first 
place in 1942-1943. 

The growing importance of the Soviet Navy was formally 



59 Combat Path , p. 166. 

60 

N. G. Kuznetsov, Pravda , 25 July 1939. 

61 

Prav da, 21 and 23 July 1939 



47 



recognized by the establishment of an independent People's 
Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR in December 1937 and by 

the organization of the Main Political Directorate of the 

62 

Navy and the Main Naval Military Council. One of the 

Stalin's top lieutenants, a member of the Politburo and 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, A. A. Zhdanov, 
who since the middle 1930 's had been responsible for naval 

development, was appointed as a member of the Main Naval 

, 63 
Military Council. 

In 1939 the naval of ficer's schools, which had grown in 

number, acquired the status of higher educational institutions 

and increased their enrollment. While the number of young 

officers graduating from naval school increased, the Stalin's 

purge of 1937-1938 considerably reduced the number of 

experienced senior officers, particularly flag officers. 

Former commanders-in-chief of the Soviet Navy Orlov, 

t 

Murlevich and Viktoro'v, fleet commanders Dushenov, Sivkov, 

'I 
Kozhanov, and Xireev, and many other senior flag officers were 

/ 

arrested and most of them shot. Only one, Pacific Fleet 

. 
Commander N. G. Xuznetsov, survived and was appointed as a 



62 

Combat Path , pp. 163-169. 

■ ----- - — — 

Nakanuae, pp. 221-222. 

■ 



i 



43 



People's Commissar of the Soviet Navy. Many young inexperienced 
officers were promoted to fill the positions of the liquidated 
commanders of fleets, flotillas and units. The widespread 

belief that nearly all of the former Tsarist naval officers 

6 4 

left the Navy and that the majority of them became victims of 

the purge is erroneous. Surprising as it may be, the percentage 
of former Tsarist officers who fell victim to the purge was" 
considerably smaller than that of the purely "Soviet bred" 
officers. Moreover, the most senior of them (Admiral G a ller 
and Fleet Admiral Isakov) were promoted and became Chief 
of Main Naval Staff and a Deputy People's Commissar of the ^ 
Navy respectively. In general, the wide use of the former 
Tsarist officers by the Soviet Navy continued up to the end 
of 1947, they were particularly numerous in the scientific, 
research, and educational establishments. 65 

The problems associated with the development of Soviet 
Naval theory, especially in connection. with the old specialists, 
the former Tsarist officers, should be briefly mentioned. The 

'See for example, R. W. Herrick, " Soviet Na val Strategy", 
United States Naval Institute, 1968, p. 45\ 

65 

In 1947, for example, majority of position of full 
professors and heads of the departments both in the Soviet 
naval Academy and Frunze Higher Naval School were occupied 
by former Tsarist officers. 



43 



decade of the 1920' s and first half of the 1930' s witnessed 
the theoretical struggle between the various points of view 
on construction and combat employment of naval forces in the 
Soviet Union. In general, the debates were mainly conducted 
in the Naval Academy and naval schools, although occasionally 

commanders of fleets and even the commander-in-chief 

66 

participated in them. Basically, the two opposing points 

of view were most loudly expressed. One, held mainly by the 
socalled old specialists (primarily, but not exclusively, former 
Tsarist officers) argued for the balanced navy, an open seas 
fleet composed, together with light surface forces and 
aviation, of capital ships as the backbone of the Navy. The 
proponents of the other view, the "young school", rejected 
any crucia.1 role for the capital ships and argued for a 
light-forces navy with preference given to submarines. "Down 
with the doctrine of the command of the seas" became the main 
slogan of the young school, expressed by its loudest proponent, 
A. B. Alexandrov. The debates have received comprehensive 
analysis in Western as well as Soviet literature. 



66 

Nakanune , pp. 49-51. 

Sec for example, D. Y/oodward, pp. 205-203, and 
particularly, Fedotov-Y.'hite in Journal of "che Royal United 
Sor v i c g s In s t i t u t i o n , August 1935; R. W. Ilerrick, Soviet Naval 
Strategy ; N. G. Kuznetsov, Nakanune , rjg, 49-55; and S. Gorshkov 
in ilo rskoy Sbornik , No . 2, 1967, pp. 9-12. 



50 



The debates definitely contributed to the development 
of Soviet naval theory, helped Soviet naval officers to learn 
more about Western naval theories, and in general reflected ._ 
the concern of naval circles regarding the condition of Soviet 
Navy and the need for its improvement. However, the debates 
neither resulted in an officially approved theory nor influenced 
any shipbuilding program. The theory of "small war" which was 
most widespread and recognized since the mid 1920* s up to beginning 
of the 1930's reflected the pragmatic recognition of the -" 
weakness of the Soviet Navy at that time. The Soviet ship- 
building of p re-World War II period reflected, at most, the 
occasional excessive utilization of available industrial 
capacities assigned to naval construction by arbitrary decision 
of Stalin and his immediate circle. Thus, newly appointed 
Commissar of the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov, learned about the 
details of 1937-1938 shipbuilding program from the head of the 
shipbuilding industry. His previous knowledge of the program 
was limited to "rumors" and "some small details" overheard 

f? Q 

during the sessions of Main Naval Council. Of course, the 
future program was discussed and debated among top leaders of 
the Navy, but the opinions expressed were so much at variance 



68 , 

Nakanune, p. 221. 



51 



with one another that, when top naval commanders were invited 
to the conference with Stalin in late 1936 or early 1937 and 
were asked what kind of navy was needed and what types of ships 
should be built, they could not give uniform answers. Reportedly, 

Stalin concluded the meeting with this remark that they themselves 

69 

did not know what they needed. 

The war with Finland (November 1939-March 1940) produced 
important consequences for the pre-World War II development 
of the Soviet Navy. The role of the Baltic Fleet in the Y/ar 
was limited to the support of the Red Army and marginal 
submarine activity. The war revealed the extremely poor 
preparedness of the Red Army and the absolescense of its 

armament. The March 1940 Plenum of the Party Central Committee 

70 

"analyzed the results and lessons" of war with Finland and 

decided to speed up the rearmament of the Red Army, particularly 
its armored and air branches. Implementation required 
industrial capacity and steel, both of which were in short 

supply. As a result, the construction of large ships, battle- 

/ 
ships, and cruisers was slowed down in the spring of 1940 and, 



69 

Ibid . , p. 257. 

70 

" Snravo chnik of itsera " (Officers' Reference Book), 

Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971, p. 157 



/ 



52 



after drastic revision of the shipbuilding program in October 

of 1940, was stopped completely. Only the construction of 

71 

submarines, destroyers, and smaller surface ships continued. 

Simultaneously, the accelerated development of naval bases 
and shore defense installations was undertaken. 

During the 14 years of pre-World War II shipbuilding 
(1927 to June 1941) 433 ships (excluding torpedo and 
patrol boats and auxiliaries) were laid down. Of that number, 
312 including 206 submarines and 106 surface ships (4 cruisers, 
7 destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, 18 escorts, 38 minesweepers, 
1 minelayer, and 8 gun boats) were completed before the wars 
started and commissioned. At the beginning: ox the v/ar, 219 
ships, including 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 cruisers, 
45 destroyers, and 91 submarines were on the building ways. 

Twenty-three submarines were completed during the second half 

72 

of 1941. 

The Soviet pre-World War II naval development has been 
differently assessed at home and abroad. The main controversy 
have been centered around the role of the submarines in over-all 
naval construction and the theory of their combat employment. 



71 

Nakanune , p. 261. 

7? 
• "Voenno-Isto richc skiy zh urnal - VIZ (Military Historical 

Journal) No. 6, 1971, pp. 36-37. 



r 



3 



For example, some claim that the submarines were under evaluated 

73 
in theory and practice. While others came to the opposite 

conclusion, claiming that submarines were the main striking 

74 ~~^~ 

force of the Soviet Navy. 

It is hard to agree with either conclusion. The May 
1928 decision of the Revvoensovet of the USSR, .which discussed 
the role of Navy in the military forces of the country, stated 
"while developing the Navy it is necessary to combine surface 
and submarine fleets, shore and mine position defense, as well 

as naval aviation in proportion corresponding to the character 

75 

of combat operations". The naval development program 

incorporated into the second Five Year Plan again emphasized 
close cooperation between fleet aviation and shore defense but 
some preference was shown to the development of submarines and 
"heavy aviation". 

In the late 1930 's preference was given to surface 
ships, which were viewed as the nucleus of the navy. The 
submarines were supposed to act against enemy communications, 
and when this task was the main one, the submarines were viewed 



73 

V oennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), Third Edition, 

1963, p. 168. 

74 

Combat Path , pp. 216 and 363. 

75 

VIZ No. 6, 1971, p. 34. 



5U 



as the main forces. The 1937-1933 program was visualized 
as a program for the development of a balanced navy. Not a 
single Soviet pre-World War II program neglected submarine 
construction, and each one planned and actually built more 
submarines than the previous one. Accelerated construction of 
surface ships became possible because of new shipbuilding 
capacities introduced in the mid and late 1930s, but by no 
means did it affect the construction of submarines. The 
fluctuation in the number of submarines built (6 during the 
first Five Year Plan, 137 during the second Five Year Plan, 
and 86 during uncompleted third Five Year Plan) is explained 
by the construction in the third period of a larger number 
of more sophisticated classes (S, L, M, and K) submarines, which 
obviously lengthened the average time for construction of one 
unit. 

To summarize the pre-World War II development of Soviet 

Navy it should be stated that with the exception of a short 

i 

period of disgrace following the Kronstadt mutiny, considerable 

/ 
attention was devoted and effort spent to restore the available 

naval units, to organize naval forces, and to incorporate them 

into combined all-arms forces. Considering the exceptionally 



1 ' C\ 

Ibid. , pp. 36-37. 



/ 
/ 






weak Soviet economy, the shortage of industrial capacities, 
which were overtaxed, the number of ships built and the even 
larger number laid down in the pre-war period is remarkably 
high. The initiation of the 1937-1938 shipbuilding program 
borders on adventurism, for, apart from the demands of the 
civilian sector, which had been traditionally neglected, the 
program was carried out to the detriment of the other services, 
including the army. The minor war with Finland clearly 
revealed this weakness, forcing redistribution of industrial 
capacities and, hence for all practical purposes termination 
of the program as far as capital ships were concerned. 
Tremendous expenditures of money, production capacities, and 
steel for the program brought little benefit to the Soviet 
naval forces. 

To a certain degree, the situation in 1941 was the same 
as the one in 1914. Moreover, in an operational sense, the 
planned naval employment, particularly of the Baltic Fleet and 

the Black Sea Fleet, was not much different from that of the 

/ . ; 

pre-Revolutionary period. The decisive battle on the mine-t 

artillery position held sway in the theory of naval employment. 

Moreover, while the Tsarist Navy v/as well prepared for mine 

warfare, the Soviet Navy had fallen behind in mine development 



5G 



and had neither magnetic mines nor the means to sweep them. 
The number of minesweepers and anti-submarine ships was 
inadequate, and there were no amphibious ships. Neither ships 
nor aircraft were equipped with radar, and sonar was in the 
embryonic stage of development. Soviet naval gunnery was good, 
as was torpedo armament, but the anti-aircraft 'artillery of 

ships was weak. Naval aviation had about 2,000 aircraft, but 

77 
many of them were old. The geography of the Soviet Union has 

> 

forced it to keep naval forces in four major theaters, with 
primary attention as far as strength is concerned given to 
the Baltic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, a logical step, for 
the major threat was anticipated from Germany and Japan. 
However, what is logical does not always turn out to be 
practical, as the war confirmed for the Northern Fleet, which 
was the most active, was at the same time the weakest of four 
major Soviet fleets, and had the least well developed base 
system. 

The importance of Northern Fleet apparently was well 
understood by the Soviet command and Stalin personally. 
N. G. Kuznctsov, pre-war and wartime chief of the Soviet 
Navy, in his memoirs described a conversation with Stalin 



77 History of Naval Art, pp. 171-174. 



■? 



57 



during which the latter emphasized the necessity to train the 

fleet under much harsher conditions in the North and the whole 

year round, and the necessity, with the aid of the largest 

Soviet shipbuilding yard, to create large naval forces in 

the naval theater which was ice free and had outlets to the 

oceans. The admiral concluded that "It is more difficult 

to train and educate skillful commanders and sailors than it is 

to build ships" is quite revealing and corresponds to the 

78 
conditions prevailing in the Soviet Navy in the pre-war period. 

In general, Stalin's role in the Soviet naval development was 

crucial. Admiral Kuznetsov stated, "The Navy was allowed under 

an unwritten rule to decide on any important matters only after 

consultation with him (i.e. Stalin), although Molotov and 

Zhdanov were sometimes authorized to prepare naval decisions 

before they were examined by Stalin". And further: "After 

my first few meetings with him in 1938, I became convinced that 

he had a clear idea Of the importance of the Soviet Navy, which 

by then had grown. The Soviet Union had come to occupy a 

fitting place in the world political arena. The events in Spain 

from 1S36 to 1939, and the need to back up our foreign policy 

with the strength of our navy well beyond the nearest seas like 



78 

The War Years, p. 164. 



58 



O 



the Baltic, which were restricted or almost closed, made us 
speed up the working out and implementation of a large-scale 
shipbuilding programme. In that period, Stalin took the most 
active part in creating a big navy. It was he, as I later 
discovered, who had taken the fundamental decision that we 
should have a big navy, and it was a correct one. The policy 
of building up the Soviet Union's defense might, which was 

pursued by the Party and the government, called for readiness 

79 

to fight not only on land, but also at sea". 

The Soviet naval command had been analyzing German 
submarine operations in the Atlantic and the Weserubung 
(the Weser Exercise, i.e., the capture '_>£" Norway and Denmark) 
and was convinced that "the importance of sea battles was not 
to be underestimated". Evaluating the Weserubung as "an 
adventuristic operation" the Soviets nonetheless that "nobody 
could say with conviction that their adventure was not to be re- 
peated when Germany attacked the Soviet Union" somewhere in 

80 
the Baltic or in the North. 

In spite of the Navy's subordinated role in the Soviet 



79 

^ The War Years, p. 163. 

80 Ibid. , p. 124. 



/ 

/ 

/ 53 



.1 



general staff strategic plans? 1 the existence of an independent 
People's Commissariat of the Navy permitted the naval staff to 
analyze the situation independently. Soviet naval intelligence 
detected the German preparation for the war and reported its 
findings, but as was the case with a number of other sources, 
the warning was apparently ignored by Stalin. 'Nonetheless, 
the Soviet Navy, by order of Admiral Xuznetsov, had been 
alerted to readiness state No. 2 since June 19, 1941, and 
at 2335 H on June 21st was placed in state of readiness No. 1 
(war). As a result, during the first day of war, June 22,~1941, 
and in spite of first German air strikes on Sevastopol and the 
Baltic Fleet naval bases, there were no losses of Soviet 
ships. As a matter of fact, Moscow learned first about the war 
from Sevastopol (the main base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet). 82 



N - G. Kuznetsov, Second Book of Reminisce 
War Years, Oktyabr', No. 12, 19681 

.. History o f Great Patriotic War, Vol. II p 
yoenizdat, Moscow, 1961; and D. Woodwlrd, p. 209. 



ence , the 
12; 



60 



The_Soviot Navy during World W 



ar II 



The element of surnHco ^^u- 

ox surprise achieved in the German attack 

on the Soviet union and the fast advance of Geraa n Ar my created 
conditions under which the traditional role of the Soviet 
Navy to support the Red Ar.y's marltime flanks gained ^ 
overling imp ortance. W hile C-ennan navai activity, centered 
mainly around the air and mi ne warfare action in the Baitic and 
nearly totally ahsent in the northern region and the BU<* Sea, 

inflicted considerable l c;c PQ rt „ +u 

losses on the retreating Soviet fleets 

it did not prevent them from fulfilling thp ,„ 

unng their assigned tasks 

completely, but did reduce their effectiveness. 



TJie_BajLtic Fleet 



The Baltic Fleet hart -,-« ~ 

6thad ln co ^ssion 2 old battleships, 

2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders iq a + 

y leadeis, 19 destroyers, 6 minelayers, 

7 escorts, 33 minesweepers, 48 PT boats a »H e« . 

> -i ooats, and 65 submarines. 

The fleet aviation had 656 aircraft i^i „• ' I a« 

o aiicrait, including 172 bombers. 83 

Between Jun e/ 23 and the end rt -p + i 

the end of the month, several minelaying 

operations were conducted and th* „ * -, ! 

' and the antral mine-artillery 

Position in the western part of the Gulf of Finl , 

_________ OI Finland as well 



83 

Combat Path T p. 288. 



61 



as a number of secondary minefields were established. The 
fleet bases of Libau, Riga, and Tallin were captured by the 
German Army. Considerable resistance was offered by joint 
efforts of the Baltic Fleet and Red Army units during the 
defense of Tallin and the Moonsund Islands. The Baltic Fleet 
bombers based on Sarema Island managed to bomb •Berlin, 
carrying out a total of 9 raids in August and the first four 
days of September. Although the material losses inflicted 
on Berlin were negligible, the raids had some psychological 
value, for it was the only time that Soviet aviation succeeded 
in bombing Berlin until 1945. 

Despite considerable losses inflicted by German mines 
and aviation, the evacuation of Tallin saved not only most of 
the ships, but most of the personnel as well. The defense 
of Hanko Naval Base in Finland lasted 165 days, until 
December 1941. The evacuation of the base ordered by Moscow 

was conducted under extremely unfavorable conditions and 

i 

resulted in considerable losses in people and in ships. 
Nonetheless, the Leningrad garrison was reinforced by 23,000 

men with combat experience and a large amount of badly needed 

85 

hardware and ammunition from Hanko. 



84 

Ibid. , p. 290. 

85 

.Morskoy Sbomik No. 12, 1971, p. 63 



62 



The loss of bases bottled up the Ealtic Fleet in the 
eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, mainly in Leningrad and 
Kronstadt. The naval guns even from damaged and partially 
sunken ships were effectively used in the defense of Leningrad, 
but massive German air raids (particularly in September 1941) 
inflicted additional losses on the ships. One »out of two old 
battleships lost half its guns, but its two remaining turrets 
continued to firer 

During the winter of 1941-1942 and the spring of 1942 
Germans improved the minefields in the western part of the 
Gulf of Finland, of which both shores were in German hands, * 
thus effectively blocking the surface forces of the Baltic Fleet 
in their remaining bases. The only forces of the fleet which 
could be used for a campaign at sea were submarines and naval 
aviation, and the latter was used mainly against land targets. 
This is how Admiral Kuznetsov describes the use of naval 
aviation during the f*irst year of war: "Torpedo-carrying , 

planes were, of course, the best means of striking at transports, 

/ ! 

and for years they had been preparing for just that/" But in 

■ 

J 

view of the emergency, the bulk of the fleet air arm had been 
sent against the enemy's tank columns moving towards Leningrad. 



°VIZ, No. 10, 1970, pp. 72-78. 






G3 



i 



In addition, it was providing cover for the Fighth Army 

fighting in Estonia, and bombing German units advancing on 

„87 * 

Tallin. Later, particularly after 1943, when the situation 

at the land front stabilized, fleet aviation was reinforced 

and it resumed its activities in the Baltic against German 

ships, particularly transports in the route alo'ng Swedish 

S3 

coasts. The light surface forces of the Baltic Fleet, especially 

PT boats, maintained combat activity through all over the war, 
in 1942-1943 in, the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and 
starting with the summer of 1944 in its western part as well 
as the Baltic Sea. 

The activity of the Baltic Fleet submarines was the most 
interesting. In spite of the most adverse conditions for 
transiting the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Fleet submarines, 
with marginal assistance from naval aviation and the minesweepers 
in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, managed to reach the 
open Baltic and inflicted losses on- German shipping in every 
year of the war. The number of submarines sorties into the 
open sea and their successes varied, the low point being in 
1943. But in spite of the considerable losses, the overall 



8' 7 The War Years , p. 118. 
Sp Gombat Path , p. 296. 



64 



combat effectiveness of Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines towards 
the end of the war increased steadily. While in 1941 only 
seven submarines scored successes, sinking fifteen ships' 
including one submarine; in 1942 14 submarines sank 37 ships; 
in 1943 only 2 submarines managed to sink 4 ships; in 1944 13 
submarines sank 37 ships, and in 1945, 12 submarines sank 35 
snips. One Soviet submarine, L-3 , was successful in each 
of the 4 years of the campaign, specializing in gunnery attacks, 
to which 17 ships, mainly small, fell victim. The greatest 
combat successes in torpedo attacks were scored by submarines 
Shch-310 and Shch-307, which sank 10 and 9 enemy ships 
respectively. Submarines S-13, K-52, and: L-3 were credited 
with having torpedoed 6 ships each. The activity of the Soviet 
Baltic Fleet submarines forced the Germans to introduce the 
convoy system in 1942 and again in the second half of 1944. 90 
Submarine S-13 is credited with six sunken ships, among them two 
large ones, Wilhelm Gustloft (25 ,484 tons) sunk January 30, 1945 
and Steuben (14,660 tons) sunk February 9, 1945. The loss of 



39 

Mor skoy Sbornik No. 8, 1967 and No. 11, 1967, pp. 46-52. 
These well documented articles presented only confirmed enemy 
losses and are the first Soviet open press publication of this 
nature . 

90 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 11, 1967, p. 49. For example, in 

December 22, 1942, in a communication to Hitler's headquarters it 
was pointed out that "every submarine breaking through the blockade 
is a threat to shipping throughout the Baltic Sea and endangers 
the German merchant fleet, which is barely sufficient as it is." 

• / • 
/ 



Wilhelin Gustloft was the largest marine catastrophe, in which 

91 
4,000 people perished. In 1945, with the advance of the Soviet 

armies, larger surface units of the Baltic Fleet, destroyers 

and cruisers, continued to be kept mainly in the eastern part 

of the Gulf of Finland, for neither their condition nor the 

» 
navigational situation (mine danger) permitted their employment. 

Besides the submarines only light surface forces (PT boats and 

patrol boats) and naval aviation were active in the Baltic. 

The Black Sea 

At the beginning of the war the Soviet Black Sea Fleet 
had in commission one old battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 destroyer 

leaders, 13 destroyers, 2 escorts, 47 submarines, 84 PT boats, 

92 
and 626 aircraft. At the beginning of the war, Germans did 

not have their own naval forces in the Black Sea and were 

apparently counting on the Rumanian Fleet, which was greatly 

inferior to the Soviet Black Sea Flee't. "However, with the 

majority of Soviet naval aviation involved in the land struggle, 

650 Rumanian and 450 German aircraft represented a real threat 

to the surface forces of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Later, 



91 

N. Kuznetsov in Novy Mir No. 7, 1969, pp. 150-156, 

"S-13 Attacks". 

°2 

Combat Path, pp. 367-368. 



/ 

GG 



in the course of the war, Germans brought their own naval forces 
consisting primarily of light surface ships and sqveral submarines 
to the Black Sea, but they were not very effective against the 
vastly superior Soviet Black Sea Forces. The German advance- 
on the land represented the main problem encountered by the 
Black Sea Fleet just as in the Baltic. The defense of the naval 
bases of Odessa (more than two months) and Sevastopol' (more 
than eight months) was assigned mainly to the Navy and commanded 
by admirals. Supported by a number of amphibious landings, 
particularly at Kerch-Feodosiya, the defense of the naval bases 
tied up a considerable number of German troops. 

From the very beginning of the war, Black Sea naval 
aviation made a number of strikes against Rumanian oil refinery 
centers with marginal success. However, when the situation on 
the land front worsened, the aviation was tied up and its 
activity in support of the naval operation diminished. In mid 
1942, because of the loss of all major bases the Black Sea 
Fleet was forced to operate out of the auxiliary bases of Poti 
and Batumi. More than ten amphibious landings were made by 
the Black Sea Fleet, including sizable ones at Novorossiysk 
and Kerch . 



93 

History of Naval Art, pp. 256-271, 



67 



The forces of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet were used in 
all types of naval operations. However, the special nature of 
the opposition and the often not very skillful application of 
forces precluded the Soviets from achieving a more effective 
employment of their fleet. For example, the dogmatic approach 
to mine warfare produced a number of mine fields in the Black Sea 
which handicapped the operation of Soviet naval forces much 
more than they did the Germans. The submarines, particularly • 
in the early period of war, were not employed aggressively and 
were losing valuable combat time waiting at assigned positions 
for the few enemy ships navigating the sea. Naval aviation, 

in contrast, was very active in the Black Sea and is credited 

94 
with 80% of the enemy tonnage sunk. In 1944, when the Germans 

were retreating, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet failed to completely 

interrupt German communications, thus permitting the partial 

95 

evacuation of German troops from Crimea. 



cj4 

ft i s to vy of Naval Art , p. 417. 



95 

Ibid . , p . 418. 



68 



The Northern Fleet 

When war broke out, the youngest Soviet flee't, the Northern, 
was in a stage of accelerated development. One of the main"' — -._ 
problems was the absence of a well-developed base system, which 
detained the reinforcement of the fleet with ships and aircraft. 
There were only S destroyers, 7 escorts, 2 minesweepers, and 
15 patrol boats in commission. The fleet also had 15 submarines 
and 116 aircraft, both of which were considered to be the main 

striking force. But, almost half of the aircraft were obsolete 

96 

seaplanes and there were only 11 bombers. By a special 

decision of the State Committee for Defense, the Northern Fleet 
was reinforced by 130 civilian ships (merchant ships, fishing 
trawlers, etc.) converted into minelayers, patrol ships, mine- 
sweepers, and tenders. But the quality of the converted ships 
was such that they were a poor imitation of what was needed; 
they were badly suited for the intended missions. In addition, . 
by the same decision, S submarines (out of 20 planned) , six PT 
boats, and 4 patrol boats were transferred via the White Sea- 
Baltic Canal from the Baltic Fleet. Eight small submarines 
were delivered from the industry in 1942. During July-October 
1942, the Soviet Pacific Fleet sent one destroyer ' leader and 



96 

Combat Path, p. 216. 



89 



two destroyers, which fn~ +ho f-j *»,-+■ -*-.; 

. *>, «mcn io. .he first time traversed the Northern 

Sea Route from East to V/e<?t a mmy.^** ~-? 

u west. a number of minesweepers for 

sweeping influence mines were bought in England. In the 'middle 

of 1942, the fleet aviation was reinforced by 31S aircraft 

from the Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Caspian 

97 
Flotilla. The Pacific Fleet sent 6 submarines to reinforce 

the Northern Fleet in the fall of 1942. Those submarines had 

to make a secret crossing of the Pacific and to enter the 

Atlantic. through the Panama Canal. In the process of this 

17,000-mile transfer, one Soviet submarine, L-16, was torpedoed 

by an unidentified submarine S00 miles from San Francisco. 98 

The base system cf the Northern Fleet was also improved in the 

course of the war. In August of 1941 the White Sea Flotilla 

was formed. In 1941 the naval base on Novaya Zemlya was 

organized, and, to protect communications in the Kara Sea, the 

Kara Naval Base was organized in 1944 on Island Dikson." As 

was the case in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, no large scale 

naval operations were planned by the Germans in the Arctic 

waters. Plan Barbarossa visualized the capture of Murmansk 

— i 

97„. 

History of Naval Art , pp. 294-295. 

93 

The War Years , pp. 148-149. 

99 

C ombat Path , pp. 244-250. 



70 



by ground forces. When the Germans failed to fulfill the plan, 
the Allied convoys started to arrive at Murmansk with vital 
supplies and armaments. The Germans own shipping supporting 
forces in Norway began to be attacked by forces of the Soviet 
Northern Fleet. The Germans then shifted considerable naval 
forces to the north and engaged in more active 'operations against 
the Allied convoy system as well as the Russian Northern Fleet. 
The general weakness of the Soviet naval forces in the North 
and their preoccupation with supporting the Army flank limited ^ 
their operations against Nazi shipping and in defense of their 
own shipping, thus precluding any substantial contribution by 
the Northern Fleet to the protection of the Allied convoy 
system, which took on strategic importance. Overall, 41 convoys 
totalling 797 transports arrived in the Soviet Union and 36 
convoys totalling 726 transport left Soviet ports in the North 

during the war. Eighty-three transports, including seven Soviet 

100 . 
ships, were lost. During the war there werel,471 internal 

Soviet convoys involving 2,568 transports escorted by total 

number of 3,617 naval ships. The system assured the transportation 

of 1,672,000 men, 3,863 guns, 380 tanks, 13.5 thousand vehicles, 

1Q1 
and other military cargo totalling 1.5 million tons. In the 



TOP 

VIZ, No. 11, 1971, pp. 22-29. 

1Q3 Combat Path, p. 252. 



71 



summer of 194-1 the Soviet Northern Fleet was reinforced by a 
number of British and American ships, including one battleship, 

one cruiser, 9 destroyers, and 4 submarines. Those ships were 

102 

employed mainly in the White Sea Flotilla. 

The action of the Soviet naval forces caused some damage 
and forced Germans to escort their convoys. According to the 

Soviets, 158 German transports and up to 50 combatants were 

103 

sunk or badly damaged. During the first two years of the 

war, the submarines occupied first place in the number of enemy 
ships sunk, but starting in the second half of 1943, naval 
aviation took the lead. Lack of repair facilities and a weak 
base system led to the steady decline in number of Soviet 
submarines at sea. Thus, whereas at the beginning of wa r an 

average of up to six submarines were on patrol, in 1944 this 

104 
number was reduced to 2 or 3. The submarines of the Northern 

Fleet made 194 attacks, fired 676 torpedos, and placed 837 

mines. The Germans in turn were also active in mine warfare; 



1 09 

^All the ships were old and could hardly be used in 

the high seas. After the war all of them minus two which were 

lost, were returned to their original owners. D. Woodward, 

The Russians at Sea , p. 214. 

103 VIZ, No. 12, 1970, p. 20. 

104 

History of Naval Art, pp. 452-453. 



9 



50% of Soviet submarine losses are credited to mines. 

During the war with Germany the Soviet Pacific Fleet 
represented a deterrent force against Japan, and also served 
a role of reserve fleet for the Soviet Navy from which some 
ships and considerable numbers of personnel were transferred 
to active Soviet fleets, particularly the Northern. In August 
1945, when war against Japan was declared, the fleet had in 
commission 2 cruisers, one destroyer leader, 12 destroyers, 19 
escorts, 78 submarines, 10 minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 
submarine chasers, 204 PT boats, 19 landing ships, and 1,549 
aircraft. In addition, the Amur Flotilla had about 200 ships 
and 70 aircraft. The fleet was in good level of training and 
combat readiness. The remnants of the Japanese Navy still 
tied up by the US Navy could hardly offer substantial resistance 
The capture of Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and a number of 
ports in northern Korea was the main task set forth for the 
Pacific Fleet. A number of successful amphibious landings, 
during which for the first time in the Soviet Navy specially 
built (mainly American) amphibious ships were used, were 
executed. The war was over in seven days, although the 



105 

History of Naval Art , p. 454, and VI_Z No. 12, 1970, p. 21. 

106 ' „ 

Combat Path, p. 511, and History of Naval Art, pp. 505-50S 



73 



107 
occupation of the Kurile Islands took until 31 August. 

In summary, World War II threatened the very, existence of 

the Soviet Union. To be or not to be was not an academic 

question. The main role of the Soviet Navy in such a struggle, 

auxiliary in nature, was "to assist the Army in the maritime 

flanks", and was determined mainly by the interests of the 

ground forces. However, the defense of Leningrad, Odessa, 

Sevastopol, as well as Moonsund Islands, Tallin and Hanko, in 

which the Navy played a very important role, had strategic 

TOP — 

importance. The Soviet Navy was neither prepared for 
nor there was any necessity created by the opponent to contest 
the control of the sea in a strategic sense, for German naval 
activity with the exception of in the North, where they 
challenged the allied convoy system, was marginal. To a large 
degree that was attributable to the intense naval campaign 
conducted by the Allied naval forces in Atlantic. The former 
head of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N.» G. Kuznetsov, evaluated 
the situation as follows: "It must be said in all fairness 
that the deployment of the German Navy against the Soviet Union 
depended, in certain measure, on the battles which had been 



1Q7 IIistory of Naval Art , pp. 513-514. 
108 VIZ, No. 5, 1970, pp. S8-89. 



74 



fought at sea since the opening of the war. If it had not been 
so, the German High Command would have assigned it^s navy a 
bigger role in Plan Barbarossa. The actions in the Atlantic 
prevented the German High Command from switching its ships 
to the Soviet shores .... our allies' success or failure in the 
Atlantic determined the size of their aid to us' during the 
hardest years of the war. The battle for the Atlantic was, 

to some extent, fought to allow passage of convoys to our 

109 
ports of Murmansk and Archangel." 

The Germans failed to conduct a single amphibious 

operation on the maritime flank of the Soviet Army, nor was 

there any indication they planned to. The Soviets, however, 

made several dozens of landings. Navy infantry and socalled 

naval rifle brigades formed from sailors and navy shore units 

totalling 405,000 men, were often incorporated in the ground 

forces and used as shock troops, in addition to their role 

in the defense of naval bases. Moreover, the formation 

I 
of the numerous naval flotiallas mainly on the rivers (Volga, 

/ ! ' 

Dnepr, Danube) played an important role in the war. In spite 

of the predominant importance of the land struggle, naval 

I 
combat, limited mainly to coastal waters, was intense during 



109 

The War Years, p. 113. 



I 
/ 



lb 



certain periods of war. The main role on both sides was played 
by the land based aviation, followed by submarines and light 
surface forces (particularly Soviet PT boats). The Soviet 
N avy was poorly prepared for antisubmarine warfare. Only 
towards the end of war were anti-submarine forces increased 
and their equipment, thanks mainly to the Allied deliveries, 

improved. 

Mine warfare was also extensively used, but the Soviet 
N avy , while improving towards the end of the war, was not at 
its best in this traditional form of warfare. The Soviet 
Navy neither had influence mines at the beginning of the war 
nor the means to sweep them. Again, it was the Allies who 
supplied the original equipment to the Soviet Navy. The Soviets 
failed to enlarge its navy with merchant ships capable of 
operating as minesweepers. The leading role of aviation 
in naval combat was clearly established. When circumstances 

permitted, during the second half of the war, Soviet naval 

ll2 

aviation was increased considerably. The important role 



H Q Morskoy Sbornik No. 11, 1971, pp. 25-28. 
11:L The Y/ar Years, p. 134. 

Soviet sources credited naval aviation with two 
thirds of all enemy ships sunk or damaged during the war. 
History of Naval Art, pp. 523-525. 



/ 



76 



f the aircraft carriers was clearly demonstrated to the 
Soviets by its Western allies. But the conclusions drawn by 
some Western students of Soviet naval affairs that the carriers 
could have greatly changed the conduct of the war in the Baltic 
and the Black Seas are clearly erroneous to say the least, and 
ignore the then existing realities. ' The anti'-aircraf t 
defense of the Soviet ships was weak, and the short radius of 
Soviet fighter aircraft and their small number, particularly 
during the initial period of war, were additional obstacles 
to more active Soviet surface forces operations. 

The Soviet Navy of the war years could in no sense be 
called a balanced fleet. However, the construction of a 
considerable number of surface ships in addition to numerous 
submarines, particularly during the late 1930' s, demonstrated 
the Soviet understanding of the concept of a balanced fleet in 
general, but it did not have the capability to realize it. 
Defending the pre -Wo rid War II naval development, Admiral 
Kuznetsov stated: "The war showed that the sea power was 



113 For example, R. W. Kerrick in the Soviet Naval 
Strategy, p. 53, stated, "Had the Baltic and Black Sea fleets 
had their own carrier-based air cover to protect the forces 
afloat, including carriers themselves, from the Luftwaffe 
attacks, there is every possibility that those fleets could 
have continued offensive operations and greatly retarded the 
Nazi offensive, to say the least". 



77 



114 
something more than just submarines . 

The pre-war distribution of naval forces with traditional 
concentration in the two closed seas, the Baltic Sea and* the 
Black Sea, did not meet the requirements of the war. The 
delayed development of system of bases in the North with the 
resulting weakness of the forces of the Northern Fleet, which 
was most active during the war, was one of the serious mistakes 
committed in the pre-war naval development. The rapid advance 
of the German Army interrupted the attempted reinforcement of the 
Northern Fleet from the Ealtic. 

In spite of the considerable losses in submarines, 
particularly in the Baltic, the Soviet Navy stubbornly continued 
to employ them throughout the war. Initially suffering from 
poor training and the consequences of the pre-war purges, 
the Soviet Navy had considerably improved its operational and 
tactical skills toward the end of the war. The combat activities 
of Soviet submarines,* naval aviation, and PT boats forced 
Germany to escort shipping in the North and in the Baltic. 
In the Black Sea, the Soviet Navy managed to retain supremacy 
but it is doubtful that the Black Sea Fleet potentials were 
fully realized in the war. 



U 4 

The War Years, p. 1G2. 



78 



The outcome of the war produced considerable improvements 
in naval geography for the Soviet Union, compared, with what 
it had been prior to the war. Both successes and failures of 
the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the enemy 
on the other produced rich material for examination and 
evaluation which influenced the consequent development of the 
Soviet Navy. 

The First Post-World-War-II Period 
to the mid 1950s 



When World War II ended, the Soviet Navy had in commission 
2 old battleships, 9 cruisers, 48 destroyers, 173 submarines, 
393 torpedo boats, 59 patrol ships, 208 minesweepers, and 
4,150 aircraft. The civilian ships mobilized at the beginning 

of war were transferred according to a special decision of the 

115 
Soviet Government to their previous owners. 

When the navies of defeated opponents in World War II 

were divided among the victors, the Soviet Union received:! 

! 

from Germany/ one cruiser, 10 destroyers, 10 submarines, 44 ' 

/ 

minesweepers, 30 torpedo boats, and other ships, mainly 
auxiliaries; from the Italian Navy, one battleship, one cruiser, 
2 destroyers, 3 destroyer escorts, two submarines, and 11 



115 



Combat Path , p. 534. 



73 



miscellaneous boats: from Japan, 7 destroyers, 17 escort ships, 

2 mine layers, one sub chaser, 4 minesweepers. According 

to an agreement, all Japanese ships were disarmed. Most 'of 

the ships received from the former German, Italian, and Japanese 

navies, with the exception of some German submarines, particularly 

those captured by the Soviets as a war prize in Gdansk, were 

of old designs with worn out machinery and armament. There" 

was a very limited supply of spare parts and ammunition for 

them. Many of the ships were never commissioned in the combat 



nucleus of Soviet Navy, and those which were did not serve for 
a long time. The ex-German submarines of the XXI, VII, and 

XXIII types, minesweepers, and some auxiliaries were used by 

117 
the Soviets up to the late 1950s. 

The degree of destruction of Soviet industry caused 

by the war, particularly in the Soviet European part, was 

colossal. Yet, the first post World War II Five Year Plan 

approved March 18, 1946, and devoted mainly to the restoration 

of the economy, visualized the "1950 level of shipbuilding 

exceeding that of 1940 by two times" and "the development of 



Combat Path , p. 535. 

117 u 

The detailed list of disposals of older submarines 
and surface ships by the Soviet Navy are given in 1962-1963 
and earlier editions of Jane's Fighting Ships. 



h 



fin 



lis 

strong and mighty navy in the USSR". 

But, during the first 3 to 4 years, Soviet industry 
was in no condition to assure construction of newly designed 
ships. Soviet Navy attempts to force the shipbuilding industry 
to accelerate the beginning of construction of new ships 
failed and the ships of pre-World War II design, whose short- 
comings were revealed during the war, were built at first. 
Thus, a number of Chapayev-class cruisers, Otlichnyy-class 



destroyers, and improved M-class (M-V) submarines were built. ^ 

Toward the end of the 1940s the construction started on 
Sverdlov-class cruisers, Skoryi-class destroyers, large ocean- 
going Z-class submarines and medium-range W-class submarines. 
Foreign experience, particularly that of the Germans, became 
known in detail and helped the Soviet Union in the development 
of new ship types. The development and beginning of construction 
of new destroyers and escorts, both with flush decks, with improved 
armament started as early as 1950. The destroyer Neustrashimyi 
(Tallin-class) served as a prototype for a large series of i 

/ I 

Kotlin-class destroyers. The construction of a number of i 
Kola-class escorts was followed by the construction of the improved 



1 18 

Combat Path , p. 585. 

119 

Kuznetsov, Nakanune , pp. 262-263. 



81 



and modernized Riga class. A large number of minesweepers, PT 
and patrol boats, and submarine chasers were built. Also in 
the early 1950's two Stalingrad-class battle cruisers were 

laid down, but their construction was stopped soon after 

120 
Stalin's death. 

The post-war development of the Navy was* accompanied by 
traditional reorganizational measures and repressions which" 
were particularly harsh under Stalin. On 25 February 1946 the 
People's Commissariat of the Navy was abolished. Four years 
later, 25 February 1950, the Naval Ministry of the USSR was 
reinstituted in order to "focus attention on the speediest • 
development of the navy". On March 15, 1953, the separation 
was ended, and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was formed 
unifying both ministries, the military and the navy. Stalin's 

post-war order to have two fleets instead of one in the Baltic 

. _ . .. 121 

and Pacific was abolished in 1956. " Among other organizational 

changes was the abolition of a number of naval flotillas 

(White Sea, Danube, and Dnepr) and the socalled naval defense 

districts. In the mid 1950s the Soviet Union returned its naval 

bases in Port Arthur and Porkalla-Ud to China and Finland 



120 

Stalin had "unexplainable partiality for' heavy cruisers", 
and people around him were advised not to test it. Kuznetsov 
Nakanune , p. 259. 

12 1 

Ibid. , pp. 276-278. 



82 



122 

respectively. In 1947, the top leadership of the navy 

was shaken by Stalin. The head of the navy, Flee^ Admiral 

Kuzhetsov was demoted in rank to Rear Admiral and sent to the 

123 
Far East. Kuznetsov's three top deputies, Admirals Alafuzov, 

Galler, and Stepanov, were court martialed and sentenced to 

prison, where Galler, a former Chief of Main Nctval Staff, 

died. The waves from this Moscow repression reached the 

lower echelons of the navy structure, but were not as disastrous 

as in the late 1930s. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral 

Yamashev was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. 

In July 1951, however, Vice-Admiral Kuznetsov was recalled 

124 
to Moscow and appointed Minister of the Navy. Kuznetsov's 

name again became associated with the accelerated development 

of the Soviet Navy. In the same month of his appointment as 

minister, Kuznetsov went on an inspection of the Baltic Fleet. 

All the best units of the fleet were gathered near Riga for 



122 

Combat Path , pp. 539-540. 

123 y 

Nakanune , p. 212. 

124 

V/hile commanding a fleet in the Pacific, Kuznetsov 

was promoted to vice-admiral, for the second time.. The third 

was in 1956, when he was demoted again from the rank of Fleet 

Admiral of the Soviet Union, a rank he also held twice. 

Combat Path , p. 579. 



/ 



63 



the review. After the parade the Admiral called a meeting of 
officers at which hedescribed the bright future of the navy 
and the large shipbuilding program for the development of an 
ocean-going navy. He also declared that in the not-too-remote 

future, the Soviet Union would start the construction of aircraft 

125 

carriers. -- • 

Parallel to the shipbuilding activity, considerable 
research and development efforts were initiated in atomic 
weaponry, rocketry (missilery), electronics (radar, sonar, 
communications, and control), and propulsion. In 1950 aviation 
received the first free-fall atomic bombs. At the beginning 
of the 1950s nuclear warheads for torpedos and cruise missiles 
were developed. In 1953 the first hydrogen bomb was tested. 
Also at the beginning of the 1950s the Soviet Union started 
the development of nuclear propulsion systems, and the 
construction of nuclear powered submarines dates back to 1953 

Simultaneously, the experiments were being conducted on a wide 

_ 1?7 

scale to employ closed-cycle engines for submarines. During 

/ 

7 

12 5 

This was the last time that the subject of aircraft 
carrier construction was raised in such a definite manner.! 

126 
19? Combat Path, p. 544, and Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 

Combat Path, p. 542. 

/ 



QJj 



the first half of the 1950s the Soviet Union conducted an 
extensive research and development program with various missiles, 
including those for the Navy. The first elements of the? Navy 
for which missiles were developed were aircraft (TU-4 , Bull, 
in the early 1950s and later the TU-16, Badger) and the 
submarines. The first experimental launch of a ballistic 
missile from an obviously submerged submarine (most likely " 









128 
converted Z class) was conducted in September 1955. In 

129 
addition to the TU-4, TU-16, and IL-28 bombers, a considerable 

number of jet aircraft, mainly MIG-15, MIG-17, and YAK-25 " 

fighters were delivered to the Navy. 

Thus, during the first post-war decade, the. Soviet Navy 

was reinforced with a considerable number of newly built ships, 

* 

submarines, and aircraft. Many old and obsolete ships were 
decommissioned. A number of ships built just prior to World 
War II were modernized. The research and development efforts 
resulted in a number- of successes in the nuclear field, missilery, 
and electronics. The first cruise missiles entered the service, 
more missiles were under development, and some had even been 



128 

Combat Path , p. 585. 

129 

The IL-28 were first delivered to the Navy in 1951 

in two versions, one as a bomber-mine-torpedo carrier, and the 

second as a reconnaisance aircraft, designated IL-28R; the 

TU-16 aircraft were first received in 1954. 



8 



1 



tested. In short, the prerequisites were achieved for the 
future development of qualitatively new navy on the basis of what 
the Soviets later called the "scientific and technological 
revolution in the military affairs". 

By the mid-1950s, the Soviet Navy had become larger than 
any in the world except that of the United States, but 
qualitatively, particularly in the relation to the threat from 
the most likely opponent and in the relation to the tasks 
which it had to fulfill, the Soviet Navy was in no better 
position than that prior to World War II. The Soviet Navy 
long-range forces were still in very short supply, while the 
forces for the traditional mine -a raillery- ?crs±ticm warfare 
were in abundance. But it was highly problematic that a 
potential enemy would be so obliging as to bring itself into 
position and subject itself to very powerful combined gunnery 
torpedo attacks. The employment of submarines was planned 
independently from th'e main forces, the squadrons o.f surface 

ships, and the main tasks of submarines were preliminary, 

130 

independent strikes against enemy forces. Such forms of 



naval combat represented nothing more than the use of naval 






130 

History of Naval Art , pp. 564-565, and S. Gorshkov 

in Morskoy Sobrnik No. 2, 1967, pp. 9-21. 



8G 



forces in the proximity of one own shore, i.e. the forms typical 
for a coastal navy. The main limiting factor, of course, was 
the absence of carrier-based aviation and the dependence* upon 
land based aviation of very limited radius of action (particularly 
fighters). It had become evident to the Soviet leadership, 
particularly the military, that despite considerable resources 
devoted to the Navy under conditions of a very tight economy, 
it was not going to fulfill its major tasks unless drastic 
changes were instituted. While apparently there was a mutual 
understanding of the necessity for change, what was desirable 
was viewed differently by the various power groups. Except for 
the loud pronouncements of Khrushchev against large surface 
ships (which, considering the types the Soviet Navy had at the 
time, were basically correct) there is no indication whatsoever 
that the Party leadership had turned anti-Navy. But some Army 
leaders came very close to demanding the practical abolition 
of the Navy, claiming that there were not many naval tasks (as 
they understood them) which the army, armed with the nuclear 
missiles, could not fulfill, including strikes against carriers 

(with long-range aviation) and against amphibous forces approaching 

131 

a defense area. Particularly strong attacks were launched 



131 

See S. Gorshkov, The Development of Soviet Naval Art , 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967, pp. 9-21. 



87 



against the surface ships and naval aviation. It was also 
claimed that the ground troops did not need the Navy's support 
even during anamphibious operations and, thus, the amphibious 
ships and the naval infantry (marines) were obsolete and not 

a a 132 
needed. 

The need for the submarines was never challenged by any 
group. 

The period of the mid 1950s and the decisions made at 
the time resulting in "the decisive changes in the shipbuilding 
program in the direction of the creation of nuclear missile- 
carrying submarines, missile-armed surface ships and ships v 
armed with modern anti-submarine, anti-mine, and anti-aircraft 

weapon systems and missile-carrying aviation" were crucial for 

133 

the further development of the Soviet Navy. It seems 

appropriate at this point to interrupt the examination of naval 
development and to make a brief analysis of international 
factors influencing the military policies of the Soviet Union, 



to indicate the major stages in the development of Soviet 

/ 
military doctrine, and briefly examine the Soviet military 

science and the role envisaged for the Soviet Navy. Such 



i 



i 



132 

Combat Path , pp. 545-546. 

133 

Ibid. , p. 547. 



t 



88 



considerations are also essential for the establishment of the 
role assigned to the various naval forces by Soviet military 
theory, and for a clear understanding of the employment of 
those forces under various conditions. 

Military Theory 

"Whoever operates without principles has not pondered 
on what he wants, falls into hesitation and half -measures, and 
loses all in war." Napoleon 

Soviet military thinking focuses primarily on three broad 
interrelated concepts: military doctrine, military science/ 
and the military art. In spite of a distinct overlapping 
of these three concepts, there are clear distinctions as to 
their particular content and purpose, and a clear hierachical 
relationship among them with military doctrine at the top. 

Military doctrine is defined as "a system of states 
guiding opinions on the character of war under given specific 
historical conditions, the determination of the tasks of the 
armed forces and the principles of their construction, as well 
as the methods and forms of armed conflict, following from the 

goals of the war, and the socio-economic and military technological 

134 

capacities of the country." Developed and determined by the 



Spravochnik ofitser g, (Officer's Reference Book ) 
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 73-74. 



RQ 



political leader-ship of the state, the military doctrine, 

according to the Soviets, reflects the social, economic, political, 

and historical characteristics of the state, the nature of its 

internal and external policies. Military doctrine, when adapted 

and put into effect, acquires the nature of a state law. 

Usually five periods in developing Soviet military doctrine are 

distinguished: 

(1) 1917-1928' that is, the Civil War and the time preceding 
the industrialization of the country; 

(2) 1929-1941, up to the beginning of World War II r In 
view of the predominantly continental character of the war n 
contemplated, the main role during this period was assigned to 
the Army, although considerable attention was devoted to the 
role of the Navy, and it was correspondingly strengthened. 

The main emphasis was on the combined efforts of all forces and 
resources, and the ideas of waging war by any particular 

predominant branch of* the armed forces (for example, Douhet's 

135 
aviation theory) were rejected. 

(3) 1941-1945, the war period. In spite of the fact 



In the course of the second world war, the Air 
Force certainly proved its indispensibility but not its 
independent and conclusive power without the effective 
support of the other armed forces, as was foreseen and preached 
by Douhet's theory. 



90 



that much new and original was contributed to military theory 
in the course of war, the period can hardly be recognized as 
a stage in doctrinal development, because, for all practical 
purposes, it was a reaction to the reality imposed by the 
enemy. 

(4) 1946-1953, the post-war period, when the experience 
of World War II, the sharp deterioration of relations between 
two opposing systems in the international arena, and the 
availability of nuclear weapons were determining factors. 

(5) From 1954 to the present. The period began with the 
availability of nuclear missiles, and is characterized in the 
Soviet military writings as a revolution in military affairs, 
with corresponding fundamental changes in the doctrine. 
Usually two sub-stages in the development of doctrine are 
distinguished in this period; the first, 1954-1959, when the 
introduction of nuclear armament into the Soviet armed forces 
and its quantative accumulation started, accelerating towards 
the end of the stage; and the second stage, starting in 1960, 
during which the rearmament of Soviet military forces with 
nuclear missiles was concluded on a broad scale. Major 



"1 o r* 

Istoriya voyn i voennogo iskysstva (History of wars and 
military arts ) Textbook for officers-students of higher 
educational establishments of the Soviet Armed Forces. Approved 
by the Minister of Defense, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 
1970, pp. 466-467. 



SI 



changes occurred in the views on the character of combat 
actions. Toward the end of the 1950s, defense as^a combat 
action had started to be considered as acceptable only for the 
secondary areas and only at operational and tactical levels. 
Defense on the strategic level was rejected as unacceptable. 
The defense of the country, and its military forces from the 
enemy's nuclear strikes had started to be viewed as an independent 

type of strategic action. The naval combat activity acquired - 

137 
the same importance, i.e. independent strategic actions. 

Thus, it took a considerable period of time, close to a decade, 

before the present Soviet military doctrine was formulated in 

138 
the years 1963-1964. 

The Soviet doctrine emphasizes that a future war will be 

a decisive armed clash of two opposing social systems 

characterized by the unprecedented bitterness of the armed 

conflict. That doctrine reserves decisive role in a modern war 



137 Ibid . , pp. 499-500. 

138 

The practice of many Y/estern military analysts to 

consider changes in the doctrine and the development of Soviet 

armed forces in connection with changes at the top leadership is 

erroneous. While there is no denying the influence of various 

top men upon the development of military policy, it has to be 

stressed that in the post-war period, the Stalinist stage not 

excluded, socalled Zadel or laying the foundation for change was 

the work of the predecessors. The wave of writings which 

inevitably occurred right after the change of the. leadership 

were probably encouraged by it to promote appearance of novelty. 



Q 



to nuclear missile armament. Simultaneously, the use of ' 

conventional armament is not excluded and the need is stressed 

» 

for a flexiable organization of military forces corresponding 

139 
to the various conditions of the conduct of the military struggle. 

Two facets, or principles, of military doctrine are distingusihed, 

the political and the military-technical. The 'political 

principles apparently reveal the socio-political essence of 

the war, the character of political objectives, and the 

strategic tasks of the state. The military-technical principles, 

being more dynamic, determine problems of organization, the 

tasks of military forces, and the means, methods, and forms 

of military struggle. With respect to means of conducting 

warfare, both nuclear and non-nuclear war are considered, and 

to scale, world and local. A world war is viewed most likely 

to be anuclear war, and under certain conditions of short 

duration; and yet, together with the action of strategic nuclear 

forces, which include' the strategic missile troops and ballistic 

missile nuclear submarines, are visualized the independent 

operations of naval forces. 



i 



139 

Officers Reference Book, p. 77-78. See also, Major 

General S. N. Kozlov, "Military Doctrine and Military Science" 

in Xommunist vooru zhennykh sil, No. 5, March 1964, and Thomas 

W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Theory: An Additional Source of 

I nsight into Its Development , p-3258, Santa Monica, California, 

The Rand Corporation, November 1965. 



i 



r 



/ 



93 



Soviet military science includes the following: 

general theory (general basis) of military science; 
theory of education, training and indoctrination; 

military historical science; military administration 
(organization and control of military forces) ; military 
geography; _ • 

military technical sciences. 

The theory of military art, or just military art, is 
considered to be the most important component part of Soviet 
military science, and has been traditionally divided into 
strategy, which studies the conditions of the preparation and 
conduct of war as a whole, and its campaigns, and operational 
art, which is the study of operations and of tactics, of battle. 
It has been the tradition of Soviet military science to consider 
all three component parts of military art as being mutually 
connected and inter-dependent, with the leading role reserved 
to strategy. In the 'nuclear age, the role of strategy has 
been elevated even more, basically because of the crucial, 
decisive role upon the outcome of the war of nuclear strikes, 
which are controlled by strategic leadership. Strategy 
constitutes the direct executor of the orders of the doctrine, 



140 

Officers' Reference Book , p . 60 . 



r 



94 



but the armed struggle is directly guided not by doctrine, 

141 
but by strategy. The major propositions of strategy, as 

part of military science are taking into consideration in 

doctrine, and represent the main content of its military 

technical principles. The Soviets view strategy as common and 

unique for all services of the military forces. of the country, 

142 
for war is conducted by the joint efforts of all of them. 

Operational art (not tactics) dealing with the 
preparation and conduct of combined and independent operations 
of the armed forces is more heterogeneous, and each branch of 
the armed forces has its own operational art. 

No single branch of the Soviet ?»n&e*i £or.<sas- i.e. ground 
forces, air force, strategic missile troops, and air defense, 
with the notable exception of the Soviet Navy, claims to have, 
apart from the operational art and tactics, a different concept 
of the military art, not to mention of military science as a 
whole. The Soviet Navy, however, does and proclaims it quite 
loudly. Accordingly, naval science is a part of the military 
science to the extent that it uses most of the common laws 



141 Marshal V. Sokolovskiy and Ma j . Gen. M. Cherednichenk, 
" sovremennoy voennoy stategii " (On Contemporary Military 
Strategy) , Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil , No. 7, April, 1966. 

142 0fficers' Reference Book, p. 68. 



95 



/* 



of the latter and is subordinated to the common military 

strategy. In its turn, naval science includes as' a main 

component, naval art divided into tactics, operational art, 

and strategic employment of the Navy. 43 Moreover, the growing 

importance of the Navy, under contemporary conditions, was said 

» 
to contribute to the appearance of a "qualitatively new naval 

art" and "further outgrowth of naval science from military 

science", particularly as far as the development and the 

operations of the Navy are concerned. In general it is 

claimed that naval science is based on the common laws with 

military science, and naval art on the common principles 

with the military art, but "in the area of tactics, the theory 

of naval art is practically independent and in the area of 

operational art it is to some degree connected with the theory 

of military art; but only in the area of strategic employment 

of the Navy does it (the theory of naval art) have its source 

in military strategy, except however, for features completely 



143 / 

Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo, " Razvitiye voenno-morskoy 

Nauki" (The Development of Naval Science), Morskoy Sbornik 

No. 12, 1969, pp. 32-37. j 

144 

Ibid. , pp. 35-36. 



96 



145 

secular to it". Thus, the independent character of Soviet 

Navy operations has been recognized, first when its fleets were 
converted into "striking power oriented first of all against 
the land" and now when they are considered together with the 
strategic missile troops as "the main deterrent to aggression". ^ S 
Nevertheless, it is basically wrong in the framework of Soviet 
military theory and terminology to speak about the Soviet naval 
strategy, for such a category does not exist. 

* 

In general, Soviet military theory as a well organized 
discipline has been developing all of its elements in ~~. 
historical perspective and conceptual unity. It took into s 
account changes which occurred in the political and technological 
spheres. It seems that both understanding of the power of 
threat and the power of presence have been demonstrated by the 
Soviet Union lately, particularly through the employment of its 



145 

Ibid . , p. 37. The specific character of the Soviet 

Navy and, before it the Russian Navy, has to be recognized, for 
it is the only service which in the past has had its own ministry. 
Even today, even in the presence of unified agency of operational 
control of the services, the Ministry of Defense ,* there is the 
Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the Navy. More- 
over, the 1967 Universal Military Law approved by the Supreme 
Soviet and put into effect in January 196S in paragraphs three 
and four defines the Soviet military forces as composed of the 
Soviet Army, the Soviet Navy, Internal troops (the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs) , and Border troops of the KGB (the Committee 
for State Security)). 

4o Marshal M. Zakharov, "uroki istorii" , (The Lessons of 
History), Kommunist No. 9, July 1971, p. 75, and Krasnava Zvezda. 
May 9, 1971. ■ a 



Q7 



naval forces. Does tM« 

this mean that the Soviets h 
tohan. and what in general . ? ^-readi^ 

general has been their at« + . 
Plulospher of sea no, attitude toward the 

- .. .... s r r- c ~° iu "°" — - - > ; -»°» 

west, particularly ia thA Tr lit -- 

/ in the United States to 
naval policy? ' to sub stantiato 

Mahan's work w as weXI knowa ln 

- - — ~~ - -. . :::::::r" *- 

-v er been aocepted as n . °* Sea P° w « *ave 

l "' cu as universal o«^ 

rsax and even orio-i nol _ . 
following con.iH <-• ™-*inal, owing to . the 

«* considerations: m th« + ; 

theories were viewed M 
being heavily biased, despite ti ■ 

1 aes P a te their historical k*-- 
around Great Britain' centered 

ta " S PraCtlCeS > toward unilateral national 
considerations- (o\ • national 

10 *s> ( 2 ) prior tQ 

th^ la COQ cepts of the 

"^ W -e expressed in the worK of Caot ■ 

n •*■ Captain Colomb of tfaa 

BriUsh Na vy during the I 860s and n . 

of the ♦ ordered the problem 

the protects of British coerce and the „• 
"aval forces . attribution of 

forces. Hence, the theories hava h 

Hahan" . •♦, U ° alled "Colomb- 

Muiian . with -fun * 

' Ui ful1 ^cognition of Mahan'* 
in th« „ maj0r COQ tribution 

ln the development of the +h« 

the theory to maturity {*\ „ , 
ffeup^T • Uiit y> (3; Mahan's 

general principles f conrfl - + . 

0,13 a " e ° tinS the — power of i 

10US and ■*»*•«*• -^cipies) are rooted in Jo • ■ 

is ~i tea ln Jomini as well 

l& ^lausewitz nnrt h« 

' and hence * are not origin* 
•t least in its D Communist ideology, 

its Propagandistic expression h • 
nti ^i i Passion, being militantiy " 

^-colonial and anti-imperialist has -also , " 

*** t "*ts also oiavpfi ^t, -,-,, 
. . y^«*yca an important 



role in the official denigration of Mahan's philosophy of sea 
power. 

V/hile the Soviets' dislike of Mahan's theories on ideological 
grounds can be disregarded, the correctness of some of Mahan's 
conclusions and the applicability of his major tenets to the 
present situation is another matter. It seems .that the sea 
power theories formulated by Mahan have not been compatible " 
with the times for decades in either in the political-economic or 
the military spheres. Mahan was obviously wrong in intimating 
that control of Europe depended on control of the sea. Neither 
World War I, with the presence of the grand fleet of England and 
of the High Seas Fleet of Germany, nor World War II prove it. 
Submarines in both wars drastically changed the late 19th 
century equation (which in turn was based on 17th and 18th 
century facts). Particularly questionable on the broad scale 
is Mahan's concept of the control of the sea, which lies at the 
very heart of his theory. The concepts have been variably 
defined and interpreted. For example, late Fleet Admiral W. F. 
Halsey, USN, used to define control of the sea as a state of 
affairs in which "we can go wherever we want to go, on, over 
or under the sea, and do whatever we want to do when we get 
there; and we can prevent other people from going where we 
don't want them to go and from doing things we don't want them 

bS 



147 
to do". During the decade of the 1950s the Sixth Fleet 

in the Mediterrnean did exercise such control to a large degree. 

However, there was no opposition and the environment was* 

extremely favorable and far from being hostile. The command 

of the sea concept often claimed to be exercised in the waters 

around Vietnam (and previously in Korea) is highly questionably 

today. First, the U. S. ships have been treated as sanctuary 

for fear of retatiatory blows far outweighing the questionable 

outcome of attacks agaiust the ships. Second, the major port 

feeding the war, Hai Phong, has never been blockaded and the 

supply ships of the opponent's friends continue to sail. 

Moreover, the navies of all major powers, particularly super 

powers, are being charged with the mission of conducting military 

actions against the land, much more than with the decisive 

battles at sea, whose goal would be to destroy the enemy's 

naval forces. Moreover, the naval forces of today are so 

widespread and so heterogenous that one can hardly speak of a 

decisive battle or even the need for unqualified control of the 

sea. While essential in some areas, desirable in others, and 

for a limited time, revision of the control of the sea concept 

is long overdue, and new theories of sea power or maritime power 



Marine Corp Gazette, June 1969, p. 27 



ICO 



reflecting changed realities are needed. The growth of Soviet 
military power in general and naval power in particular are 

14 8 
among the major factors generating the need for reexamination. 

The development of Soviet maritime power, particularly 

its naval power, has been one of the major factors forcing 

reevaluation of old concepts and the necessity »to adjust for 

new realities. These new realities did not appear at once , but 

are the result of two decades of development. Particularly 

important was the decade of the 1960s, foundations for which, 

at least, in the case of Soviet Union, were laid in the mid-1950s 

and were the result of a changed strategical situation which 

must be examined and of advances in science and technology for 

which the term "revolution in military affairs" was coined. 

Soviet military specialists distinguished three main stages 

in this military-technological revolution which are associated 

with nuclear armament, missiles, and control respectively. 

Nuclear armamen't initially was to be employed together 

I 

i 

with conventional means of warfare. Approximately in the 

/ ' ! 

mid-1950s a contradiction between the potentials of nuclear 

i 
warheads and the mean of delivery developed (free fall bombs 



148 

The reexamination seems to be underway, as evident from 

a number of articles, Congressional hearings, and some books. See 

for example, the Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1971; The 

Washington Post, 17 January 1971; The Congressional Records, Vol. 

117, No. 125, 1971, and Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow , 

New York, Harper and Row, 1970, p. 377. 

/ 



101 



delivered by aircraft) . The appearance of missiles wedded the 
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weaponry with a most 
reliable means of delivery. The new missile-nuclear armament 
has acquired a high degree of sophistication and reliability 

thanks to the wide introduction of cybernetics, which also 

149 
tremendously improved command and control and communication. 

The post-World War II period produced a drastic shift in 

the nature of threat to the Soviet Union from a potential 

enemy. While before the war the primary threat had been posed 

by the continental powers, after the war the Soviet Union had 

to face the coalition of Western powers headed by traditional 

naval powers "in whose armed forces special importance had, 

150 
for a long time, been attached to the navy". The formation 

of NATO with the United States as the chief ally elevated the 

significance of the naval power even more. In addition to the 

direct maritime threat to the Soviet Union, the Atlantic Ocean 

communications again *became the arteries through which American 

military power would be delivered, but in this case as reinforce- 

/ 

raent to the NATO. However, by the early 1950s except for the 



149 

Colonel V. Bondarenko, " Scientific-Technological 

Progress, and Strengthening the Country's Defense" , Communist 

of Armed Forces, no. 24, December 1971, pp. 9-16. 



150 ;vlorskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967, p. 16. 






102 



need to increase the Soviet naval forces along the familiar 
quantitative line to fulfill the traditional tasks; not much 
seemed to have changed for the Soviet Navy. ' 

In the early 1950s, however, when the American aircraft 
carriers were assigned the task of delivering nuclear strikes 
against the Soviet Union, the situation had changed, and quite 
drastically. In the eyes of the Soviet military leaders, the 
attack carrier became at once a ship capable of fulfilling 
strategic tasks and together with the Strategic Air Force of 
providing the Americans with the capability of a broad targeting 
possibility which included practically the whole country. 
Obviously it became the task of the Na^y and the Air Defense 
(PVO) of the country to prevent the attacks of carrier-borne 
aircraft. In order to fulfill its tasks the Soviet Navy had 
to destroy the United States carrier strike forces before they 
reach launching position. If the Navy failed, it would become 
the task of the PVO to repel the attacks of carrier-borne 
aircraft. Obviously, the Navy's task to sink or even severely 
damage the attack carrier before she could launch the aircraft 
was the most important, for it was unrealistic to count on a 
one hundred percent success in intercepting and destroying 
f lying aircraft, and yet it was unacceptable to let even few 
aircraft carrying nuclear bombs to penetrate. Thus, the problem 



103 



or how to counter the attack carrier forces acquired a very 

important significance. I„ addition, the American experiments 

with the REGULUS missile with a nuclear warhead and intended 

for the strategic delivery by submarines became known. This"^ 

just reinforced the Soviet's conviction that "during the first 

post-war decade, the fleets of -the Western coalition were built 

up with great intensity, far and away surpassing in their " 

striking power the other branches of the armed forces. The 

tendency to assign to the naval forces the role of one of the 

primary strategic weapons in a future war was becoming ~ 

increasingly clear". Fo r the Soviets all these meant that 

the threat of an attack from the maritime direction had increased 

sharply and the defense interest of the country "demanded a 

considerable increase in the combat might of the Soviet Navy". 152 

The doctrine of "massive retaliation" proclaimed by the 

American government in 1954 had probably reinforced Soviet 

convictions of the necessity not only to improve defensive ■ 

measures but to speed up the development of the means of delivery 

for nuclear weapons. The latter, naturally, raised the question 

151„ „ 

S. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967", p. 16. 

152,.. , 



mu 



of the Navy's role in delivery, and the best means of achieving 
it, if the role should be assigned. In short, while the Soviet 
shipbuilding industry was involved in the massive production 
of conventionally armed ships and submarines, the urgent need 
for a constructive revision of naval policy had arisen. The 
death of Stalin in March 1953 released the Soviet naval planners 
from the need to follow his arbitrary rule, and produced a more 
favorable atmosphere for objective discussion and evaluation 
of naval policy. Moreover, the physical characteristics of 
nuclear armament (size and weight) made it possible in the" 
mid-1950s to consider its delivery by a variety of means. 
This led to the problem of selecting the best carriers for 
nuclear armament, i.e. whether aircraft (and in what mode of 
operation, land based or carrier based) or submarines or surface 
ships; as well as the means delivering nuclear weapons to the 
targets, i.e. bombs or warheads for torpedoes or missiles. The 
progress achieved in *the research and development of missilery 

indicated the rockets might soon become an important means for 

153 

the delivery of nuclear weapons. As was indicated earlier, 



153 

The progress with missile development in the mid-1950s 

made the Soviet Army so happy that its "influential authorities" 

decided to solve all problems including those associated with naval 

warfare, by missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. See Morskoy 

Sbornik No. 2, 1967, p. 11. 



105 



a further consideration was that definite progress was achieved 
in the development of nuclear propulsion systems for submarines. 

West Germany's joining NATO and the creation of the 
Warsaw Pact in May 1955 further aggravated the already tense 
situation of confrontation between the two major opponents, the 
US and the USSR, and the systems of alliances Under their 
leadership. This in general was the political, military and 
technological situation in the mid-1950s, when the crucial 
decision which changed the course of Soviet Navy development 
was made. 

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and Fleet Admiral 
of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov described the decision-making 
process in the following way : "Party and government did not 
share efforts but devoted considerable time in studying the 
problem in detail, clarifying and comparing various points 
of view of Navy and Army specialists, scientists, and designers, 
analyzing experience of the war and the possibilities which 

had been opening in connection with accelerated progress in 

/ 154 

science and technology." Consideration was given to the 

composition of the future Navy and what forces, i.e. surface, 

I 

submarine, aviation, or any combination of them, should 



154 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1963, p. 15. 



/ 



106 



represent the "main striking forces" of the future Navy. 
Apparently, as to the nature of a future war, i.e N whether 
nuclear or conventional, there was no problem, for it was 
assumed that it would be nuclear. Special consideration was 
given to capital surface ships. The Soviets "know that sun 
had set on battleships as far back as the Battle of Midway in 
1942", and, according to Gorshkov, "the replacement of long-range - 
guns in surface ships with artillery using nuclear ammunition 
and even missiles would not make them any less vulnerable or ^ 

suited for the employment in a nuclear war as a primary naval 

155 
strike force." The Soviets also concluded that "the process 

of the sun setting on aircraft carriers as well had begun, 

and that the process was irreversible". The Soviets became 

convinced that "seeking ways in which to employ them (aircraft 

carriers) as a primary strike force in the armed struggle at 

156 
sea had no future". 

The rejection of the attack aircraft carriers as the main 

striking force of the future Soviet navy was made in the atmosphere 

of a strong belief that the era of the general erosion of surface 

naval forces has began. This, of course, does not mean the 

complete rejection of the surface ship's usefulness or the 



155 Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967, p. 19. 

156 T ,., 
Ibid. 

r 



107 



necessity to have them. But the Soviets strongly believed 
that it is much easier to locate the surface ship, v including 
the carrier, than to locate even a diesel-electric submarine, 
not to mention nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, they have 
been convinced that any surface ship is more vulnerable to a 
nuclear blast than a submarine. Finally, the package of weapon 
systems, i.e. the variety of missiles which did not require 
large capital ships and could be effectively deployed aboard 
smaller ships, and particularly aboard submarines and long-range 
aircraft was selected. 

' Thus, in the words of S. Gorshkov, "In the mid-1950s, 
in connection with the revolution in military affairs, the 
Central Committee of our Party defined the path of Navy develop- 
ment, as well as the Navy's role and place in the system of Armed 
Forces of the country. The course taken was one which required 
the construction of an ocean going navy, capable of carrying 
out offensive strategic missions. Submarines and naval aviation, 
equipped with nuclear weapons, had a leading place in the 
program. Thus, there began a new stage in the development of 
the Navy and of its naval science. 

The latest achievements in science' and production, and 
the creation, on this base, of what were, in principle, new 
weapons for the armed struggle made it possible to bring about 

/ 

/ ' . 1G8 



in a short period a radical change in the technical base, and, 
in essence, to create a qualitatively new type of ; armed force, 

4 

our ocean going navy, in which submarine forces, aviation, .^ 
surface warships, and other types of forces developed 
harmoniously. Thus the beginning was made for the creation 

of a balanced Navy, capable of successfully conducting combat 

157 
operations under differing circumstances." 

Of course, it must be realized that the decision of the 
mid-1950s just established a concept which gave the green ^ 
light so to speak for the corresponding development of the Soviet 
Navy, and it would take years, more than a decade, for its 
final implementation. Neither the Soviet technological- 
industrial base was immediately ready for the concept implementation 
nor was the Soviet military theory, especially its naval art, 
adjusted to the concept. Now we shall examine the development 
of the Soviet Navy since the mid-1950s to the present time. 



157 S. Gorshkov, Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 19 67, p. 20. 
The balanced navy was defined by Gorshkov as follows: "By 
well balanced navy we mean a navy which, in composition and 
armament., is capable of carrying out missions assigned it in 
a nuclear war, as well as in a war which does not make use of 
nuclear weapons, and is also able to support state interests 
at sea in peacetime." 



ic 



Q 



Fron tho "id-lPSOs to the 
Beginning of the 1970s 

At the time of mid-1950 decision the construction of light 
and heavy cruisers had already ceased, the construction of the 
last new conventional Kotlin-class Soviet destroyer was well 
underway, and the production of submarines, accelerated. 
Approximately between 1955 and 1957 the Soviet shipbuilding 
program was shifted partially from the construction of 
conventional submarines and destroyers to the construction 
of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles and to 
destroyers equipped with cruise missiles. A prototype of a 
nuclear submarine was already under construction and, as stated 
previously, a ballistic missile of approximately 350-nautical 
mile range had already been tested in 1955 (surface launch) . 
The construction of the post-war second Soviet long-range 
diesel-electric F-class submarines was started. 

In 1956 and 1957 the situation was probably considered 
promising by the Soviets. They started to get the first, 
primitive, ballistic missile delivery system placed on their 

Z-V-class submarines, later to be placed on the nuclear H-1-class 

158 

submarines. Construction of the first surface ship armed with 



1 r o 

Congressional Records, July 1, 1971, p..E6854 



110 



cruise missiles, a modified Kotlin-class destroyer, was well 
underway. Naval aviation which already had a substantial 
number of TU-16 (Badger) aircraft, was about to receive a 
longer-range TU-95 (Bear). m short, it looked as though the 
Soviets were acquiring forces which would be able to deal with 
aircraft carriers successfully. But they were 'not alone in 
enjoying the fruits of the "revolution in military affairs" 'they 
so loudly glorified. 

Towards the end of the 1950s the emphasis on nuclear 
delivery capabilities was growing steadily in the United States. 
Aircraft primarily designed for nuclear strikes, the A-3 

(A3D Douglas Sky Warrior) , were introduced in quantity in 

159 
aircraft carrier strike forces. Larger planes, larger carriers 

and smaller nuclear weaponry made the US Navy a powerful 

strategic offensive force. The increased range of US carrier 

borne aircraft permitted launching farther from the Soviet shores 

and deeper penetration inside the Soviet territory, thus making 

defense against them of strategic significance. 

The next problem which became strategic from the beginning 

was the Polaris program launched in the US during the second 

half of the 1950s. In the case of the Polaris submarines, the 

159 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1964, 
PP. 29-30. 






M -* ^ 



necessity to destroy the ballistic missile carrier, the "platform" 
from which the nuclear missiles are launched, became even more 
important than the anti-carrier tasks. A carrier does not 
launch the weapon but only the weapon carrier, the aircraft.. 
There was a well-developed country air defense program (PVO) 
disposed in depth which could intercept at least the majority 
of the aircraft and prevent them from delivering the nuclear 
weapons. In the case of the Polaris submarines, if the weapons 
were launched, the only defense would be an anti-ballistic 
missile system (ABM) defensive capability, which, even if "fully 
developed, would have to be distributed between ICMBs and SLBMs. 
Because of the strong possibility that the SLBM would be 
launched after the ICBM, the available ABM's would be few in 
number at best or even lacking. The situation might be even 
more complicated in case of a coordinated attack by ICBMs, 
SLBMs, SAC (Strategic Air Command) and carrier borne aviation, 
when each previously -launched system would considerably reduce 
or nullify the defense against the next offensive system. All 
this made the task of countering the Polaris submarines of 
utmost importance. However, this extremely complex task 
compounds an already complex ASW (anti-submarine warfare) problem 
and would have to be performed in the remote areas of the 
oceans, where ail kinds of opposition to. the ASW "forces had to be 



11? 



expected. The rapidly increasing ranges of Polaris missiles 

(A-l, 1,200; A-2, 1,500; A-3 , 2,500 nautical miles) would draw the 

ASW forces farther and farther into the open sea. It was also 

important to establish an optimum package of ASW forces, i.e. 

a combination of surface forces, airborne forces, and killer 

submarines. Thus, the announced Polaris program, even more 

than the increased potentials of carrier-borne aircraft, 

contributed to the necessity of forward deployment of the Soviet 

161 

Navy. 

The third factor forcing the Soviet Navy's forward 
deployment was the necessity to assure the deployment of their 
own submarines. Because of the geography, the deployment of 
Soviet long-range submarines would often if not always have 
to be accompanied by protective forces which would minimize, if 
not eliminate, the effectiveness of enemy ASW efforts. This is 
a complex and very intensive operation in which a considerable 
portion of the Soviet fleets, primarily the Northern and Pacific, 

would have to participate. When a growing number of Soviet 

- 
submarines armed with ballistic missiles became an integral 



t en 

Jane's Weapon Systems , 1970-1971, pp. 135-137. 

161 

It must be realized that any program is announced or 

detected by intelligence long before its practical realization, 

thus generating the need for counter measures. 



•« 



113 



part of the Soviet strategic forces, their deployment assumed 
correspondingly greater importance. Thus, the threat initiated 
by the opponent and the growing participation of Soviet naval 
forces in nuclear delivery generated a number of specific tasks 
which, in turn, determined the development and the mode of 
operation of the Soviet navy^ during the decade »of the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 1970s. 162 

As previously stated, toward the end of the 1950s Soviet 
military theory rejected strategic defense as a predominant 
type of warfare, and started to emphasize the strategic offensive. 
Such an emphasis, however, while being treated as an important 
shift in the Soviet military policy, could not and did not 
eliminate the necessity of having various forces capable of 
both offensive and defensive operation. This was particularly 
true, more than in any other services, in the case of the Soviet 
navy. For this reason, considerable resources and production 



An analysis of factors influencing Soviet naval 
development can be found in John Erickson, " Soviet Military Power ", 
Royal United, Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, 1971, 
pp. 52-61, and Michael McGuire, " Soviet Naval Capabilities and 
Ind entions" , Congressional Record, July 1, 1971, pp. E6850-E6S65. 
While it would be wrong to underestimate the influence of 
American naval development on generating a corresponding Soviet 
reaction, it would be equally wrong to treat it as asole factor. 
The Soviets have had their own plans and programs, but the threat 
as they see it could not be ignored and hence, it obviously played 
an important role in necessitating a speedy reaction and thus 
interfering somewhat with what otherwise would be a much smoother, 
planned development. 



/ 



in* 



capacities were allocated for naval development. In addition 
to the construction of the first ballistic missile submarines 
both nuclear and conventionally powered, and the conversion of 
the first diesel submarine into long-range cruise-missile 
submarines, a search for a new type of surface ships corresponding 
to the newly emerged tasks was underway in 1957-1958. The 
new types of surface ships armed with various missiles were" 
widely discussed during special conferences called for this 
purpose in late 1957 and early 1958. Commander-in-Chief of the 
Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Gorshkov himself used every occasion 
to find different opinions and arguments concerning the type 
of ships needed. 'As a result, the basic designs of such missile 
ships as the Kynda and the Kashin were proposed by the Navy 
in the spring of 1958 and were soon approved by the Soviet 
government. Considerable resources were allocated for research 
and development, apparently in excess of what could be absorbed. 
All the foregoing permitted Admiral Gorshkov to state, "The Navy, 
having always been the focus of the latest achievements in 
science and technology, was the first of the branches of the 
armed forces to see the large-scale and general introduction 



In the fall of 1957 Admiral Gorshkov bitterly complained 
about the underutilization of allocated resources for research 
and development and demanded a drastic improvement in the 
situation. 



I 

' i lib 



of nuclear missiles, radio electronics equipment, and nuclear 

i • ,,164 

propulsion.' 

In February 1959, addressing the 21st Party 'congress, 
Soviet Defense Minister Marshall of the Soviet Union R. Ya 
Malinovskiy stated, "Our Navy has become in full a modern navy, 
capable of resolving any strategic mission in its area of ■ 
responsibility. Overseas, they quite frequently speak and write 
that the U. S. Navy is capable of delivering an attack and 
landing at any point along our coastline. But as the saying 
goes, 'It is easy to boast, but it is also easy to fall. '- It 
seems to me that the people overseas should be thinking about 
the fate of their own coasts and their extended lines of 
communication, whose vulnerability is now monstrously bared, 
and about the traditional invulnerability of America which 
has forever been eliminated." 165 

But in spite of the gradual introduction of some new 
types of missile carrying surface ships, the end of the decade 
of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s witnessed the main 
emphasis placed on submarines and naval aviation in the Soviet 
Navy development. For example, an editorial in the Soviet' Navy 

164 j 

S. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 1967, p. 7. 

165 T 

Izvestiya , February 4, 1959. 



•T 

/ 



116 



newspaper emphasized the "nrnfn,.^ -, ■ ^ ^ 

profound qualitative change which have 

recently been made and are beinz mid^" <« +u 

in " made in the composition of 

the Soviet Navy, stressing that " + }-,« ^ v l 

e^smg tnat the submarine • force armed with 

modern weapons has become the basis for the combat force" of 

the Navy. Naval aviation was named as a second most important arm 

of the Soviet Navy. 166 

That attitude was understandable, for the main stress- up 
to the beginning of- the 196 0s had been placed on anti-oarrier 
operations and the necessity of assuring the deployment of Soviet 
submarines in the face of opposition by those attack carriers 

and their supporting- forcpc ti,» ,. u 

vv img xorces. The submarines and naval aviation 

were viewed as the main forces for anti-carrier operations, and 

the leading role of submarines armed with cruise missiles in 

aati-carrier operations was supplemented by the "sophistication 

ot naval aviation". 167 

The role assigned to the naval aviation, particularly in 
mti-carrier operations, can be seen from the following statement 
>/ Chief of soviet Main Navy Staff Admiral ». D . Sergeyev, "The 
diking power of the Soviet submarine fleet is successfully 

! ^ t6d " ith th6 *™ «**at capabilities of missile carrying 

166 

Sovetskiy Flot r July 20, I960. 

167- - ., 

S. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1963, p. 16. 



'» 



111 



naval aviation, which is equipped with fast, long-range 
aircraft and armed with long-range missiles for various 
purposes. Even the most modern of surface ships cannot oppose 
this aviation successfully, because nowadays it is not the 
aircraft themselves which must be repelled, as was the case 
previously, but rather the homing missiles they release from 
long ranges." 

Rejecting the attack aircraft carriers as a main force 
for their own navy, the Soviets did not lose respect for them, 
and were not ignoring the threat they posed. In the middle 

and late 1960s they still viewed aircraft carriers as an 

16 ^ 
"extremely powerful enemy at sea". 

The Soviet Navy's confidence in its ability to counter 

attack carriers force in the pre-launch zone and hence reducing 

the danger to the ships operating in coastal waters, was 

reflected in a decision to remove fighters from naval aviation 

and to transfer them 'to the PVO and the Air Force. Since 1960 

the Soviet naval aviation has been divided into three major 

types: missile carrying (strike) aviation, reconnaisance 



Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1965, pp. 89-93; I. M. Korotkin, 
Z. ?. Slepenkov, B. A. Kolyzaye, " Avianostsy " (Aircraft Carriers), 
Voenizdat, 1964, pp. 280. In 1967 S. Gorsakov, Morskoy Sbornik 
No. 2, 1967, while denigrating the aircraft carrier as a main 
combatant, nonetheless confirmed its residual value for 
strategic delivery. 

•r 






aviation, and anti-submarine aviation. The Soviet Long Range 
aviation (LRA) subordinated to the Air Force, was intended for 
use against naval targets since the mid 1950s. With the' 
development of Soviet ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines, 
the LRA role in delivering strategic strikes was gradually 
diminishing while its naval role, particularly .against carriers 
and large grouping of ships and convoys, increased. The LRA 
role in anti-ship operations was clearly emphasized by the 

authors of Military Strategy , particularly in its second, revised, 

- 

edition, where they stated that "long-range bombing aviation 
armed with long-range missiles retains the capability to launch 
attacks on enemy targets, especially at sea and in the oceans, 
and also on those along the shore." 

"Attack carrier units can also be successfully combated 

169 
by bothnaval and long-range aviation." 

This role of Soviet long-range aviation v/as confirmed 

by the commander-in-ohief of the Soviet Air Force: "Long' range 

aviation armed with air-to-surface missiles can attack important 

/ ■ ! 

strategic objects at a great distance on land and fulfill 

missions at sea in annihilating naval forces of the enemy 

l 
Thus our aviation in close cooperation with other armed forces 



169 ! 

Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) , 2nd Revised 



Edition, 1963, p. 312 and 398. 



! 



; / 



119 



of the country is called upon to perform a sizeable number 

170 

of tasks in modern warfare.' 

Early in the 1960s, the Soviet military planners probably 
realized that the growing nuclear strike capability of the US 
Navy had started to shift in favor of the Polaris system. 
With the announced forthcoming increase in the 'Polaris missile 
ranges, it became evident that countermeasures, preferably in 
the form of the permanent presence of naval forces in the 
remote areas were the Polaris submarines were most likely to 
operate, were needed. Such an awareness was clearly expressed 
by Admiral S. Gorshkov, when he emphasized the necessity for 
the Soviet Navy to have, in addition to the long range striking 
forces, "other forces which are necessary for the active 
struggle against any type of enemy". Such forces, in the 

opinion of admiral, should be represented by "missile ships 

171 
and boats, ships and aviation to fight enemy submarines". 

To a certain degree, dual forces had been under development 

since the late 1950s. However, except for the long-range 



i 



striking forces, that is, submarines and naval aviation, the 



170 Marshal X. Vershinin, "Contemporary Aviation and War", 
Av iatsiya i Kosinonavtika , No. 6, 1963, p. 14. See also Lt . Gen. 
S. A. Gulyayev, The Role of Aviation in Combat Operations, Morskoy 
Sbornik No. 6, 1965, pp. 36-43. 

i 7] 

S. Gorshkov, The Party's Care of the Navy, Morskoy 

Sbornik No. 7, 1963, p. 16. 

.. . , 

120 



rest of the Soviet Navy forces, had been handicapped by the 
lack of air cover, and their effective operating range was 
limited to that of shore-based air cover plus the range of their 
missiles. At the beginning of the 1960s that was obviously . 
not enough, particularly if the Soviets wanted to seek out 
Polaris submarines. Any forward deployment of .the Soviet naval 
forces, even for a short period of time, would require a 
considerable increase in air defense armament. This is precisely 
the end toward which the Soviet Navy started working from the 
beginning of the 1960s. Not only ship constructions received 
drastically increased and improved air defense armament, but 
some older units were modernized and equipped with surface-to-air 
instead of surface-to-surface missiles. 

Historically, the Soviet Navy approach to antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) was quite specific. Up to the mid 1950s very 
little attention was paid to the problem, and anti-submarine 
defense was centered -around self-protection of individual' 
units underway and protection of convoys in the pre-coastal 
zone. To a certain degree, it was probably a rational approach, 
for there was neither a need for extensive efforts in anti- 
submarine defense, i.e. there were not many submarines to oppose, 
nor was there any requirement for protection of convoys on the 
high seas. 



121 



During World War II, most submarines were detected and 
located because they had to expose themselves at the surface 
(while underway to an operations area, to change or take' 
position for an attack, to charge their batteries). Strictly 
speaking, the World War II and first post-war generation of 
submarines were merely diving boats; only nuclear propulsion 
made them true submarines. In addition, high speed ceased to 
be advantage of the" surface ships. Thus, advances in science 
and technology clearly benefited submarines more than they did 
the surface ships, and made ASW an even more complex problem. 

Since the first Polaris submarine started its patrol, the 
existing ASW forces of the Soviet Navy, mainly oriented toward 
the defense of the fleet operational zone, were straightway 
found inadequate. Built primarily around the surface search 
strike group (PUG-poiskovo-udarnaya gruppa) supported by 
mainly independent efforts of submarines and in cooperation 
with the shore-based *ASW aviation (helicopters and not very 
numerous BE-6 aircraft) , the Soviet Navy ASW forces were forced 
to operate in new zones which had become oceanic and of vast 
dimension. Obviously, a complete reorientation of ASW efforts, 
and more importantly, an accelerated build-up of forces in 
different proportions was needed. 

Contrary to a widespread belief (mainly as a result of 






Krushchev pronouncements) concerning the Soviet Union purported 
condemnation of surface ships, their construction ^and, what is 
more important, efforts at their improvement and sophistication 
never ceased. What the ASW problem did for the Soviet Navy 
surface fleet was to create conditions which helped accelerate 
its development. It was obvious that the forces needed to 
combat modern submarines, particularly the Polaris type, had 
to be a combination of submarines, aviation, surface ships, and 
various fixed and/or floating detection sensors. The main 
problem remains that of detection and classification, for'as 
soon as a submarine is reliably tracked, the available weaponry, 
particularly those which would be employed in a nuclear conflict, 
can destroy it. In short, what was needed was a massive effort 

combining heterogeneous naval forces and representing "a case 

i no 

of assembling quantity to counter quality." 

Despite the considerable research and development efforts 
to employ the other physical fields in submarine detection such as 
thermal, electromagnetic, hydrodynamic, turbulent, radioactive, 
the acoustic field continues to be most widely used. Shore 
based ASW aircraft have been charged with the initial detection 
of submarines in most of the remote areas. The concept of the 



i 

172 

L. Martin, p. 103 



/ 



. 123 



combined, systematic employment of all ov *■ 

1 all existing forces and 
means for ASW has been irin«+ * 

n ad ° Pted as a major principle . "3 

Correspondingly, all three main. * 

e major ^Pes of AS17 forces 

submarines, aviflti^ 3 ' 

tl0U aQd SUrfa0e S "P3, were improved, 
particular duriag the secoud 

me 1960s when new 
classes of submarines new „„* - 

' and 1MPrOVed ve "i°"s of long-range 
-craft, and a nuraber Qf _ ciasges 

.. iiace ships entered 

the service. The s'ovi + v 

. ° Vlet ^^ C ° nSide - ". new Moskva-class 

AW cruiser with helicopters aboard in ' 

aooard, in commission since 1967 
as "a fundamentally new ASff ship to fi- h V . 

P t0 fl S ht submarines in the 
remote areas." -174 

«°skva, a sophisticated combination of detection se 

^^cixon sensors 
ana weapons system to n + 

" P1 ' eSent **»»•* «- best Soviet ASV , 
ship and probably one of the best it * 

' lf ° 0t the b ^t, ASff surface 
ship in the World n»t +h- , ""ace 

M. But this does not mean that Moskva meets 

re<,UirementS *~ ■»» 4-1 by nuclear submarines 
— riy the Polaris type, and.it ,s hardly possible that 
«f surface ship would, m cert- in . ' 

onf1 , ° areaS ' P^icularly in such' 

o»«»ed basins as Mediterranean (where th. h • u 

" USht have * certain marginal anti pm ■ 
__ " al ant i-Polans capability. i a 

173 

^HassaLSbojnik »»,. 10 , 1970< pp> 16 _ 23 . . 

4 i!arskoy_aorni iLN o. 11, 1971j p> 24 _ 



1 9ii 



addition, this type of ship might be deployed to provide the 
ASV/ capability of a task force underway or during .a fleet 
operation assuring deployment of the submarines. 

As is the case with any major navy in the world, the 
problems associated with the anti-submarine warfare have become, 
during the decade of the 1960s, one of the majdr preoccupations 
of the Soviet Navy, and a combination of forces have been 

under development. Moreover, ASW was a factor necessitating 

175 
the forward deployment of the Soviet Navy forces. 

The new tasks of the navy and the new armament of its forces 

generated the necessity for the revision of theoretical 

principles of the naval art. There was an initial application 

in the late 1950s of the first types of new armament and ships 

to the "provisions of the operational art and tactics", but as 

the latter were based on past experience, it was of relatively 

short duration. The Soviets most likely realized that the 

existing theory of the deployment of naval forces (with the 

exception of submarines) was a naval variant of the Maginot 

Line, while the capability of their opponents could produce 

the effect similar to Ludendorf 's maneuver. But this was just 



175 

Vice-Admiral A. Sorokin and Capt. V. Krasnov, Anti- 
submarine Defense, Nauka i zhizn * (Science and Life), No. 1, 
1972, pp. 48-55. 



■1 O ' ' 

1^0 



one more proof that history teaches what should he avoided 
rather than what must be done, and a prolonged debate and a 
vigorous seareh for "new, original and extremely effective ' 
nethods for conducting the armed struggle with a powerful 

"J *T/^ 

enemy at sea" was needed. 

The debates, initiated in .the early 1960s, continued for 
several years and resulted in a considerable revision of the 
naval art and a reexamination of naval missions. The content 

■ 

of such well known principles as concentration, cooperation, . 
and maneuver was adjusted to the new conditions of missile - 
nu clear war . ^ Aocordingly) ±t ^ ^^ ^ ^^.^ 

should be achieved not by concentration of weapon carriers 
(ships, submarines, aircraft) but by the concentration of 
«re through the manuever of trojectories. The power of the force 
should he achieved not by the number of missiles fired, but by 
the yield of the nuclear warheads used. 

S. Gorshkov in Horskoy Sbornik No.' 2, 1967, p. 17. 

Stalbo"article Ie "On eS ^ anitiated *y *•»* Admiral K. A. 

'Contemporary L 1 if^°"'?- Ca * eg r ieS ° f NaVal Art in «•** 
be f oVi™ 7 ••^"ifes.ation", Morskoy Sbornik No. 1 1961 to 

«• xollowed by a number of articTSS T h n :,I ot ~ 

articles written >■„ -n , articles. Ihe „iost important were 

*>! 3, 19 C T T4 *ear A ch ;11 ral V. Lisyutin, Morsko y Sbornik 

■'<>• 4 lltl and " _22 '. R ? ar Admi ^l V. SysoevT lio^i koy sborni k 
"Some Q L'stions of U Fwt Z A n f artiCle '° V Ad= ' iral **• ^teleyevT 
a££2il So! 2 itte pp 27 IT" " COat ™^y »«". ^rskoy 



l*»o 



While recognizing the desirability of cooperation 
between homogeneous forces at the tactical level, the cooperation 
of heterogeneous forces has not been considered necessarily 
obligatory and in certain cases not even desirable. It 
was claimed that the power of nuclear warheads permits the 
solution of various tasks independently by a limited number 
of homogeneous carriers. Cooperation on the operational 
level, under the condition that the vital principle "nobody 
waits for anybody" be observed was found desirable and necessary. 
A high degree of operational and strategic cooperation among 
various Soviet fleets was found obligatory. 

Under certain conditions of c^mb^t, .-^.rouvctr was also 
found of limited value; hence, the maneuvering of forces could 
often be replaced by the maneuvering of trojectories thanks 
to the increased range of missiles. The role of the various 
naval missions has been also revised. For example, such a 
traditional mission eff the Soviet Navy as the support of the 
maritime flank of the army has been reduced in importance and 
has acquired a different meaning, to include the situation when 
the navy has to exclude an attack from the sea by the enemy's 
naval forces. In short, when supporting the Army, the Navy 
would be involved in purely naval operations far from the 
shore and therefore the Army "will not see the naval units 



127 



involvoil in its support". * ' 

The importance of action against sea lines of 
communications was said to be diminished, although the necessity 
to be ready for such action under certain conditions was 
stressed. A new approach was taken in regard to amphibious 
operations. Previous claims that the role of amphibious 
operations in a nuclear war has diminished was dropped, and the 
necessity to have specialized forces appropriately equipped 
and supported, emphasized. In this regard, the first edition 
of Military Strategy, 1962, which negated the role of amphibious 
operations conducted by the Navy, was strongly attacked by a 
leading Soviet admiral for such an oversight. 179 Admiral 
Alafuzov strongly critized practically the whole treatment 
of naval matters by the authors of Military Strategy , but he was 
in complete agreement withthe authors in their recognition 
of an "independent type of strategic operations conducted by 
the Navy" and the potentially decisive importance of naval: 
forces in local wars. 

•n. / ' I * 

lhe overwhelming importance of nuclear strikes launched 



17< 



°Vu. Panteleyev, p. 31. 

179 

Admiral V. A. Alafuzov "O n the Appearance of the Y/ork , 
military strategy ", Morskoy Sboraik , January 1953, pp. S3-95. 



: / 
I 



15.2. 



by naval forces against enemy territory has been constantly 
emphasized. While recognizing the diminishing role of the main 
force in combating the enemy naval counterpart, that role 
has been found even more important for the remaining naval 
forces, because of the enemy's ability to launch strategic 

strikes against Soviet territory and hence the .necessity for 

180 
the Soviet Navy to prevent it. In this respect, combating 

enemy ballistic missile nuclear submarines and attack aircraft 

carriers was found to be of utmost importance for the reasons 

previously discussed, and the necessity for forward deployment 

of naval forces, recognized. ^ 

Continuing to recognize submarines and naval aviation 

as the main striking forces of the Navy, the Soviets developed 

renewed interest in surface ships equipped with new armament, 

particularly for air defense, and capable of operating without 

air cover in remote areas. It was emphasized that the new 

ships armed with SAM -complexes and automated rapid-fire guns 

would shift the previously extremely unfavorable odds between the 

ship's PVO and attacking aircraft in favor of the former. As 

a matter of fact, the necessity for the air defense systems to 

combat enemy weapons, i.e. missiles, and not only carriers, i.e. 



"I no 

° Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, "Trends in Naval Development", 
Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1966, pp. 31-36. 



129 



181 
aircraft, was stressed as predominant. The necessity and 

the possibility for even small surface ships to have a reliable 

air defense in the form of compact SAMs was emphasized. 'It 

is remarkable how closely these theoretical conclusions were 

carried on into practice by the consequent development of the 

Soviet Navy. On the other hand, it can be assumed that when 

these theoretical articles were written, the decision to build 

corresponding forces had already been made, and the articles 

were just preparing the Navy for such forces and were stimulating 

the development of tactics for their deployment. 

Now we shall briefly examine the development of various 

forces of the Soviet Navy after the mid-1950 decision. 



181 

Rear Admiral V. Sysoev and Captain V. Smirnov, Ant i -Air 

Defense of Formations of Surface Ships , Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 

1966, pp. 32-38. 



130 



/ 



• 



Development of Forces 

Submarines ; 

As was noted previously, Soviet naval construction' started 
in the late twenties with submarines. In spite of considerable 
economic and particularly industrial difficulties, the serial 
construction of L, Shch, M, S, P, and K classes" of submarines 
was mastered in the decade of the 1930s. Particularly productive 
was the year 1936, when the Soviet shipbuilding industry 
delivered to the navy the largest number of submarines. The 
tempo of submarine construction was such that, once in the 

summer of 1936, the Soviet Navy commissioned a whole brigade 

182 
of submarines (6 to 8 units) . The development and alleged 

construction of submarines with closed-cycle engines was started 

183 

prior to World War II. During the decade of the 1930s, the 



182 

G. M." Trusov, Podvodnye Lodki v Russkom i Sovetskom Flote 

(Submarines in the Russian and the Soviet Navy, 2nd Edition, 

revised and enlarged. Shipbuilding Industry Publishing House, 

1963, pp. 440; See also Captain 1st Rank V- S. Bakov, "History 

of Soviet Submarines", Morsk oy Sbornik No. 11, 1964, pp. 90-93; 

and Rear Admiral M. A. Rudnitskiy, "Soviet Submarines", Morskoy 

Sbornik , No. 7, 1967, pp. 29-34. 

G. M. Trusov, p. 338. Except for the source, no 
confirmation or denial concerning the closed-cycle Soviet submarines 
during p re-World War II period could be found. However, during the 
first three post-war years, an intensive test of closed-cycle 
submarine No. 401 was conducted in the Baltic. This, however, coiild 
be result of Soviet knowledge of work by the German designer 
Walt her. 



131 



Soviet shipbuilding industry delivered 206 submarines to the 
Soviet Navy and 52 more were commissioned during £he war. 184 

The World War II experience of foreign and Soviet 
submarine operations were carefully studied in the Soviet 
Union. As a result it became clear that submarines were in 
need of serious improvement in greater range and submerged 
speed, submerged depths and in secrecy. During the second 
half of the 1940s, the Soviet Union constructed a considerable . 
number of small modernized M-class submarines, while maintaining 
basically the submarine fleet of pre-war construction. However, 
starting with end of the 1940s, a new series of submarines of 
improved quality, the W-class (Project 6137 ana Z-cIass (Project 
611), were built. The diesel-powered W-class submarine was 
originally produced as an attack submarine armed with torpedoes 



184 Morskoy Sbornik No. 9, 1971, p. 29 

185 

See for example L. M. Yeremeyev and A. P. Shergin, 

"The Submarines of the Foreign Fleets- in World War II. Operational 

and Statistical Materials Based on the Experience of World War 

II ( Podvodnyye lodki inostrannykh flotov vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne . 

O perativno-statisticheskiye materialy po opytu vtoroy mirovoy 

voyny) (Voyenizdat, 1962); I. S. Isakov and L. il. Yeremeyev, 

"Transport Operations of Submarines" ( Transportnaya deyatel ' nost \ 

podvodnykh lodok ) (Voyenizdat, 1959); S. A. Sherr, "Warships of the 

Sea Depths", (Ko rabli morskikh glubin) (3rd ed., revised and 

enlarged, Voyenizdat, 1964); The lead article of Pravda of 

10 July 1942, "Submarine Fleet — Pride of the Soviet People" 

( Podvodniy flot — gordost' sovetskogo naroda) . 



1 r 9 

*** O K- 



and eouipped with dock-mounted guns which were later removed. 
Close to 200 units were built altogether; many were transferred 
to other countries but most, although aging, still remain, in 
commission in the Soviet Navy. As is the case with all Soviet 
torpedo submarines, the W-class is capable of ■ minelaying. 
Through various types of changes a true familyof classes has 
emerged from the W-class. Apart from various conning tower 
shapes (of which there are at least five) , the most important 
modifications of the W-class were in 1956 or 1957, when the 
first submarine of that class was converted into a guided-missile 
submarine. An erectable cylindrical housing for a guided 

missile was installed on the upper deck, and the new class 

183 
received the NATO designation of W single-cylinder class. 

In 1958-1959 several other Y/-class submarines were outfitted 

with twin launchers for guided missiles, resulting in the 

socalled Twin-Cylinder-class guided missile submarines. Another 

major conversion of W-class submarine produced the Long Bin class, 

a guided missile submarine carrying four missiles in its modified 

tower. A few units were converted to radar early waring submarines 

designated the Canvas Bag class. 



n Of! 

Siegfried Breyer, Die Sow jetischen U-Boo t e der "W"- 
Klass als Typfamilie (The Soviet Submarines of the W-Class as 
a Family of Classes)", Soldat Und Technik, No. 1, 1971, pp. 10-15. 



' / 



1 OQ 



The Z-class dicscl powered submarine, of which a few 
dozen units were built, was originally built as an ocean going 
long-range torpedo attack submarine. Although several modifications 
of this class are known, the most important was a conversion 
to ballistic missile submarines known as the Z-5 class. It 
was undoubtedly a modified Z-class submarine from which the 
first surface launching of a ballistic missile occurred in 
September 1955 , Somewhat later, between 1956 and 1957,^ several 

units, each carrying a pair of surface-launched Sark ballistic 

187 
missiles with a range of 300-350 nautical miles, were produced. 

Starting in 1954 a few dozen diesel powered, closed-cycle 
propulsion system submarines, Q-class (Project 615) were built. 
This small (around 700 tons displacement) short-range submarine 
was intended primarily for anti-submarine warfare and carries 
four bow-mounted torpedo tubes. The closed-cycle propulsion 
system, at least during the first three to four years of operation, 
was less than satisfactory and dangerous to operate. 

The second half of the 1950s and the beginning of the 
1960s produced considerable changes in Soviet submarine 
construction. In contrast to the first post-World-War-II decade, 



187 Lt. Com. Robert D. Wells, USN, The Soviet Submarine 
Force, IT. S. Naval Ins t itute Proceeding s, August 1971, and S. 
Breyer, Noue and modernisierte Kriogsschi f f typen. der Sow jet- 
Flotto. (New and Modernized Warship Classes of the Soviet Navy) , 
Soldat und Tcchnik, No. 11-, 1970, pp. 628-635. . 



1 1l\ 



when, despite considerable qualitative improvements in the 

W, Z, and Q classes, emphasis .as still on quantity , the second 

generation of post-war Soviet <^-,,-i~4- t. . * 

v war soviet Soviet submarines was narked 

by drastic qualitative chances both in }^o+ 

%yfa ' DOtn ln boats performance and 

the armament systems installed. Recognizing the considerable 
improvements in conventionally powered submarines, the two most 
important factors were the beginning of construction of nuclear 
powered submarines and the wide introduction of both ballistic 
and guided missiles. Construction of nuclear powered submarines 
.which was initiated in 1953 on an experimental basis, was" 
authorized sometime in late 1955 or early 1956. It was obviously 
part of a program which visualized the construction of nuclear 
powered torpedo attack N-class and ballistic missile H-class 
submarines. A nuclear warhead for torpedoes was successfully 
tested in i 95 7. Conventionally-powered ballistic missile 
G-class and torpedo attack F-class submarines were built 
simultaneously. Later the program was augmented and the ' 
construction of diesel-powered torpedo attack R-class submarines, 
nuclear powered guided missile E-class, and diesel powered 
guided missile J-class, submarines was authorized. It should 
be noted that the Soviets first built ballistic missile 
submarines (G and H classes), and two or three years later, they 
built cruise missile submarines ( J and E classes) , after the 



T5C 



concept has boon tested on V/-class conversions. Technological 
problems, possibly associated with the development of submarine 
launch cruise missile system, notwithstanding, the strategic 
importance attached to the ballistic missile submarines armed 
even with a short range (originally 350 n.m.) missiles is obvious. 

Construction of conventionally powered oceangoing torpedo 
attack F-class submarines displacing over 2,000 tons (submerged) 
and carrying 20-24 torpedos started in 1956. The submarines of 
which 45 units were built have been assigned ASW and anti-shipping., 
role. 

Between 1958 and 1961 about 20 conventionally-powered l 
medium-range R-class torpedo submarines were built. As an 

improved W-class design, the R-class most likely has been used 

188 

primarily for ASW. 

Nuclear powered N-class hunter-killer and attack submarines 
were built about 1957 and the early 1960s. More than a dozen 
units were constructed, making the N-class the first Soviet 
nuclear powered submarine to be produced in series. 

Conventionally-powered ballistic-missile G-class 
submarines were constructed during approximately the same period 



138-p or characteristics of Soviet submarines see Jane ' s 
Fight ing Ships , 1971-1972 and earlier editions; U.S. Nava l 
Ins titute Proceedings , August 1971; Soldat und Tec hn.tk No. 7, 
1969, pp. 376-382; Congres sional Records July 1, 1971, pp. 
E-6360 - E6386. 



lob 



a s the X-class. Originally armed with three surface-launched 

SS-N-4 Sark ballistic missiles (350 mautical mile range) , many, 

i 
if not all, G-class submarines were later refitted with three 

underwater launched SS-N-5 Sark ballistic missiles (650 nautical' 

nile range) . Close to two dozen units were built. 

Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile H-class submarines 
were constructed during approximately the same period as the 
N and G classes, and were originally outfitted with the same 
Sark missiles as the G-class (a variant known as the H-l) . 
Later, H-2 class submarines carrying three Serb missiles were 
produced. Less than a dozen H-class units were built. 

During the last two days of February 1972, a US Navy 
plane spotted a disabled Soviet nuclear H-class submarine 
surfaced about 600 miles northeast of Newfoundland. A photo 
appearing in the Washington Post shows an unusally long sail 
with five or six hatches clearly visible on the top of the sail. 
This would represent a third modification of the class and would 
be designated H-3. The type of missile carried by these 
submarines, conversion of which was said to have been accomplished 
just a few years ago, is the object of conjecture. 

After the engineering feasibility of submarine launched 
cruise missiles had been tested and approved by the conversion of 
a few W-class submarines, the Soviet Union in 1960 or 1961 



137 



initiated the construction of a new type of nuclear-powered 
guided-missile submarine, the E-1-class, which car.ries six 
Shaddock surface-to-surface cruise missiles with a range 'of 
between 300 and 400 nautical miles In 1962, the construction 
of E-2-class submarines each carrying eight Shaddock missiles 
,and a number of torpedoes was initiated. A total of about 
30 E-class submarines were built. 

Practically simultaneously with E-class was initiated 
the construction of the conventionally-powered guided-missile 
J-class submarine. About 16 units were built, each carrying 
four Shaddock missiles. 

Similarities in basic designs of hulls and propulsion 
between nuclear powered N-class and H-class as well as between 
conventionally powered F-class and G-class are considerable, 
and testify to the Soviet utilization of basic concept designs 
and serial production methods to build a multi-purpose submarine 
fleet. Also, characteristic of Soviet naval development has 
been the practically simultaneous outfitting of the submarines 
with radically different propulsion systems with the same 
armament package (G and H, F and N, J and E) and with consequent 
modernization upon the availability of better systems. 
Utilization of existing submarines to test new concepts and 
armament systems (Z-5 for ballistic missiles, W-class for cruise 



13fl 



missiles) has also been characteristic. 

Somewhere in the mid 1960s, possibly in 1963, a new 
program for the construction of at least four, and perhaps five, 
classes of new submarines was authorized. The submarines "~ 
built under this program started to enter service toward the 
late 1960s, and represent a powerful addition to the Soviet 
submarine fleet designed for multiple tasks, ranging from " 
strategic deliveries of nuclear weaponry to AS1V and patrol in 
coastal waters. Three out of four new known submarines are 
nuclear powered and one is conventional. The most important 
have been the Y-class ballistic missile nuclear-powered 

submarines, which iq C Am «,v, n 4. • . -, 

*«^o, wuACH is somewhat similar to tho ttc v+u a-,-, 

Uldr zo tne US Etnan Alien SSBN". 

They are equipped with 16 missiles which reportedly have a range 
of 1500 nautical miles. The construction of Y-B-class submarines 
which carry 16 missiles with a 2,400 - 3,000 nautical mile 
range was reported. 189 The annual rate of production originally 
estimated at 6 to 8 units was recently corrected upward, to 8 
to 10 units. By April 1971, 17 units were operational and 15 
".ore under construction. Even with an annual rate of construction 
of 8 units, the Soviet Navy would have more than 40 Y-class 

^oldat un d Technik. Wo. 7 1971, p . 415. ' 



2£L 



.ne 



submarines by the beginning of 1974. 190 The subraari) 
displacing over 8,000 tons (submerged) has somewhait greater 
horsepower than American Polaris submarines and its submerged 
speed is reportedly close to 36 knots. 

Another new submarine which appeared in the late 1960s 
is the nuclear powered cruise missile C-class. * This fast 
submarine is armed with eight underwater launched short-range 
cruise missiles of a new generation. The range of C-class 
missiles eliminates the necessity for target acquisition by 
other sources and permits quick response based on the submarine's 
own sensors. Both an anti-shipping and an ASW capability of 
C-class submarines and the possibility of a mixed package of 
missiles, i.e. against surface ships and submarines, have to 
be assumed. 

The third is the V-class nuclear-powered torpedo armed 
submarine, the apparent successor to the aging N-class. The 
submarine most likely' has both ASW and anti-shipping capabilities. 

The fourth new submarine, the B-class, is conventionally 
powered and is apparently intended for operation in coastal 
waters. The possibility of a closed cycle propulsion plant 



190 

At the beginning of 1972, Secretary Laird stated that 

there are 25 operational Y-class submarines and 17 more under 

construction. Washington Post , February 16, 1972-. 



• ? 



•"■^ 



should not be excluded. 

Presently there are 350-360 submarines in the Soviet 

l 

order of battle of which 85-90 are nuclear powered. It i's by 
far the largest and most diversified submarine fleet in the world. 
Approximately 15% of the Soviet submarines carry ballistic 
missiles. In spite of the growing number of the Y-class SSBN's, 
the majority of the operational units are still represented by 
the H class and G class, although the Y-class submarines are 
already carrying more missiles than the total of the others.' 

Cruise-missile submarines comprise approximately 20% of 
the total, and play a very important role in the Soviet concept 
of submarine operations, particularly against surface forces. 
The residual role of cruise-missile submarines against land 
targets located along the shore line and in support of amphibious 
operations should not be overlooked. 

The remaining Soviet submarines, approximately 65% of 

the total force, are torpedo attack type. Armed with long-range 

homing torpedos against surface targets and anti-submarines 
/' - I 

torpedos, these submarines are also capable of minelaying. A 

considerable portion of this group is undoubtedly employed in ASW. 

Thus, in two decades of post-war submarine fleet development, 

the Soviet Union has built several hundred boats of at least 

14 classes (W, Z, Q, F, N, II, G, R, J, E, Y, C, V, B) of submarines 

I 
/ 

f h 1 

I • J.T1 



If the numerous modifications and conversions (such as Z-5, 
twin cylinder, Long Bin, Canvas Bag, H-l, H-2, G-l, G-3 , E-l, 
E-2, etc.) were added, the number of classes built would 'exceed 
25. 

The Soviet submarines are designed to perform a multiple 
number of tasks some of which, such as cruise-missile attacks, 
are capabilities which so far are unique to the Soviet Navy. 

In addition to construction of new submarines with improved 
characteristics and armament, the Soviet Navy had to solve 
another problem, that of training its submarines crews. Soviet 
submariners had to master not only new hardware in its 
oualitatively different performance (speed, depths, armament) 
but during the decade of 1950s they had to cross the psychological 
barrier of cruise duration. As has been openly admitted by the 
Soviets, during the decade of 1950s "the technology was basically 
ready for long cruises, but the men turned out to be insufficiently 
ready psychologically" . Submarine commanders in making off-shore 
cruises light heartedly run down their batteries on a simple 
maneuver, navigators lost their skill in celestial navigation, 
and the proximity of the bases had an effect on the careless 



191 

Good examples are provided in an article by Rear Admiral 

A. Gontayev, "The Path to the Ocean", Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 
Wl, pp. 47-52. 



■•* 



142 



attitude toward fuel consumption. Such deficiencies in training 
were basically overcome during the decade of the 1950s when 
considerable emphasis was placed on not only prolonged cruises, 
but snorkeling technique. The task was set to stay on snorkel 
days and weeks and to cover thousands of miles. 

Arctic and under-the-ice navigation of Soviet nuclear 
powered submarines assumed importance immediately after 
commissioning of first SSBN. During the 22nd Party Congress 
(23 October 1961) it was reported that Soviet missile submarines 
had mastered under-the-ice navigation and could reliably reach 
their launching position. 192 m July 1962 the nuclear powered 
submarine Leninskiy Komsomol made a voyage to the North Pole. 
On 29 September 1963 another Soviet nuclear powered submarine 
surfaced exactly at the North Pole and hoisted the flag of the 
Soviet Union and the flag of the Navy there. 193 Both were N-class 
submarines, and their cruises were undoubtedly generated by ASW 
interest. A claim was made that "underwater combat, including 

combat under the Arctic ice is becoming an imminently practical 

194 

matter". 



192 

Pravda , 24 October 1961. 

193 

Morskoy Sbornik Mo. 2, 1964, pp. 30-31. 

194 

Collection of articles, Podvodniki (Submariners), 

Moscow, 1962, p. 97. '. 



143 



During the first carter of 1966, a group of nuclear-powered 
missile submarines under the command of Rear Admiral A.I. 
Sorokin made a submerged cruise around the world; in 45 days 
the submarines covered almost 25,000 miles without once surfacing . 195 
Soviet submarines are now often observed at various remote areas 
of the world ocean, and reports on very prolonged cruises of 
some of them are common phenomena. It appears that the praise 
heaped on them by the Russian media is well deserved. 

Soviet submarine development during the post World War II 
period, and especially since the mid 1950s, seems to testify 
to an acute awareness, even a conviction, of the Soviets that 
the balance between surface ships and submarines has shifted 
in favor of the latter. 196 The size of the Soviet submarine 
fleet, the multiplicity of missions and tasks, the variety of 
submarine types and armament packages all make it a major threat 
in practically any confrontation. Further technological progress 
would seem to benefit- submarines even more than other naval 
forces, and the gap between ASW forces and submarines, despite 
the considerable progress of both, would be widened in the 

195 

VIZ (Military Historical Journal), No. 7, 1970 p 31- 
aad Morskoy Sbornik No . 9 , 1971, p . 29 . 

196 

For an interesting discussion of this problem see 
!:" Coh f Q > "^e Erosion of Surface Naval Power", Foreign 
H£^i£s, January 1971, pp. 330-341. ' ~ 



m 



foreseeable future even more in favor of submarines. Even a 
major breakthrough in ASW, and it would to come in the problem 
of detection first of all, would not nullify the many advantages 
possessed by the submarines, which are benefitting from 
technological progress much more than their hunters. This 
fact seems to be well understood in the Soviet Union and the 
further development and sophistication of their submarine 
forces is proof to it. 

Recognizing the fact that they do not possess either a 
monopoly on technology nor are they necessarily far ahead Tn 
its application to submarine construction, the Soviet Navy has 
maintained a respectable number of boats in commission, obviously 
utilizing the advantage of numbers. In this respect, it is 
interesting to note not only the Soviet Navy's maintenance of a 
considerable number and an even larger percentage of conventionally 
powered submarines, but their continued construction. For 
certain tasks and regions there is no pressing need for nuclear 

submarines. A number of tasks, including ASW in areas where 

/ i 

enemy anti-submarine surface and air forces can be reliably 

excluded or their effectiveness greatly reduced, protection of 

convoys in restricted areas and coastal patrols can still 

successfully be performed by conventionally powered submarines. 

The moderate consumption of energy required for such tasks 

i 
■7 



/ 



l!r5 



coupled with the increased capacities of batteries, not to 
mention closed-cycle engines, permit their presence in the patrol 
area for a considerable time. The cost of conventional ' 
submarines compared with nuclear powered is considerably lower, 
several conventional boats can be constructed for the price 
of one nuclear powered submarine. * 

Greater emphasis on the forward deployment of Soviet naval 
forces should force them to increase the ratio of nuclear 
submarines, but this does not mean the gradual elimination of 
conventional submarines for the immediate future. The fact 
that the Soviet submarine construction program presently 
underway initiated an obvious reevaluation of their submarine 
force requirements for the current decade seems to warrant such 
a conclusion. 

While it is relatively safe to predict that current and 
future submarines will be quieter and deeper-diving than their 
predecessors, speed is another matter. While certainly needed 
and beneficial, for the attack submarines (both torpedo and cruise 

/ ! 

missiles) , it might not be essential (especially under optimum 

selection of propulsion plants and tasks) for other types,; 

i 

! 

including some hunter-killer submarines. The first generation 

of Soviet nuclear submarines, particularly the first mass 

i 
produced N-class, is credited with a submerged speed of 25 to 

-, 

1U6 



30 knots. Even at 25 knots they are faster than the early US 
nuclear submarines. 197 However, there is a price for speed, 
and most Soviet nuclear submarines are reported to be noisier 
than their American counterparts. 

The practically simultaneous construction of 3 (N, H, E) 
classes of nuclear submarines in the late 1950s* and early 1960s 
and of 4 conventional (F, G, J, R) classes seems to testify to 
the Soviet confidence in the existing technology and that the 
time from 1953 to 1957-1958 had not been wasted. Soviet 
nuclear submarines of the second generation built since the' 
mid 1960s have even better characteristics. In that regard ' 
Admiral Rickover stated, "From what we~ haw been able to learn 
during the past year, the Soviets have attained equality in a 
number of these characteristics (weapons, speed, depth, sonar, 
quietness, and crew performance) and superiority in some". 198 

It was reported that the number of submarines launched 
per year with the initiation of construction of more sophisticated 
boats appeared to have dropped, but a one-shift annual capacity to 



197 

Norman Polmar, "Soviet Navy Pulls Even in Nuclear 

Sub Might", Washington Post , October 4, 1970, pp. Dl and B4; 
I zvestiya , October 9, 1971, claiming the existence of "quite a 
few" nuclear powered Soviet submarines had also called them the 
fastest in the world. 

19 Washington Post , October 4, 1970. 



/ • 



■•? 



built up to 20 nuclear powered submarines exists. 199 Due to 
the retirement of older classes of submarines built in great 
number, the total Soviet submarine order of battle might 'decline 
to 250-300, but numerically they would still be far ahead of 
any other navy in the world and greater even than the combined 
submarine force of NATO. In overall balance, the present 
potentials of Soviet submarine force are considerably greater 
compared with that of a decade ago, a trend most likely to 

> 

continue. 

Surface Ships 

At the time of fateful decision of the mid 1950s 
concerning the development of the Soviet Navy which emphasized 
the submarine - aviation nature of its main striking forces, 
the complex problem associated with surface ships (i.e. does 
the modern navy need surface ships and if so what kind; what 
missions should be assigned theisuand what place in general 
should they occupy in the navy) remained to a large degree 
unsolved. Two aspects of the problem should be emphasized. 
The first is connected with the role of surface ships, especially 
capital ships, as the main strike forces of the navy. By 



199 

Naval Institute Proceedings . August 1971, pp. 60-62. 



_L 



43 



delegating this role to the submarine and naval aviation, the 
decision automatically solved this aspect of the problem. 
The Soviets arrived at this decision through a careful examination 
of the past, present, and future role of capital ships in a big 
war. The big, world war of the future was seen only as a 
nuclear one. Past experience had been projected into the 
future, and the fate of battleships compared with the aircraft 
carriers. The continuing preoccupation of Western navies, 
particularly the American, with aircraft carriers, was compared 
with the outdated Japanese approach during the preparation and 
execution of attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. It 
has been claimed by the Soviet specialists, including leading 
admirals, that the Pearl Harbor attack aimed mainly against 
American battleships, viewed by the Japanese as a main striking 
force, and launched not by the Japanese battleships but by 
aircraft carriers, which then were viewed as supporting forces, 
was a major mistake demonstrating an absence of foresight and 
dialectical considerations on the part of the Japanese naval 
command. It was concluded that, as the era of battleships was 
replaced by the era of aircraft carriers during World War II 
and the first post-war decade, the role of the latter as a main 
strike force is on the decline and the future belongs to the 
submarine-aviation forces armed with missiles as their main 



149 



armament. It should be repeated that all these considerations 
are applied by the Soviets only in respect to the large war, 
the nuclear war, and to attack aircraft carriers, (CVA) . ' In 
relation to the small local wars where major powers are not 
opposing each other and which are conducted with conventional 
armament, the continued role of attack aircraft carriers has 
never been questioned. If one separates the propagandists 
rhetoric concerning the underdeveloped and small countries' 
lack of modern means of armed conflict to repel the attackers, 
the attack carrier role as the main naval force in such wars 
has been recognized by the Soviets. It should be also stressed 
that at the time of rejection of attack aircraft carriers as 
the main striking force, the Soviet Navy had neither a single 
carrier in commission nor any experience on how to build or 
operate them. The economic and technological feasibility to 
build aircraft carriers were clearly present in the mid 1950s, 
but it would require V to 8 years before the first group of 

those ships and the aircraft for them would be developed, built, 

/ 
and initial operation experience acquired. However, the early 

and mid 1960s were seen by the Soviets as a period when various 

sophisticated missiles tipped with nuclear warheads would 

dominate the naval armament and, coupled with greatly improved 

electronics and means of reconnaissance, a huge aircraft carrier 

"« 

1 En 



would have no chance to survive an attack against her. The 
tragic experience with the battleship Novorossiysk, formerly 
the Italian Guilio Cesare, sunk by a conventional World Y.'ar II 
mine with the loss of over 600 men in the middle of Sevastopol 
Harbor in October 1955 soon after expensive modernization, was 
a painful example in the minds of the Soviet leadership of how 
easy a large ship can be sunk. The loss of Novorossiysk was 
a hard blow to the Soviet Navy, and it gave to its opponents 
one more argument on how vulnerable ships are. 

The second aspect of the above problem dealing with other 
classes of surface ships was resolved differently. It has always 
been well understood in the Soviet Union,, in. spite of some 
loud pronouncements in favor of submarines and aviation, that 
surface ships of various displacement acting independently or 
in cooperation with other combat arms of the navy are irreplaceable 
for a variety of missions. Because of the changing conditions 
under which those missions would-be accomplished, the problem 
arose of the compatibility of armament and the tasks to be 
solved. The majority of the surface combatants of the Soviet 
Navy during the second half of the 1950s were, owing to the 
nature of their opponent and by the type of their armament, 
ill suited for their assigned missions. Moreover, the missions 
themselves had been gradually changing, and a degree of 



51 



uncertainty about them most likely existed toward the end of 
the 1950s. In this respect, Khrushchev's denigrating remarks 
about surface ships made during his trips to England in 1956 and 
to the United States in 1959 were aimed at large conventionally 
armed ships, Svedlov-class cruisers included, and obviously did 
not mean the negation of the surface ship's rol-e, particularly 
in the future. The construction of surface ships has never 
ceased in the Soviet Union. The greater or lesser intensity of 
construction during the second half of the 1950s and beginning 
of the 1960s can easily be explained by the availability of 
the armament, uncertainty in the regard of operational concept 
due to changing requirements, and the search for an optimum 
armament package . 

K What is unmistakenly clear was the Soviet decision in late 
1950s to concentrate practically exclusively on the missile 
armament of the surface ships. This truly revolutionary concept 
did not compete with but rather supplemented, in a variety of 
ways, the Soviet main naval striking forces, submarines and 
naval aviation. The Soviets became convinced that missile 
ships of any displacement, including missile boats, can 
successfully engage any surface ship at sea as soon as it comes 
within the range of their missiles and that many advantages 
previously enjoyed by large-displacement ships armed with 



t 



152 



conventional weapons have been nullified by the missile-anr.od 
ships. Not all missile ships built by the Soviets in last 
fifteen years turned out to be unouestionable successes.' The 
first few classes were built on the basis of old operational 
concepts and did not produce drastic qualitative improvements 
in the Soviet surface forces. However, the great majority of 
the newly created ships had been laying down the foundation "for 
the oualitatively new surface fleet forces which started to 
emerge toward the end of the 1960s. Moreover, Soviet missile 
ships have started to produce corresponding, but unfortunately 
belated, reactions in the Western navies. It took a relatively 
minor (compared with the potential of missile ships) engagement, 
the sinking of the Israeli destroyer, Elath by the Egyptian 
Navy using Soviet built missile boats, to speed up the process 
of the realization that to measurethe naval strength of a country, 
and sea power in general, by the number of stacks above the 
surface and the amount of smoke they are producing is to live 

i 

dangerously in, the 1 past and to overlook the present, and 

especially future, realities. 

| 

The immediate result of the mid 1950 decision was the 
cancellation of further construction of Sverdlov-ciass cruisers 
(out of 20 ships laid down only 14 were completed) , and the 
gradual reduction of ICotl in-class destroyer construction. 



f 

/ 



1 ^Q 



The Sverdlov class was the last conventionally armed cruiser 
auilt by the Soviets. While continuing the construction of 
Skory-class destroyers, 71 units of which were built during 
the 1948-1952 period, a single unit of the first Soviet 
:lush-deck destroyer of the Tallin-class (Neustrashimyi) was 
milt and tested during the 1950-1952 period. .'The class was 
lever put into serial production, but served as a prototype 
;or a large family of hulls, the Kotlin, Kildin, and Krupnyi 
dasses and their modifications. It was found necessary to 
:orrect the design by augmenting the anti-aircraft armament and 
•educing the displacement. The resulting Kotlin-class destroyer 
as put into serial production in 1952, and about two dozen 
nits were built. The Kotlin class turned out to be the last 
onventionally armed destroyer built by the Soviets. 200 . 

After construction of 6 to 8 units of the 1,900-ton 
ola-class destroyer escort, production was switched in 1952 
o the somewhat reduced tonnage (1,600 tons) and armament 
3 100 mm guns instead of 4) of the Riga-class, of which close 
o 50 units were built. The further development of this type of 
hip by the Soviet Navy resulted in a stronger tendency toward 



2 °0„ 

ivlorskoy Sbornik No. 12, 1966, pp. 16-21; No. 3, 1967, 

p. 18-22; and Jane's, 1971-1972 edition. 



151.1 



SW ship. The construction of the Pctya class in the late 
ijs and early 1960s in two modification:; war; followed by the 
itruction of the Mirka class, also in two modifications, 

t during the first half of 1960. Both classes are propelled 
ombined diesel and gas turbine propulsion plants. 201 

The following other conventionally armed Soviet ships should 
rmtioned: PT-boats of the P-6, P-8, and Shershen classes; 
weepers of the T-43, T-58, Yurka and Vanya classes; a 
br of classes of patrol boats, auxiliary ships, and support 

[i. The total number of all these types and classes runs 

202 

1 into the many hundreds of units. 

Toward the spring of 1958 L.:e ilrst Soviet missile-armed 
E.ce ship, the Kildin-class destroyer built on the basis 
islightly modified Kotlin-class hull and equipped with one 
iher for the Strela surface-to-surface guided missile, was 
1. Four units were built. From 1958 to 1960, 8 units of 

rupny-class surf ace-to-su-rSace guided-missile destroyers 
■ped with two launchers were constructed. The construction 
3e two classes might be viewed as a classical example of 

pplication of new weaponry to an old operational concept, 

201 

See Jane's , 1971-1972, p. 631. 

202„ 

For details see latest editions of Jane's Fighting Ships. 



' . : IjJ 



ater denounced by Gorskhov. As both ships had only conventional 
; uns for anti-aircraft defense, they were poorly suited for 
.istant operations at sea requiring fighter support which could 
e provided only by shore-based aviation. Yet, the availability 
f missiles increases the striking power of surface units by 
00 to 150 miles - a quite respectable distance" particularly 
mportant in closed seas, which would include the Mediterranean. 
n the late 1950s the Soviet Navy developed the Komar-class 
issile boats armed with two short-range (about 20 miles) 
tyx cruise missiles. In the early sixties, Osa-class missile 
Dats armed with four Styx missiles were built. Three 
edifications of the Osa are known. - 

During the decade of 1960, the Soviet Navy was reinforced 
Lth variety of missile armed ships. Four Kynda-class guided 
issile cruisers were built between 1960 and 1964. The Kynda 
is the first surface ship armed with both surface-to-surface 
laddock missiles (2quadruple launchers) and surface-to-air 
■>a missiles (one twin launcher) . Additional armament includes 
: (2 twin) 76-mm guns, 6 (2 triple) ASY/ torpedo tubes and 2 
H-barreled ASW rocket launchers. There is a helicopter platform 
i the stern. Construction of the Kashin-class guided-missile 
•stroyer, which the Soviets call a large ASW ship, also started 
| the early sixties A total of sixteen units have been built 

/ ' • . : 

1 en 



so far. The Kashin class is armed with 2 (twin GOA) surface- 
tO-air-(SAM) missile launchers, 4 (2 twin) 76 ma guns, 4 ASW 
rocket launchers and ASW torpedo tubes. The Kashin was the' • 
world's first gas-turbine-propelled ship of its size. 
J As a result of the Soviet concern for the anti-aircraft 
defense of their surface units, certain classes of ships were 
converted during the decade of 1960s and armed with surface-to-air 
nissiles (SAM). Dzerzhinskiy , a Sverdlov-class cruiser, was 
inverted around 1960-1961. The third 152-mm triple gun turret 
us removed and in its place installed a twin SAM launcher for 
hiide-line missiles, used by the Soviet air defense troops. - 
.ong-range but heavy missiles did not prove to be well suited 
:or naval purposes, and the experiment did not continue. 
Hiring the 1962-1968 period a number of Kotlin-class destroyers 
'ere converted into SAM ships. One surface-to-air missile 
auncher was installed instead of the main twin 130 mm tureet. 

During the second half of the 1960s at least three 

i 

rupnyi-class ships were armed with SAM launchers instead of' 

/ " | " 

&• originally installed surface-to-surface launchers, and j 

ere given the NATO designation of Kanin class. | 

In the mid 1960s a new class of Soviet guided missile 

raisers, the Kresta, emerged, and a total of 4 units were 

Wleted. The ships' armament includes everything except 



i 



/ 



allistic missiles: 2 twin Shaddock surface-to-surface missile 

aunchers, 2 twin Goa SAM launchers, four 57 mm (two twin) 

ati-aircraft guns, 4 ASW rocket launchers (2 12-barrel and 

6-barrel) , and 10 torpedo tubes (2 cuintuple) . The ship 

Lso has a helicopter hangar, the first Soviet ship so equipped. 

lis 7,000-ton multi-purpose ship has no counterpart in 

astern navies as of the early 1970s. 

Toward the end of the 1960s at least 2 modified Kresta- 

lass ships, designated Kresta II, were built, with the following 

;ianges from the Xresta I: Instead of 2 twin Shaddock 

irf ace-to-surf ace missile launchers, two quadruple new short- 

imge surface-to-surface missile launchers (possible suited for 

:>me long-range ASW weapons as well) were installed: 2 twin 

aunchers for GOA SAMs were replaced by 2 twin launchers for 

:>w surface-to-air missiles; 8 (four twin) highly automated 

:)mm guns were added. The remaining armament is the same as 

i 

ii Kresta I. 203 

In 1967 the existence of a large ship variously described 

/ I " 

k the West as a helicopter carrier or a combination helicopter 



203 

For the further details on the described ships, see 

f ine's Fighting Ship s, 1971-1972 ed., pp. 615-620; and earlier 
Editions; "New and Modernized Ships of the Soviet Navy" are ! 
ISO described in Soldat und Technik , No. 10, 1970, pp. 566-570. 

! 

I 

/ 
: / 

' 158 



guided missile cruiser was revealed. The Moskva class, 
hich two units, Moskva and Leningrad, are presently in 

:ission, is designated as an anti-submarine cruiser in the 

204 
ret Navy and that undoubtedly is what she is. Displacing 



>t IS, 000 tons, the ship is exceptionally well armed for its 
-ose and fit with extensive electronic equipment, including 
•e-dimensional (three-D) surveillance radar (also installed 
resta II) and variable depth sonar (VDS) , both firsts aboard- 
r et ships. The ship armament includes one twin. launcher for 
'missiles (which might be intended for surface-to-surface 
;iles as well) , a new Soviet weapon; 2 twin launchers for new 
-3 surface-to-air missiles, 2 250-mm ASW rocket launchers, 
ubes each; four (2 twin) ASW torpedo tubes, 4 (2 twin) 
•a guns. The ship also carried about 20 XA-25 ASW helicopters 
'Moskva class is the world's largest warship designed for 

} 

Towards the end of 1960s, Soviet Navy efforts to have 
slip with as .small displacement as possible for a given 

/ ! ■ 

iliaent and mission resulted in the development of Nanuchka-class . 

i 
^lacing about 300 tons, the Nanuchka is armed with six (2 triple) 

'ace-to-surface missiles, which seem to represent a new-vintage 

i 



204 TRTJD, 25 July 1963. 



•? 



TS9 
— \j kj 



/ 



;jipon. In addition, a photograph published in the Soviet 

|ss reveals provision for the installation of a SAM launcher 

„< the existence of a retractable one) which would have to be 

.small dimensions (smaller than the GOA SAM or SA-N-3) . The 

^P most likely is a successor to the Osa class and is considerably 

iter suited for operations in a more remote areas: 

Soviet development of ships with new propulsion principles 
| armament have accelerated during the deoade of the 1960s. After. 
:ensive tests in the late 1950s of hydrofoil, -gas turbine/ and 
sel propelled boats, were developed and placed in service in" the 

1960s. Toward the end of the 1960s, there were approximately 
Dzen Pchela-class hydrofoil patrol boats. 206 The same approach 
: been taken with xthe air-cushion ships. At least four, obviously 

Omental types, one of which was armedwith a Styx-like SSM, were 

207 
va. One class of air-cushion boat has been used by the naval 

mtry since at least the spring of 1971. 2 ° 8 

A greater role for ships with uem propulsion principles 

Krasnaya Zuezda , 6 August 1971. 

206 

ERXBNNUNGSBLATTER , May 1970, p. 135. 

207 

SudostroyeniyeN o. 2, 1959 and No. 8, 1969. 

203 c . 

See Chapter Shipbuilding. 



i ■ ■ 

I . ISO 

/ 



d their combat employment were theoretically justified by the 
>viet Navy in mid-1960' s . 20D 

in June 1971 a brand new Soviet missile ship, the Kri vale-class , 

Ued the Atlantic via the Danish Straits after tests in the Baltic. 
::h a displacement of only 3,500 - 3,S00 tons the ship's armament 
eludes: four surface-to-surface (and probably long-range ASW 
epons as well) missile launchers; reserve space (or concealed " 
OW the deck) for two installations of new SAM launchers similar ■ 
the Nanuchka class; 4 76-mm automatic guns (2 twin turrets); ' -. - 
l ASW rocket launchers, 8 ASW torpedo tubes (in 2 4-tube installations) 
. Krivak-class is equipped with sophisticated electronics and has 
. It is obviously a multipurpose ship with a strong ASW inclination, 
is possible that after extensive tests this class of shi P will 
produced in considerable number. With no counterpart among the rest 
:he world's navies, the ship surprises with a variety of armament 
called on a platform of such a modest displacement. 210 

Thus, the decade of the 1960s witnessed a gradual increase 
eviet Navy interest in surface ships, sophistication of tiJir 
=ment, with practically exclusive emphasis on missiles as the " 

2 °9 i 

•ice Shi'o^.n ^J?' TU f ' " Surface s "es Are Really Becoming , 
ice Ships , Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 1936, pp. 22-25. 

210 

Soldat und Technik No. 7, 1971, o. 373- a-d v„ in ' ta-ri 
>S4-^oQ- vv>" ■v^v^T.^r-;;:',-,-,;- ' ' ** ^'•-'i a..a .NO. 10, 1971, 
" J ' J -"^^-W.ObB+.AyTat ■ October 1971, p. 152. 



/ 



161 * 



hip's main weaponry. A number of classes of Soviet built ships so 
ar have no equals among the major naval powers. Many, newly-built 
urface ships were eouipped with gas turbines, thereby eliminating 
oiler rooms, providing more space and provisions for the automation,' 
ad reducing maintenance requirements. Other navies of the world 
tarted to emphasize the advantages of gas turbine propulsion towards 

jl* end of the 1960s; in fact, all new British surface ships will bo 

„ 211 
;) ecuipped. 

Starting with the 1957 installation of an after helicopter 

jatform aboard a Xotlin-class destroyer, the Soviet Navy has ~ 

continued this practice which resulted in a permanent hangar for one 

Cf two helicopters aboard Kresta-class ships. The employment of 

hlicopters by many Soviet surface ships for ASW, extended over the 

Sjrizon target detection and classification, cruise missile course 

:rrection, relay stations and perhaps future anti-ship missile 

ifense has represented to a large degree the light airborne 

ilti-purposo system (LAMPS) presently being evaluated by the US Navy. 212 

Toward the end of the 1950s, when they started to arm their 
/ ' r 

^face units first with surface-to-surface missiles and to employ 

•km within the framework of an already outdated operational concept, 

211 

Naval Institute Proceedings , October 1971 ' p->. 111-112. 

212 

US Naval Institute Proceedings , December 1971, pp. 27-29. 



i 



S9 



ilts realized the need for improved anti-aircraft defense of 
;le ships and undertook appropriate remedial action, eruipping 
,'units, starting with the Kynda, with SAM missiles as well, 
uch as the Kashin-class) were built with predominantly 
missile armament and more were converted into SAM ships, 
a class and probably the Krivak class represent the ships 

balanced armament, the ships which so far have not been 

213 
by any other navy. Admiral S. Gorskhov words about 

issile ships being the pride of the Navy" seem to be 

m J 214 
y justified. 

Naval Aviation 

rhe birth of Russian naval aviation dates back to the year 
b the first seaplanes arrived in the Black Sea Fleet. Up 
he naval aviation units were equipped primarily with foreign- 
planes. During World War I most of the aircraft were Russian 
he M-5 and M-9 designed by D. Grigorovich, the Sikorskiy-10 
l'ya Moromets designed by I. Sikorskiy, who after the 
n left Russia and continued his work in the United States. 
Muromets, which was the first multi-engined aircraft was 



213 

See Admiral Xharlamov, "Ships and Their Armament", Ncdelya 
?68, p. 8. 

214 

S. Gorshkov in Pray da, 14 February 1963. 



163 



iicularly well suited to meet the requirements of naval 
•nuaissance. In 1915 the Baltic and Black Sea fleets aeouired 
raft earriers. They served as a base for 6 to 10 seaplanes, which 
• lowered to the water by special cranes. At the beginning of .^ ' 
, 10 seaplanes from two Black Sea Fleet aircraft carriers made a 
essful attack against the Turkish port of Zonguldak. Dropping 
ombs, the planes sank one steamship and several small vessels. 215 
js the October 1917 revolution, the Soviet Navy has always had an 
grated naval aviation. By the mid 1930s, aircraft designed by - 
irigorovich (flying boats M-24, ROM) and Tupolev (MDR-2, MIC-i, 
design bureaus were delivered. During the secondhalf of 1930 
|tly modified aircraft built for the Soviet Air Force, P-5, TB-1, 

DB-3, reinforced naval aviation. When the war started (June 
, the Soviet Navy had 2,581 aircraft distributed among its 
'fleets of which 10% were torpedo carriers, 14%, bombers, 45%, 
ers, 25%, reconnaisance, and 6% miscellaneous. During the war the 

aviation received considerable number of fighter aircraft and 
rs (particularly PE-2 and TU-2) . 216 

The post-World-Y/ar-II period witnessed the steady growth 
val aviation. But this growth up to 1955 followed the familiar 
kt and wartime pattern, exclusively land-based aircraft with 

215 

S. Berdnikov, "How Naval Aviation was Born" 2fc>r<?kov 
fJCNo. 10, 1970, pp. 59-55. ■ ; " *' V 

216 

Morskoy Sbornik No.' S, 1971, pp. 18-23. " r 



aV y emphasis upon fighters and the virtual absence (with the 



cc 



ption of a few TU-4s) of long-range aircraft. la addition to 

rious types of MIGs, IL-28s in light bomber, torpedo carrie'r, and 

:onnaisance versions were delivered. In 1955 the first regiments 

TU-16 Badger medium-range bombers were transferred to the Navy 
>m Long Range Aviation. During the second half of the 1950s, the 
/y received a number of long-range TU-95, Bears. In 1960 all ' 
;hters were taken away from naval aviation and transferred to the 
lutry air defense (PVO) , which became the sole provider of air 

ev for Soviet naval units in the coastal zone. This step reduced 

numerical strength of Soviet naval aviation from about 3,500 

217 
craft to 800. 

The removal of fighters from the Navy simplified the 
ining and maintenance problem and did not handicap the effectiveness 
ship and convoy protection in the coastal zone. The Soviet Navy 
a well developed system of shipboard fighter control (KPUNIA) , 
ch, in close cooperation with the shore based units of the PVO, has 

a charged with the responsiblity of providing fighter cover for 

218 
p units and convoys at sea. 



217 

S. Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy , United States Naval 

titute, 1970, p. 181. 

218 

See lor example, D. Fomin, "Covering Single Ships at Sea 

fust Enemy Air Strikes", :,lorskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1967, pp. 29-32. 



1 CM~ 
-i. u u 



The decade of the 1960s represented the most interesting 

nd important period in the development of Soviet naval aviation, 
hich, organizationally is divided among the 4 Soviet fleets, 
t is also centrally controlled from Moscow by the Office of the 
3 mmander of Soviet Naval Aviation. There are three major combat 
ranches: Reconnaissance, Missile-Carrying (Strike), and 
iti-Submarme. The number. of aircraft incorporated into " 
;ese three branches exceeds 1,000 (including helicopters). 
iere are also naval transport and training aviation, which total 
'veral hundreds of aircraft. 220 

Also of extreme importance in any consideration of the * 
le of Soviet aviation at sea is the close cooperation between 
e Navy and Long Range Aviation (LRA) discussed previously, 
ch cooperation provides the Navy with a considerable number of 
ag-range aircraft under the operational control of the Navy for 
honnaissance and strike missions. The principal aircraft of 
t LRA participating in the maritime role, are: the 4-engine 
rboprop TU-95 Bear; the 4-engine jet Miasishehev Bison; and 
i 2-engine supersonic jet TU-22 Blinder. All can be refueled 
the air. The aircraft of the naval missile carrying aviation 

010 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 1966, p. IS. 

Jane's Fi^htin^ Ships , 1971-1972, -p. 593.. 



••? 



10 -^ 
Sb 



include the 2-cn-ino jet TU-1G, llacltfur; Lhu TU-OS, TH-aa, 1 iuh1 
perhaps the Bison. During the first hall of the }960a all Navy 
3adgers were modified for in-flight rofuoling. ' 

Naval reconnaissance aviation employs the TU-95, TU-16 and 
possibly a M-4 modification. A small number of AN-12 Cub, a 
modified version of a 2-engine -turboprop 'transport aircraft, and 
the IL-18 May, a 4-engiue turboprop commercial aircraft modified 
for patrol and ASW are also employed. The anti-submarine 
aircraft are: The BE-6 Madge, which are being rapidly replaced by^, 
2-engine turboprop flying boats; the BE-12, Mail; MIL-4 Hound 
helicopters; and KA-25 Hormone helicopters. The old IL-2S s 
Beagle twin- jet has been used to carry ASW torpedoes. It was 

reported that some TU-95 and Bisons (M-4A) were converted to the 

221 
ASW role. Modified Bisons and TU-16 aircraft are used as tankers 

for air refueling. The TU-16 tankers are an integral part of 

•missile carrying aircraft units. For example, an air regiment 

has two squadrons of strike aircraft and one squadron of tankers. 222 

The TU-95 Bear is known in several modifications from Bear-A 
■ / i 



221 ' 

Armee Rundshau , No. 1, 1971, pp. 29-31. For characteristics 
of aircraft see also Jane's All the World's Aircraft , 1969-1970 
and 1971-1972 editions'] : 

222 

OXFAN - Manue vers of the USSR Navy Condu cted in April - 

May, 1970 , Moscow, Military Publishing House , 1970, pp. 203. 

! 

i / 

'•* / 

" \ / 

lft 7 



to Boar-D. It is the longest range Soviet aircraft and l.'wldoly 
used for various naval roles. The TU-22 Blinder so ; far has been 
the only supersonic aircraft in naval aviation delivered cfuring 
the second half of 1960. After its first showing in the 1961 
soviet Air Show, the aircraft electronics was considerably 
.ap roved and an in-flight refueling capability, added. A * 
portion of the Blinders in naval aviation, however, are still" 
ithout an air refueling capability. The Blinder is the most 
ogical aircraft to replace the aging Badger. If the development 
t wing-wing Backfire is as advanced as has been claimed, delivery 
o naval aviation should be expected. 223 

| The Soviet practice of the last 15 years of concentrating 
j* heavier, long-range aircraft in the development of their ' ! 
aval aviation can be only partically explained by the absence ' 
t aircraft carriers. That absence was definitely a factor ' 
jring the post-World-War-II period up to the end of the 1950s, 
jring the decade of the 1960s, however, the development was j 
ictated by the, conscious rejection of the attack carrier concept 
|r the reason discussed earlier, and in turn, the conscious 
'cognition of the great maneuverability and striking power of 
avy aircraft armed with missiles in naval warfare. At least 



US News and World Report . September 27, 1971, p 



i / 



d Q a 



initially, the combination- of missile . , 

Bl , H issues with nuclear warbeacis 

Played an important rolo in th, ^ 

m the development. 

The Soviet Navv full,, 

y fUlly ^cognized the potential n-r •■ - 
for-atir.no PQ^on.ial of surface 

locations, especially those with 

lth ° arriers f ^ anti-aircraft 

defense. They had also were aware of diff ic „• 

e 01 difficulties for bombers 
using free-fall bombs, even tha, 

those armed with a nuclear charge 
>o penetrate the defense and to hit 

Q so nit a maneuverable tar-et As 
1 result ' ^ssile carrying aviation • u- 

, wnich is immeasurably more 

missiles which can hit S11 , f , 

nit surf ^ce and shore target- W it hrt * 

tti t>^ts without even N 
atering the anti-aircraft *«+ 

^^ *° M ' Was b °- ^ developed. 
«•» Colander of Baltic Fleet A vi,f 

Fleet Avaataon wrote in 1S55; "&val 
■ ssxle - carrying aviation armed with n-s^ 

lth ra - s siles with nuclear 

^ads can use its powerful weapon outside th. 

¥ u uutsiae the operational 
Q Se of shipboard surfo^ + 

surfacc-to-a.r missiles and almost beyond 

POt ° ntial ^' e Of •«.„*.„ direct6d against . 

d&ainot these aircraft 

" S PenaitS miSSile — ^n s aviation to effectived I 

^ exxecxively carry but 

1 miSSiOQ ° f destroying enemy warships and * ' " 

1PS and ^ansports at sea, 
-ardless of their anti-aircraft * * 

aircraft defense systems. Modern 

' al aviat ion has great possibilities f«, « ! 

iDilities for conducting successful 

° at ^^tions not only a-ains- i a 

/ a e ainst large surface warships but 

T a S"inst submarines, including « i 

. including nuclear-powered ones . . . and ■ 



j / 

i 



. 163 



in many instances aircraft' have advantages over surface combatant 
ships and even over modern submarines. With their great rango 
and speed they can strike quickly against enemy forces found at 
sea. Aviation units and forces can be transferred to other 
operational areas quickly (for example, large groups of aircraft 

can be redeployed from one continent to another in less than a 

224 

day, without any loss in combat capability)." 

Air refueling, widely practiced since the mid 1960s gave 
Long Range Aviation and many types of naval aircraft a practically ' 
unlimited range within the framework of naval tasks. During the' 
large-scale Soviet naval maneuvers Sever-1968 and particularly 
Okean - April-May 1970, it was claimed that air refueling 
resulted in "substantial qualitative change converting long-range 
aviation into global range aviation which mastered all the world's 
oceans". During the Okean maneuvers alone, more than 500 Soviet 
long and medium-range aircraft were observed in the Atlantic and 
Pacific. In a period of 24 hours alone, 200 sorties were recorded. 

Close cooperation between ASW aviation and other ASW forces 

/ i " 

have been widely practiced. Of great interest is a Soviet claim 



22^ 

Lieutenant General S. A. Gulyayev, "The Role of Aviation 

in Combat Operations at Sea Under Contemporary Conditions", - 
Morakoy Sbornik No. 6, 1965, pp. 36-43. 

225 , 

Soldat und Tochnik No. S, 1970, pp. 423-431. 

i 

; / 
. i7'n" 



-t cooperation not on ly betweea Afflf ^^ ^ ^^ 

,t between long-range recomuissaace ^^ ^ ' 

,as been established ia action . 

n aSainSt Various kind- of ouWy 
aval forces. 6 ' "*-^ 

It appears that all three co.bat branches of land-based 
-let naval aviation have been developed into 

operative and emotive a™. the Soviet Nayy . ^ ^.^ 
j Soviet shiphorne aviation is an interesting subject, 
j - safe to clai-n that no attack aircraft carriers .ill he ' ■ 
bUt, that Soviets have no great nee d for the,, an d hence/no 
-rait for such ships are require., the nee d for other types 
> shiphorne aviation is another matter. There has been a 
:-ving nunber of tasks which might be assigned to either 
jc-wing aircraft or helicopters. The most attractive type of 
-craft for shiphorne aviation seems to be the VTOL (vertical 
J. off an d landing) . Aa0 ng possible tasks assigned to such 
<* of shiphorne aviation are participation in air defense of 

■ surface units, primarily in anti-crui«> „<<,=.•■■ ., „ 

j A.i duu cruise missile defense* 

■Set acquisition, classification and, if necessarv niri 

potion of cruise missiles; support of an amphibious landing; 

•^cipation in anti-sub.arino defense of surface force. The 

226., 

...orskoy Sbornik > T o in iacr, , ^, 

" =■!£' "^-+^cy Publishing House, I970~ " 



1 "71 



possibility of such future use of shipborno aviation by the Soviet 
Navy should not be excluded. 

The development of reliable VTOL aircraft and further 
sophistication of helicopters might serve that purpose. The 

experimental VTOL aircraft Freehand shown at Demodedovo in 1967 

» 

was the beginning, and the work has undoubtedly been continue_d 
since that time. During the celebration of Soviet Army -Navy Day, 
February 23, 1972, it was claimed that VTOL aircraft had 'been 
developed and there is no reason to doubt the Soviet technological 
capability to do so. Assuming, however, the availability of VTOL 
aircraft, their most probably employment a - t. sea would be from a 
relatively small carrier, accommodating just a dozen or so VTOL 
alone or together with helicopters. It seems that the possibility 
of development of shipborne aviation by the Soviet Navy along 
this line should not be excluded, but again this is far from the 
attack-carrier concept for which Soviet skepticism, if viewed 
within the framework of a military conflict involving major 
naval power, seems to be largely justified. Some specialists in 
the West share the Soviet skepticism concerning the aircraft 
carrier, and see its declining role. The importance of shore-based 
maritime aircraft, particularly in reconnaissance and missile 



/ 

/ ' 172 



striking roles, is viewed as growing. 227 

Secretary Laird in his annual defense report to Congress 
in February 1972 mentioned the possible use of the 3-52 to help 
the U.S. Navy control the sea lanes, for minelaying, ocean 

surveillance, or for dropping listening devices to detect 

228 

submarines. Whether this is an attempt to utilize surplus 

heavy aircraft or the beginning of something similar to what the 
Soviet Navy has been doing for over 15 years remains to be seen. 

Shore Defense Forces and Naval Infantry 

The Russian Navy and later the Soviet Navy have traditionally 
had sizable and well-organized shore defense forces. The major 
element of this force was represented by gunnery units deployed 
along the extensive Soviet shore line with heavier concentrations 
around naval bases. Some areas, particularly the approaches to 
Leningrad, Vladivostok, and Sevastopol, had been protected by the 
system of forts with heavy caliber long-range guns since long- 
before the Revolution. The Soviet Navy, while improving the 
/ ° : 

hardware, changed little up to the late 1950s, when the gradual 



227 

' An interesting book analyzing the problem and claiming 

the shift turn of naval aviation uc the shore-based long-range 
maritime aircraft was written by Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezler, 
Ai rcraft and Sea Power ", New York: Stein and Day, 1970, 370pp. 

228, 

Washington Post, February 24, 1372. 



173 



introduction of shore-based fixed and mobile surfaco-to-surfaco 

missiles started. At present, the Missile-Gunnery Troops, as 
they are called, are still in existence, although the majority 
>f naval heavy guns were replaced by the missiles and the total 
lumber of conventional medium and small caliber guns were reduced 
| Another major element of the shore defense, force had ■ 
een the infantry. Historically, there have been 3 distinct - 
ypes of units often simplistically grouped under the term 
aval infantry (fcprskaya Pekhota) : 

(1) rifle units, incorporated in to the shore defense" 
:Drce and used often together with units of the army in defense 
(f naval bases and shore installations, on land fronts and 
ati-amphibious defense; 

(2) units formed only during a war from the crews of sunk 
c- damaged ships and naval shore installations (like training 
enters, armament test grounds, etc.) and called naval battalions, 
aval brigades, or just naval rifle units; 

I 

i 

(3) Naval Infantry proper, the exact equivalent to the 

/ '; 

J S. Marines-, specially organized and trained units whose 

! 

Umarily missions are amphibious landings, defense of naval: 

I 
*jses and other special assignments. 

i 
The Naval Infantry has a long history interrupted by 

i 
retain periods when it was either reduced in importance or even 

/ 



, / 

1 7 li 



deactivated in the Russian or Soviet navies.;. It viuh horn in 

1705 when, on the order of Peter the Great of 16 November, the 

229 
first naval infantry regiment was formed. At the time o*f 

Peter's death in 1725, there were 50,000 troops of naval 

infantry in the Baltic. During the reigns of Peter's successors 

the strength and importance of naval infantry fluctuated. 

rlowever, it was extensively and cuite often successfully used" 

in numerous wars, particularly against Turkey in Meditermean. 

Some students of Russian naval history have found that 

'Tsarist Russia conducted a respectable number of assaults 

md landings from the sea against fortified positions. For 

unphibious operations the Tsarist government developed a suitable 

230 s 
chicle, a lead force and a functioning doctrine." 

After the Revolution, a considerable number of rifle 

nits were incorporated into shore defense forces. The first 

nit of naval infantry, however, the Independent Special Rifle 

rigade, was formed in* the summer of 1939 on the basis of the 

ronstadt Rifle Regiment. In June 1940 the brigade was renamed 

s First Special Brigade of Naval Infantry, thus reactivating 

231 
hese special troops in the Soviet Navy. 



" 

229 Xh. Kamalov and others, Morskaya Poxhota -(Naval Infantry), 
ilitary P. H. , Moscow, 1957, p. 7. 

230 

See for example, Dr. R. V. Daly ,. "Russian Combat Landings", 

arino Corp Gazette, June 19.39, pp. 39-42. 



••» 



231 Xh. Kamalov, p. 53. 



During World War IX, the. total number of porsonnol cn-acod 

in the land fronts was close to half a million, but, only a small 
part of this was represented by actual naval infantry. Trio 
others were units organized from ship's personnel, coastal defense 
units, and other naval establishments. They were formed into 
naval infantry brigades, special regiments, battalions and 
detachments, subordinated to the respective army commanders in 
the area of operations. Most of these units were called naval 
rifle units as distinguished from naval infantry units, but the 
term commonly used in' reference to them by army commanders and 
the press was "naval infantry". This fact was probably responsible 
for the widespread belief of the existence of a large Soviet naval 
infantry corps. All these naval units were extensively used in 

nost critical battles of World War II, and took part in the 

■ 

iefense of Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad. 

Towards the end of the war, all naval infantry units and 
:ost naval rifle units 'were given the guards designation. 
)uring the course of the war, the Soviet Navy conducted four 
■mphibious operations and 110 tactical landings. The distribution 
'f landings among Soviet fleets can be seen from the following 
able : 






North Baltic 



Dim I 



Xinber of landings 13 

L tided troops (thousands) 16.5 

Xniber of participating 
orabatant ships 196 

Nmber of participating 
ransports and landing 
;raft 50 



36 



89.5 



38 



200 



340 1700 



300 1000 



• 1 !'<<■. 
I 

21 
21 



260 



'/■> i ,' - 

UMll 



3.5 



70 



50 



5»urce 



Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo , "Naval Art in Amphibious 
Landings of Great Patriotic War", Morskoy Sbornik 
No. 3, 1970, pp. 23-30. 



(Lose to ouarter of ail Soviet amphibious landings were under 

232 

ie command of Admiral Gorshkov. Soon after the World War II, 

233 

,ie Soviet naval infantry was abolished. 

The period of Soviet Navy development since the mid 
950s produced a new interest in the naval infantry. A number 
f published works refer to the uneven development of naval 
nfantry throughout history and its' abolition during certain 
leriods in peace time, necessitating its reactivation during war. 
Imphasizing the specialized nature of these troops, the need for 



232 Rear Admiral X. A. Stalbo, "Naval Art in Amphibious Landings 
it Great Patriotic War", Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1970, pp. 23-30. 

233 :,Iorskoy Slov ar (Naval Dictionary), Military P.K. , 
loscow, 1959, Vol. II, p. 6. 



/ 



1 / 7 



i.-olonged training and special landing equipment, these works' 
;idircctly indicated that the army alone would not be able 
D conduct successful amphibious landing. 234 In the fail of ' 
]>57, the final Baltic Fleet exercises were joined with a 
j.rge amphibious training exercise conducted by the units of 
5»viet Army. A number of top military men, including Admiral 
Grshkov and Marshall Bagramyan, were present. Analyses of 
lose exercises have 'shown that army units could not 
sccessfully conduct such operations, and that particular 
dfficulties were observed in the advanced party and in the", 
frst waves. It is probably from that time that the Soviet 
nlitary began to consider reactivation, of the naval infantry. 
3fore the decade of the 1950s was over, the first two "classes 
d amphibious landings ships, the MP-2 and MP-4 were built. 
3 course, the Soviet military was not alone in its skepticism 
lout the importance and even the possibility of amphibious 
ladings in the nuclear age. However, after the initial 
"nthusiasm" over nuclear weapons as a panacea to all military 
tsks disippated and the discovery was made that the Soviet Army 
culd not do everything alone" with the help of missile-nuclear 
■vaponry, the attitude towards the naval infantry changed. It 



2°^ 

See for example, KH. Kamalov, pp. 106-109. 



/ 
/ 



173 



as quietly reactivated somewhere in 1962 or 1963 and, starting 
ith 1964, after its existence was officially rovoa^lod, tho 
lorification campaign was begun. Soviet naval specialized .^ 
iterature produced a number of important articles theoretically 

ustifying the need for naval infantry and the importance of 

235 

mphibious operations. 

During the decade of the 1960s a number of classes of 
mphibious ships were built and placed in service. The >\IP-6, 
olnochny, Vydra, and Alligator classes of amphibious ships 
ere produced in considerable number. The largest of them, the 
.lligator class, has a full load displacement of close to 
;,000 tons and has been used in all major Soviet naval exercises 
if the late 1960s and 1970s, and is often seen in Mediterraean 

, + . 236 
.nd otner areas. 

In spite of the frequent claims by the Soviet leading 
idmirals that the naval infantry is armed with specially created 



235 The existence of Soviet naval infantry for the first 
;ime was reported in the July 24, 1964 issue of Krasnaya Zuezda. 
:he Soviet Navy periodical, Morskoy Sbornik , has devoted increased 
ittention to the problem, printing in September 1963 ".Modern 
\mphibious Operations'* by Captain Vyunenko; March 1964, "Special 
features of Contemporary Amphibious Operations" by Captain Sveislov 
md Skimkevich; and the June 1964 "Role of Amphibious Operations 
in a Nuclear War", by Rear Admiral Tuz . 

236 For the characteristic of Soviet amphibious ships 
see Jane ' s 1969-1970 to 1971-1972 editions; and Sol da t und 
rechnik No. 12, 1971, pp. 696-699. _ 



173 



■anient, with tho exception of a slightly modified PT-76 
pibious tank, nothing different from the standard army 
tiiaent can be found in the material published by the Soviet 
.;s. Recently the supplying of the naval infantry with 
i-cushioned vehicles (ACV) started, and during the Navy Day 
nde in Moscow one such vehicle with naval infantry men aboard 

i;icipated in the landings. A claim was also made that there 

237 

emore in the Baltic Fleet. 

The naval infantry basic landing tactics, which is a 
actional first wave assault, seems to be quite similar to 
e tactics used by Western navies, including the US Marine 
r>s. The absence of carrier-born:? aviation in the Soviet 
v is definitely a limiting factor, for the air assault 
port in most cases has to be provided and is being provided 
;hore-based Soviet Air Force aircraft. However, the Soviets 
e convinced that aviation alone supporting landings cannot 
e r ent missile strikes by the beach defenders, and thus "it is, 
e-efore, expedient to include submarines, aviation, surface 
t>s, and even land missile units, in the attempt to destroy and 
uralize missile installations, air defense means, and airfields, 



237 

S otsialisticheskay a Industrie a (Socialist Industry) , 

Tuly, 1970. It is still impose- 'jlo to say either ACVs are 
ig used on an experimental basis or have become a standard 
I'.pment. 



180 



o *"* o 

i the beach defense zone."" 00 

The wide use of missile firing submarines and surface 
sips in preparing a beachhead for an amphibious landing, as 
dscussed previously, has been viewed as essential. Usually, 
te amphibious landing by Soviet naval infantry is accompanied 
fcj parachute and helicopter landings of Soviet airborne or 
amy units in the rear of the landing areas to capture key 
psitions on the avenues of approach of enemy reserves, and to 
envelop the defenders. 

All present naval infantry units are guard's units 
ad most likely maintain their traditional brigade organizations, 
/brigade consists of 3 to 4 battalions, one of which is tank 
Uttalion. The basic assault unit is the battalion reinforced 
ath tanks (most likely a tank company) . There probably are 7 to 
\ brigades distributed among four Soviet fleets: 2 or 3 in 
he Baltic, about 2 in the Black Sea, one or 2 in the Pacific, 
ad one or 2 in the North. The total strength of the naval i 



afantr 



y is 13-15,000 men. 



The Soviet naval infantry is an elite, highly specialized 

orce with high espirit. The mottoes, "Remember, the fundamental 

aw of him who makes the assault is advance, advance, advance, 

here is your victory.", is printed in the walls of naval infantry 



238 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1966, pp. 92-94. 



181 






arracks and recreation rooms. There is even a Ballad of the 

lack Beret, an official sons, of the naval infantry. 239 .Major 

i 

eneral P. Mel'nikov, in charge of the combat training of the 
aval infantry, emphasized that future naval infantry officers 

re selected from among "best graduates from the army military 

, 240 

chools (academies)". Another general from the main naval 

eadquarters, after being asked "What kind of troops are our 

aval infantry men?", andwered, "They are a special kind of 

roops. Emphasize this! Our marines can do everything. They 

an blow up bridges and remove mines from harbors. If necessary, 

ast two of them can disrupt an entire platoon in the rear of 

be enemy. They can also jump from parachutes. They can climb 

Duntains like mountaineers. And they make excellent snipers." 241 

Obviously offensive-oriented, the Soviet naval infantry 

5 certainly capable of conducting small-scale landing operations 

/ themselves and assuring small to medium landings of army units 

l seizing the beachhead and holding., it until the army units 

ive landed. There is strong emphasis on the high degree of 



239 

See Lt. Col. F. C. Turner, USMC, "The Resurgent 

>viet Marines", Marine Corp Gazette , June 1969, pp. 29-32. 

240 

Ncticlya, No. 46, 1968. 

241 

Komsomo 1 ska y a Pra yd a , IS September 1966. 



/ ■ . 

/ ' 182 



ability of naval infantry and the necessity for the wide 

itroduction of new means of transportation. Air-cushion 

» 

242 
chicles and skimmers have been mentioned in particular. ' 

\ addition to its employment in a classical amphibious role, 

[;e Soviet Navy capability to use naval infantry as a reaction 

Erce or in the role of interposition should not be excluded. 

;e rapid growth of this relatively small force in the immediate 

■jture is unlikely because it has to be in conjunction with a 

^responding development of the Navy's surface forces, and ' 

irticularly its landing ships. A gradual increase in the"* 

irength of the Soviet naval infantry up to a level of 

243 
:;-30,000 men during the decade of 1970s is quite possible. 

Science and Armament 

The close dependence of armament, especially its quality 
rl modernity, upon the science, technology, and general level 

i industrial development is well known. However, traditionally, 

I 
nRussia and the Soviet Union, at least up to the recent past 
/ | 

a maybe even up to the present, there has been a gap between 
J achievements of science in the field of basic and applied 



242 

Morskoy Sbo rnik No. 3, 1971, p. 29. 

243 

For a detailed analyses of the subject see Charles G, 

rjtchard "The Soviet Marines", US Naval last:, cute Proceedings , 
afch 1072, pp. 19-30. 

■'. 

• 

• ■ ' 183 



research, inventions or discoveries, and the ability oX the 
existing technology, industrial base, to implement them. It 

is not to say that the Soviet Union has been unique in this 

aspecx, but that gap has been wider, compared with e.g., the 

United States, because of the lower Soviet technological level. 

The number of Soviet scientists employed in defense work and 

correspondingly their role in the development of Soviet 

armament have been substantial, and probably proportionally 

have exceeded those in most other countries. Defense research 

and development and allocation of industrial capacities for- 

■ 
the production of armament have always been items of first 

priority in the minds of the Soviet leadership, and that 

attitude goes back to the first years of Soviet power.. The 

Soviet Navy has been receiving its share of both. 

In 1923 and later, the naval research and development 

efforts were directed by the Scientific Technical Committee 

>f the Navy (NTKM) created by a special decree of the Revolutionary 

Iilitary Council. In 1032 the departments and sections of the 

ITKM were organized into independent Scientific Research 

•nstitutes of the Navy (gunnery, mine-torpedo, navigation, 

Communications, etc.). The Soviet Academy of Sciences and its 

•umerous institutes have been working in close cooperation with 

•he naval scientific research organizations. Tor example, welding 



84 



methods for ships and particular!,, , 

rticularly submarine construction were 
developed at the beginning 1930s *« * h 

g U.Os m the welding institute 
now named after the then head P™* 

head Professor Patton. A crucial role 

was played in the development of defense M 

aeiense measures against 
magnetic mines, includ-ino- ,*« 

including degaussing methods by the institute 

headed by academicians V S ffni^v - • 

V. S.. ^ulebalun and A. P.. Aleksandrov in 

-chatov. a future leading Soviet nuclear soieatist) acwveiy 
-ticipated in this wo* and beaded a speoial group ^ 
ith the Black Sea Fleet. 

Since 1 925 the development of scientific-technological 
prs associated with radio electronic, including tele- 
pnics (remote controX) and Xater cybernetics, was Xed by ' 

^ician, Xater Sngineer-AdmiraX, and Assistant .Minister of 

3'fense A. I a P « CT T + . 

**• a. xsoxg. it was Ber°- who o<= f,„ v i 

«c Ao wr.o as tar back as 1923 

•kexoped a theoretics analysis of the probXem associated with 
jUo communications with submerged, submarines , eM p aasi2ing 
} necessity of developing Xonger-wave transmitters to increase 
J -ge and depth of underwater reception. Since the late 
,0s the scientific group headed by Professor A. P. Shorin 
jrfd to develop remote-controlled aircraft-torpedo boat 
j*». After successful research during 1930-1035, the first 
'"PS of remote-controlled torpedo boats and aircraft (one ' 



aircraft per pair of boats) were delivered to the Baltic and the 

Pacific Fleets. 

> 

The mathematical apparatus has been widely employed 
by the Soviet scientists, and, in a number of cases, they 
were literally ahead of their time in its application. Tor 
example, the works of L. V. Kantorovich "Mathematical Methods 
of Organizing and Planning Production" (1939) and "Further 
Development of Mathematical Methods and Prospects of Their 
Application in Planning and Economics" (1943) actually already 
contained the basic ideas of the mathematical theory now widely 
known as linear programming. Methods for the approximate 
solution of non-linear problems were developed in the works of 
Academicians N. M. Xrylov and N. N. Bogolyubov. A leading 
contribution to the development of the theory of random processes 
was made by Academician A. N. Kolmogorov. 

The application of the mathematical apparatus to the naval 
art has been considerable. The work of Professor Vice Admiral 
L. G. Goncharov, "The Beginning of the Theory of Probability 
in an Application to Questions of Naval Tactics" published in 1921, 
expounded on certain methods of operational research. 

When World Y/ar II broke out, special defense committees 
headed by leading scientists were organized in the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences. The Naval Scientific Technical Committee, headed by 



186 



Lcademician A. F. Ioffe, made substantial contributions to' the 
;olution of various problems, and the organization .served as an 
mportant coordinating body between the Navy and the scientific 

ommunity . 

The theoretical works of Nobel Prize winners N. G. Basov 
nd A. M. Prokhorov were important to the development of lasers, 
oth scientists were named as" participants in the solution of 
arious radioelectronics and communications problems. 

The story of Soviet naval armament starts in 1321, when 
he Special Technical Bureau (Ostekhbyuro) charged with the 
evelopment of naval weapons was established. Following the s 
:ussian tradition and the dictates of a purely defensive naval 
olicy, considerable attention was devoted to the development of 
lines and torpedos. Special decisions of the Soviet Government 
.ssued in 1937, 1938, and 1940 called for the accelerated 



244 

.tor more on the subject of Soviet scientists and the 

kvy, see (1) Vice Admiral G. G. Tolstolutskiy , "50 Years of 

Omraunications in the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1S67, pp. 

5-22, and "Communications in the Okean Maneuvers", No. 11, '1970, 

p. 22-25; (2) Rear Admiral B. V. Nikitin, From the History of 

Iblemechanics Development in the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. |4, - 

t>69, pp. 80-83; (3) V. Volodkovskiy , "Scientific Technical I 

f ogress and the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, pp. 88-73; 

]0 Yu. Skorokhod, "The Soviet Navy and Cybernetics", Morskoy 

jjornik No. 7, 1965, pp. 62-68; (5) Rear Admiral N. Boravenkov, 

'Scientific Organizations for the Development of Naval Armament", 

brskoy Sbornik No. 5, I9 60, pp. 69-73; (5) Professor Engineer - 

fee-Admiral it. A. Krupskiy, "The Development of Communication 

■i the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1971, pp. 81-85. 

• ■ ."" i ' 

• ■ 

, 187 



development of nine and torpedo armament and considerably increased 
the production base. Prolonged research and development initiated 
in the 1920s resulted in the successful development of the first 
Soviet influence mine, which entered service in 1939. When the 
war started, the Navy had in service the following 5 types of 
nine: M-26, KB-1, Mirab, R-l, M 08/39. During 'the war the 

following 6 types were added: AGSB, PLT-G, AMD-500, AMD-1000, 

245 

XPAB, EP-G. 

In the post War period, the Soviet Navy continued to make 
its mine armament more sophisticated. Particular attention was 
devoted to the development of influence mines, both bottom and 
moored, and, according to principle on wfrxcrB rhe ^ines- operated, 
whether magnetic, acoustic, or pressure. Various combinations 
such as magnetic-acoustic mines, as well as multi-channel mines 
were also developed. From the predominantly defensive employment 
of mines, a gradual shift toward utilization of the offensive 
characteristics of the* weapon has -been observed, and submarines 
and aircraft started to be considered as the main mine carriers. 
The development of a deep-water mining capability has been a long 
time preoccupation of the Soviet Navy. 



5 A. B. Geyro, "Naval Mines", Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1971, 
pp. 83-91; and Vice Admiral B. D. Xostygov, "Mine-Torpedo Weapons 
during the Years of Soviet Power", :.;orskoy Sbornik No. 9, 1987, 
PP. 34-38. 



1 nn 

loo 



The importance of nine weaponry was clearly demonstrated 

during the Korean War, when the North Koreans, using mainly 

» 

obsolete Soviet nines as well as Soviet technical and tactical 
supervision, laid a few minefields off Wonsan. Those fields not 
only delayed the American landing for eight days and caused the 
loss of a few minesweepers, but were responsible for a message 

received in the Pentagon stating, "The US Navy has lost command of 

246 

the sea in Korean waters". 

A continuously exercised' fleet and an all-Navy competition 
for minelaying in the combat training of the Soviet Navy are 
evidence of the importance attached to the mine warfare. 
Advances in science and engineering kave already resulted in new 
models of mines which can be planted very deep and are made of 
non-magnetic materials, of self-propelled mines, and rapid 
propelled surfacing mines. Mines with fuzing mechanisms utilizing 
ultrasonic, optical, thermal, and other physical fields have 
definitely attracted t-he attention^of. the Soviet Navy, and their 
appearance can be expected. 

Prior to the war, a variety of 45 cm and 53 cm torpedos 
for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft were developed. All 



246 

0. V. Shulman and B. A. Stlimanyuk, "The Mine as a 

Weapon under Contemporary Conditions", Morsk oy Sb ornik No. 12, 
1937, pp. 39-43; and Cagle and Sanson, The Sea War in Korea , 
1957, p. 142 ;Soldat und Technik No . 4 , 1972, pp. 191-195. 



1 



109 



,voro gas-steam torpedos and particularly commonly used wore 
53-3S and 53-39 models. The wakeless electric torpedo, 2T-30 . 
successfully used by the Northern Fleet, was introduced in 1942. 
L number of aviation torpedos for both parachute and free fall 
/ere also developed. 

Work on the torpedo self-guidance (homing) system interrupted 
>y the war was resumed in 1944. The sinking in July 1944 of the 
erman submarine U-250 by a Soviet submarine chaser provided the. 
oviet Navy with a rare opportunity to learn about three new ^ 
erman torpedos, the T-V, G7A , and G72 . Particularly important 

ere the homing systems of torpedos and two previously unknown 

247 

aneuvering devices, FAT and LUT. After the German capitalation, 

ractically all her existing arsenal aad research work on torpedos 
2came known to the Soviet Navy and made a sizeable contribution 
d the further sophistication of Soviet torpedos. Better electric 
orpedos, new jet RT torpedos and improved guidance systems were 
eveioped soon after the War. 

The improved anti-submarine defense and the arming of 
>rpedoes with nuclear warheads forced the Soviet Navy to j - 
i:ceierate work on' long-range torpedos. In the second half of 
iq 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a few types of long- 



247 

"The 2nd of the U-250", Morskoy Shornik , No. 5, 

31 71, pp. 67-74 



■•* 



1 O 



SO 



range homing torpodos v/oro developed Darin. 

peu> Dur.mj; approximately the 

same period, t,o soviet Navy concents on the UevoXo PW o„t o, 

better ASW torpodos, in Waic h it definitely l asged belW the 

Western navies. It now aDoearq no +v . ""^ ' 

appears as chough a number of ASY/ 

torpedos for submarines, surface shin<, a «* *• 

, ur.acc ships, and aircraft were developed 

and are presently in the armament of the Soviet 'Navy. 

in the missile field 'the Soviet Navy approach turned 'out 

to be different from that of the «.=+ n -r *>, 

.he rest of .he navies. A comparison 

■otwoen the Soviet Navy and the US Navy in their approach to the 
■evelopmcnt of three different missiles - ballistic, surface-to- 
urface (cruise), and surface-to-air (SAM) - is very revealing 
The development of a naval ballistic missile system, or 
attaer the adaption of available land ballistic system to be 
pched from submarines started q uite early in the Soviet Union, 
ad in September of 1955 a ballistic missile was launched from 
surfaced submarine. Either for lack of an innovative approach 
'• for reasons of technological difficulties, the first Soviet 
Marine-launched ballistic missile system with which both 
^ventional and nuclear submarines were armed in the late 1950s, had 
■o Shortcomings: it was of short range and had to be launched 
■P* the surface. The American goal from the beginning was 
'f*erent, and the Polaris system developed over a short period 
■ time has been of much greater range and with a submerged launch 



1S1 



capability. Through three successful modifications (A-2, A-3, 

Poseidon) the initial range of the Polaris syste* was ra ore than 
doubled, and was finally made suitable for MIRV (Multiple ' 
independent Reentry Vehicle) . Moreover, all Polaris missile .""" 
submarines carried 16 missiles, while the Soviet submarines 
carried only three, until the Yankee class made its appearance. 
Starting in the early sixties, the original Soviet ballistic " 
missile SS-N-4 Sark was replaced with the SS-N-5 Serb. The Serb 
system has double the range of the Sark and can be launched from 
the submerged position. During the second half of the 1960s, 
a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SS-N-6, with a 
submerged launch capability and more than double the range of the 
Serb, was developed for the Yankee-class submarines. It was 
also reported that another new ballistic missile, the SS-NX-S, 
with a range of close to 3,500 miles, has been under development 
and may be presently already operational. 248 

The shorter range of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles compared with those of the US has not necessarily been 
as much of a drawback as might appear at first glance. The great 
concentration of important targets along both US coasts, the 

243 
^ x Characteristics of Missiles can be found in Jrre's Ml 
5jgl_cl Aircraft, 1970-1971 ed. , pp. 565-571; and Weapon S^st e-s, 
19/0-1971. See also In ter ^a^onal^ Defe nse Review v. 5 .\ T o . 1 ' 
February 1972, p. 20 and Washing ton I-cs;, March 22". 1972, "US 
Analysts Puzzled by Soviet Sub Missile". 



Q 



2 



A f "' ;,n| »'■ ; "><1 thd I'.W, Fin nnrl 1 • 

warfare have presented tho Soviet's ballistic 

missile submarines with th« „ 

- with the opportunity to inflict no less 

damage than tho more numerous US submarines arae(J ^ ^^ 
number of missiles (prior to MIKV introduction to Poseidon) 
would on the Soviet Union. 

The Surf act i -tn-.->" v.-?/ , -, 

**aoe to .wrtwe cruise missiles are a different 

story. The start of the program in both navies was either close 
in time or perhaps the US Navy was evea ahead _ ^ ^ ^^ 
missile was launched from a submarine in 1953 and in mid-1954 
the system became operational. Two submarines, ten aircraft 
carriers, and four- cruiser, were capable q£ ^.^ ^ ^^ 

I hy 1957. Towards mid-1958 a bigger and faster missile, Regains 
H, was developed, but after a single operational test, the whole 
Program was terminated in late 1958. It should be emphasized 
that the Eegulus system was intended to be fired against land 
targets, i.e. loP strategio delivery) and ^ successful 

development of the Polaris system, initially tested in spring of 

1959, quite logically replaced the Regulus. 

The Soviet development of surface-to-surface missiles 
has been taking a different approach. From the beginning, it 
was oriented toward the development of a primarily anti-ship, ■ 
and originally anti-aircraft carrier, surface-to-surface cruise 



1 C 



oo 



tailo. Obviously a system designed to operate from a moving 
itform against another moving Platform can, if the necessity 
rises, be used against land targets within its range, three 
yes of firing platforms have been adopted for a variety of 
jjiet crnise missiles, the submarine, surface ships, and 



L craft. 



The first to be equipped with air-to-surf ace cruise missiles 
j aircraft of Soviet naval aviation (early 1950s Kennel) . i n 
;3-1957 two cruise-missile systems were developed, strela for 
c surface ships and the long-range Shaddock for submarines, 
jla used to be a universal system employed by aircraft, > 
iface ships, and shore missile units, SUatftfecS? originally 
coyed ^oy the submarines, found its first application on surface 
is in the Xynda-class cruiser. Also during the second half 

he 1950s, Shchuka, an extremely low-altitude guided missile 
iched from aircraft against surface targets, was developed. 

be late 1950s the" Styx, a missile system for -the Xomar and 
■ nissile boats, was developed. 

Such widespread application of cruise missiles by the 
j* Navy introduced a qualitatively significant change into 
f warfare. From the point of view of naval combat (ships 
-st ships, particularly) the missiles erased the advantages 
'large-displacement conventionally-armed, armored ships, 



/ . 

/. 

-L J L f 



making them to a largo degree obsolete (with the exception of 
for shore bombardment tasks under certain condition). The 

possibility of delivering a multi-missile salvo, particularly 
one fired from various directions with the missile approaching 
at different altitudes and homed in by various guidance systems 
employing various frequencies, made the defense of major ship 
formations an extremely difficult task, even when a considerable 
lumber of aircraft and ECM devices are employed. Multi-missile 
Launch systems of Soviet surface ships and submarines and the 
jroup attack pattern of missile carrying aircraft bear testimony 
;o a possible saturation technique by the Soviet Navy. 

The original Soviet concentration on a long-range missiles 
lictated by the requirement to counter aircraft carriers 
;ertainly imposed some limitations, as it demanded target 
.cquisition by the support forces and occasional mid-course 
orrection, and reduced the space available for the defensive 
rmament. Moreover, 'the long ranges of the early Soviet cruise 
issiles imposed a certain limitation on their speed, for most 
f them have been subsonic. Gradually the above shortcomings- 
ere overcome, and shorter, horizon-range missiles with supersonic 
peed were developed. ' In the case of the C-class submarines, 
submerged launch system has been added. The altitude shimming 
rajectories of most Soviet cruise missiles added to the armament 



1S5 



[luring the decade of 1960s have further improved the missile 

penetration capability and further complicated the already 

i 
difficult problem of defending against them. Early warning for 

launched and approaching surface-skimming missiles can 1 in most 

cases, come only from the air, and hence the role of shipborne 

aviation in the anti-cruise missile defense. If a missile carrier 

has not been detected and destroyed - not an easy task in case of 

a submarine and even a small surface missile carrier and low 

flying aircraft - the only defensive means available are those 

against the missiles themselves, i.e. disruption, principally 

by jamming; deception, by jamming and decoys; destruction, by 

anti-missiles and highly automated rapid-fire coventional guns. 

The SAM systems presently available to Y/estern as well as 
Soviet navies are poorly suited for the anti-cruise missile 
defense. 249 Smaller faster SAMs, a sort of "mini SAM", are 
needed. 

The Soviet Navy., after a decade of employing PVO SAMs 
(mainly GOA) , appeared to be turning toward more compact SAM 
system which, in addition to an anti-cruise missile capability, 
can be installed aboard smaller ships, and/or makes it possible 



249 ?or elaborate discussion of the problem,. see Desmond 
Scrivener, "Defense Against Anti-Ship Missiles", interna tional 
Defense Review No. S, 1971, pp. 539-543; and US Naval 
Prcceoclings , March 1971, pp. 45-58. 



••? 



1 QO 



250 
to carry more missiles aboard. The Soviet Navy's preoccupation 

with anti-missile defease has been evident since the summer of 

251 
1971, when a number of such exercises was reported. ' 

The development of Soviet naval guns indicates a trend 
toward highly automated lighter-caliber systems. Not a single 
surface ship built during the decade of the 1960s has been 
equipped with guns larger than 76 millimeters. Host of them 
have 57 millimeter 'rapid-fire guns, and recently, starting 
with Kresta, even larger ships have been equipped with 30- 
millimeter guns in twin automatic mounts, a trend indicating 

252 
an increased awareness of the threat from the air. Unquestionably 

the small-caliber guns are ins tallad mace: for defense against 
the cruise missile in the terminal stage than for the anti- 
aircraft defense. Even recognizing that the angular error 
increases rapidly at the ranges where the kill probability 
builds up sharply, the guns can still deliver something against 
missiles in their final stage of^approach which is better than no 
defense at all. 



250 

The demand for such systems was expressed in the mid 

1960s. See for example, Vice Admiral V. Syehev, "Missiles - The 
xArmament of Ship", Krasnaya Zvezda , April 20, 1966; and Morskoy 
Sbornik No. 3, 1966, pp. 32-38. 

251 

Krasnaya Zvezda , 15 June 1971. 

Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 October 1971. 



1S7 



The wide introduction of cruise missiles by the Soviet 
avy undoubtedly aggravated even wore the already t complex problems 
f anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defenses with their often 
onflicting requirements. Submarines again gained most from the 
ruise missile armament, for they received the capability to 
ttack surface ships and formations from a 360° circle, while in 
he case of torpedo attacks, their firing positions had been much - 

ore restrictive. 

» 

It may be surprising, but almost a decade and the sinking ^ 
f the Israeli destroyer Elath was needed before the potentials 
f cruise missiles were recognized by the West. Not until 
.967 did the defense ministries ci Germany and France started 
. crash program to develop a medium-range ship and air-launched 
.nti-ship missile. The French company has developed the Exocet 
"Flying Fish") missile while the German company has concentrated 
>n the air-launched version of the same weapon, named Cormoran. 
l number of short-range cruise missiles were developed in the 
late 1960s by other countries (Norway, Israel). 

It can be concluded that out of three types of missiles - 
ballistic, surface-to-air, and cruise missiles - only in the latter 
las the Soviet Navy had almost a monopoly for an over a decade. 
)f course, ballistic missiles are a part of a strategic delivery 
system, and no navy is going to use them except during a nuclear 

/ 

138 

— ■■■■ -. . .. . ' „, ,... — .,. . — , — . — , , — i . — — * . ■ — i — —— — ■■ ■ — — - 



war, in which case the value of co— -- 

ou '- j " t ' at sea could hard 1 " *- 



J dc 



called important. Of course, any Qavy having ^^ ^ 
submarines is responsible for their successful deployment 

However, the execution of the task or i+= »,*, 

" s,t or lts -ailure would depend 

,pon the more conventionally understood naval power, whore the 
»ployment of cruise and surface-to-air missiles, as well as 
torpedos, mines, and guns, are crucial. Concentrating on the 
fevelopmeut of various cruise missiles deliverable by submarines, 
surface ships, and aircraft, the Soviet Union built a qualitatively 
•ew navy, powerful enough to leave its traditional, mainly" 
oastal, zones of operations and to enter the areas of the world 
cean where it had not been seen until the recent past. This 
ecame possible thanks to the coordinated efforts of Soviet 
dentists, industry, and the Navy. The recent testimony of 
efeuse research head Dr. John S. Poster before the House 
jpropriations Committee indicated that the Soviet Union presently 
|s a research effort larger than that of the United States, is 
ending more and in the^ future may gain technological superiority 
j« the U.S. military. 203 How accurate the estimates have been 
I an open question, but the innovative nature of the Soviet 
"jval armament and its employment are beyond any doubt 

._ . *■ 

253 

Washington Post . 23 August 1971. 



/ 



Party Control and Personnel Policy 

Party control of the Soviet armed forces was established 

luring the first days of their existence. ' In the summer of~^^ • 
LOIS, political departments started to be organized in the amy 
mits. The Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 ordered the 
creation of a Political Department headed by a Central Committee 
aember as a part of the Revolutionary Council. In May 1919 the 
iepartment became the Political Administration (PUR) , and the 
mified system of the political organs of the armed forces_was 
established. 

The naval department of the PUR was organized in March 
L922 by a decision of the Party Central Committee. In 1938 

the Military Council of the Navy and the Political Administration 

254 
pz the Navy were organized. 

Throughout their history the political organs have undergone 

the traditional Soviet shake-ups and reorganizations, but have 

invariably maintained their importance and general structure. 

The Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and the Navy, 

having rights of the Party Central Committee Department, is in 

charge of all political activity in the armed forces. The 

Political Administration of the Xavy, subordinated to the Main 



254 Co;:-- unist of Mi li tary For ces No.. 7, 1969, p? . 9-22; 
jflorskoy Sbornilc No . 3 , 197 J, , p . 11 . 



c p. n 

»— \j <*> 



Political Administration, is charged with political work in the 
Navy. In addition, there is the Military Council, of the Navy. 
The Chief of Political Administration of the Navy is a member 
of the council. Hence, the official title of Admiral Grishanov 
is Member of Military Council of the Navy, ChioX o£ Political 
Administration. * 

Each fleet in its turn has a Fleet Military Council and 
Fleet Political Directorate, and the chief of the latter is also 
a member of the former. In addition, the local republic, region, 
or district First Party Secretary also serves as a member of the 
Fleet Military Council. At the top, one of the leading members 
of the Party Central Committee, and often a member of Politboro 
is a member of the Navy Military Council (historically, such 
important figures as Zhdanov were either members of the Military 
Council of the Navy or, like Brezhnev in 1955, chiefs of its 
Political Administration) . Sub-divisions and units of fleets 
such as flotillas, fi'eet aviation, and naval bases have political 
departments. Commanders of ships starting at destroyer escort 
and larger have a deputy commander for political affairs (Zampolit) 
In the case- of smaller ' ships, such as minesweepers, missile and 
torpedo boats, the Zampolit is assigned to each division or 
aircraft squadron. Commanding officers of large departments of 
aajor ships, such as missile-gunnery and engineering departments 



901 



of cruisers, also have deputies for political affairs. 

The Political Administration of the Navy, Political 
Directorates of theFleets, and Political Departments are'' in 
effect staffs with their own units and sub-units and are manned 
by a considerable number of professional political officers, or 
political workers in official Soviet terminology. The political 
organs of the Navy are in charge of the activity of the Party and 
Komsomol (Young Communist League) organizations from the top to. 
the bottom. The organizations are created if there are three or 
more Party or Komsomol members. Because about 90% of the naval 
personnel are either members or candidate-members of the 
Communist Party or members of Komsomol, such organizations exist 
practically in all navy units down to the smallest. .The crews 
of the nuclear submarines which made the submerged round-the-world 

voyage in 1966 consisted completely of members of the Communist 

255 

Party or of Koms omo 1 . 

i 

In a like maimer, Navy leaders, admirals and officers, are 

elected to the, bureaus of local civilian Party organizations, 

/ 
republican Party central committees and even the Central Committee 

of CPSU. Thus, a sort of interweaving of military and party 

leaders is taking place where, of course, the Party leadership is 

preserved. 



255 

Soyetskiy Voir, No. 13, 1966. 



^r. ' 



9 



The Party leadership considers the moral-political and 
spiritual potential as being the most important element of the 
state military power, and its significance has grown immeasurably 
under contemporary conditions. The .Marxist-Leninist ideology^ 
being viewed as the foundation of thispotential, and the Party 
leadership directly and through political organs of the Array and 
the Navy is trying to increase the political awareness and a 
fommunist world outlook of the servicemen. The indoctrination 
>f the armed forces personnel in a spirit of patriotism and 
preparedness for the defense of the fatherland under the ~ 
condition of modern warfare is among the major goals of political 
/ork in the Soviet armed forces. The Party obviously considers 
/ell presented Party and political work as one of the most 
•nportant ways to influence the development of the Army and Navy. 
'he daily activities of the military councils, political organs, 
ommanders, and party organizations are concrete examples of the 
arty control of the -armed forces, but the bulk of the political 
ork is performed by the political workers, those numerous chiefs 
x the political departments, instructors, propagandists, and ' 
articularly the. Zampolits, and Party and Komsomol secretaries. 
hey have been labeled "true engineers of the sailors' souls". 256 



256 



Sr.1 



Admiral :.l. N. Sakharov, The Autority of the Ship's Politic-- 
.«*-, .uorskoy Sbornik Xo. 1, January :.970, pp. "41-46; and krziy 

^eral A. A. Yepishcv, The Indispensable Pounclation cf the Soviet 
^loary Structure, Xrn5:uaya Zvozda , November 30, 1967. 



2C3 



Of all those "engineers" the Zampolit is, of course, the most 

important figure. Strictly speaking, even Army General Yepisbev 

is the Zampolit of Minister of Defense Marshall Grechko and 

Admiral Grishanov is the Zampolit of Navy Commander-in Chief 

Fleet Admiral Gorshkov. 

These so called Institute of Zampolits has a complex history 

in the development of the Soviet armed forces and even more so 

in the development of the Navy. Before the Institute of Zampolit 

was finally established, there were three periods during which 

the Institute of Political Commissars existed. When the Soviet 

armed forces were organized, and the need for political control 

arose, trusted Party members were assigned- as political commissars 

to each unit. They were responsible not only for political work, 

but were required to countersign each order given y oy the commanders 

If a commissar considered an order counter-revolutionary, he had 

the right to negate it. Thus, in effect, a duel command system 

existed. The first introduction o£ system of one-man command 

■ 
(Sdinonachaliye) occurred during the second half of the 1920s. 

In the Navy, the introduction of the system was delayed for the 

reasons discussed previously by at least two or three years. Under 

the Edinonachaliye system, the Zampolit (Deputy Commander for 

Political Affairs) was introduced, and replaced the commissar. 

But if the commissar had ee,ual rights with the 



C \J T" 



commander, the Zampolit was his subordinate, and the commander 
was fully responsible for the units condition, including its 
socalled moral-political and spiritual potential, not to'mention 
combat readiness. The Institute of Political Commissars, however, 
was introduced twice again, first during Stalin's purges in 1938, 
to be replaced again by the Institute of Zampolit in 1940 right 
after Finnish - Soviet War; and in 1941, right after the German 
attack on the Soviet Union, to be replaced, this time definitely 
in 1942, when it proved to be unworkable. 

While officially proclaimed, the Edinonachaliye was "not 
immediately exercised in all services and units. In the Navy, 
particularly in submarines, the commissars survived longer than 
in any other service or branch. However, the post-war period 
witnessed a genuine strengthing of the system of Edinonachaliye 
without weakening neither party control nor the intensity of 
party-political work. Marshall Zhukov, while Minister of Defense, 
went a step further in the implementation of the Edinonachaliye 
system. The number of political workers in the units was reduced, 
criticism of military commanders during the Party meetings, 
prohibited, and the political workers were made responsible not 
only for the state of affairs in the area of their immediate 
responsibility, i.e. party-political work, but for the state of 
discipline and even combat readiness of the units. When removed 



/ 

■ O p £T 



from his post in October 1957, Marshall Zfaukov was particularly 
severely criticized for the above steps and accused of attempting 
to undermine Party political work in the armed forces. ' 

Until recently, and to some degree even today, the gap 
between line naval officers and political officers in general 
education, professional knowledge and popularity among enlisted 
personnel was considerable and in favor of the line officers. 
Even in the ability to explain purely political and ideological 
matters, the line officers often have been more capable and 
effective than the political officers, who frequently had "to limit 
themselves to dogmatic repetition of slogans and citations. 
Moreover, contemporary Soviet professional naval officers, who 
represent a privileged group in Soviet society and are a sort 
of elite compared with other services, having been brought up under 
the Communist form of government and being themselves members of 
the Communist Party or of Komsomol (junior officers) , have 
accepted the regime and are unquestionably devoted to- the 
fatherland. Party and Komsomol membership are necessary 
prerequisites for advancement in the ranks and for promotions. 
In the Soviet Navy, command of a unit cannot be given to an 
officer who is not a Party member. Moreover, all naval officers 
know that fitness ■ report includes considerations of his 
participation in party-political work, ideological maturity in 



/ • 

I ' nop 



firxism-Lcninism and the political-moral state of the unit he 
onimands . Thus, the commanders themselves, under; the system of 
iinonachaliye, at least in part, represent those channels through 
tiich Party control is being exercised. 

Although recognizing the loyalty of the officers, the Party 
till finds it necessary to maintain the separate channel of 
ommunication represented by the political organs, via which any 
eviation from the "True line" can be reported up to the Central 
ommittee. The importance of political organs of the Navy is ^- 
een by the Party leaders also in the necessity to improve the 
ffectiveness and increase the intensity of party-political work 
rider conditions of the socalled intensified ideological struggle 
etween two opposing systems. The expanded scope of navy operations, 
hereby its personnel are more exposed to possible subversive 
nfluences of alien ideology and non-Soviet ways of life, create 
dditional demands upon political work which are openly recognized 

y the Soviets. As was recently^dmphasized by member of the 

■ 

Military Council and Chief of the Political Administration of the 

;avy Admiral Grishanov, the situation "makes it incumbent upon 

■ 
.11 Communists to be tireless carriers of our Party's line. Not 

•inging phrases but business-like work is needed so that every 

'arty organization and every Party member fulfills to the fullest 

legree the duties outlined in the CPSU Rules, in the Instructions 



/ 
/ 

2C7 



ctho CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and in the 
iree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 January 1967 "On 

i 

i 

proving the Party-political work in the Soviet Array and Navy." 257 

The 1967 decision was an important one for the political^ 
rans. First, the position of company and equivalent Zampolits, 
Iminated under Zhukov, was restored thus increasing considerably 
h number of political officers in the units. Second, the -stature 
fall schools training political officers has been elevated 
>higher schools with a four-year period of training. The 
:viously unsuccessful efforts to elevate the prestige of the 
)itical officers, to improve the quality of their work were 
lensified. Army General Yepishev wrote, "In accordance with 
i Central Committee demands steps were taken recently to further 
trove Party work in all sectors of the armed forces, to raise 
ij activeness and militancy of party organizations and to 

rease their influence in all aspects of troop life and 

• • ,,258 
Ining." 

The necessity for the political officers in the Navy to 
f naval matters was emphasized by Admiral Zakharov in the 
•Lowing way: ■ "It is unthinkable today that a political worker 
i have authority without deep knowledge of the equipment and 



257 

Morskoy Sbornik , No. 9, 1971, p. 7. 

258,, 

.\rasnaya Zvozda , November 30, 19S7. 






aponry with which our submarines, modern surface ships and 
;?et air units are outfitted. This is well understood by deputy 
comanders for political affairs. Many of them arc qualified to 
(imand a ship. They stand undex'way watches and fly in the 
nacity of pilots and navigators in combat aircraft. Constant 
:Litary training permits them to work better With the men, and 
(influence them more effectively." 

The Admiral, however, warned political officers against 
o much involvement with professional naval work: "While 
csistently raising the level of their military-technical 
nwledge, political officers must not under any circumstances 
cget about their basic duty. They need first-rate military 
uining in order to better educate the men more concretely, 
cbe able to speak out together with party bureaus, committees, 
i the bureaus of the Komsomol as military organizers of Party 
c.itical work. It is necessary to speak about this because, 
fortunately , certain deputy commanders for political affairs 
cisider the standing of underway watches or good qualifications 
sof paramount importance and forget about their primary 

e;ponsibilities. Usually party political work suffers in such 

259 

a;es, sometimes even becoming a mere formality." 



259 

Morskoy Sbomik No. 1, 1970, pp. 44-45. 



/ 



20 c 



■u 



Oa the other hand, the political training of Soviet line 
fleers is never completed, and the political officers must 
sjre that standards are met. Groups of Marxists-Leninist 
uation are organized, and lectures and seminars, conducted, 
tndance is obligatory, although the officer may decide for 
nklf which group he prefers. Each officer must attend 50 
iijs. of service time each year for Marxist-Leninist studies alone.. 
as studies are supplemented by theoretical conferences, 
)jtes, and lectures conducted after regular duty hours. 
Listed personnel must attend three hours of political instruction 
Jl week in addition to two or three socalled "political 
icmations" of 20 minutes duration each. 

Thus, the Party's desire for a sort of conversion in the 
« of ideology, knowledge, and professionalism between the 
iiical and line officers while they maintain their main efforts 
ne areas of primary responsiblity is being gradually exercised. 
-J political officers and line officers may disagree over the 
at of political control, as was evident in the past, there is 
evidence that the latter are seeking disengagement from it, 

mder the Soviet regime, they could not even if they wished. 

■riction between the two revolves around the large amount 
f-me party-political work consumes, often to the detriment 
imbat training. Many line officers see the positive results 



__ 



91 n 

_____ 



w indoctrination produced by party-political work upon ship 
ompanies; good morale and stronger discipline can and do result 
rora skillful indoctrination, and the occ.^ional disputes over 
uplementation of party-political work methods and time allocated 
) it do not testify either against the loyalty of the Soviet 
avy or the firmness of the Party control. Along the line of 
ommand, the top military leadership have constantly stressed 
fie necessity for effective political indoctrination. Marshall 
(rechko stated recently that "one of the most important 
onditions for successfully solving the tasks confronting the 

;rmed forces is to raisethe ideological maturity and Marxist- 

260 
]jninist conviction of all our servicemen." It may be 

oncluded that in general Party control is accepted, and many 

ine officers even might find it beneficial for their career and, 

bing themselves Communists, skillfully use it in command. 

While Party control and ideological indoctrination of 

^rvicemen by a system of political organs, may keep the Navy 

a a desirable political track, they will not, however, maintain 

ne Navy as a combat entity, for regardless of Communist claims of 

:;s universality, Marxism-Leninism will not control propulsion 

^/sterns, navigate the ships, or keep the armament ready for the 



260 

Marshall Grechko "On Guard for Pea ce an d t he BirJ I'-icy; of 

Ommunism" , Military Publishing House , 1971, p. 109. 



211 



4nbat use. To that end are needed professionally trained and 
>perienced personnel, and first of all the officers corps, the 
:dre, appropriately educated and trained, a fact recognized 
L the early years of Soviet power. The Revolution destroyed 
iny things in Russia, but not the naval officer educational 
sstem, which, after the years of revolutionary and civil war 
;rmoil, resumed its functions with the majority of teaching 
jrsonnel, buildings, and laboratories inherited from the 
!perial Navy. 

The contingent of cadets had obviously changed. V/hile 
;(e former Naval Cadet Corps, presently the Frunze Higher Naval 
ihool (the equivalent of the United States Naval Academy at 
>;aapolis) , accepted only sons of nobility, the Soviet version 
..itially accepted only workers and peasants. The education 
I Soviet naval officers started in September 1913 with accelerated 
imrses for the fleet command personnel. In July 1919 the 
;urses were converted into the Fleet Command School with a 
;lree-year course of training. In 1922, the Fleet Command School 
m renamed the Naval School (present Frunze Higher Naval School) , 
ill the Naval Engineering School (present Dzex*zhinskiy Higher 
f;/al Engineering School) was opened. The leaders and professors 
>: both naval schools were former Imperial naval officers and 
>ch a counterrevolutionary term of address as "Gentlemen" instead 



212 

-. 



of "Tovarishch" (Comrade) was common to the great confusion of 

261 
the cadets. In 1939 by decree of the Council of People's 

Commissars of the USSR both naval schools were elevated to 
institutions of higher learning. 

The accelerated expansion of the Soviet Navy prior to Y.'orld 
War II and the growing demand for officers produced a corresponding 
expansion of naval schools. The Pacific Higher Naval School, 
the Baku Higher Naval School, the Naval Communications 

> 

Schools, and the Gunnery School were established. The curriculum ^ 

,-. 262 

in all naval schools was extended to four years. 

After graduation from higher naval schools, officers N 
received one year of additional training- in higher special officer 
classes, to which they were sent after having completed from two 
to three years in their first assignments. Graduates of the 
classes were assigned as heads of departments. Thus, training 
of shipboard officers took five years (four years in school and 
one year in the classes), but tha-re was a break of from two to 
three years in that training. 



DX Kuznetsov, Nakanune , pp. 10-12. 

262 

For the details of Naval Training Development, see 

Admiral N. I. Vinogradov, Training Officers Cadres for the Navy , 
Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1967, pp. 25-31; Vice Admiral V. A. Krenov, 
F orge of Naval Officer Cadres , Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1971, pp. 
17-24; and K PSS i stroitol ' stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzaonykh Si l 
(The CPSU and Development of the Soviet Armed Forces) , Second 
Revised Edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967, 464 pp. 



213 



Also in 1939 several Special Naval Schools were organized 
vhich served as preparatory schools, graduating cadets at the 
ligh school level. In the summer of 1944 these Special Naval 
Schools were merged into the newly organized Leningrad Naval 
Preparatory School with a three-year high school curriculum, 
'he special and preparatory schools were similar to Valley Forge 
[ilitary Academy with the significant difference that the 
raduates of the Soviet Naval Special and Preparatory Schools 
ere guaranteed continuation of their studies in higher naval 
chools. Also, in 1944, the Nakhomov School, an extended "type 
f preparatory naval school with up to a seven-year curriculum, 
as organized. 

The post-war Soviet naval construction generated an additional 
emand for naval officers and a number of new naval schools were 
rganized in Leningrad, Sevastopol, and Kaliningrad. In 1967 

ill of the higher naval command schools as well as some of the 

i 

agineering schools (ordinance and radio-engineering) were; 



inverted into higher naval command and engineering schools with 



•to 

/ 



:ive and five and a half years curriculum. Today's young Soviet 

uval officers in the shipboard complements are graduates of 

"iese schools. They all hold diplomas as engineers with full 

i 
uion c-ualif ications. The longer duration of training has been 

explained by the sharp increase in the volume of information in 

-r / 

! / 

'214 



general scientific, technical, and special fields and the 1 
necessity not only to maintain, but to improve, the quality of 
aaval and command training. 263 Under the present system;' 
significantly more time has been set aside for the practical 
training of midshipmen. During his five years of training 
the cadet spends almost ten months on board ships and in units 
)f the Navy. 

The Soviet Navy has at least ten higher naval schools, 
:ive of them in Leningrad, two in Sevastopol, one in Kaliningrad, 
me in Baku, and one in Vladivostok. In addition, there is a 
{aval Higher Political School in Kiev, an Auxiliary Fleet 
laritime School in Lomonosov, a Naval Department in Volk'sk, 
i Rear and Supplies School, a Naval Department of the Medical 
.cademy , and the Nakhimov Preparatory School. The curriculum of 
'akhimov school was reduced to two years of study. Selected 
;enior officers (line officers, engineers, and naval aviators) 
•eceive advance training in the Naval Academy. A small percentage 
£ naval officers from the positions of commanding officers of 
estroyers, submarines, and their equivalent and higher are 
ppointed to the Academy. Senior political officers are trained 
y the Naval Department of the Lenin Political Academy. 

The officers for naval aviation are educated in the Air 



2S3 Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1371, pp. 17-24. 



L. 10 



-- 



orce higher schools and appointed to the Navy, where, after 
.dditional training in special centers, they are assigned to the 
nits of naval aviation. Officers for the Naval Infantry are 

elected from the best graduates of the ground forces higher 

264 
chools . 

All Soviet naval officers are volunteers.- Since the 

id-1950s preference in admission to the higher naval schools, 

ithin the framework of competitive entrance examinations, have 

een given to qualified servicemen. Civilian candidates and 

raduates of high schools, after satisfying academic requirements 

or admission, are sent for extensive shipboard training, where 

inal judgment on their fitness.to.be aavs.! officers is made. 

■he third source of naval school enrollment is the Nakhimov 

chool, graduates of which are assured entrance to one of the 

igher naval schools, often of their choice, without an entrance 

xamination. 

- 

The quality of 'education ire naval schools, is generally 
od. The cadets receive broad knowledge in mathematics, physics, 
hemistry, and a large dose of engineering, ordnance, and 
lectronics. Despite all efforts to graduate well trained" 
rofessional naval officers, while the graduates of Soviet naval 



Xrasna ya Zvozda, 18 February 1972; Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 
'369, pp. 69-72; and Komsomol skaya Pravda, ],l+rch 1, 1972. 



/ 216 






ihools possess a good academic knowledge, they are obviously 

Icking in practical experience This shortcoming in wo.U 

i 

^cognized, and corresponding measures are provided for tho 
neediest training of young officers aboard ships Accelerated 
jiientif ic-technical progress, which produces the most rapid 
cianges in armament and equipment, probably justifies the Soviet 
Hvy ' s accent on broad academic knowledge for young officers 
viich provides with relatively fast mastering of practical 
jjquirements of the billets they are assigned. The important 
Jict is that the great majority of Soviet naval officers are 
^aduates of naval schools and holders of professional diplomas. 

Practically all graduates of Soviet naval schools are 
assigned to shipboard duty, and, in general, sea duty is 
eiphasized and encouraged. The natural selection process 
hs been the standard practice, whereby the best fitted are 
f'ovided with a continuous opportunity to serve in fleet operational 
uits, and cases of an officer spending twenty out of thirty 
yars of service aboard a ship are quite common A recent Pravda 
E'ticle stated that in spite of all hardships of sea duty it 

i; difficult to find enough naval officers for the shore duty, 

265 

bcause prevailing desire to be assigned to ship billets. 



265 Pravda, March 30, 1972 



•v- .1. i 



Moreover, sea duty provides the Soviet naval officer with 
better promotion opportunities and faster advancement in rank in 
addition to considerable higher pay than in shore billets. For 
example, all personnel aboard operational ships receive a 30% 
bonus above basic pay; submariners receive 20% more, for a total 
of 50% above basic pay The pay of e.g. an average Soviet 
lieutenant commander is four to five times greater than that of 
the average worker. In addition, they are supplied with free 
uniforms, free food, paid transportation during their leave, 
rest homes and sanitoriums. The retirement system is quite 
similar to the United States Navy system. However, quite often 
sea duty and service in the remote areas provide officers with a 
bonus calculation for retirement; for example one calendar year 
is counted as a year and a half, or even two. 

Shipboard duty billets, particularly for the leading 
officers, represent a relatively prolonged assignment. For 
example, the recommended duration of a tour for the head of the 
department of a destroyer or a cruiser is three years, the 
commanding officer of third rank ships (destroyer escort, large 
minesweepers, etc.), three years, the commanding officer of 
second-rank ships (destroyers, most submarines) , four years, and 
the commanding officer of first-rank ships (cruisers and nuclear 
submarines), five years. The billet an .officer occupies and not 







18 



the rank is wore important in the Soviet Navy. Cases where a 
commanding officer is a lieutenant commander and his executive 

i 

officer a commander, or a vice-admiral commands a fleet where 

a member of the Military Council is a full admiral, or both, 

esr a commanding officer and his subordinates are equal in rank are 

quite common. The position of commanding officer in the Soviet 

Navy is the most respected. Considerable attention is devoted 

to the selection of future commanding officers and to their 

training . 

The total number of young naval officers graduating annually 
from the Soviet naval schools probably exceed the sum total of 
all graduates from naval academies, of NATO countries, including 
the United States. For the greatest majority of the graduates 
the naval service becomes a lifetime career and there is practically 
no officer retention problem. The naval reserve has been in 
existence for a long time in the Soviet Navy. Graduates from the 
maritime schools of the Soviet merchant marine, fishing and river 
fleets, certain engineers and scientists, are kept in the naval 
reserve with occasional short tours of active duty for training. 
However, since 1968, when the new Universal Military Service Law 
became effective, young naval reservists who were formerly 
excused from military service while in school are now obligated 
to serve two years. The present policy is to select best and to 



219 



drsuade them to enter the regular navy. Ju o < rii 

pblished in the Soviet press an unknown number of reserve officers 
d just that. Article 61B of the Universal Military Service 
L\v, which entered into effect on January 1, 1963, provides that 
te Council of Ministers can call up reserve officers to active 
dty in peacetime for periods of 2 or 3 years if the officer's 
secialty is required. In short, it seems that while the Soviet 
Nvy educational system is capable of providing the Navy with 
rasonably well trained professional officers capable of employing 
te latest in naval weapons and equipment, the service itself 
povides the officer with substantial material and other benefits 
t create not only a privileged group in the Soviet society, 
r.ich the naval officers definitely are, but an elite within 
te framework of the Soviet armed forces. 

All enlisted personnel of the Soviet Navy, sailors as well 
a; petty officers, are draftees. Up to the mid-1950s, the 
ctration of service was for 5 years, and between January 1955 and 

3)68, 4 years. In compliance with Article 132 of the Soviet 

/ i 

(institution, Article I of the Universal Military Service Law 

£)ecifies that "military service in the Soviet armed forces is 

lie honorable' duty of citizens of the USSR." Further, Article 

::i states, "All male citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of 

uce or nationality, religion, education, domicile, social and 

/ 

. ' • ' 220 - 

^ -__ 



• 



iiporty status must undergo active service in the runkM of Lii 
iiied Forces of the U.S.S.R." The new law reduced the draft age 
■j>ia 19 to 18, and established new terms for active service, i.e. 

; /ears for navy personnel, with the exception of naval aviation, 

- 266 
/fere service is for 2 years. 

Pre-draft training requirements for all young men has been 
iitablished. That training begins at age 15 at school and special 
iurs are reserved for it. The law also obligates the leaders 
(•enterprises, educational establishments, collective farms, 
:2. to create conditions for such pre-draft training and be 
■(Sponsible for its quality. One-year pre-draft training of 
lacialists for the armed forces is provided by the Voluntary 
i'Ciety for Assisting the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) . 
'e DOSAAF is assisted by the corresponding services of the 
iviet armed forces in this training, which starts at age 17. 

After completion of service, all service men are placed 
. the reserve. Afte.r completion of active duty, qualified 
i listed men, upon passing a special examination, can be promoted 
; reserve officer status. A twice-a-year draft has been 
;tablished by the new law. 



26S 

For a comprehensive analysis of new law see, Capt. 

jorge Grkovic, U3N, Soviet Ur.i versa". Milit ary Service , US Naval 

istitute Proceedings, April- 1969, pp. 55-63. 



/ 

221 



The shortened duration of service forced the Soviet Navy 
to reexamine and reduce from 9 to approximately 6 .months the 
training of Navy specialists in a number of training detachments. ' 
There are two types of training centers, one is Moscow controlled, 
and the second, controlled by the fleets. Future Navy specialists 
trained in such centers, under revised programs which place 
greater emphasis upon practical 'training and programmed teaching *, 
methods, are sent upon graduation to shipboard duties, where, after » 
one or two months, they have to pass an examination and are then ^ ::_ 
appointed to the billets. It has been claimed that the higher 
educational level of draftees, the good quality of pre-draft 
training and improved methods of aavjr- training nave made it 
possible to obtain good specialists even with the shorter term 
of service. The Soviet Navy has traditionally received better 
quality draftees, and continues to be selective in accepting 
personnel. An article in the official Soviet Navy magazine, 
.lorskoy Sbornik , opened with the-.- follow-ing statement: "Even a 
person who holds to the opinion that 'even hares can be taught to 
Light matches' will hardly deny that not every person can become 
*. good navyman." 



°'Capt. First Rank R. B. Radushkevich , T he -Selection of 
Specialists in the Navy - On A Scientific Basis , Morskoy Sbornik, 
Jo. 8, 1970, pp 53-55; see also Capt. First Rank 0. L. Kufarev, 
In der New Conditions - A New Training Method , Morskoy Sbornik No. S, 
-970, pp. 34-37; and Rear Admiral A. F. Nadezhdin, Results of Work 
Jnder New Conditions ,' Morskoy Sbornik No 2, 1971, pp 13-19 . 



222 



Potty officers of the Soviet Navy • repn d 

,y two categories of sorvicomon, potty oi'l'ieoi'H i- n. wi i ...i r, 

.he enlisted ranks and reenlisted potty officers. Au a matter 
if fact, practically all reenlisted personnel of the Soviet Navy 
lad petty-officer rank. Two methods of training petty officers, 
>n duty and in special schools, have been widely exercised. 

The November 1971 decree of the Supreme Soviet abolished 
;he Institute of Reenlisted Personnel and, accordingly, there 
vill no longer be any reenlisted petty officers in the Soviet 
favy after completion of their present terms. The same decree 

introduced the Institute of Michman , a grade practically exactly 

268 

equivalent to US warrant officers. rhus~, in the future all 

Soviet petty officers will be from enlisted personnel selected 
from the best sailors and will serve the same three years of 
active duty . 

Judging from the numerous articles in Soviet military 
press, which even seems to try to high-light the shortcomings, as 
well as from the extensive operations of the Soviet Navy, it 
appears that the personnel problem has found a satisfactory 
solution, and a degree of professionalism has been achieved. 
Moreover, through an increased number of calls at foreign ports 



268 



Izvestiya, December 1, 1971; and Trur\, December 1, 1971 



223 






jtnd official visits of Soviet ships to foreign countries, the 

Soviet Navy can demonstrate not only its advance hardware, but 

the good behavior and disclipine of its crews which, in ;he final 

malysis, are no small asset to the Soviet government's foreign 

policy in the area concerned. 

• 
Forward Deployment 

As indicated previously, the initial forward deployment 
vas literally imposed upon the Soviet Navy by the nature and 
:haractor of potential opponent forces, and the strategic 
situation therefor existed at the end of the 1950s and beginning 
3f the 1960s. It was necessary to go forward, to the high seas 
in the areas of the most probable combat employment of aircraft 
carriers and later of the original Polaris submarines in order 
to strike the former before they reached their launching positions 
ind at least try to handicap, if not prevent the latter from the 
unopposed launching o'f ballistic missiles. With the further 
sophistication of Soviet naval hardware and considerable revision 
r£ naval theory, including the strategic use of the Navy, in the 
framework of the latest versions of Soviet military doctrine and 
strategy, the meaning and nature of forward deployment has been 
changing and acquiring more important significance far exceeding 
the original, generally defensive, measures. Starting in the 



224 



f^weigaix and Mediterranean Seas and selected areas in the 
>:ific, Soviet naval units later appeared in the Indian Ocean. 
?:)longed cruises and foreign visits have become a common 
p^nomenon. The logistic supply of the Soviet Navy, a must for 
sustained operations in the remote areas, initially primitive, ha^ 
aen improving. Sophisticated combat ' training » and large scale 
i;/al exercises in the remote areas of world ocean are becoming 
.-utine in Soviet Navy life. Both the Sever and Okean naval 
)})rcises, during which the Navy demonstrated its muscle, are 
HJLte illustrative. 

i diterranean 

In 1948 Stalin reportedly demanded that the Yugoslav 
Jmmunists stop their support of the Communist led uprising in 
niece on the basis "that Great Britain and the United States, 
;b United States the most powerful state in the world, will not 

icmit a break of thdir line of communication in the Mediterranean 

269 
!u, and the Soviet Union has no navy". The first deployment 

>: Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis 

:ok place in 1958, when a brigade of W-class submarines was 

;ansferred to a newly established submarine base in Vlone , Albania 



■2 C 9 

w Milovan Djiias, Conver sations "" : ' gt j 1:. •' (New York 

ifcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 181-182. 



225 



The permanent presence in the Mediterratiean of Soviet intelligence 
collection ships started approximately at the same time. The 
submarines were based in Ylone until 1361, when the Soviet break 

vith Albania occurred. Since 1963-1954 Soviet navy surface 
units have been deployed primarily from the Black Sea Fleet, and 

the submarines, from the Northern Fleet. ' Thus, the newly formed 

270 . 

lediterraneanean eskadra whose strength was gradually built 

ip has become an important element in the mediterranean, 
Particularly in the eastern part. Originally, the Soviet Navy 
.sed to withdraw a considerable portion of its forces from" the 
.editerranean during winter months, reinforcing them again in 
he spring. While the seasonal fluctuation of forces seems to 
e continuing, after the Sixth Day War a considerable higher 
inimum level of forces was established, and the average strength 

f the eskadra, increased. An improved system of logistic supply 



oupled with the availability of ports in some Arab countries have 
ade it easier to maintain the increased number of Soviet ships, 
'he Soviet Mediterranean eskadra does not make extensive use of 

/ . ! 

bore bases/ Instead, a supply train of oilers, tenders, and 
ther auxiliary ships have been replenishing the combatants. The 
otion of using Soviet merchant ships in addition to the Navy's 



270 

Eskadra - a combined naval forces unit, just a step 

blow a fleet: The common translation, s^ua^cn, is not accurate 



' 



O O P 

lib 



auxiliaries is available nnH ~ 

ailablo and occasionally has boon exercised. 

The present average strength „* *u „ 

° Stren £ th of the Soviet Jjcditerraneau 

£2^ is about 50-60 ships, including 12 . 14 ButaaplBO , ; Qf ^ 
2 or 3 are nudear. Not onl y submarines, but surface snips as 
well from the Northern Fleet ana the Baltic Fleet are deployed 
together with the Black Sea units. 271 

While the defensive role of +h« c 

ve rote of the Soviet .Mediterranean eskadra 

i.e. ASW and anti-carrier, which has been particularly strongly 
emphasised by the Western specialists, has definitely remained 
the composition of the eskadra and the nature of its employment 
nave clearly indicated the eskadra role in support of Soviet 
foreign policy. Since the six Day fcr rf 1967 ^ ^ ^ 

has been demonstrating to ii-o a^^v. i • 

"n„ to its Arab clients that it could offer more 

than moral support, and the Soviet ships in Egyptian ports during 
the conflict were definitely an inhibiting factor against the 
continuation of Israeli air strikes The Soviets themselves like 
to emphasize this point. F or example, Admiral. Sysoyev, the Commander 
of the Black sea Fleet, in his recent speech to the Ukranian 
C~s^arty Congress discussing the growing role of the Soviet 
271 

Isaac C. Kidd Jr rrcw v • lo ^ e ^ aia £ s > March 1967) j Admiral 
wi. u ^ xaa > J ^-> Jfetf, View from the Bridge of thp fit'-, vi oa * 
i' lan-jjhi n fix =; v.,.., i T ~Z~r~. — — — J^_L ^__>-^e ota ^ ieet 

iaUrr 2 ' i w Val Instlt "te Proceedings j£brS5Tl972~'~s£ 

1 — 3); and Washi ngton Post . November 30, 1970 



227 



I 



Wy in international events and repeating a Soviet standard 
ciim that "imperialist domination of the high seas has ended 
firever" , stated that "Israeli aggression in the Middle East 

.iated and supported by the USA could be even more impudent 

272 
1: there were no Soviet combat ships present in the .Mediterranean". 

\lhen the Y/estern press emphasized the growth of Soviet 

ir/al power in the Mediterranean and its maturity from a presence 

t< a challenge, the challenge directed first of all toward 

educing the influence of the US 6th Fleet and to ending the 

^dominance of American power in the area, Soviet propaganda 

iswered with an array of articles. It was emphasized that the 

5(/iet Union as "a Black Sea power and consequently a Mediterranean 

Kver is closely connected with all problems" in the area, and has 

u "irrefutable right" to keep naval forces there, "to promote 

rxbility and peace in the area which is in direct proximity 

t<j the Soviet southern borders", and "not allow the American 

3,i Fleet to carry ou*t the aggressive ideas of the Pentagon with 

273 

Lipunity" . 



272 Pravda Ukrainy , March 20, IS 71. 

273 

L. Kolosov, Me di te r ran ean P ro blems , (Izvestiya, November 

I, 1968); Vice Admiral N. I. Smirnov, Soviet F leet in the 

Waiter ranean, (Krasnaya Zvezda, November 12, 1968); V. Ermakov in 

> avda , November 27, 1963; and V. Kudryavtsev in Pray da , December 

I 1963. 



22? 



o 



The Soviets obviously were irritated by the NATO decision 
o establish coordinated aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet 
n the Mediterranean and the creation of a new NATO command, 
aritime Air Forces Mediterranean, effective November 21, 196S. 
he permament deployment of the eskadra produced the emergence 
f the Soviet Union as a true Mediterranean power, producing the 
ituation where since the late 1960's there can be no single 
laimant to the control of the Mediterranean. By maintaining an 
npressive number of missile armed ships which can be rapidly 
Binforced from the Black Sea Fleet, and with numerical 
;jperiority of submarines over the::6th Sleet, all th.?.t the Soviets 
jxck is the carrier-borne air power which is the backbone of the 
th Fleet. With no point in the Mediterranean more than 200 
iiles from land and the availability of air bases in a number of 
-rab countries for the Soviet aircraft, the overwhelming dependence 
<£ the 16th Fleet upon its carrier,, aviation for its "combat 
inability" are not very convincing. The rapid redeployment of 
;:>viet aircraft to the network of air bases in Arab countries as 
fell as direct employment of Soviet aviation from the south- 
astern regions of the Soviet Uniou and Warsaw Pact members, at 
^ast to the eastern part of the Mediterranean, has to be viewed 



?23 

-■- i~. vj 



274 
s a distinct Soviet capability. '* Admiral Kidd, former 

:ommander of the 6th Fleet, recently wrote that "the growing 

loviet naval strength in this area has caused many to question 

he capability of the US 6th Fleet to perform its stated mission". 

he admiral continued, "the fact is that under existing pressures, 

e are walking a tightrope of adequacy; at some points, the rope 

s beginning to fray. Our still formidable fleet is being forced 

o accommodate to a new environment far different from the one 

275 

hich it dominated for almost a. quarter century." The 

dmiral also described the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean 
.s "a have fleet" which has new ships, modern weapon systems, 
ell trained and highly motivated personnel. Staling "that there 
s no longer a permissive enviroment where once the 6th Fleet 
loved at will" the admiral described the situation during the 
"ordan crisis in October, 1970, during which the Soviet naval 
'orces in Mediterranean were quickly reinforced and appropriately 
lositioned. From the chart accompanying the article showing 
listribution of forces of both fleets, it is impossible to tell 
'ho surrounded v;hom. Soviet ships followed all major 6th Fleet 



274 

John Marriot, The Air Situation in the Mediterranean , 

'International Defensive View, Vol. 4, No. 5, October 1971, 

>p. 429-432); also see the New York Times, May 13, 1370, " US 6th 

'leet Concerned Over Sovie t Nav y in the Med ", and Time, June 

IB, 1971, " Soviet Thrust in the Mediterranean . 

275 
' US Naval Institute Procecdj , February 1972, p. 19. 



230 



ips and as the 6th Fleet watched and waited, the Soviets 
.so watched and waited, giving no evidence of stress but a 
trmal and restrained behavior which Admiral Kidd described 
follows: "There was none of the nonsense of their ships 
nning in and around our men-of-war at close range. It was 
Ident the Soviets were under the direction of a seasoned 
aman who not only knew well the capabilities and limitations 

ihis equipment, but also was sensitive to the potential 

276 

Piousness of the situation." 

When King Idris of Libya was overthrown in a coup in" 

Member of 1969 the behavior of the Soviet Mediterranean 

;adra was very similar to that during Jordan crisis. While some 

)iet ships took positions along the Libyan Coast, others 

idowed the 6th Fleet units. It was a sort of indirect warning 

) to attempt a repetition of 1958 Lebanon landing, which for 

• practical purposes cannot now be repeated. Such actions are 

.ling political capital for the Soviets and the new Libyan 

imminent publicly expressed gratitude to the Soviet navy for 

/ 
Is support". The reported presence of amphibious ships and 

Ks of naval infantry with the Soviet naval forces in the 
cterranean and occasional landing exercises performed under the 
vr of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft "as a buffer 
276 



I 



Ibid . , p. 27. 

/ 



231 



tgainst any attempt at intervention from outside" raises the 

luestion as to whether the Soviet forces themselves might not one 
lay be involved in the situation similar to the 195S Lebanon 
ole of the US 6th Fleet. 

As a significant commercial and maritime power, the Soviet 
nterest in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal is under- 
tandable. The closure of the Canal seriously hurt Soviet merchant. 
flipping, including its supply routes to North Vietnam, The 
importance of the Middle East and Mediterranean region as a route 
) the Indian Ocean and Far East is obvious. Most of the Soviet 
ati-Chinese moves in Asia should be supported by maritime power, 
ad the Mediterranean-Suez Canal route—is saast convenient. 

Emphasizing the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
a "necessity" because of the presence of the US 6th Fleet 
tere, theSoviet Union expressed its readiness to consider the 
r'moval of these forces. A widely propagandized June 1971 speech 
bi Brezhnev during the Soviet ele-ction campaign-emphasized the 
anormality of the situation when great powers keep their navies 

fir from their shores, and expressed the readiness "to solve 

277 
tfe problem but on the equal basis", i.e. the mutual withdrawal. 

lanwhile, the Soviet Union is very sensitive to any change in 



, 



277 

See Krasnaya Zvezda, July 25, 1971, Mediterranean 

adr'a . 



232 



he status quo in the Ltorranoan. A roccnl 

»ii the new naval base lor the 6th PL prod cud : ill ■ .• vt ■■■ i I 

;n addition to the Soviet government statement with the warning 
>f "appropriate counter-action", a number of articles sharply 
criticizing "Pentagon bases strategy" and the US and NATO efforts 

'to widen and strengthen their position" in the Mediterranean, 

278 
;ere published. 

In the realm of international politics, the Soviet naval 

presence in the Mediterranean definitely altered the balance 

t>f forces in the region and increased Soviet influence in 'many 

Mediterranean countries. By projecting a major military, 

political, and economic presence -..txtCv/tho- ..'Mediterranean basin, 

the present Soviet leadership has accomplished what the Czars 

and Stalin failed to do. 

Indian Ocean 

In the spring of 1968 the. first detachment of Soviet Navy, 
headed by the cruiser Dmitriy Pozharskiy , appeared in the Indian 
Ocean. The cruise lasted 80 days, and the Soviet ships visited 
ports in India, Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Ceylon. In 
addition to interest of combat training, the stated purpose of the 



273 

See for example, an article by Deputy Chief of Staff of 

the Soviet Navy, Admiral Alekseyev, in Izvestiya , March 8, 1372; 

and - Krasnaya Zvezda , International Military Review. 

/ 
/ 



cbise was to make "friendly contacts" and to produce "favorable 

279 
jpressions". Since that time, the frequency of Soviet naval 

aits appearing in the Indian Ocean increased, and at the beginning 

o the 1970s the more or less permanent presence of rather modest 

fjree has been established. 

The vacuum and balance of power theories ^originally tied 
u the Soviet appearance in the area with the British government's - 
dcision to withdraw from east of the Suez. It looked as though 
te Soviet Navy was just waiting for such a withdrawal, and soon ^ 
t|e decision was announced to fill "the vacuum". Such arguments 
i not warrant a lengthy analysis, and the British might in the 
scond half of I960 could hardly be given such a deterrent role. 
Ydely rumored Soviet attempts to acquire bases in the Indian 
Dean were categorically denied by the local governments allegedly 
ivolved in such deals, and at the present, there is no Soviet 
ose in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval units in the area nave 
teir own supply ships, and the use of local facilities has 
aparently been minimal. 

The previous absence of Soviet naval forces in the Indian 
Gean could probably be explained not by the lack of interest, 
wich was strong even in pre-revolutionary Russia (allegedly one 



279 Admiral V. Alekseyev in TRUP , June 17, 1968. 



/ 



234 



of the naval projects of Peter the Great involved the annexation 
of Madagascar)? 80 but by the luck of opportunity and, more 
important, the means. Post-war political development in 'the area 
and disintegration of the colonial system resulting in the 
creation of numerous newly formed independent states, many with 
unstable regimes, presented the opportunity. The economic 
development of the Soviet Union, the growth of its foreign trade, 

economic and military aid intpneifior) ,■?„.. -, 

' dlu « lQtensiiiea development of its 

merchant marine paralleled by the naval development, produced 

the means and elevated the importance of the Indian Oceanic the 

Soviet Union. A sizeable Soviet fishing fleet has been operating 

in the Indian Ocean since the decaxle o^tbe 1950s- and the annual 

catch toward the end of the 1960s was about 2 million tons. 

Soviet commercial shipping via the Cape in 1970 was represented 

by 3,900 transits or more than 25% of the total. In addition 

to a permanent presence of alarge fishing fleet, there are 

^proximately 100 Soviet me rchan^anips- in the- Indian Ocean at 

281 
my given time. Soviet oceanographic and space support 

ictivities in the Indian Ocean have been considerable. Thus, 

the Soviet Union is simultaneously involved in a multiplicity 
~ _ 

Orbis, V. XIV, No. 1, Spring 197O. These alleged Russian 
imbitions were recently "massaged" by the Chinese - see Washington 
lost, December 30, 1971. fe 

281 

Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union and the I ndian Ocean 
Survival, November 1971, pp. 370-375) . ' 



SLii: 



i maritime activities in the Indian Ocean: in showing the flag 
hich, at least chronologically, confirms a case of the flag 
ollowing trade; it is involved in active shipping, fishing, 

ilitary assistance, political support, and economic aid to the 

2 S2 

on-allied nations of the area. 

Military, particularly naval, aspects of , the situation in 
tie Indian Ocean are still in the embroyonic stage of development 
ad in spite of the' fact that during last couple of years, a number 
c: new steps have been initiated by both the United States and 
tie Soviet Union, the outcome is not clear. When an agreement 
btween the US and Australia concerning the installation of a 
T ;ry Low Frequency (VLF) station on Northwest Cape was disclosed 

i. the mid-1960s, the Soviets probably concluded that the Indian 

2 S3 
Cean would become an area of operations for Polaris submarines . 

■ 
Een before A-3 Polaris and Poseidon missiles became operational, 

te Arabian Sea could already provide Polaris submarines with 

;od coverage of targets in the southern part of the Soviet 

J ion. The introduction of longer-range (2,500 n.m.) missiles 

ito US submarines brought target areas from the Soviet western 

orders to Central Siberia and as far as Moscow within range. 



p pp 

For a view on the Soviet activity in the- Indian Ocean, 



sc 



i T. B. Millar, Soviet Pol-' ' Jos, South and Zast oi Suez , 
ign Affairs, October 1970, pp. 70-31.) 

233 

Marine Rundschau, Vol. V, October 1969, pp. 312-316. 



loo 



Vhethcr US Polaris submarines arc- deployed at present in the 
Indian Ocean or not makes no difference to the Soviet Union, 
for the major factor to be considered in the Soviet naval plans 

is the possibility of Polaris missile submarine deployment. 

Regardless of what type of ASW forces are selected by the 
Soviet Navy (major emphasis on submarines supported by the surface 
forces seems- to be obvious) a standing naval force for the Indian 
Ocean would be required. The degree of effectiveness of ASW 
■forces against Polaris missiles submarines is to a certain degree 
irrelevant here, for the choice has to be made between unopposed 
and opposed operations. 

The rejection of the Soviet proposal of December 1964 co 
make the Indian Ocean a nuclear - free zone probably made the 
Soviets even more convinced that the deployment of Polaris 
submarines was under consideration. Of course, the Soviet 
proposal represented an attempt to get something for nothing, i.e. 
to close an area for 'the U.S. strategic employment which has no 
value to the Soviet Union. The deployment of Soviet naval units 
in the Indian Ocean might be viewed also as an attempt to show 
Soviet determination to meet the potential threat by force, and 
to create pressure for the reconsideration of the Soviet proposal 
which, together with vaguely defined security measures for Asia, 
continues to be mentioned by the Soviet -press. It was reported 






.hat, at the end of April 1971, a committee of the US National 
;ecurity Council was considering proposing an agreement with the 

■oviet Union to neutralize the Indian Ocean by abstaining from 

234 ^~ 

aval deployment there. 

Meanwhile, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean 
as continued, and the US has stepped up its naval activities in 
he area as well. In addition to the construction of a naval 
ommunication center and air strip on the strategically located 
sland of Diego Garcia and the agreement of December 1371 to take 
ver from the British the naval base at Kahrain in the Persian 
ulf, a Pentagon spokesman emphasized the 7th Fleet capability 
p operate more in the Indian Ocean, particularly as the 
"ietnamese War is being wound down. 

When the Indian-Pakistani War broke out, the Soviet naval 
:>rces in the Indian Ocean which comprised approximately 10 
nits were quickly reinforced to about 15 ships. The US sent 
task force headed )5y the nuclear carrier Enterprise to the Bay 
: Bengal. Thus, a variant of a Mediterranean situation was 
upeated in the Indian Ocean, although on a smaller scale. 



284 Survival, November 1971, p. 372. 

2S5 

Navy Extern.-:, Operation in Iv^ ia- Ocea n, Washington 

f'St, January 7, 1972. 



/~* s*s ,-\ 

L. O KJ 



Prolonjo d cruises and foreign vi ■:; J^ of the Coviet Navy 
during the decade of 1960s have become a common phenomenon. 
The Atlantic cruises, particularly in the Card >bean strea', have 
been of special interest and have produced controversial publicity 
It was reported that the Soviet naval detachment which visited 
Cuba in the summer of 1969 conducted unprecedented ASW exercises 

in the Gulf of Mexico with the participation of ono tf«ol;\sa 

286 

submarine. At the end of 1970 Defense Secretary Laird 

emphasized the Soviet Navy's continuous operation in or near the . 
Caribbean. Pie added "I think that this is further evidence of 
the Soviet's determination to expand their naval interests into 

the Western Hemisphere, just as they nave in other parts of the 

2S7 
world". The U.S. Defense Department announcement concerning 

the construction of new Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos and 

the Soviet government's denial of this by Tass, October 12, 1970, 

were generated by the presence of a submarine tender and the 

suspicion that the Soviets may be' developing- facilities similar 

to those the United States has at Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota, 

238 
Spain, to service the submarines. While the alarm generated 



286 

US Naval Institute Proceedings Review , May 1970. 

287 

Washington Post, December 6, 1970. 

238 

Washington Post . September 26, 1971, Cuba Scceor Field 

Scared US in ' 7u; and the R eader's Digest , Soviet Submarines: New 

Challenge From Cuba, .May, 1971. •. 

/ 

/ 
/ 
/ 

••■; '. . 



Lit a possible base for submarines in Cuba sei ... to be 
_ rounded, the Soviet Navy's familiarization with the area is 

significant. From July 1959 to July 1970, the Soviet NaVy visited 

2S9 
3 countries. 

The visits provide the Soviet Navy with an opportunity not 

cly for combat training while underway in ofter. unfamiliar 

ajeas and for showing the flag, but they are extensively used 

fr propaganda purposes. The detachment of ships conducting 

fie visit is as a rule accompanied by a fleet theatrical group 

c orchestra, selected performers, a team of athletes which 

ocasionally incudes a complete soccer team. During the visit, 

ie activities of the crews are planned accordingly. As a result 

:i most cases visits of Soviet ships to foreign ports have 

290 
roduced favorable reactions. 

Logistics did not represent a serious problem in the Soviet 

avy up to the late 1950s due to a nature of employment of the 

aval forces. The ships at that time represented forces which 

ere occasionally employed from the basesfor a short period of 

ime and returned to them to be replenished and repaired. Forward 

leployment of the Soviet Navy units, however, in the absence of 



289 

US Naval Institute Proceedings , Naval Review, 1971, p. 290 

290 

See for example an article in Krasnaya Zvezda, October 

), 1970, Norway, Our Ne ighbor, describing a recent visit of a 

letachment of the Soviet Northern Fleet to Oslo. 



> : n 



joviet bases in the area of their operations, presented anoth c 
roblem. It should be emphasized that Soviet combatants were 
eady for forward deployment Ions before the Soviet Navy' 
ogistic system could cope with it. The main problem was the 
bsence of suitable support ships; tankers were very small 
nd not fitted for side refueling, and supply and depot ships 
ere practically non-existent. Gradually, during the decade of 
;he 1960s a considerable number of support ships of the Don, Lama, 
iskoi, and Ugra classes were built. Larger tankers and supply 
;hips were introduced, permitting a gradual switch to the" side 
•efueling and supply method, which is definitely more productive 
md expedient. The Boris Chilikiu-class support ship, which 
recently entered service, is a good illustration of the progress 

>eing achieved by the Soviet Navy in the solution of logistic 

291 

problems. In addition to the Soviet Navy's own support 

mits, the ships of the Soviet merchant marine can be, and are 
often, used. When docking facilities are available in a number 
Df friendly countries, the use of the merchant ships to bring 
supplies to those ports where Navy support ships can be re- 
plenished provides the. Soviet Navy with additional advantages and 
permits the number of support ships required to be reduced. 



291 

Erkennungsblatter, FRG Ministry of Defense, No. 154, 



De cembe r 19 71 . 



2W 



By developing a supply procedure similar to the US Navy 

leet train system, the Soviet Navy has reduced the requirement 

> 
or naval bases. Of course, the fleet train system is vulnerable 

o enemy attack and requires considerable protection. Naval 

ases on the other hand also have become one of the most preferred 

argets, and are very vulnerable. Naval bases ^on foreign 

erritories, in addition, can cost dearly in material and 

olitical terms, and depend to a considerable degree upon the 

.evelopment of a political situation in a host country. Despite 

;he marked improvement in the Soviet Navy logistics, it is "an 

txtremely difficult task to supply a number of naval units v/ith 

lodern armament far away from the bases. This matter is openly 

-ocognized in the Soviet specialized press, where the great 

292 
lifficulties associated with the process are discussed. 



292 

Admiral G. G. Oleynik, Excellent Support to the Sea 

Cruises , Rear and Supply of Soviet Armed Forces, No. 7, July 
1971, pp. 26-30; Rear and Combat Readiness of the Navy , No. 5, 
.May 1971, pp. 69-71; The Navy Rear Services Today ,- ('.lorskoy 
Sbornik No. 12, 1970, pp. 3-8); Krasnaya Zvczda, July 25, 1971 



91;? 



Nay al Exe rci.scs 

The recent large-scale Soviet naval exercises, on one 
ocasion involving all four Soviet fleets, on the one harld 
rs resent a new phenomenon in the Soviet naval development, but 
on the other is a logical consequence of the process. 

The joint command and staff exercise, code named SEVER 
(i\>rth) , took place during the "period of 11-19 July 1968. The 
participants in the exercise were the Soviet Baltic and Northern 
?:?ets and the Polish and East Germany navies. Involving 
i:?as in the Northern Atlantic, the Baltic, the Norweigan 
id the Barents Seas, Sever was at once the first major naval 
jprcise of the Warsaw Pact and the biggest naval maneuvers 
l to that time in Soviet history. While the Polish and East 
Jrman navies played a significant role with the Soviet force 
L the Baltic, including participation in a joint amphibious 
..nding , only Soviet forces were involved in the major events 
iich took place in the North. The East Germans, however, 
lose to emphasize a much greater scale of cooperation stating 
iat "the Sever exercise represented a new level of cooperation 
itween the combined (i.e. Soviet Baltic Fleet, Polish and 
ist German navies) Baltic sea fleet and the Northern Fleet of 



2 1.-3 



?93 



he Soviet Union." 

> 

Admiral Gorshkov emphasized that it was an ''exercise of 
he ocean navy which has everything necessary to conduct 
uccessful combat activities far from its bases". While all types 
i Soviet naval forces participated in the exorciso, the submarinow 
.nd naval infantry were particularly glorifiod. In addition to 
.he submarine's role in strategic delivery, demonstrated by an 
mderwater launch of missiles, the ASW role of the submarines 
-as highlighted: "Battles of submarines with submarines is not 

iiction or the imagination of a visionary, but is actual 

294 
reality". The importance of a second, amphibious landing in 

;he North, on Rybachiy Peninsula, executed exclusively by' the 

soviet Naval Infantry and being larger than the Baltic landing, 

vas an obvious desire of the Soviet Navy to demonstrate mobility 

apparently over a considerable distance, for it is most likely 

that the naval infantry force participating in the landing came 



293 

An interview with the Commander of the East German 

Mavy, Vice Admiral Ehm, published in Gstsee Zestung, 29 July 1953. 
The same interview emphasized Kosygin's evaluation of the political 
significance of the exercise. In his 13 Ji\±y press conference 
in Stockholm, published in Pravda on 15 July 1963, Xosygin noted 
chat "the exercise was an emphatic answer to the intensified 
policy of aggression on NATO's northern flank clearly demonstrated 
by the Polar Express maneuvers" . 

294 

Izvestiya, July 14, and July 19, 19SS. 



/ . 2W 



295 

from the Baltic. However, as later became ev ... the Sever 

exercise was a rehearsal for the Okcan (Ocean) manouvoru, durliiK 
which the major events of the Sever exercise were ro pea Cod on a 

larger scale. 

The Okean maneuvers were held from 14 April to 5 May 1970 
under very adverse weather conditions, particularly in the 
North Atlantic. The area of the maneuvers included two oceans, 
the Atlantic and Pacific, and several seas including the Barents, 
Norwegian, North, Okhotsk, Japan, Phillipine, Mediterranean, 
Slack, and Baltic. A detachment of Soviet ships headed by" the 
missile cruiser Admiral ITokin was in the Indian Ocean. All four 
Soviet fleets participated in those, world-wide maneuvers, which 
were called unprecedented by a Pentagon spokesman, "a first for 
anyone in the history of the naval art" with the emphasis that 
"no navy has had anything like this on this scale and this 
scope . Even the maneuvers code name Okean was depicted as 
symbolic not only in .referenceto the scale, but also in that it 
related to a former Tsarist yacht, renamed Okean during Lenin's 
time. The name was seen as an omen and an expression of Lenin's 



295 

In addition to the hints in the Soviet press, the 

independent Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shippi ng on 
19 July 1968 emphasized that a sizeable unit of amphibious forces 
moved from the Baltic in two groups, one of which followed the 
Norwegian Coast north during the period of the exercise. 

296 

Vfa^hing ton Post , April 24, 1970. 

/ 

/ 



24 I 



J 






j-sire to have a strong ocean-going navy in the future. 297 

Hundreds of Soviet naval ships and aircraft ^particii .ng 
ji the maneuvers were employed in a seemingly realistic scenerio 
isualizing a strong experj need enemy Ln a m , r oX ■ ■ lodon 
situations) in which the readiness of the Soviet Navy to fuli'iiJ 
tie tasks assigned to it was checked. The following tasks were 
onions t rated in the maneuvers: 

the deployment of submarines, the main striking force 
k the Soviet Navy, and the creation of combat conditions 
ssuring their most effective combat use; 

extensive ASW against Polaris submarines, and for the n 
jrotection of Soviet's own naval forces, including missile- 
arrying submarines; 

anti-carrier operations in order to prevent carrier 
arcraft from attacking naval and shore installations, and to 
oduce enemy "combat stability" by eliminating carriers from 
arious (including ASW) formations; 

operations against enemy lines of communication, including, 



/ - 

297 

All important Soviet newspapers assigned their special 

orrespondents to cover the maneuvers and extensive information, 
oviously on a selective basis, covering major events of the 
uneuvers was published between 14 April and 12 May 1970 in 
jravda , Izvestiya , Krasnaya Zvezda , and others. Following the 
uneuvers a special book, Okc a a-M:. b u yers of the US SI? l-.'av;- Ccr. ducted 
a April - May 1970, 20S pp. was published in Moscow by the 
lilitary Publishing House. 



2kS 

J 






attacks against its shipping; 

to assist the Soviet Army on its maritime i'luiikrj, 

including use of amphibious landing and missile strikes from 
submarines and surface ships. 

Not all these tasks are of equal importance to the all 
Soviet fleets, and they vary in the individual theaters. The 
major events during the maneuvers took place in the Atlantic 
Ocean and the adjoining seas, where more than half of episodes 
were played. The Northern Fleet as -well as the Baltic 'and the 
Black Sea Fleets were more actively involved in the maneuvers 
than the Pacific Fleet. 

The maneuvers were conducted in a nuclear enviroment, and 
the use of the missile armament of the Soviet Navy included 
combined missile strikes of naval aviation, submarines and 
surface ships, the launching of ballistic missiles and underwater 
and surface launching of cruise missiles by the submarines, and 
combat employment of SAMs against both individual and group air 
targets. The extensive use of in-flight refueling and the long 

duration and long distance of the flights were special 

i 

characteristics of the air operations. Very extensive air 
reconnaissance was conducted and close cooperation of naval 
aviation with Longe Range Aviation was evident. 



n • 7 



Amphibious landings were conducted by all four Soviet 
feets. The Baltic landing against an area "strongly fortified 
i -depth" clearly imitated an operation against the Danish Straits. 
Te landing in the north on the Rybachiy Peninsula by forces of 
Nval Infantry from the Mediterrnean (Black Sea) , Baltic, and the 
Nrthern Fleet was of a considerably larger scale and was 
oserved by the Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Nvy. The Naval Infantry demonstrated improved skill and 
sphistication by landing on difficult terrain after a relatively 
lng voyage under adverse weather conditions. 

The two newest ships of the Soviet navy, the ASW cruiser 
Mskva and the sister ship Leningrad, were active participants 
i the maneuvers together with many classes of missile and 
cnventionally armed ships. The ability of the surface forces 
t defend themselves against air attacks was emphasized. 

The time of the exercise, the early spring months when a 
cnsiderable number of young sailors trained according to provisions 
o the new Universal Military Law were aboard Soviet ships, and the 
etremely unfavorable weather conditions, can be viewed as testimony 
t the satisfactory solution of the personnel problem and the 
mturity of the Soviet Navy. In the command and control field, 
te wide use of computers in the decision-making process, the 
efective and reliable communications during all phases of 



248 



keuvers (labeled "fantastic") , and the effective work of the 
;rious staffs were emphasized. Satellites wore most llkoly 

<;d in communications. * 

The high degree of combat readiness of the Soviet Navy 
il its alleged ability "to go into action at any moment, even 
iler the most unfavorable conditions and circumstances" were 
tessed. Soviet Navy leaders emohasizedthat the preceeding 
cade of combat training was "a process designed to master the 
can" and the Okean maneuvers "the final stage of the process, 
h Navy's final exam, which it passed successfully" demonstrating 
t readiness "to execute strategic missions and to counteract 

trong naval foe" in. defense of the "national interests of the 

298 
oiet Union and other Socialist countries". 

To explain the Soviet Navy's forward deployment as dictated 

ay by the necessity to counter the strategic nuclear threat 

: a the Western, mainly US, naval forces would be an ovcr- 

iiolification. Initially this threat played an overwhelming, 

vq singular, role and is still important. But, during the second 

a'.£ of the 1960's, when the Soviets started to speak about the 

•eossity of its navy to protect the "spreading interests" of the 

net Union, a nev/ and important element which may be crucial in 



298 , , , 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, p. 4; and Marshall 

laJaarov in Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 June 1971. 



249 



the future was added. This new mission of the Soviet Navy 
required its constant presence in the "remote areas of the world's 
oceans previously considered the zone of control" of Western 
maritime powers. The presence of substantial Soviet naval forces 
does not exclude the support for a friendly regime threatened either 
by internal turmoil or foreign intervention or in direct assistance 
to newly born regimes more favorable to Soviet interests, as for 
example the 1969 Libya revolution illustrates. 

What was exercised by the Soviet Navy during the 1968 

seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea might be classified as an 

299 

attempt to employ the strategy of interposition. When it was 

unclear what the US would do, and a carrier task force was heading 

toward North Korea, a detachment of Soviet ships appeared in the 

vicinity. The Jordan Crisis of September-October 1971 provides an 

example of another situation, discussed previously, when the 

presence of Soviet naval forces in the proximity of the US forces 

could be viewed as a restraining factor. j 

| 
Finally, showing the flag through frequent foreign visits and 



299 

The strategy of interposition is employed for the 

purpose of denying an objective to an opponent and usually 

without actual use of force. Interposition does not necessarily 

require superior forces of interposer. By placing his forces 

between the opponent and the opponent's object the interposer 

increases the opponent's risks and presents him with choice to 

drop or change the objective or escalate. 



I / 



250 



and displaying; muscles by large-scale maneuvers and exorcises 
in remote areas are a demonstration of po.or and maritime 
mobility. At least in their statements, the Soviet military 
ieadersbip appear to be confident that their navy has "mastered- 
tfc. spaciousness of the W orld ocean and possesses everything which 

is required for the simultaneous and prolon 3 ed conduct of combat 

.. .. 300 

activity on several oceans and seas." 

Toda^, the Soviet navy order of battle includes the 
following : 

J about 360 submarines, nearly 90 of which are nuclear powered; 

two ASW cruisers, each with about 20 helicopters; 
! 23 cruisers, including at least 9 armed with missiles; 

about 100 destroyers and equivalent ships, many of which 
ire missile armed: 

about 130 escorts; 

about 270 coastal escorts; 

about 320 minesweepers; 

about 130 missile boats; 

over 300 torpedo boats; 

about 200 amphibious ships and landing crafts. 
Support ships, auxiliaries, and service craft according to Jane's 
'run into the thousands". Naval aviation has about SCO combat 



300 

Marshall Grechko in Pray da , 23 'February 1971 



251 



aircraft. Numerically, it is the largest navy in the v/orld. 

Its personnel strength is about 500,000 officers and cen. 

» 

Most ships are of recent construction, are fully manned 
and operational. The percentage of ships, primarily older ones, 
in reserve is small. 

B The main strength of the Soviet Navy, hoy/ever, is not in 
number of ships it possesses or in the total displacement, but 
in the armament. In addition to the ballistic missile submarine's 
contribution to the Soviet strategic delivery, which is close to 
600 missiles, there are a variety of surface-to-surface, air-to- 
surface, and surface-to-air missiles which constitute the main 
armament of the Soviet navy's forces, submarines, naval aviation, 
surface ships, and shore defense units. At the present, no one 
navy in the world approaches the Soviet Navy in total number of 
such missiles, the variety of their carriers, the scope of ranges 
they cover (long and horizon range) and methods of launching 
(surface, air and submerged) and perhaps even in quality (propulsion 
systems and various guidance methods employed) . The latest edition 
of Jane's Fighting; Ships started its remarks on the Soviet Navy 
with a statement that "by any standards, the Soviet fleets now 
represent the super-navy of the super-power" . The continuous 
appearances of new classes of missile armed ships, submarines and 
boats which are impressing observers by their sophistication and 



252 



301 
novelty has been emphasized. 

Soviet naval power is divided among four fleets, the 

Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific and one flotilla; the 

Caspian. In addition, the deployment of naval forces in tho . 

Mediterranean, a main responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet, but 

also utilizing ships and particularly submarines from tho Northern 

and Baltic Fleets, constitute in effect a fifth Soviet fleet, 

although it continues to be called an eskadra . The further 

build-up in the Indian Ocean might in the future produce a 

situation similar to the Mediterranean, with the bulk of the naval 

forces coming from the Pacific Fleet. The size of the Pacific 

Fleet, in addition, will also be influenced by general developments 

in relations with China and Japan and in turn the subsequent 

development of their naval forces. The bulk of ballistic missile 

and cruise missile submarines are based in the two most powerful 

fleets, the Northern and the Pacific, in order to have easier 

302 
access to the oceans. • 

In addition to a continuing intensive submarine building 

program, the construction of new surface ships with an improved 



"301 

jane's Fighting Ships, 1971-1972 ed., p'p. 80-S2, 

590-593; The Military Bala nce, 1971-1972, The International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, London. 

302 

For the details of the distribution of forces see 

Erickson, op. cit., ^i?. oe-57 and V/EHR, Politishe Information 

No. 37, September 16, 1971. . 



253 



nse, mainly anti-aircraf t capability, tin huprovort AHW 
Jability and horizon-range missiles (not requiring target 
iuisition and mid-course correction from an outside source) ^is 
i B g on. These submarines and surface ships will gradually. 
luce the remaining conventionally armed and aging units built 
i large series in the 1950' s. Although modernization involved 
S me classes of submarines and surface ships, it does not appear .. 
t be among the most favored measures of the Soviet Navy. 

The fleet of support ships is being reinforced with larger ^ 
lips equipped for side replenishment. It is probably still 
adequate in size, bnt with the help of the Soviet merchant- 
Mine, it has managed to supply Soviet Navy operational units with 
U the essentials. The system of naval bases on .Soviet territory 
ppears to be under expansion. It was reported that one of the 
iggest complexes of naval and air force bases in the world is ^ 
Lder development in the Soviet North, including Novaya Zemlya. 
Lough not a balanced navy in the Western sense, primarily because 
L a lack of aircraft carriers, the Soviet Navy appears to be not 
;1 uch disturbed by the fact. 304 After the mid-1950's, Soviet naval 



303 Vfashinston Post , October 16, 1971. 

3 ° 4 The term "balanced navy" appears to be ^f* ^ 
indiscriminately, without a :tempt to define M*™?^ 
navy should be in the composition 01 * In - 80 000-ton carrier 
"balanco" seo,, to be « lered acn. a ^ -J^ ng those 

is surrounded by a protective sc > » ^ 

armed with five-inch guns of Wort * " - *°« 

displacement of another 80,000 tons. 



254 



wory did not embrace cither a traditional eaiplo; . of naval 
cer in a quite non-traditional international situation or 
ac.erence to the established hardware with the emergence of 
qiilitatively new military technology. What ^s seen today in the 
vrious areas of the world ocean is an innovatively developing 
ttiy which appears to be well aware of its limitations and 
strength and which is trying ."in different situations to perfect 

tfe methods of combating a strong enemy under the most adverse • 

305 
conditions" . 

The role of maritime power in general and naval power in 

prticular continued to be debated and analyzed in the Soviet 

J ion. An essay "Navies in Wars and Peace" by Commander-in-Chief 

d the Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov 

:.y turn to be a modern Soviet version of "the influence of sea 

306 
pwer upon history". Emphasizing the increased importance of 

::eans and naval combat, the admiral gives a comprehensive 

::ouomic, political, and military analysis of the role of the sea 

a historical development and recalls Peter the Great's statement 

bich compared a state with only an army to a person with one hand 



305 

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet 

dmiral V. Kasatonov in Soviet Military Review No.. 7, July 1971, p. 4 

306 

At this writing, only three installments of what appear 

o bo a sizeable work have been published in the Soviet Navy 
agazine, __ _,v S bornik No. 2, 1972, pp. 20-29; No. 3, pp. 20-32; 
ad No. 3, pp. 9-23. ■•? 



255 

- 



ad a state with both an army and a navy, to a person with two 
b.nds. The historical peacetime use c. . navy as an instrument 
c foreign policy, which can demonstrate the "oconomic i Litary 
B,gnt of a state beyond its borders" an J. w he fact that "navies 
:>r many centuries have been a single service of armed forces 
apable of defending the interests of a country far away from its 
lorders" were viewed as important features of the naval forces. 
.lalyzing "Russia's uneasy path to the sea", the Admiral attacks 
alien propaganda inspired and actively conducted by England" which, 
llegedly, had been concerned by Russia's drive to the sea 
nitiated by Peter the Great. Strong attacks are made against 
igh Tsarist officials, who on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War 
tried to persuade the Tsar that there was no need for the navy 
.n the Pacific". Modern foreign propaganda allegedly inspired by 
;he US was said to be using the old British argument that the 
Soviet Union is a land power and, hence, its military requirements 

ire different. As an 'example, President Nixon's speech of August 

'"■' 

1, 1970, was cited. 

Russia's unfavorable maritime geography, which historically 
complicated the development of the navy, is fully recognized. The 
Admiral's treatment of "Russians in the Mediterranean Sea" is of 
great interest. Analyzing the long history of Russia's naval 
appearances and occasional presence in the Mediterranean, the 



< 

/ 



' ■ 256 



^kiral draws several conclusions. Acco~- iorically, 

wjsn the threat of attack against Russia's southwestern borders 
eerged, the Russian Navy appeared in the sea and "demonstrated 
t the whole world that the .Mediterranean is not somebody's forbidden 
sace or closed lake and that Russia is a Mediterranean power". 
Te current presence of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean in 
Grshkov's view is substantiated not ^nly by the geography, but 
b many centuries of the presence there of the Russian Navy; it • 
i| playing an especially important role in the defense of the 
ountry and "blocks the violation of the peaceful atmosphere there 
ajid plays a role of containment". If nothing else, this work 
c:monstrates that Soviet naval thought is not merely working, 
ht is quite active. 



?5"7 



i 
I 

Soviet naval develops titia half cent 7 ago 

us initially accompa.._^ ,. by -cui revolutionary slogans en the 

<ie hand and conservative, unrealistic att :s to oronote 

<JLassical naval theories en the other. Such dichatomous views 
\2re interpreted by seme Western students of Soviet naval 

;cfairs as testimony to the e::i.^ jo of uwo c; .;: ;inj schools 

:i the Soviet Navy involved in a perpetual struggle to influence 
i^viet leadership. In reality, however, without seriously - 
ojecting to debates, and occasionally even encouraging them, 
■.ie Soviet leadership was quite pragmatic in its approach to 
:aval construction. It could not be otherwise, I'or the economic 
oaditions of the country and the defense requirements as seen 
y the Soviet leaders for all practical reasons excluded any 
ther approach. This is not to say that the Soviet leadership 
xpressed a deep understanding of naval power and skillfully 
implemented it, but the available options were very limited. 

While World War I , the Revolution and the Civil War 
nflicted severe losses on the Russian Navy, resulting in its 
isinte^ration, and produced economic dislocation in the country, 
number of factors favored t -ehabili .-._.:.... ȣ the Navy: 

The Russian naval heritage, which, with the notable 



/ 



O Q O 

<_ o u 



eception of the Tsusima disaster, was generally glorious; 

the remaining ships and personnel, particularly a considerable* 
amber of former Imperial Navy officers, who, without necessarily 
acepting the Communist ideals, joined the Soviet Navy and, 
icved by patriotic feelings, worked hard; 

rather extensive naval shipbuilding experience and 
considerable shipbuilding capacities, which could be and were 
r stored; the Soviet leadership's preoccupation with the defense 
c the country. Long before the first Soviet tractor was 
fc.ilt, the Soviet shipbuilding industry was gradually restored 
a.d the construction of naval ships, and first of all submarines, ■ 
s.arted. 

The accelerated industrialization of the country, strongly 
Lased toward the defense sector, permitted the initiation of 
£ number of shipbuilding programs, including the 1937 program 
vsualizing the construction of a "mighty high sea navy worthy 
c* the Soviet Union". This program was far exceeded what the 
ountry could afford. A continuous shortage of metal, of machine 
Uilding, and of other industrial capacities created the 
onditions wherein the implementation of the program was to the 
etrinient of the other services, particularly the. army. As a 

onsequence, a minor v/er witl- - 7 ~: - revealed the backwardness 

ad unpreparedness of the Soviet armed forces, and generated 1 — 



9 r. o 



need for urgent measures to correct the B <tun^ *bo 1<W 
pro-ran was sharply curtailed and the construction of lar 2 e curiae, 
ships, stopped. However, reallocated capacities and resources 

did not affect either the sub——-. ~- e «,n „ 

„, — i Q Qjm small surface combatant 

construction. Considering the cond 4 «-ion »■* **,« c-.,, 

»,i*c w^, — -j.on Oj. v ^c Soviet economy 

before World War II, the variety of z^zs t and -particularly 

submarines, built and under construction at the beginning of the ■ 
.war was substantial' and no-ate the notion of the Soviet leader- 
ship's neglect of the navy. 

The employment of the Soviet Navy during the war was" 
-eiuhor brilliant nor disastrous. The Lund war threatened the I 
existence of the Soviet Union as a state. The composition of 
the enemy forces neither created conditions ' for the application 
of classical tenets of naval warfare nor was the Soviet Navy 
ready for it or was there any need for it. On the other hand, 
the employment of Soviet naval forces, particularly during the 
initial period of war, was of tea, marked by not very imaginative 
tactics and was handicapped by the lack of forces, a considerable 
portion of which were involved in the land struggle. The war 
revealed a number of serious mistakes made in the process of 
naval development, ^-q Northern Fleet was the weakest, and its 
reinforcement was slow. The Soviet Navy had no amphibious snips, 
and the formation of naval infantry was delayed. r ::-.- Soviet Navy 



210 



was la-in S behind in the development of — 

y cng 0I influence mines and 

the means to combat them. The ant* ,,-„ n 

*»o anti-aircraft defense of the 

Soviet ships was inadequate due to an ilWH - • 

An insufficient number of 

automated and multi-purpose guns . The top . . 

w«y ecnexon c^ ^g Soviet 

naval command. eli"-im^^ * 

a, eliminated during the 1S37-1938 Stalin purges, 

v/as replaced by young officers w^o , id „«< , • 

W ?° dld aot faave chance to gain 
experience. Moreover ±h« o«-~~ t. 

over, the atmosphere of terror had to produce 

suppression of initiative and fear o- halt < • 

sear o^ oold action, resultin- ia - 

reluctance to commit important -•■»« < 

-. w *^u: ^u; fleet ups+e -*-o, ^^~-« jl. 

we* i s uo comoat, as was 

particularly evident ^ +k^ »-i , — 

/ eviaens xn the Black Sea Fleet. 

After the war en^-' j-u^ o 

war ended, the Soviet Union wasted no time in 

resuming naval construction, & Qs ^ t ~^ 

, ae^t©~ w ne considerable destruction 

-o the economy inflicted v>», <-v~ 

jr j.^x J »j.c»,eu ey the war. A.t fi> e + «u • •> 

at xirst, snip designs of 

-he pre— war a^r 1 "»o ■»-•■> io.i^ 

4 w*t a..a xa te 1940 periods were h»n+ ,•« 

w "* e ^uii^ ^n considerable 

mmber, repeating the "practice ^-? -* 

- practice 01 .ae second half of the 1930's. 

*e orientation of Soviet naval theorv fln , .. 

V " A cneory ana practice in both 

i* Pre-war period and fi rst P0? ,,. wai . decad& wag ^^ ■ " 
tensive, althou S h a -considerable number of supines and ' " 
eUUvoly well developed naval aviation provided the Soviet ' 

avy with a limited offensive caoabilitv i„ + , 

c^p^eilivy m tae peripheral waters. 

•Utical, and particularly economic, realities for all practical' 

.j-cven^en w ne Soviet Zfavy from f v--,-^. 

«** // xrom OD*,aining any other 

^abilities. Even reop-ranhv ,hj. ai1w , . 

- geography, although improved as a result of 



2C1 



Ibrld War II, has continued to be unfavorable, and tho cc'nturi* i 

dd problem of the Straj..., remained, Y.'iti; tho oxception oX an 
imecessarily large number of conventional cruisers and destroyers 
Uilt up to the mid-1950' s, the remaining naval forces developed 
uthin the means of the Soviet Union did correspond to the role 
^signed to the Soviet Navy. * 

For a few years after Stalin death, overwhelmed by the 
ictories of Y/orld Y/ar II and particularly by the consequent 
svelopment of nuclear weaponry and missilery, some influential 
oviet military leaders, represented by the marshalls whose 
xperience and outlook was limited hy army operations, clearly 
uderevaluated, and to a certain degree, neglected the role of 
he navy. Soviet naval theory, on the contrary, even under the 
ondition of severe limitations on the available hardware imposed 
iainly by the weakness of the economy and availability of 
.llocated resources, continued to be quite active and modern. 
Various theoretical groups on the fleets, the academy, and naval 
schools encouraged and supported by a more imaginative navy 

/ 

Leadership worked out a number of original and innovative 

proposals concerning the further development of the navy under 

lew strategic and technological conditions. Strategically, in 

■ 
the post-war period, the Soviet Union l:as been facing opponents 

of which the majority have been traditional maritime nations 



262' 



haded by the US and which have possessed strong navies. 

i.reover, military geo S ra P hy has changed, elevating the importance 

& naval warfare. 

On the technological side, it was claimed that the 
envelopment of nuclear weaponry, particularly coupled with the 
i.-w means for its delivery — missiles and the 'progress in 
c.ectronics, all of which the- Soviets have termed the "scientif ic- 
ichnological revolution in military affairs", made the. 
r.vy particularly suitable for the application of these new 
c.ans of warfare. The mid-lSSO's decision of the Soviet 
leadership to drastically alter the course of -aval development 
is testimony to fee success of the Soviet Navy's persuasion 
:id probably of the military-political leadership's understanding 
i the problem. 

A far looking approach taken in the course of the 
.-cision-making process, which rejected any plans to construct 
;tack aircraft carriers and to fight the opponent with its own 
capons, approved the orientation of further naval development 
ward the missile armament and emphasized the prevailing role 
: the submarines and naval aviation, seems to have been the. 
>st possible under the circumstances for the Soviet Navy. The 
slatively rapid adjustment of both t le Soviet Navy and the 
; fense industry to the new course has produced a qualitatively 

r 

W navy . 



O0 7 



The first stage of the development of the new navy, lasting 
little past the mid-1930' s, revealed its orientation toward a 
uclear war. The tasks of the Navy's main striking forces, 
uclear delivery, anti-carrier operations, and anti-Polaris ASY/, 
dearly required the employment of nuclear weaponry and to a 
arge degree were directed against it. 

While it is safe to assume that a nuclear war has been 
•uled out as an instrument of Soviet policy, a number of factors 
iave contributed to the nuclear orientation in the Soviet 
lilitary, including the naval build-up. First, with the 
ippearance of new weapon system, any military establishment would 
iave a tendency to increase its stockpile, and often up to an 
mreasonable level. The notion of deterrence has implied a 
;endency to promote the armament spiral. Mutual suspicion and 
fear of "inferiority" (real, implied, or imagined) , particularly 
In the atmosphere of occasional pronouncements of "strategic 
superiority" by the adversary vV have, definitely p-layed an 
important role. The fact that, above a certain level, superiority 
in numbers ceased to produce strategic superiority, but is 
capable only of maintaining a deterrence balance, seems never to 
bother either side. The socalled theoretical field has not been 
very helpful, for a myriad of academic bachelors, masters, and 
doctors in the US and lieutenant-colonels, colonels (ca "..dates 



264 



nd doctors of philosophy) of th« -■ 

V1L c ,,liIi t.iry-poli, Llca.L 

pparatus contributed he^iv t-~ ^u 

^ea heavily to the confusion of x the still 

ittle understood nature of nuclei Wa rf a ™ 

uucxear warfare and the associated 



trategy . 

The naval contribution to the strategic deUvery, originally 
k possession of only the US Kavy in the form of the attach 

aircraft carriers woe *> ,• *,«.*. -. 

^^iixcis,, was iirst suoolerasntpH o«^ i x 

«yyienLnted and later practically 

-Placed by ballistic missile submarines. The original Soviet 
.stem with surface Xaunch and a 350-mile ran S e was gradually ^ 
proved, and it required almost a decade of effort to produce 
s submerged-launched 1, 500-mile range system. A longer-range 

baarine-launched ballistic missile system, whose range has 
:en variously estimated at from 2,500 to over 3,000 miles, has 
jportedly been under development. Correspondingly, the launch 
.atform was improved also, from the 2 to 3 missies carried by 
■e original Z-class and E-class submarines to 16 on the Y-class 

bmarines. 

i 

Paralleling the growth of the naval strategic delivery 
stem, a rather sizeable construction of more conventional 
rces, but quite unconventionally armed, has been observed 
roughout the decade of 1930's. Besides continuing the 

*Oyment of f„ rc es and the conduct of o::ercises i lJt.«..t 

anti-carrier operations and ASW in remote areas, the « iarged 



/ 



r 1 <~* T~ 
L. O vj 



i.rces of the Soviet Navy and first of all, its surface fore 

live permitted the Soviet Union to initiate the second stage 
c: forward deployment which, while explained originally by the 
-cessity of defending against the same aircraft carriers and 
Claris submarines, in effect was the application of Soviet naval 
pwer to "protect the interests of the Soviet Union" and to 
sipport,its foreign policy. The nuclear balance of the mid-1960* s 
aready had all the essential elements which led to parity, 
sufficiency, equality, or whatever term is preferred over mutual - 
(/erkill capability. 

Such a state of affairs originally permitted the Soviet 
Uion to deploy her naval forces in the area where the opposing 
iarces were stronger and still have a credible instrument to 
upport her policy. The Mediterranean deployment during the 
:irst 3 or 4 years was a classical example of this. Gradually, 
articularly after the crisis in the area had sharpened and 
;ore and better units were built and became operational, the size 
f the permanently present forces has been increased, creating 
he condition where neither side could claim superiority (with 
he exception perhaps of some naval pilots, who, as soon as they 
re airborne and feel the three-dimensional freedom of skies, 
ave a tendency to project that feeling into the notion of 
uperiority) . In areas sucli as the Mediterrneaa, Soviet naval 

/ 

' 26S 



brces can receive substantial reinforcement on rather short 

.otice, including land-based air power. The oft repeated 

soviet dependence on the good will of the nations controlling 

;he Straits seems to be no re wishful thinking than an objective 

evaluation of the situation, for it is doubtful that, short of 

i major conflict in which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would 

je involved, the Straits would be closed. The ability to have 

superior forces in the area of confrontation, while not necessarily 

Leading to an ability to control the sea, can certainly provide 

its possessor with a number of advantages and considerably 

increased chances for the favorable resolution of the conflict. 

The presence of Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean 
■ 
aas appeared to be an embryonic variant of the Mediterrnean 

situation. The behavior of the Soviet detachment during the 

India-Pakistan War in a sense was not much different from that 

in the Mediterranean during the Jordan and Libya Crises or during 

the Pueblo incident in the Sea of Japan. It appears that the 

employment of the Soviet Navy for what might be termed selective 

containment of the US Navy, still in restricted situations 

and carefully selected times and places, is being progressively 

intensified. 



307 

For an evaluation see R.D.M. Furlong "St rater; 5 P :. v 3 v 

In The Indian Ocean" , international Defense ;vov_ .0. 2, 

-. 1372, pp. 133-140. ■ ; 



9R7 



It can be assumed that technically the Soviet Navy can 

be employed in gunboat diplomacy. If one accepts Mr. Cable's 

> 

definition of gunboat diplomacy: "the use or threat of limited 
naval forces, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure 
advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an 
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within 
the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state", 
it might be concluded that the Soviet Navy has all the necessary 
elements for its application on a selective basis. The political 
validity of such an assumption is another matter, and, in most 
cases, the Soviets are bound to lose more than they gain. 
Soviet Navy support for an established friendly and legitimate 
government, threatened internally and particularly under 
circumstances where the blame for the turmoil can be placed upon 
the "intrigues of the imperialists", is another matter, and its 
possibility should by no means be excluded. 

If the concept x>i an "all-out war at sea" seems to be 
questionable, at least for the foreseeable future, a controlled 
war on sea communications under certain circumstances cannot be 
ruled out. However, it would not be in the form of unidentified 
submarines sinking ships, but in the form of mutual retaliatory 



John Cable, j _ '^Z-SlL 1 Political ppl :ations of 
Limited Naval Force (Institute for Stra >tic ies - Studies 
in International Security : 16) . New York: Praeger Publishers, 
251 pp. , 1971, p. 21. 



26 



o 



trikes. Possessing the world's largest submarine fleet, a 

oasiderable portion of which is well suited for the attack 
ole, the Soviet Navy technically and operationally is capable 
if conducting such a war. However, ±i would inevitably bear 
.he fruits of growing into ;x general war and, hence, Ls extremely 

remote . 

No picture of the Soviet Navy, even such a sketchy one 
is presented in this paper, should be considered complete if 
viewed in isolation, for in the final analysis, showing the 
flag is only one profitable side effect of navies, which are 
built and maintained to be engaged in naval warfare. An 
obvious choice, and a singular one, for general comparison 
might be only the US Navy. Only the most general type of 
comparison of trends in the development of the two navies can 
be made here. If, for the sake of analysis as well as for the 
practical matters of naval warfare, one isolated ballistic 
missile submarines, what remains in the two navies would be a 
composition of forces which have been built for naval warfare 
and which are navies as they have always been understood. 

The Soviet Union's decision of the mid-19 50' s not to 
build attack aircraft carriers was a correct one, considering 
•the peculiar nature of the Soviet Navy at the time of the 
incision, the trend in the development of naval warfare, and 



c 



269 



Soviet policy. The US y, on the contrary, has -'or a loi 
tine considered aircraft carriers as the nucleus of its naval 
forces, which, to a large degree, have been developed to' support 
carriers. The Soviet Union's rejection of the idea to fight 
[carriers with carriers for a while denied their navy a number 
of options. This probably still holds true in 'relation to a 
number of situations in which, however, the Soviets do not likely 
want to be involved. A diversified anti-carrier force developed 
by the Soviet Union includes attack submarines, both cruise- 
missiles and torpedo, land-based missile carrying aviation, and, 
marginally, missile armed surface ships. While capable of 
fighting carriers, they are hy no means a complete substitute 
for them, although in the attack role at sea they might be more 
effective. 

The Soviet striking forces, as platforms for weaponry, 
have a higher utilization of offensive armament. Aircraft 
carriers, being high 'value targets, have to share a considerable 
portion of their weapon capacity with the needs for AS 1 .'/ and 
anti-aircraft defense, and many of them in effect become 
siulti-purpose platforms. The question naturally arises whether 
a package of diversified forces which may even cost less, can 
perform the same tasks and bo lo^s vulnerable? Y/hile it _~ 
logical to apply the CV concept to the existing carr: one 



/ 



270 



should remember that the concept itself was born in order to 
increase the survivability of the CVA portion of \i. Moreover, 
the size and large tonnage of ships have ceased to play any 
significant role in the age of missiles and sophisticated control 
systems, "compressed" in size and "inflated" in performance by 
the power of explosives and microelectronics. 'While ship-borne 
aviation's role in combat at sea will not only survive, but might 
be even elevated, the attack carrier concept, particularly in 
relation to the Soviet Navy, is not very impressive. In the 
decade of the 1970' s the advocates of SO, 000-ton mammoths, 
particularly when they demand an increase of their number, bring 
to mind Santayana's remark about fanatics who redoubled their 
efforts as they lost sight of their goals. So, in relation to 
the US Navy, the Soviet Navy is not much worse off at the present 
without attack aircraft carriers. 

The appearance in the future of carrier-like ships not 
exceeding 20,000-30,000 tons displacement and serving as a 
platform for VTOL aircraft in the Soviet Navy should not be 
excluded. In general, both type of na\ r al aviation, shipborne and 
land-based, seem to be needed and will be developed. Heavy 
land-based maritime aircraft are extremely maneuverablo „ requiring 
less defense than any surface ship, and are capable of carrying 
a considerable load in flights of prolonged deration, they Will 



2 



'^1 



continue to be employed in a variety of . ions. The Soviet 
levy's emphasis on such aviation was initiated by i necessity, 
tt turned out to be beneficial. ' 

The Soviet lead in submarines today is overwhelming. 
A least numerically they have held this lead since the second 
hit of the 1930«s. But only during the postwar period, when 
te Soviet Union built close to' 600 submarines, were the majority 

them designed for long-range operations. Submarines, with ■ 
pactically every known type of propulsion systems and armament, 
sme unique to Soviet submarines, were produced. Ballistic- 
-ssile submarines in both the United States and the Soviet ' 
:\ T vy augment both countries strategic delivery systems 
prticularly the second - strike capability. Llany of the 
rinaining submarines, particularly in the Soviet Navy, are 
alti-purpose boats whose role in the future would probably be 
s.panded. At the present, submarines represent the main striking 
tree of the Soviet Navy, the role they undoubtedly will retain 

t the foreseeable future. The long nurtured idea that the 
ijbmarine is a weapon of the "have-not" navy is archaic, if it 

1 any time was valid. In spite of the US Navy's long and, in 
i'B limits of technological possibilities, somewhat productive 
>forts to have an effective anti-submarir.c defense system, the 
ijture of the problem, the budgetary limitations imposed u^on the 



272 



size of the ASW forces, and the size of tlie Soviet submarine 
force, which under certain circumstances can afford even 
saturation tactics, seems to create a situation where it would be 
extremely difficult to cope with Soviet submarinos. 

Besides, ASW is a two-way game, and the hunter quite often 
himself can be attacked, not only by the object of the hunt, 
the submarine, but by the forces supporting the submarine or 
cooperating with it. This is why just installing sophisticated 
search equipment aboard ASW ships is not enough. Modern weapons ' 
to defend the ASW forces from various types of attacks are 
needed. It seems that the submarine at the present is the best 
ASW platform, and a considerable number of them are needed. 
Whether the Soviet Navy has enough submarines for a variety of 
missions is hard to tell, but it has considerably more than the 
US Navy. 

The size of the Soviet surface force, which is capable of 
being deployed in remote areas, is obviously smaller and less 
diversified than that of the US navy. However, there is a growing 
number of Soviet Navy surface ships armed with a modern missiles 
presently absent in the armament ox the US Navy ships. Certain 
classes of Soviet surface ships have no counterparts in the 
US Navy, and a unit-by-unit comparison is meaningless. Today, 
there is no reason to consider the Soviet ffavy either as a 



273 



"ne-shot navy" or a "first-strike navy", because, for .... 
foreseeable types of conflict, it seems to have more than one 
sot, each one with a high degree of probability of hitting an 

asigned target, and its defense of surface units is no worse than 
oher navies, the US Navy included. The vulnerability of Soviet 
srface units varies from area to area. Considering the 
cordiua-ved system of naval warfare, however, other forces can 
waken the opponent's ability to strike, (at the present mainly 
v;th carrier-borne aircraft) thus, making the defense ability 
c Soviet surface units more effective. 

The amphibious capability of the Soviet Navy is very marginal 
ompared with that of the US Navy with respect to the size of 
te force and the size and range of operations. The important 
i.ct is the emergence of such a capability coupled with the 
i.pid growth during the 1360 's of Soviet airborne troops, which 
i; testimony of the Soviet military orientation reward mobility, 
deluding that at sea. While a ra.pid increase in size of Soviet 
aphibious forces in the near future seems to be unlikely, it is 
^gical to expect the sophistication of lauding means, including 
$tter amphibious tanks, air-cushion armored personnel carrier, 
'ie employment of helicopters, and appearance of specially designed 
:Lre support ships armed with long-range guns and missiles. 

In the field of tactical armament,- the Co vie t Navy scored 



274 



able :^cco:^ by emphasizing the d feloj lent of sr 
LBiiiles since the ^ic 1950*s.' ?or some reasc- which is difficult 
o explain satisfactorily the US Navy apparently neglected this 
ype of armament. The traditional preoccupation with carrier- 
orne airpower, which in the words of US Navy Captain Smith 
previously cited) , put "too many eggs in too few baskets'* and 
ater the budgetary limitations imposed by the Vietnam war, 
bviously do not explain the whole story. There should be no - 
uestion that the US is technologically capable of building 
ine cruise missiles, and thus avoid the situation where in the 
ords of Vice Admiral K. G. Rickover, "our gun-equipped surface 
;hips are considerably outranged by Soviet surface-to-surface 

;ruise missiles and would suffer severe attrition in an 

309 

engagement". Some anti-ship capability of certain US Navy 

>A2.is can hardly be compared with the capability of the Soviet 
cruise missiles. The wide adaptation of cruise missiles permitted 
;he Soviets to increase the range of an engagement by many 
;imes, and to change the nature of defense, so that instead of 
lighting the weapon systems carrier (ships, submarines, planes) , 
It became necessary to fight the weapon itself. In the early 
L9C0's Soviet Academician Admiral-Engineer Berg advanced the 



.'a a Post, May 31, 1971. 



275 



iea that the task in the scientific . of 

tjo systems is not to try to catch up, but to out ;ance, 
lave behind, without catching (£ regnat ' nye '^V. 
I seems that in relation to a naval engagement and ':he role of 
ajtack aircraft carriers in it, the Soviet Navy followed that 
a vice and leapfrogged the traditional carrier 1 stage in its 
dvelopment, and, by concentrating on cruise missiles, created 
is own "carriers".' To a certain degree, 2, C and ether classes 
c cruise missile submarines and Kynda, Xresta, Krivais, and ^ 
Nnuchka-cla.ss surface ships are carriers of robo t -kamikaze . 
The effective deployment of naval forces is presently 
i conceivable without reliable ocean surveillance to assure the 
umost effective employment of missile armament and to minimize 
a. opponent reaction time. The intensive activity cf Soviet 
rconnaisance aviation above the oceans, demonstrated particularly 
dring* the Okean maneuvers and the reported launching of 
aditional satellites during the India-Pakistan war are evidence 

Soviet recognition of the importance of surveillance. The 
Sviets emphasized the necessity for a wider application of *. 
ir.cro-electronics and laser technology and the creation of 
diensive means, not against already operational offensive 
£ stems, but against potentially possible ones, "the appearance 
c which are most likely to ho expected in the armed forces cf 



/ 
1 

i 

/ 



r\ —/ rs 



310 

[countries of the opposing camp", Th •:■... • assurance by 

Marshall Grechko that "the Navy will bo su] i ith mc re 

sophisticated technology and pcwer_ aL .. lonstrated 

the Soviet Union's deter. ..Ion to keep its navy apace with 

t 
technological progress. 

The prime mover behind the rapid and quite sizeable advance 

of the Soviet Navy during the last fifteen years, however, was not 

Soviet technology, which, in spite of the heavy emphasis on the 

defense sector and obvious advances in certain fields, is no 

better than US technology, and most likely behind it. The 

imaginative thinking of the Soviet naval circles which did not 

hesitate to break with established concepts, but worked out and 

applied new ones has to be given major credit. In the United 

States Navy, apparently, there are a number of people justifying 

US Navy Captain Smith's statement that "out-of-date thinking 

even more than our publicized over-age ships is our problem". 

Often heard references to Mahan's basic concept, command of the 

sea, which, as it is well known, is supposed to be gained hy a 

decisive battle won y oy a superior navy, can hardly be called 

valid in the nuclear age, and its advocates seem to continue to 

live in "a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan 



CIA 

G. A. Kadomtsev, ' "On t! - I •. . ot 

scientific foresight", i Sborj - No. 11, I960, p. 5. 



277 



j prophet, and the United States Navy the only true c 

ris way of thinking leads to over... thusiastic cc tts conc< 

bdrofoil patrol ships as "able to take- . . - floats", 

irf ace-effect (air cushion) ships employed in up to small 
c.rrier size and changing "the whole power' relationship at sea", 
ad small carriers labeled "sea control ships". While indicating 
■je propulsion modes of the visualized ships, most of which 
re still in the drawing board stage of development or at best 
re being tested in boat-size prototypes, very little is said 
bout the armament packages which, in the final analysis, together- 
lith tactics are the main thing, and the ships are only platforms 
o carry them. Surprisingly, there is not much talk about 
surface skimmers, and yet the Soviet Navy seems to be interested 

in them. 

Recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet ground 
forces concluded his Navy Day greetings with the assertion that 
the Navy "can count on the efficient and the effective support 
of ground forces", which represented a considerable change from 
the not so old view of the Soviet Navy as "a reliable helper of 
the Soviet Army." The independent nature of Soviet Navy 
operations, its alleged ability "to solve strategical tasks 
directly" and, hy its presence in remote areas "to contain . 
aggressive actions" claimed by the Soviets, cannot any longer 
bo rejected off-handedly or lightly. How efficient the Soviet 



27' 






jfavy would be in the claimed capability might be debatable, bat 

:heir firm understanding of the effective use of the Navy seems 

511 
to be beyond any doubt. 

The overall capability of the Soviet Navy and, more so , 
its intentions, might be debatable as are conclusions concorning 
the Soviet naval policy and the nature of strategic employment 
Df the Soviet Navy. However,, the Soviet Union's determination 
to break away from her recent naval inferiority, to go beyond ■ 
the customary closed seas and coastal waters, to employ a 
considerable portion of its imaginatively renovated navy in the 
world's oceans for the "protection of state interests" and to 
exclude the mistakes and misfortunes of the past, is obvious. 
The following quotation illustrates: "For many decades almost 
continuously warring among themselves, the European colonial 
plunderers unanimously aspired to deny Russia access to the 
ocean — by force, by diplomacy, and even by 'scientific' 
argumentation. A "theory" was devised and circulated to the effect 

that historically Russia was a purely continental state, and that 

/ 
therefore it was neither necessary nor possible for it to have a 

powerful navy. Influential mercenary supporters of this theory 



It was reported that during India-Pakistan War, the 
Soviet ambassador to India, -.'. M. Pegov, assured Indian 
officials ":.. .: a Soviet fleet is now in the - san, and 
that the Soviet Union will not allow the US Seventh U"i^ ., :o 
intervene". Pnrado , February 13,1972, p. 8. . 



279 



vcrc found in the Tsarist government, the consequences are 

312 
veil known — it is enough to recall the Tsushima' trade^y." 



« 



One wonders if the political goals of the Tsar jovernment 

.vhich led to Tsushima are not shared and pursued by the Soviet 
(government. 



Cl-'o ■? n-Maneuvo rs of the Soviet Na.vy in, April-May 1070 , 
Vcenizdat, 1S70, pp. 2G-27. 






CHAPTER II 



MERCHANT MARINE 



History of Development, Plans 
and their Implementation 



At the beginning of World V, r ar I, the Russian mercantile 
:Leet numbered 1,040 ships with a total cargo carrying capacity 
if 912,000 tons; many were old, slow, technically obsolete 
teamships and sailing vessels. Although three quarters of 
ussia's foreign trade was carried 'oy sea, only 7% of it was 
arried on Russian ships. 

Foreign (German, French, British) interests owned a 
onsiderable percentage of the joint stock companies. 

As a result of World Y/ar I , the chaos of the Revolution 
.rid particularly the civil war, many merchant ships were 
.ost-sunk, taken overseas by the White Guards, or confiscated 
)y foreign states. The total loss amounted to over 400,000 
cons, or more than 40%. For example, in the Black Sea-Sea of 
\zov basin in addition to combat losses, 2C4 ships with a total 
cargo capacity of 200,000 register tons were tak&n away in 



1 
Vodnyy Transport, 20 June 1970. 






920 by the retreating White Guards, The majority of the 
emaining ships were in poor technical condition, land many were 
ailing ships. 

The February 1917 Revolution generated alarm among foreign 
tockholders of Russian steamship companies. There were attempts 
o hold Russian ships in foreign ports under various pretexts, 
he October Revolution just accelerated the process. In order to 
revent it, the Soviet government issued the decree of 24 
ovember 1917 concerning "prohibition of the sale, hypothecation - 
nd chartering of Russian merchant ships by foreign citizens 
.nd organizations". All transactions concerning the transfer 

if ships abroad conducted prior to November 24, 1917 were declared 

2 
'oid, and the sailing of ships to foreign ports prohibited. 

.'he socalled "workers control" of steamship lines through 

specially organized committees was established. The decree 

)y the Council of People's Commissars on the 23rd of January 

(February 5) 1918 nationalized the whole Russian mercantile 

fleet. The newly organized Baltic company, Transbalt, in 1918 

candled 160 Soviet and foreign ships in the Port of Petrograd, 

out the Civil War interrupted even such modest activity. 

On ilarch 15, 1920, Lenin stated: "I repeat, that our 

destiny depends on the forthcoming water transport c, ipaign 

"::or3ko'/ Plot Mo. 1,-1967, pp. 5-7. ., 



f. c> <-> 
£01 



3 
fcrhaps more than on the forthcoming war with Poland". In 

iy 1920 the decree signed by Lenin gave the Sovnarkom (Council 

c: People's Commissars) exclusive right to permit the sale of 

nips and to enter into charter party agreements. 4 

The resumption of foreign trade was badly needed to ease 

;ie economic dislocation of the country and to 'start the 

^storation of industry, and at least a small number of 

oerational ships was required for that purpose. Eecause of the 

evil war, the only area from which the ships could operate 

ad carry foreign cargo was the North. In May 1920 three sunken 

slips and, during the summer of 1920, several more were raised 

ii the White Sea. The newly organized Directorate of Sea 

1-ansport for White Sea - Murmansk (Belomortran) collected 23 

s;eamships (some with the ice-reinforced hulls) and 23 sailing 

vssels. Because of the shortage of coal, the latter were 

5 
onsidered of a special importance. The first Belomortran ship, 

£ibbotnik, left Archangel on the 16th of August 1920 with foreign 

t*ade cargo. In 1921 the Belomortran was reorganized into the 

Viite Sea District of Sea Communications (BOMPS) , and in 1922 the 

Northern State Steamship Line Company was formed. 



3 V. I. Lenin, Co mplet e Works', Fifth Edition, Vol. 40, p. 213 

Sorskoy Plot No. 11, 1067, pp. 2-3. 

5 

iorskoy Flot No. 3, .1963, pp. 3-10. . 



o o ^ 



In the Black Sea, the salvage of ships started in the 
:ond half of 1920. After one year of salvage and extensive 
air work, the Black Sea Steamship Line Company resumed 
o e ration. 

In the Baltic, the Baltic State Steamship Line was organized 
i 1922. The company immediately started to caTry foreign cargo. 
Mney earned by charter permitted the Baltic Company to repair 
sips and thus to increase their number and total tonnage. 

A'ter one year the company had 30 ships with a total tonnage of 

6 

J, 590 tons. After 1922, the shipbuilding industry speeded up 

nip repair and soon began the construction of new ships. 

With the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy) in 
D21, all steamship companies started to operate on a self- 
upporting basis; they were no longer financed by the state. 
n order to attract private capital, the joint stock shipping 
ompanies Dobroflot and Sovtorgflot were organized. In addition, 
oreign capital was attracted through a number of mixed companies. 
for example, in May 1921 the Russian-German company, Derutra, and 
.a 1923 the Norwegian -Russian Steamship Company were organized, 
.'he mixed companies, besides bringing in needed foreign capital, 
vere viewed as a device for avoiding the blockade of Soviet foreign 



b _ 

MA y»oV/~ t? TV 1 -"■-*- '*V- 1 ' TOR7 nn — 7 

uitji . sKuy x .'.>..' ... fto . X , — > ^j I f yjtf . »-» * • 

7 

i SiH J. I.i) L' , i CD nSQ.C ■■■ ^v/ ■ -j v - . iOJj JLo . o , p , ^ 



c O S- 



rade cargo and for gaining experience in operating steamship 
ines. There was a strict "division of labor" between joint 
took and nixed companii;:;; tho formor w< •/ •■ .. llnwM i., . .,,, 
:argo between Soviet ports in coastal navigation and the latter 

>ere used for the transportation of foreign trade cargo 

8 
.'xclusively. With the growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine 



md improved relations with many foreign states, both types 

9 

)f company were liquidated. 

In 1925 the restoration of the majority of ships was 
iompleted. The Soviet yards started to build new ships and, 
In addition, ship procurement abroad was initiated. The merchant 

aarine program visualizing the construction of 698,000 tons of 

10 

ships was approved by the Counsel of Labor and Defense in 1925. 

In 1928, prior to the first Five Year Plan, about 80% of Soviet 
Merchant Marine ships were more than 20 years old. According to 
the first Five Year Plan (1928-1929/1932-1933) , 10 billion rubles 
of capital investment were planned for Soviet transport, 3.6 
times more than the 2.7 billion rubles for the previous five 
years. It v/as further planned to complete the restoration 
of Soviet Merchant Marine and to increase cargo sea transportation 



8 M orsVoy Flot Xo. 11, 1967, pp. 2-3. 

9 

March 1930 Decision of the Soviet Government t . .:oy 



Flot No. 1, 1937. 
10 



For details, see Chapter entitled "Shipbuild g". 



/ 



r\ r\ r~ 
J >-■ w x 



re than four times, port cargo turnover two tir.es, and total 






tjanage of ships more than two times. 

During December of 1930 and the first few months of 1931, 
te Soviet transportation system, which was lagging considerably 
chind the increasing demand, became the object of the special 
onside ration of the Party and the government, 'which led to a 
nmber of decisions to improve the situation. The decision to 

cganize the People's Commissariat for Water Transport was made 

12 
a January 30, 1931. On April 14, 1931 another decision "on 

<)a transport" demanded an improvement in the efficiency of the 

iranch and approved the organization of six merchant marine 

drectorates: The Azov, Baltic, Caspian, Northern, Pacific, and 

Hack Sea. 

Although the first Five Year Plan was not fulfilled, the 

erchant marine received 136 new ships with a total cargo capacity 

f close to 500,000 tons (more than half were Soviet built). In 

932 the total cargo turnover of the Soviet Merchant Marine 

13 

eached the pre-revolution level. 

The Party directives for the second Five Year Plan 



1 Morskoy Plot Ho. 2, 196S, p. 3. 

1? 

Up to that time the Soviet Merchant Marine was subordinated 

o the Ccii cit of Railroads. The new Co^-ii^sarir. b of Yi'ater 
'ransport included the merchant marine and the river fleet. 

1° 

Morskoy Flot T.o . i, 1967, pp. 5-7. 



p p 



(1933-1937) visualized an accelerated development of Soviet 
Merchant Marine. A total of 26.3 billion rubles were planned 
for the development of Soviet transport. Although the figures 
for the merchant marine were not published, .judging from 
previous practice, 6 to 8 billion rubles would be a fair 
assumption. In reality, however, the merchant *marine received 
only 23 new ships during 1933-1934, with a total cargo capacity 
of 130,000 tons. The remaining three years of the second ?ive 
Year Plan witnessed a sharp reoricniaiion of Soviet industry 
toward military production. "In shipbuilding, Navy orders 
became predominat, and construction of merchant ships practically 

stopped. Partial reinforcement of the merchant marine was 

14 
conducted through the purchase of ships abroad." 

Instead of ships and port modernization, the Soviet 

Merchant Marine was fed with decisions. According to a decision 

of the CPSU Central Committee in 1934 the political directorate 

of Water Transport and political departments in steamship 

companies were organized. Their functions were defined as "to 

assure fulfillment of Party directives for the improvement of 

all activities of water transport, to increase political 

15 
education and training of personnel, to elevate vigilance". 



14 Morskov Flot No. 2, 1987, p. 4 . 



15 

Morskoy Flot No. 2, 1967, p. 5. 



287 



anwhile, the shortage of Soviex tonnage forced the greater use 
o the chartering of foreign ships. • l 

The Spanish Civil War presented the Soviet Merchant Marine 
v.th an additional burden. The Soviet supply to the Republican 
culd be delivered only by sea, directly to the Spanish ports, 
c through France. A number of Soviet ships were detained by 
Panco forces, and three, the Komsomol, the Timiryazev, and the 
Eagoev, were sunk. The weak Soviet Navy could not provide the' 
bviet Merchant Marine with effective protection. 

The 18th Party Congress (March 1939) directives for the 
tiird Five Year Plan for 1939-1943, visualized the acceleration 
c: the merchant marine development. According to the plan, the 
nrchant marine role in the country's transportation system was 
") be increased, new types of ship were to be built, ports 

:aproved, and the Northern Sea Route mastered. A considerable 

16 

ncrease in capital investment was planned. In reality, however, 

espite a modest increase in civilian- shipbuilding <, little was 
Dne to improve the merchant marine prior to World War II. By 
940 the tonnage of the USSR Merchant Fleet approached 2 million 
ons, but qualitatively the majority of ships were obsolete and 
a no way able to satisfy the needs of sea transportation, either 
a peacetime or during the war. 



.Morr/.roy 7 J ot No. 3, 1957, p. 7. 
/ 



288 



Vn>on the war started or. June 22( : C .;i, a UUKbor of merchant 
ships wore taken over zy the Soviet Kavy. The activity of ail 
steam-ship companies was immediately subordinated to the 'needs 

of the military .command, and firm m-m-*-o~„ ~~„+ - 

, «uu una military control over them was 

established. In the Baltic the merchant fleet was used to 
evacuate retreating troops, military hardware, -some industrial 
machinery and civilian personnel' from the Saga, Tallin, and 'later 

the Khanko. In the fail n-P iq/i -.., , , 

iaj.1 oi 1941 the whole remaining fleet was 

blocked in Leningrad, where it remained to the end of the war. 

In the Black Sea, the merchant ships v;ere used to supply aid, 

later to evacuate, the Odessa garrison, to supply the defenders 

of Sevastopol, and to assist the Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet 

Army during the defense of the Caucasus. In the north, the 

majority of available 40 merchant ships were used for transportation 

of Lend-Lease cargo and raw materials (in western convoys and 

also along the Northern Sea Route). Twelve ships were lost. 

In the Pacific, merchant ships participated in the transportation 

of Lend-Lease cargo from the U. S. and continued to provide sea 

trasnportation for Far Eastern region, and along the Northern 

! 
I 

Sea Route. In the Caspian Sea, the tanker fleet was used 
extremely intensively, delivering Baku's oil. 



The war took a heavy toll c^ the Soviet :.: 



V. ...O 



— v^ 



Nearly half (330) of all ships were lost and practically all 



/ 



28S 



remaining ships were badly rep; rs. 

collected all the Axis shipping it could as rep ons. A 
number' of ships, mainly Liberty -class, ware obtained under 
Lend-Lease. Decrepit was the term describing the condition of 
small old ships built in various countries during previous two 
to three decades. / 

The war caused considerable damage to Leningrad, Murmansk, 
and a number of other ports, while such large ports as Odessa, 
Novorossiysk, Nikolayev, Tuapse, Tallin, and Riga were destroyed. 

The plan for the restoration and development of the Soviet 
economy approved in March 1943 envisaged, for the merchant marine, 
the delivery of 400,000 tons of ships, accelerated repair of 
suitable ships, capital reconstruction of major ports, 2.2 times 

greater cargo turnover in 1950 compared with 1940, and a 2.5 

17 
times increase in production capacity of ship repair yards. 

Actually in 1950 the Soviet Merchant Marine transported 33.7 

million tons of cargo with a total cargo turnover of 21.4 

billion ton-miles. The promised tonnage was not delivered, 
» 

although the repair facilities were improved and port restoration 
had begun. The inability of the mercantile fleet to fulfill 
the plan was recognized in the Counsel of Ministers Decision of 
17 June 1947 "on measures to improve the operation of -jhe merchant 



1? 

Morskoy Plot No. 5, 1967, p. o. 



2c 






•i:ic and fulfillment of the St • - 

argo in 1947". While this "= + ,-~i-» . . 

tms stick intensified somewhat an 

:Lready tense situation in the induct™, ,• + 

tne ~aaustry, it could not and did 

ot produce drastic improvements. 

Directives for the fifth Five Year Plan (1951-1955) , 
clopted by the 19th Party Congress in October i 9 52, devoted 
considerably greater attention to the merchant marine. The" 
cfpital investments were increased, somewhat larger facilities' 
»r new constructions allocated, an intensified procurement of 
sips abroad approved, modernization of existing and construction 
c new shipbuilding yards and ports, planned. 

During the 1951-1955 five-year period, the growth of the 
Sviet Merchant Marine exceeded that in the previous five-year 
pried by 63.8%. More than half of the new ships received were 
Sviet built. In addition, many ships underwent major repairs, 
tje last time such an approach was used on a large scale by the ' 
Sviet Union. In 1955 the Merchant Marine carried 53.7 million 
Aw of cargo with total turnover of 37.2 billion ton-miles. 18 
The XX Party Congress directives for the sixth Five Year 
'an, (1956-1960), envisaged a ..-..-chant fleet growth by 1,600,000 
t (to be built mainly hy the Soviet avid Comecon country yards) 
d increased participation of Soviet ships in transportation of 

13 

Morskcy _?lot No. G, 1967, p. 7. 

/ 



2S1 



.reign trade cargo. The Soviet North - led out as a 

piority area for merchant marine development. The timber 
ejport there was carried out mainly by foreign ships (85/6%) 
chartered by the Soviet Union. By 1959 only 70% of the Northern 

S.eamship Company tonnage was powered, including 77.5% still 

20 
Liming coal and only 22.5% using liquid fuel. * 

While the sixth Five Year Plan was never fulfilled, (it 
v:s replaced by the 1959-1965 Seven Year Plan) , the measures 
provided in it did play an important role in the development" 
c: the Soviet Merchant Marine. While not contributing much, 
drectly, the Plan did set a definite trend, building up a 
jrerequisite for the future accelerated development of the 
i^rchant marine. In effect, it was the first plan which was 
arried out during its initial three years as it was visualized: 
ore funds were allocated and spent for ships at home and abroad, 
ad more domestic shipbuilding capacity was allocated and 
tilized for civilian' construction. 

During the Seven Year Plan period (1959-1965) , the Soviet 

/ 

.erchant Marine underwent a truly unprecedented development. 

he plan for the merchant marine was revised twice, each time with 

, considerable increase in tasks. The first revision came after 



~' J .Morskoy 71 ot No. 8, 1967, p. 7. 

20 

Morskoy Flot No. 3, 1967, ^n . 8-10, 



TOO 
i- cJ /. 



tje 22nd Party Congress (October 1961), when it was decided to 
acelerate even more the already fast growth of the merchant 
ojrine for the reason that the plannedgrowth of the cargo 
cpacity of the fleet was lagging behind the growing demand of 
te foreign trade, and, consequently, a considerable expenditure 
u.s required to charter foreign ships. The second increase was 
ii 1963, for the plan was fulfilled two years in advance. The 
increased tasks set for the Soviet Merchant Marine in 1963 were 
iso over-fulfilled towards the end of 1965, again an unprecedented 
nenomenon in Soviet planning practice. 

According to the original plan, the cargo turnover was 
•) increase by 220%, but the actual increase was 360%. In 
958 the Soviet Merchant Marine carried only 6.6% of the total 
argo turnover for all types of transportation in the country, 
'bile in 1965 it carried 14%. In foreign trade, the cargo 
urnover increase was 480%. The total cargo turnover increased 
rom 57.4 billion ton'-miles in 1953 to 209.9 billion tons in 
965. The merchant fleet tonnage grew from 2,845,000 register 
ons in 1953' to 7,150,000 register tons in 1965, or 2.5 times, 
n 1953 the Soviet Merchant Marine had about 250 ships suitable 
or long hauls while in 1965 there were over 800 such ships, 
he average cargo carrying capacity of the dry cargo shd . 
ncreasod 150% over the Seven-Year Plan period, while that ^or 






O Q 

£. vj O 



.;•■ tankers increased 180%. The Soviet Merchant Marine jumped 
;iW the 12th place in world ranking in 1953 to 6th place in 
LS5, becoming one of the youngest fleets in the world with 
.liost 30% of its ships built in the previous ten years. Towards 

;b end of the period, the Soviet Merchant Marine sharply 

21 
.creased its participation in the charter market. 

The Seven Year Plan resulted in the complete elimination 

i coal-burning ships, which at the beginning constituted 77.5%. 

lithe total ship inventory of the Northern Steamship Company 

ii:ered by way of example above. The average age of ships was 

icreased from 14 to 8 years, while the average speed increased 

'»m 8 to 14,5 knots. As a result, the amount of export timber 

STied on Soviet ships increased from 14.4% to 195S to 32% 

vl965. In 1962, the Northern Steamship Company was receiving 

iij new ship per month, and in 1G65, two ships per month. 

though completely retiring old ships, the company nevertheless 

22 

.creased its tonnage* by 1.7 times. 

The phenomenal growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine during 
its seven year period attracted the attention of world shipping 
sWunity and press. For the first time in its history, the 



Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 9-14, and No. 3, 1967, 
). 6-8. 

22 



Morskoy Plot No. 3, 1967, pp. 3-10. 



294 



Sviet Merchant ' c /oil as a • ■ i 

ad effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy .i 2 ** 

Directives for the 1966-107C Five Year Plan approved 
V the 23rd Party Congress in April 1933 provided for a 50% 

ncrease in Soviet Merchant Marine t .- .30 ; an SC% increase 

24 

:i total cargo turnover, and a 40% increase in port productivity. 

.:cording to the plan, the average ship operating time toward 

le end of period was to reach 320 days per year for dry cargo • 

25 

;nips and 325 days for tankers. ^• 

Although the plan was not fulfilled, actual performance 
as close to the planned figures. The fleet was augumented by 
40 new ships totalling 4.5 million dwt, an increase of 42% over 

five-year period. Total cargo turnover in 1970 amounted to 
54 billion ton-miles, an increase of 70% over 1935. (In foreign 

uns, which accounted for 91% of the ton mileage, the increase 

26 

as 78.4%) . 



23 

See Reporter , February 10, 1966, pp. 24-23. 

24 

Morskoy Plo t No. 6, 1968. 

Morskoy riot No. 11, 1967, p. 8 and No. 2, 1970, pp. 3-5. 

26 

The socalled Cuban Sea Bridge and the closure of the Suez 

Janal contributed considerably to this Soviet index. Day-in and 

lay-out the Soviet Merchant Marine has had some hundred chips on 

:he Cuban run, where total tonnage deli 197C exceeded 3 

million tons. The Sovi- .■ ~ - Vietnamese linos were served in 

L970 oy more than 150 ships. The 1970 cargo carried to ..';.. h 

Vietnam was sale to be equivalent no about 1,000 trainloads. 

few Times No. 10, 1971. 



90s: 



During those five years, 730 million tons of cargo and 167 
million passengers were carried by the Soviet Merchant Marine. 

I 1970 Soviet ports handled 1,300 million tons of cargo,' a 

27 "^ - 

fifteen percent under-f ulf illment of the plan. Average ship 

aerating time increased for dry cargo ships from 310 days in 1965 

tj 331 days in 1970, and for tankers from 311 days to 322 days. 28 

_ 
A'erage "speed" of dry cargo ships grew from 235 miles per day 

ii 1965 to 315 miles per day in 1970, and tankers, from 327 to 

C.!3 miles per day. At the end of 1970, the Soviet Merchant 

Mrine had established 65 foreign lines including 33 with a * 

jiblished schedule. In addition, there were many lines in coastal 

nvigation. 

Reporting to the Collegium of the Ministry of Merchant 

;*rine, Minister Guzhenko stated that the Soviet Merchant Marine 

uring 1966-1970 "assured the complete fulfillment of the cargo 

rausportation requirement in coastal navigation, the independence 

f Soviet foreign trade from the capitalistic charter market, and 

ssistance to fighting people of Vietnam, Egypt, and other 

29 
ouutries". First Deputy Tikhonov added that, by satisfying 



27 Ibid. 

28 Morskoy Flot No. 3, 1971, pp. 3-7. 

29 

Vodnyy Trar port, '11 7o;:^uary -07.:. 



OOP 



requirements of the Soviet .. t ........ economy, 



lafine fulfilled "the century-old dream of Russia's leading 
legators" . 

The following table illustrates the augm< ition of the 

iciet civil fleet. It can be seen that, while total annual 
pjwth has been around 1 million tons, not all *shi^^ ~clong 
;c the merchant marine. 



O r "? 



K > 

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238 



The Five Year Plan for 1971-1975, directives .for which were 
.proved by the 24th Party Congress in April 1971/ provides for a 

3 

.Vther increase in Soviet Merchant Marine tonnage of 5 million 
■As. It is planned to increase total cargo turnover by 35%, 
Ale increasing cargo carriage '^y 40%. The plan provides for the 
instruction of new ports and modernization of existing port 

:.;ilities. The deep-draft dock areas in the Soviet ports are to 

30 

jc increased by 37%. 

It is planned to increase container carriage and to replenish 
:b merchant fleet with ships carrying 40, 200, 300, and 700 
xitainers. Special container terminals in Leningrad and 
f&hodka, utilizing the latest container handling techniques, are 
:c become operational. The introduction of ships of 5,000 dwt 
ill 25,000 dwt with stern ramps as well as LASH (lighter aboard 
sifl.p) ships, each designed to accommodate 40-50 lighters of 
20-400 tons each is also being planned. The Soviet Merchant 
Urine is supposed to receive a number of large bulk carriers 

y. 23,000 dwt,, 50,000 dwt, and at the end of the period, 

/ 
.'(-30,000 dwt, combination tanker-ore carriers of up to 120,000 

IV;, and large, 150,000 dwt tankers. More intensified long-haul 

*ory service", most of which will be suitable for .ice navigation 



o 



0,, 



forskoy .Flot No. 3 and .:o. 4, 1971; _ > Times No. 10, 1971 



/ 






a the Far Fast, the Baltic and the Caspian Seas is visualized. 31 

The merchant fleet is to be augmented according to following 

pproved principles: new constructions will have an increased 

argo capacity "up to rational limits", with increased speed, 

otimum minimization of number of ship types built in series with 

nde introduction of automation and crew reduction. It is planned 

d increase the profit from Merchant Marine operations by 29%, 

ad the net profit from foreign runs by 28%. 

The development of the Soviet Merchant Marine in the more 

2mote future," during the second half of the 1970s and the" 

aginning of the 19S0s, although not validated by any announced 

Ian, is being discussed by leaders and specialists of the Ministry 

ad can be visualized as follows: 

(a) Ships - The process of ship specialization already 

ell unaer way will not only continue but intensify, coupled 

ith the increased size (tonnage) of ships. Bulk carriers of 

0-100,000 dwt and larger as well as tankers of about 200,000- 

50,000 dwt most likely will be built. The number of general 

/ 
argo ships,' so numerous in the present Soviet Merchant, will 

eiinitely be reduced. Considerable attention will be devoted 

o containerization, which will be particularly intensive during 

be second half of the 1970s, when the port facilities and other 



31 Mor • Flot No. 0, " 70; N .- •:: ' -.;os ::o. 10, 1971; and 
oy ctskay a , : ^;ssiya, 25 May 1971. 



\J v-' J 



<|>des of transportation sho . be ready for it. Dur 

hlf of 1970s, containerized car-.. . I exc the 

ital. The speed of ships will be increased gradually, .or in 

i>st cases a drastic increase in speed is not yet warranted 

:>t only technologically but it would require the modernization 

c: ports, particularly their cargo handling facilities. 

LASH and Roll-on/ltoll-of f ship types will be introduced 
:i considerable number during the 1975-1930 period. The process 
(L ship automation should not only continue but will most likely 
12 intensified. New types of crews composed of specialists 
(Lviaed into two groups - control and maintenance - will man 
iighly automated ships. Wide introduction of submarine transports, 
arge air-cushion and hydro-foil ships during 1970s is unlikely. 
;sw methods of handling and transporting bulk cargo, such as 
'atering down the cargo and loading or unloading it through 
ose-pipes, combined with 90-95% enrichment of ores, will 
robably be introduce'd on an experimental basis towards the end of 
he 1970s. 

(b) Ports - Initially in large ports (Zhdanov, Murmansk, 
akhodka, Novorossiysk, Ismail) and later in others, more highly 
utomated cargo processing devices will be installed, and there 
hould be a four to five-fold increase in productivity of loading 
'.ad unloading operations. More deep-channel approaches to the 



o c 1 



Arts will be dredged and dock arc d \ ... increased. Spec. zed 
clicks (terminals) for handling containers and packaged (unitized) 
ergo will be built in Leningrad, Riga, Il'ichevsk, Odessa, 
Vldivostok, and Petropavlovsk. Specialized docking areas for 
kndling chemicals, ores, coal, and similar cargo will be built. 

(c) Management - Wide introduction of a 'computerized control 
astern (ASU) will succeed the initial, present basin and 
seamship companies computer centers. Towards the end of the - 
])70s the automation of control in the Soviet .Merchant Marine 
sould be completed. 

Coupled with the further increase in line shipping with 
lie employment of specialized, automated, series-produced ships 
ad improved port facilities, the measures most likely will 

jjsult in a considerable improvement in the over-ail efficiency 

32 
<f the Soviet Merchant Marine. 

Those are the main stages in the development of the Soviet 

erchant Marine and the most probable trend of its development 

aring the decade of the 1970s. It can be seen that despite 

36 numerous attempts, mainly through unrealistic plans approved 

y the Party, to speed up the growth of the Merchant Marine and to 

acrease its role in the overall transportation system, in reality, 



39 

Krasnaya Zvezda , 4 August 1070; Literati] \ayg Sa zeta , 

January 1971; Morskoy Plot No. 12, 1970, pp. 4-7 and Xo . 7 , 

971, pp. 3-5. 



d for a variety of reasons (mainly the priorit: • to th 
Ltary production) that goal was not achieved uo to the middle 
oi 1950s. Starting in 1956, but particularly during the' 1958- 
IfO period, not only did the Soviet Union for the first time 
ci^elop an extensive and realistic program of merchant marine 

Mansion but, more important, for the first time was able 
t<j implement it. In fact, speaking about the plan, it, too, 
,;5 imperfect, for 'it was revised at least twice, but. in this 
esse, upward. 

The foregoing decisions and figures do not tell the 
cmplete story of Soviet Merchant Marine development. Moreover, 
tey do not reveal either the reasons for the decisions or the 
mchanism producing the figures. The rest of this chapter will 
fc: devoted to an examination of the factors which necessitated 
tie decisions and the ways they were implemented; the present 
cganization and the management (control) of the Soviet Merchant 
hrine; the Soviet Me'rchant Marine research and development, 
ducational institutions, and the personnel policy; ports and 
hip repair facilities; some economic aspects of Soviet Merchant 
arine operation. 



«3 p «■> 

1»* 



The Ne ed for t '/.,.• M .- ' Marine 

Up to the middle of the 1950 's the development of the 
Sviet Merchant Marine was dictated mainly by the internal 

economic needs and demands of Soviet foreign trade, which was 

33 
nt substantial. Since that time, however, there has been a 

* 

onsiderable increase in Soviet foreign trade and in the development 
a Soviet program of economic and military assistance. The 
ped of the Soviet economy for sea transport between Soviet ports 
primarily associated with the development of new economic. 
2gions, in many of which land transportation is practically 
bscnt) has intensified. The events in Cuba, Vietnam, and the 
iddle East have not only increased the demand for shipping - 
o transport armament, equipment, and goods - but, in turn, were 
o a certain degree influenced by the cargo. 

Since 1955, the growth of Soviet foreign trade has out- 
gripped the growth of the Soviet economy. The growth of , 
:ransportation of foreign trade cargos in turn exceeded the growth 

>f the foreign trade. For example, during the period 1955-1907 

/ 
the transportation of foreign trade cargo grew 4.2 times, while 

34 
the value of the Soviet foreign trade grew only 2.8 times. In 



33 

See Appendix II, Soviet Foreign Trade. Economic and 

Military A j d, 

34 N. D. Mozharov, "C of Socialist Coi "- \s :■.:-. 

the Area of Sea Transportation" , Transport, Moscow, 1963, p. 62. 



OvJH 



.•oo years, 1959-1961, sea transportation of foreign trade cargo 
i creased more than two times, reaching 5S.5 million tons in 
161. ' . 

The reasons for such rapid growth are both political 
aid economic. On the political side, the obligations assumed by 
tje Soviet Union toward a number of Arab countries, Indonesia, 
c.d India during the second half of the fifties were of definite 
importance. During the same period, trade with China continued 
i> grow, and a considerable portion of it was carried by sea. 
iward the end' of the 1950 's and the early 1960*s, what the 
oviets call "the process of disintegration of the world colonial 
:/stem" had intensified considerably. During 1960, for exa.mple, 
b Africa alone, 17 newly independent states were established, 
'he Communist victory in North Vietnam and particularly the 
ictory of the Castro revolution in Cuba were of significant 
mportance. Not all the above outlined events played an equal 
ad permanent role in generating the demand for Soviet shipping. 
tame, like Cuba and North Vietnam, left the Soviet Union with 
lo choice; others, like Indonesia, had looked very promising, and 
lence worth the gamble. The third category of country such as 
the Arab countries, while in the majority ideologically alien, 
presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity to undermine 
Western positions in the region and hence with possible political 



o r ~ 



met, in the future, maybe even economic gains. The break with 
:hina in the late 1950's on the one hand forced the Soviet Union 
;o reconsider its obligation toward certain countries, and as 

l result, for example, sharply increase its assistance to India. 
)n the other hand, the break relieved the Soviet economy of a 
:onsiderable burden thus permitting more flexibility in trade 
is well as economic and military assistance. 35 The traditional 
OViet design "to free the country of the capitalistic shipping 
larket" and to have greater flexibility in the support of political 
;oals should be added to that set of factors. 

The peculiarity of the Soviet economy plays an important 
•ole, for, while the USSR is the second economic power in the 
■orld and produces sophisticated armaments, the overall level 
if Soviet technology is still below that in most the Western 
•.ountries. This factor has given a peculiar character to Soviet 

foreign trade. While a positive balance of payments has been 

— 

While the ideological, historical, and nationalistic 
.spects of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and break nave been investigated 
n great detail, the economic aspect, with the exception of the 
iifficuities the break created in China, has to a large degree 
>eea neglected. It is a firm belief of this writer, 'chat 
ihina's needs and the Soviet Union's economic possibilities, 
trimarily industrial capacities, were incompatible. The break, 
herefore, although producing clearly undesirable political 
:onsequences for the Soviet L'aion, si. . iu ltaneously ' released 
:onsiderable industrial capacities, permitting the Soviet 
.overnment greater flexibility in its foreign trade, economic 
.nd military assistance. 



7 f >-; 



maintained in most of the years of Soviet power, the physical 

olume of Soviet exports and imports has varied sharply. Heavy, 

i 

ulky, raw materials have dominated the cargo in Soviet export 

hipping. The increased foreign trade in monetary terms has 

een primarily with capitalist countries from which mainly items 

f advanced technology have been important. In return, a very 

ew industrial goods produced in the Soviet Union could be sold 

n capitalist countries, and, hence, raw materials continue to 

emain the main item of Soviet export to them. In the trade with 

-eveloping countries, the picture is reversed. All this produced 

. situation whereby in 1967 Soviet export sea shipments exceeded 

.mports by nearly nine times in physical volume, as can be seen 

:rom the following table: 

Soviet Foreign Trade Shipment (thousand tons:) 

All means of transport (Share of sea 
sea transport shipment -%) 

19SQ 1965 1967 

Total 99,310 ^5^ 173,910, . 206,683 , 

447690 U5/o) -9lT837 (52 - D/o) 108,753 (53%) 

Export 84,376 (46%) 151,767 (52%) 184,563 ( %) 

38,765 79,088 98,459 

Import 14,934,.^ 22,143, N 22,120, „ s 

-57925(40%) 127749(57%) 107297(46%) 



V ^ y* p "1 T 



... uiia 
a, o c •- 



Institute, 1968^ and N". D. Mozharov, pp. 62-33. 



O r "7 



Soviet Merchant Marine participation in assistance 

3 North Vietnam goes back to .1954-1955, when two Soviet ships, 
jrkhangel'sk and Stavropol', were assigned exclusively to the 
SSR-North Vietnam "line". 36 With the escalation of the Vietnam 
jar, the number of Soviet ships delivering cargo to North Vietnam 

ncreased correspondingly: in 1964 47 Soviet merchant ships 

37 

eached North Vietnam; in 1965, 79; in 19S6, 122; 1967, 433. 

The first Soviet ships, Arkhangelsk, Brats, Izhevsk, and. 
olnechnogorsk delivered cargo to Cuba in the fall of 1959. ' The 
sea bridge" to Cuoa was established in 1960, when the first 
Soviet tanker, Cheboksary, delivered 11,000 tons of oil, followed 
>y uninterrupted deliveries by other ships. In 1960, two million 
;ons of oil were delivered and in 19-59, 5.5 million tons. At 
present, the annual cargo turnover of the Cuban "sea bridge" is 
xbout 9 million tons (7.3 million tons to Cuba, and 1.3 million 
tons, mainly sugar and ore, to the Soviet Union in 1969). During 
the 1960-1966 period,' Soviet seaborne cargo shipments between 
the USSR and Cuba grew nearly five times and with North Vietnam, 
3.4 times. Toward the end of the 1960 's the Soviets had 20-30 



36 Morskov Plot No. 1, 1971, pp. 3-4. 

. 

37 

Report to the U. S. House of Representatives, Committee 

on Armed iorvices, "T! '* Ch Strn to -jc Nay :\ 1 JBj^^incej _Ht "-„ i 

USA " , Section 4, V ■ • .t 'Marine , U.S. Govt. ?r — ;ing , , — ee, 

December 1968, Washington, D. C. 

38 

yoi-skov 7 V; t No. S, 1970, p. 53. 



C-8 



•lips on route to or from Cuba on any given day. 39 

Seaborne- cargo shipments between Soviet ports and developing 
ountries grew considerably during 1961-1965. With Socialist 
ouutries it increased from 6.3 million tons in 1960 to 16.4. 
illlion tons in 1967. The seaborne shipments between the USSR 
ad capitalist countries grew about three times*, while with 
,ipan, 5.5 times (6.7 million tons in 1965), with Italy, 3 times 
3 million tons), and with West Germany, 7 times (3.1 million 
ons) . 

Shipping Policy 

The foregoing factors and figures are definite testimony 
p the importance of the Soviet Merchant Marine during the 1960's. 
iit at the beginning of the decade discrepancy arose between the 
lanned growth of merchant marine tonnage and the tonnage actually 
squired. It forced the Soviet Union to increase considerably 
He chartering of foreign - flag ships, which in turn "reduced the 

ffectiveness of foreign trade" or, in simple language, cost too 

41 
uch and forced the Soviets to pay in badly needed foreign exchange. 



V. G. Bakaev, "USSR na morskykh putyakh" (USSR on World 
ea Routes ) , Znanie, Moscow, 1969, p. 16. 

40 

N. D. Mozharov, op. cit., pp. 63, 66 and ^.04. 

41 

Moreover, the shortage of ships imposed an added burden 

pon the other, already ovc^-oaded, modes of Soviet tr.. . -nation, 

articularly the railroad system. 



O ^' 



p i3 why at the beginning of the 1960's a review of the 
iven-year plan for the development of oho Soviet Merchant Marine 
ms made, resulting in accelerated shipbuilding at domestic 

;3.rds and increased orders for merchant ships abroad. In 1962 
le total annual increase in Soviet Merchant Marine cargo carrying 
apacity was equal to the growth of sea shipments of foreign 
rade cargo, and toward the end of the decade exceeded it. The 
ptal tonnage of dry cargo ships increased from 2,107,000 
3gistered tons in 1953 to 4,704.000 registered tons in 1965. 
.a even more rapid growth of total tonnage was achieved in the 

anker fleet: from 741,000 registered tons in 1953 to 2,446,000 

42 
egistered tons in 1935, or 330%. Major factors for such a 

apid tanker fleet expansion were Cuba's need for oil, which had 

o be shipped thousands of miles, boycott attempts (which only 

artially succeeded) organized by Western oil companies, and the 

rowth of Soviet oil exports. 

The development* of foreign trade, particularly on the 

• asis of the long-term agreement preferred by the Soviets, created 

. more or less steady flow of cargo to and from certain geographic 

.ud political regions. It permitted the Soviet Union to establish 

'foreign trade cargo traffic directorates" and to establish five 

;roups incorporating several such directorates, European, Middle 



42 

N. D. Mozharov, p. 105. 



310 



/ 3 
East - African, South Asian, Far Eastern, an J American. 

T he European Group , where close to one-half 'of foreign 

A 

trade cargo is shipped, includes three directorates: the -^ 
Mediterranean (Italy, France, Greece); the Scandinavian; and 
Continental (West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great 
Britain). Oil, oil products, coal, and timber are the main 
cargoes (by volume) in this .group. 

The Middle East - African Group includes five directorates 
The Near East (Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus); the Red Sea 
Countries; the Persian Gulf Countries; the North African 
Countries; the West African Countries. The largest cargo flow 
is to Egypt. 

The South Asian Grou includes India, Pakistan, Ceylon, 
Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia; The Fa r 
Eastern Group, Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam; The 
American Group , Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, the U.S., 
Mexico, and other countries of the Western Hemisphere. 

Practically all major Soviet basins (Northern, Baltic, 
Black Sea-Azov, Caspian, and Far Eastern) are participating 
in more than one group through the steamship companies located 
there. Some steamship companies of a particular basin have been 
assigned to specific directorates, and also are specializing in 



Soviet Union Sea Trar ,'.,r/; ;. - F :.: J :y Years, Moscow, 



Transport, 1967. 



rs_ 



p a rticular c a r g o . 

The Northern Basin companies are specializing in ship-oats 
f timber and minerals, mainly to the European -roup, as' well 
s delivery of coal to the USSR from Spitsbergen. 

The Baltic Basin companies are mainly involved in 
bipments of industrial goods as well as coal and oil mainly 
.o European and American (including Cuba) groups. The companies 
if the basin are also participating in shipments to West Africa 
rroups . 

The Black Sea-Azov Basin companies are serving all five 
;roups and are carrying a considerable portion of Soviet foreign 
trade cargo, mainly oil, coal, cement, metals, machines, and 
sugar. The companies of Far Eastern Basin are serving the Far 
Eastern and in part the South Asian and the American groups. 

Up to 1965 the Caspian Basiu provided partial deliveries 
of Soviet foreign trade cargo to Iran in addition to internal 
transportation of oil from Baku. Staring in 1965, but especially 

after the closure of the Suez Canal, it has been involved in the 

/ 
growing volume of Iranian cargo to and from Europe. 

With the closure of the Suez Canal, the length and the 

duration of the North Vietnam runs from the Black. Sea and the 

Baltic increased considerably, thereby requiring more ships to 

maintain even the same volume of cargo. t?hile continuing North 



312 



letnam shipments from Euro? 5 j.ns, Far .... 

is been gradually assigned the larger share of cargo for North 
ietnam. Shipment via railroad a . the Northern Sea Route are 

d have been increased corresponc gly. 

The Soviet Merchant Marine has developed extensiv aer 
ervice in four major categories: purely Soviet, operating jointly 
ith other Socialist countries, jointly with capitalist countries, -• 
nd jointly with developing countries. The economic advantages 
f liner shipping are obvious, but their organization and 
aintenance are possible only in the case of the availability 
f a steady flow of cargo, at least in one direction. The 
.learly established policy is to expand liner service, something 
•elatively easy to achieve in internal shipping or in the case 
)f lines operated jointly with Socialist or developing countries 
[thanks to the planned deliveries and the absence of opposition for 
i variety of reasons) . The initial Soviet attempts to join lines 
run by V/estern countries, many of which are under the strong 
influence of British shipping companies, ran into opposition, 
rhe shipping conferences initially rejected Soviet steamship 



AA 

■* A conference is usually formed by a number of shipping 

companies agreeing to provide scheduled runs on certain routes at 

fixed freight rates. Their customers often receive more favorable 

rates as a reward for long business associations. The con .-. .ces 

serve specific lines, many wi inounced schedules. The ships 

participating in a line service are calledliners. The occasional 

cargo, or c: L-go who^Q volume fluctuates considerably., is usually 

ca r r i e d b y t ram o s . 

. / 

oio 



ompany applications for membership. Of the various reasons 
iven for rejection, the most common and important wore: all 
oviet steamship companies and their ships are government owned, 
nd the principle of government non-interference with commercial 
hipping would be violated by acceptance of the Soviet companies; 
he alleged fear that the Soviets were trying to monopolize 
.heir own shipments, while infiltrating the Western lines. 

The rejection of the Soviet application for membership 
.n London's Baltic Exchange and in various Australian conferences 
•esulted in not just a war of words, but certain deeds from the 
soviet side. At least some Soviet business with the Baltic 
Exchange was cancelled, and Soviet shipping companies organized 
i number of "outsider lines" competing with the existing Western 
Lines, often by cutting rates. Finally in 1969 a number of 

Soviet steamship companies were accepted as members in various, 

45 
previously exclusively Western, shipping conferences. By the 



45 

Morskoy F lot No. 3, March 1971. For the detailed 

description' of the Soviet "battle" with Western conferences, 

see David Fairhall, "Russian Sea Power, pp. 119-148, Gambit, 

Boston, 1971. Actually the first to accept a Soviet member, the 

Baltic Steamship Company in 1960, was a passenger conference 

controlling services in the North Atlantic. The Soviet rcacticn 

.s expressed in an article which stated: "In these days, it is 

a hopeless enterprise to discriminate against t! . Soviet anion, 

and it is good t fc the A ;ralian conferences have f tally 

understood . ,". zvej , 15 March 1969. The £ .: claimed 

up to 1^69 they were paying over 1 million rubles an 

Ito foreign shipping companies to carry Australian . - fcc Soviet 

pores . 



Q1 U 



4d of 1970, out of 65 Soviet lines, 15 were being operated 
jiintly with Western shipping companies, and the number continue 
ti grow. In April 1971 a joint Soviet-French line between Odessa 

a.d Marseille was opened, and in May, the Japan-Mediterranean 

46 

Is a line became operational. 

The growing importance of liner service can be illustrated 
b way of the example of the Chernomorskoye (Black Sea) Steamship .. 
Cmpany which in the middle of 1971 had more than 80 ships 
asigned to all four types of lines. In order to increase the 

efectiveness of the company liners, a special Department of 

47 

Iternational Lines was organized. 

The conflict between Western shipping conferences and the 
Sviet Merchant Marine has not been unique, for the conferences 
peviously were involved in a conflict with the U.S. Maritime 
Cmmission and opposed any attempts to impose shipping regulations 

b the U.N. (UNCT.VJ - United Nation Conference on Trade and 

48 

Dvelopment) . Sovie't efforts l.ave been directed toward reassuring 



46 

Vodny y T ranspo rt , S July 1971. 

47 

Vo dny y Trans port , 13 September 1971. 

48 

The Soviet Union obviously prefers that UNCTAD play a more 

important role in regulating international shipping, as is evident 

fom a number of pre ounces » 2t Merc ': Marine officials, 

ad particularly clear ^pressed in ... 'mer Merchant M rine 
Minister BaL:ayev's publication The S oviet Union on ' c. 1 ... _Jea 
Rutes, 1970. . 



315 



Western ship owners and demonstrating that once admitted, they 
are faithful observers of conference regulations ,' which , in fact, 
according to available information, they have been. The' Soviets 
flatly deny the allegation that they desire and plan to monopolize 
their own seaborne trade, emphasizing that it is a practical 
impossibility and that the achievement of independence from the 
world freight market does not mean monopoly. 

Starting in 1962 there was a gradual increase in -the 
number of Soviet ships chartered by foreigners, with correspondingly 
greater earnings of foreign currency. In 1962, Soviet ships 

carried 1.9 million tons of foreign cargo, in 1965, 8.6 million 

49 
tons, and in 1967, 15.7 million tons. Simultaneously, the 

number of foreign ships chartered by the Soviet Union has 

increased, too. Chartering increased 4.4 times during the 

1959-1967 period, and in 1967 59.7 million tons of Soviet goods 

were carried by foreign ships, while the remaining 64.1 million 

tons of seaborne foreign trade cargo were carried by Soviet 

50 
ships. Soviet statistics are vague concerning the balance of 

/ ! 

charter in monetary terms, for they do not specify what percentage 
of cargo carried by foreign ships was transferred by the ships of 
CMEA countries. The Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine stated 



49 

V. Bakayev, op.cit., p. 25. 

50 

V. Bakayev op.cit., p , 23 . « 



3lb 



: 19C9 that between 1964 and 19G I the ....- :■■..., 

f convertible currencies increased ten tiir.es. It is fair to 
ssume that, at least in foreign convertible currencies ,' the 
carter balance continues to be favorable for the Soviet Merchant 
irine. 

The activity of the Soviet Merchant .Marine and merchant 

arines of CMEA countries is closely coordinated in Section 

i 

j. 3 of CMEA Permanent Committee for Transport. The Soviet 

conization, Sovphrakht, in cooperation with its counterpart in 

tiEA countries, conducts a coordinated charter policy through the 

barter Bureau. Cooperation in mutual use of tonnage, charter 

f foreign tonnage, mutual use of ports, ship-repair bases, 

xchange of information, joint policy toward international 

emulations, etc. are well developed within the CMEA framework. 

otal tonnage of Socialist countries at the end o£ 1970 was 

1.4 million registered tons, or approximately 9.4% of the world 

otal. It was argued that with its share of world production 

utput in excess of 1/3 of the total, merchant marine growth 

s not only warranted "from the economic and other points of 

51 
lew", but should be intensified. The effectiveness of CMEA 

ountry merchant marines undergoes close examination during the 



51 - f orr;!:oy Plot No. 1, 1971, pp. 47-49, and __/vv 
£*!H»22£i* 23 January 1971. 



317 



r.athly .Moscow meetings of their representatives.'"" 

The Soviet Merchant Marine is maintaining a\few joint 
Lies with developing countries which have been operating for 
ay years. The joint line with India was organised under an 
ii'eement signed between the two countries on 6 April 1956, and 
.but 20 Soviet and Indian ships are now serving the line.. 

HJ joint line with Egypt was organized after the signing of an 

53 

ig-eement on 18 September 1958. 

The Soviets have never failed to answer Western accusations 

:acerning the Soviet merchant marine deliveries of cargo of 

54 
ie'eloping countries. The Soviet countercharges are usually 

)">e£ upon the claim that up to recent times Western shipping 

xipanies had no competitors in the developing countries, and 

"iace dictated their own terms. Those companies have been 

ujiused of "squeezing more than two billion dollars annually from 

:t> developing countries for the transportation of their goods", 

ul of being irritated at the "unselfish" Soviet assistance to 



52 

A. V. Voronkov, YU. V. Klemen'yev, Merchant Fleet of 

wiet State, Moscow, Znanie , 1971, p. 44. 

53 

Ibid. , p. 45, and New Times No. 10, 1971. 

54 

See for example, an article in July 1970 issue of U.S . 

fos and vror ic; r '"'i> ailc * Soviet Minister 0; mko's answer 

rt; it in Nov; Times No. 34 ; 1970, pp, 27-2S . 



O 1 o 



lp devclopin ; countries. 

As for the accusation that the Soviet Merchant Marine permits 
is ships to carry cargoes of foreign shippers on their return 

is at cut rates, the Soviet Minister admitted the charge, 
dlling the practice "perfectly normal". He added that "many 
:>reign shipping companies do the same and no o*ne has yet accused 
tiem of engaging in economic subversion", and "it would be 
isurd to deny that the Soviet Merchant Marine is interested in 
fcrning foreign currency". In their counterattacks, the Soviet 
preservatives accused the U.S. shipping cc":zz.:.Ljz of charging 
ates "more than double the world's standard" and being subsidized 
!y the government which, in addition, "have introduced 
iscriminatory regulations", seeing in them an indication of a 
risis in U.S. shipping. Admitting the economic competition 
hich is going on today between the two systems in the maritime 
ield, the Soviet Minister conduce .hat "socialism is demonstrating 
ts superiority over capitalism", emphasizing that the Soviet 

Merchant Marine is technologically more advanced than the 

55 
'leets of leading western countries, including the U.S. 



55 

New Times No. 34, 1970, p. 29 



wo. J 



Fleet C". '- •■:.- . 

To implement the above outlined policies, the Soviet 
erchant Marine has to have ships in appropriate number and of 
uitable quality and assortment. Certain aspects of Soviet 
olicy in this respect are considered in the analysis of Soviet 
hipbuilding (the choice of rational, or optimum, sizes of 
ry cargo ships and tankers; production, i.e. mainly series 
onst ruction; selection of speed and type of machinery for the 
arious ships, etc.). However, the operational aspects 
nfluencing the fleet growth and composition and the employment 
f ships under particular circumstances were not discussed. It 
s appropriate to briefly consider these problems. 

One of the major features of the Soviet Merchant Marine 
s its serial composition. Large-scale standardization of ship 

1 

ypes was accomplished at the beginning of the 1960 's, when more 

han 30 different types, which used to be produced for the 

56 
bviet Merchant Marine, were reduced to 11. The use of a 

tandard design for ships and ship machinery allowed the Soviet 

nion to build ships in large series, to improve the training 

i crews and operation of ships and of ship repair facilities. 

ong-term planning, although it did not always work smoothly, 

Morskoy Sbornik No. ;, July, J.ybJ, p. i^s. 



/ • - 

I 

' 320 



haS be °^ a contributing factor to iaproving the composition 
of the merchant marine and its performance, including expansion 
of liner services. It has been claimed that the ccono.il gains 
from the above measures are in the tens of millions of rubles. 
During the last 12 years, Soviet Merchant Marine was 
upplied with more than one thousand ships with total of 9.3 
illion deadweight tons. Most of the new ships have speeds in 
excess of 16 knots. The highest priority in the merchant fleet- 
replenishment has been given to dry cargo ships, tankers, and 
passenger ships. 

Dry cargo, particularly general cargo, ships are in the 
largest number in the Soviet Merchant Marine. Most of them are 
of heavy tonnage, and can carry bulk cargos and heavy, and long 
cargos. Many of them have removable hatches, making it possible 
to open the deck wide. The advantages of that type of ship are 
constantly being emphasized in the Soviet Union. In addition 
to the conveniences they provide for loading and unloading 
operations, they are the best suited for carrying a variety 
of military cargos. The Soviet Union convincingly demonstrated 
this when it used Poltava-class ships to transport missiles to 
Cuba in 1962. ■ 



The di-y cargo ships-, which were built in lar 
during the last decade, are by class: Leninskiy Koi 



, v,- o v: .•. ^ e .^ 



isomol class, 



21 



milt in Nikolaev and Kherson, • Lth 00 to. ... 
speed about 19 knots; K / - ' nar ':o class, assent llj the 
same design as Leninskiy Komsomol, but with a 12,300 hp diesel 
Lnstead of a 13,000 hp steam turbine; Poltava class, built during 
L960-1967 in Nikolaev and Kherson, with 12 , 000 dwt and speed 
around 17 knots; Slavyansk class, with 12,900 dwt and a speed of 
13 knots. One of the Slavyansk class ships has completely automated 
control of the propulsion unit. 

The dry cargo ship classes built in large series abroad 
include the Omsk class, 14.9 thousand dwt, built in Japan, the 
Beloretsk class, 14.9 thousand dwt, built in Denmark, and the : ula 
class with 12.2 thousand dwt, built in Yugoslavia. 

Other classes of ships built for the Soviet Union in foreign 
countries are the Krasnodar class, built in Finland in 1961-1968, 
the Murom class built in Poland, and the Vyborg class built in 
East Germany, all between 12.4 - 14.9 thousand dwt and with a 
speed of 17-18 knots. The Soviet Merchant Marine has about 300 
timber carriers, which carry more than seven out of the ten million 
tons of exported timber. The Soviet timber carriers are suitable 
for carrying, and are being used to carry, other types of cargo. 
Two series of large timber carriers, the gas-turbine propelled 
Pavlin Vinogradov, 6,000 tons dwt, and the diesel-propelled 
Vyborglos of the same tonnage, and a largo series of medium and 

i~\ /-» ,->> 
6^2. 



mall timber carriers of 3.3-4 and 1.4-2.4 t wt 

espoctively were built in Soviet yards. In addition, a large 
eries of Volgales class ships of 5.8 thousand dwt was built 
n Poland, and of Kotlasles class ships, in Finland. Many Soviet 
ry cargo ships have ice-reinforced hulls and are suitable for 

avigation in northern areas with, and under certain conditions 

57 

ithout, ice breakers. The current Five Year Plan provides for 

he construction of a number of bulk carriers and other. specialized 

hips. A large ore carrier, Chernomory 'ye , 50,000 dwt, is under - 

53 
Dnstruction in Okean, one of the Nikolaev district shipyards. 

Tankers constitute close to 40% of the total Soviet Merchant 

arine tonnage. Although the average tonnage of the Soviet tanker 

s still below that of the world's major maritime nations, it is 

teadily growing. Besides, the size of Soviet tankers has been 

ictated by the depths in home ports and in ports of the foreign 

ountries with which the Soviet Union trades. Eighty-five percent 

f the tankers were built during the 1360 's and have a speed of 

ore than 15 knots. The Soviet-built Sofiya class ships of close 

/ 
o 50,000 dv/t are at present the most advanced and largest Soviet 

ankers. They have hull" reinforcement for ice navigation, and 



57 

A. V. Voronkov, op. cit., pp. 15-13. 

53 

Komsomol 'skaya Pravda, 22 September 1971. 



o o ^ 
6/. J 



cijiic have been built for foreign sh: > o 1 Start in 

]iG7, a large series of Velikiy Oktyabr' class tankers of 15.2 
tiousand dwt v/as built. Also starting in 1957 a large series 
c: small tankers, the Baskunchak class, of 1.6 thousand dwt, 

Lmilt in the Soviet yards. LUit t ho tn.vjowi \ ^ I ;iovli ivhant 
.v.rine tankers were built abroad. Between 1932 and 1965 Japan 
elivered tankers of the Lisichansk class of 35,000 tons dwt; 
ialy, the Leonardo da Vinci class of -19,000 dwt; Yugoslavia, 
tie Split class of 20.5 thousand dwt; Poland, the Eauska class 
c: 19,000 dwt and International, of 20,000 dwt; Finland, the 
bvek class of 4,200 dwt. Several tankers were modified for 
;:-fueling naval ships, and some tankers are used for delivering 
uel to naval bases. The largest Soviet tanker, Mir, 150,000 
ivt is under construction. The first gas carriers, the Kegums 
lass, designed to carry 2,800 cubic meters of liquid gas, were 
jilt in Japan in 1365, but no more ships of this type have 



jen reported. 



The present Soviet passenger fleet has about SO ships for 

/ 

ixlimited navigation and several hundred small ships xor 

oastal navigation, including hydrofoils serving local passenge; 

ines. About 60% of the large passenger ships are less than 



A. V. Voronkov, pp. 22-25, :oy Sbo mik No. 7, D6o, 

p. 9-1-1, and S^dost f^ "__:_-_-^i -'•° ' 4 > -- ^ J > P* -"-" 



6/Ji 



;cn years old, and all are serially built. Thor< an ... ... 

jhips of the Ivan Franko elass for 700 passengers) with a speed 
>f about 20 knots; 19 ships of the Mikhail Kalinin class for..^ 
iOO passengers, and 9 ships of the j r rizstan class for 240 
>assengers. 

The Soviet passenger fleet now operates 15 international 
Lines with a total length of 27,089 miles, linking the Soviet 
Jnion with 37 ports in 24 countries. The Soviet General Maritime 
5 assenger Agency (v/o Morpa-rflot) has been promoting tourism 
iboard Soviet passenger ships. In 1933 the Black Sea Liner, 
Shota Rustaveli , made her first trip around the world. Mixed 

uruises involving several modes of transport are now being 

60 
organized. Soviet passenger ships employed in international 

Lines or under charter provide the Soviet Union with an important 

source of foreign currency. 



Morskoy Flot No. 5, 1971, pp. 14-16, No. 10, 1070, 



pp. 24-25. 



o o :: 



Organization and Mr . n a ; ; 
of the Soviet Mcrchar.w i.Tariric ; 

.* 

During its development, the Soviet Merchant Marine did 
lot avoid the usual growing pa^ns. The Independent People's 
Commissariat of Water Transport was organized in January 1931, 
incorporating the Soviet Merchant Marine and river transport, but 
prior to this, the Merchant Marine was subordinated to the 
People's Commissariat of Transport Communications. In April 
1939, the Independent People's Commissariat of Sea Transport 
(Merchant Marine) was organized. In March 1953, right after. 
Stalin's death, the Soviet Merchant Marine and river transport 
were again united in a single Ministry of Sea and River Transport 
Finally, in August 1964, an All-Union Ministry of Merchant 

Marine (Ministerstvo Morskogo Flota) with the mission "to 

61 
supervise all sea transportation of the country" was organized. 

The Ministry of Merchant Marine is subordinated to and supervised 

by the Council of Ministers and its agencies. The Ministry 

activity is coordinated with the Ministry of Water Transport, 

Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Railroad, Ministry of 

Shipbuilding, and others. 

The Ministry of Merchant Marine is headed by a minister 



•.. »skoy 71c-:, Mo. 6, 1967, p. 



<-j r\ ~\ 

3 Z b 



:id a numoer 01 deputies. To ... i . he ;ter, to provid 

';oliectivo leadership", there is a collegium consisting of the 

:.nister as its chairman, his depu , , and a number oi members ' 

£ the collegium including all the cl:iofs ci the main 

./aist rat ions. The decide, oi the collegium are put into 
Jfcct by order of the minister. The minister can overrule the 
ollegium, but it in turn can appeal So the Council of Ministers. 
here is a relative!}' clear distinction between staff and line 
unctions. The function of the staff ia .Moscow is to plan, 
oordinate, and control. The immediate economic management is 
ainly in the hands of the basin steamship companies, which are 
ie operating divisions of the Ministry. The Ministry of Merchant 

.irine is also the agency of state supervision of mercantile 

62 

svigation in the USSR. It publishes regulations, instructions, 

ad statutes which are binding on all ministries, departments, 
ad organizations. The USSR Registry is within the purview of 
he Ministry. The most recent changes in the Ministry structure 
ook place in late fall 1970. 

The Ministry is now comprised of two main administrations, 
he Main Administration of Fleet and Port Operations and, the 
ain Administration of Development and Capital Construction of 



'Article VI, '_ ]Sl xt shi PP* n g Code - 



> ' 



611 



oris, Yards, and Shore Facilities and several a< strations 

ad departments. The most important is the Main Administration 
f Fleet and Port Operations, which supervises the operations-^)* 
5 Soviet steamship companies through three subordinate 
dministrations. 

The Administration of Fleet and Port Operations .of the 
outhern Basin, Yzhf lot , supervises the operation of seven 
teamship companies: Chemomorskoye (Slack Sea) , Azovskoe 
Azov), Xovorossiyskoye, Gruzinskoye (Georgian), Dunayskoe.. 
Danube) , Kaspiyskoe (Caspian) , and Sredneaziatskoye (Middle 
jsian) Steamship Companies. The Administration of Fleet and 
ort Operations for the Northwestern Basin, Sevzapf lot , supervises 
wo northern steamship companies, Severnoye and Murmanskoye , 
ad four Baltic companies, Baltiyskoye (Baltic), Estonskoe 
Estonian) , Latviyskoye (Latvian) , and Litovskoye (Lithuanian) . 
he Administration for Fleet and Port Operations of the Far 
astern Basin, Dal f f lot , supervises three steam ship companies - 
alnevcstochnoye (Far Eastern) , Sakhalinskoye (Sakhalin) , 
amchatskoye (Kamchatka) . The Northeastern Administration of 
erchant Marine with headquarters in Tiksi is subordinated 

irectly to the Ministry. The Middle-Asian Steamship Company 

63 
perates in the Aral Sea and en the Amy Darya River. 



V ■-■- Trans ; _.-, 15 September 1970, and '— . :.— "■ lot 
o. 11, IS 70. 



3?R 



During the fal '0 reorgar tiou of the Ministry, the 

Scientific-Technical Administration, incorporating the 

:echno logical Council, the Department for the Introduction of 

Ldvanced Methods of Transportation and Loading and Unloading 

operations, tne Department for Containerization and the Department 

* 
lor Analysis were established. 

Each of the Soviet steamship companies is a large enterprise 
•ith a vast area of responsibility, including not only "the 
operation of ships but of ports, ship repair yards, salvage 
ervices, etc. 

To manage such a huge and complex enterprise as the 
oviet Merchant Marine with its highly centralized structure 
nd under the overwhelming priority of the Soviet plan, based 
pon various economic as well as political criteria, is obviously 

very difficult task. In spite of the greater emphasis upon 
he economic independence of the major units of the structure, 
radually introduced after the 1965 Economic Reform, the 
lentral apparatus of ministry, its main administrations, and 
he management of the steamship companies are in constant need 

f receiving and supplying the flow of data concerning the 

64 

alfillment of the plan. The Soviet preoccupation with 

.tistics is not for the' sake of statistics per so, but is an 



64 V. G. Bakayev, op. cit., pp. 22-23 



323 



bjoctive necessity uuder the system of management control based 

pon central planning. 

It now appears that the point has been reached where 
jnning the economy under the existing principles and structure 
3 becoming more and more difficult, and either the principles 
liould be changed (and there is no indication of the leadership's 
sadiness for this) or the methods should be adjusted to the 
ituation without considerable modification of the structure. 
'.ie Party approved state network of computer centers and the 
lified automatic cdmmunication system, to bo gradually introduced 
ithin the next ten years, appears to bear witness to acceptance 
f the latter. The need for improvement in the- system of control 
■f the Soviet economy was labeled "the main problem of the Party 
sonomic policy" in Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress, 
arty and government decisions stressed a need for the speediest 

atroduction of a comprehensive system of automated control 

* 

ased on a network of computerized centers as a means of fulfilling 

/ 
tie task. The All-Union Automated Control System (CGAS- 

bschegosudarstvennaya Automaticheskaya Sistema Upravleniya) 

ill incorporate the automated system of Gosplan, the Central 

tatistical Administration, the All-Union Supply Administration, 

he industrial bra n c h e s , a a d other ce n t rally s v. b o r d : i . a t e d 

i'encies , each having its own system called AST' (Av^oaaiokookaya 



30 



5istema Upravleuiya - automated control system). All 

systems are based on a network of computer centers down to the 

Large enterprise level. A number of such computer centers are 

io\v in operation. The problem, however, is that the elements 

)f the system introduced earlier were based upon various computers 

vhich are in the main obsolescent and incompatible with one 

Jther. Moreover, the installed computers utilized non-standard 

programs. For those two reasons, they can not be linked 

together even in the framework of one industry, not to mention 

af an All-Union system. The Soviet Merchant Marine case 

represents a typical example. 

The Ministry of Merchant Marine, by virtue of its 

activity and the availability of a relatively well-developed 

communication system, was among the first where introduction 

of the automated control system, ASU, was initiated. During 

1962-1963 the TsNIIMP (Central Scientific Research Institute of 

Merchant Marine) worked out computer programs for the 

organization of cargo movement, distribution of ships on lines, 

/ 
and the optimum fleet development. Since 1964 the optimum 

lines schedule has been controlled with the use of the Minsk-22 

65 
Computer. In 1965 an experimental Calculating Computerized 



65 TsNI IMP Transactions, Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 45-07. 



331 



Center was organized in th Itic St Co -, followed 

in 196S by two centers at the Black Sea Steamship Company 

and the Far Eastern Steamship Company, la 1933 the Main 

Computerized Calculating Center of the Ministry of Merchant 

Marine was organized. The center's task has been to control 

» 
both the routing of ships and the flow of cargo and to plan and 

regulate the operation of ships and ports, in cooperation with 

steamship company centers, whose introduction into service and 

operation the main center is supposed to coordinate. 

The ASU of the Ministry of Merchant Marine, "Morflot", is 

supposed to be developed on the basis of existing computer 

centers utilizing a third generation of computers. The ASU 

Morflot is being developed under the supervision of the Institute 

of Control Problems, USSR Academy of Sciences, in cooperation 

with various scientific research and educational organizations. 

Two Soviet Academicians, V. A. Trapeznikov ("Scientific 

Leadership") and N. P. Federenko ("Chief Economist") are in 

charge of the system's development. The scope of the system 

can be illustrated by the outline of functions the system is to 

perform. Each function is tied to a corresponding sub-system, 

as follows: 1. "Operational Control of Fleet (ships) location" 

2. "Operational Control of Cargo Transportation Process" 



p. 99, i ; orskoy Flot h'o . 11^ 1967, p. 



/-. /-. r*> 

66/. 



3 : "Operational PI; I of Fleet . Port 

1 "Current Planning of Basic Activity 'ine" 

(utomates preparation of a economic calc." ...c^) 

5 "Charter" (Automates flow of infor concerning the 

darter market situation, analyses the economic effectiveness 
5 charter transactions, determines optimum ship requirement) 
5 "Technical Control of Fleet Condition, Ship Repair Plans, and 
[plementation" 7. "Supply Planning and Stocktaking" • S. 
'ookkeeping and Statistical Calculations, Zconcmic Analysis" 

"Personnel". The ASU's of steamship companies, ports, and 
Lrge shiprepair yards are to have similar appropriate sub-syste us . 
^unified system of documentation based upon computerized data 
:ocessing is also under development. Those are the basic 
fatures of the planned unified automated system of merchant 
nnne control. 

The system of communicat--<~.- existing in the Soviet ile reliant 

Grille can hardly cope v/ith the fully developed ASU Morflot and, 

■ 
Lerefore, there are plans to improve it "to the level of world's 

est systems" over the current five-year period and in compliance 

»..th the unified automated system of communications of the country, 

63 
llch is presently under development. 



67 

V . Vo r o n k o v , pp. 27-31, 

68 'i>ansactions Vol. 133, pp. 44, 99. 



n ^ '"^ 

3o3 



The development of ASU Morflot . y been >c 

ith a number of problems. The computers installed dur 

•ush to create more computer centers in steam ship companies 

.re of various designs, and xy of them do not leet ... demands 

i)f the system. There is lack of program standardization among 

steamship companies, and the existing and presently ized 

>rograms do not always correspond to the design cf the sub- 
systems of ASU Morflot and hence have to bo modified and adjusted 
;o the central system. In September 1971, the Chief of Far 

Eastern Steamship Company Computer Center wrote "what at present 

69 
constitutes the ASU of the steamship company is not clear". 

The Ministry was accused of trying to introduce first the sub- 
systems for the center and of neglecting the interests of the 
operating divisions (steamship companies) . The existing variant 
of the system design was criticized for its complexity and the 

excess of information flow it requires, which presumably "would 

*70 
overload the system". 

The main problem, it seems, is not the amount of information 

processed by the system, but its quality and reliability. V/hile 

automation of the chain of information definitely reduces the 

intermediate bureaucratic echelons "corrections" and the adjustment 



Vodnyy Tran t, 14 September 1071. 
70 

/ • 

334 



yf figures required by the . ., , such a possibility . ... be 
sompletely eliminated by compute rizatic ., particularly at the 

initial level (enterprises). An unrealistic report fed into 
somputer does not change its quality, i.e. "garbage-in, 

;arbage-out". Of course, the specifics ofmerchant marine 
operations, the rather great dependence upon non-Soviet sources 
>f information, and the need -co analyze a set of objective data 
(cargo, speed, weather parameters, time factor, ship capacity, 
3tc.) seems to diminish the negative effect of traditional Soviet' 
'adjustments" of the data and, hence, makes application of 
automated control system more effective. Accepting such a 
[lopeful assumption, one might conclude that the measures under 
Implementation would increase the effectiveness of merchant marine 
Management, resulting in reduced turn-around time, increased 
Ship usage, and improved utilization of port capacities. 

Pers onnel -Poli cy , Educat ional 
ana ^-search ^ns\m. . . fces 

/ 
In the course of developing a merchant marine, any country 

faces two immediate problems: procuring ships and manning them. 

Yhile the first problem can be solved during a relatively short 

period of time hy building ships md buying them, the second 

requires a considerably greater :oricd of time, for it takes 



3 Q c 

U \J \j 



years and even decades to educate an apj priate number of 

specialists and to gain experience. 

i 

Pre-Revolutionary Russia had two maritime academies and 
nine nautical schools. After the Revolution, the nautical 
schools were transferred into specialized secondary educational 
establishments, and two higher institutes to train engineers for 
water transport were opened, one in Leningrad and another in 
Odessa. Leading personnel of steamship companies and other, 
merchant marine enterprises was trained in the Academy of . Y/ater 
Transport. Drastic educational reform for the Soviet Merchant 
Marine was introduced in March 5, 1944 by Decree of the State 
Committee for Defense "on measures concerning the training of 
command cadres of the mercantile fleet". Higher engineering 
education for ship's officers was introduced. Educational 

institutions of the merchant marine were enlarged and upgraded. 

■ 

The decision was said to be motivated by the considerable losses 
of personnel during the war, and the planned expansion of the 

Soviet Merchant Marine. Three higher merchant marine academies, 

/ 

Leningrad, Odessa, and Far Eastern, were organized in addition 

to twelve nautical and one Arctic schools. In Soviet specialized 

71 
literature, the decision has always been referred as historic. 



71 Morskoy "' 3t No. 3, 1969, .. 34; So. 10, 1967, pp. 7-14; 






and Vodnyy Tr; rt, l.'^ --• 1969 



ID 



During the post-World War II _ -ic ., the .■ a - 

the size, of merchant marine educat: 

In 1945 the Higher Arctic N sal School was org In 

.1 the Arctic School was merged with the Leningrad Hij her 

Maritime Academy into the S. 0. Makorov Leningrad Higher sring 

Nautical School (Academy) , the largest Soviet Merchant .Marine 
educational institution. 

At present there are four higher and twelve ialized 
secondary educational establishments, administered by the Ministry 
)f Merchant Marine, engaged in training officers for an engineer 

liploma in fourteen specialities and a technician diploma in ten 

72 

specialities. In addition to the Leningrad Higher School, 

:.here are three more, Admiral G. I. Nevel'skoy the Far Eastern 
ligher Engineering Nautical School; the Odessa Higher Engineering 
tautical School; and the Odessa Engineering Institute of Merchant 
iarine. All four combined have 5,000 full-time cadets and more 

;han 4,000 correspondence courses and part-time students. In 

■ 

iddition, three institutes are .raining engineers for shore 

services and some of them, such as the Gor'kiy Engineering 

institute of Water Transport, have departments for training ship 

Officers. All higher schools have period of training of not less 



79 .... 

Morskoy ;- ': No. C 1971, pp. 3-7, and Soya* 

l ev icv/ I\o . o, 1970, pp. 8-9. ., 






• ' 



f han five years, and for some speciality 2 years 

.nd six months. Secondary specializ* utical schools have 

1 

>eriod: of training of from three years to four years and three 

73 

lonths. The post-graduate training is provided by higher 

;chools and two merchant marine scientific research institutes, 
[ost of the graduates pursue full-time study. 

The education is free, and the cadets receive allowances, 
miform, and free board. But there are also part-time study 
.rrangements with extended period of training, and correspondence 
courses. Many sailors (unlicensed and sub-officer seamen) study 
it both higher and secondary nautical schools by correspondence, 
vuch studies are encouraged. The educational institutions 
occasionally send instructors to serve on ships on long voyages 
;o help correspondence-course students, and in large ports, 
special student consultation centers have been set up. Students 
In correspondence courses are given additional paid leave for a 
Deriod of 20-40 days of year to prepare for and to take examinations 
Approximately one-third of the Soviet seamen are involved in 
studies at the higher or secondary educational level. The number 
3f seaman correspondence-course and part-time students studying 
in just the educational institutions of the merchant marine reached 
23,000 in the 19C3-13S9 school year. In 1570 one out of four 



Vodnyy Transport, 26 May 1970, and 23 ilay 1971. 



/ 



°. ? 9 



men in the Soviet Mer ... . . G _- ^_ higher 

di- specialized secondary edu -..-.."_ >n ,....' 

Cadets in higher and secondary nautical schools receive 
good sea practice, which starts on sailing ships, and continues 

bn special training ships assigned to the schools. In 1970, 

the training fleet of the Soviet Merchant M ae consisted of 

15 ships, and has boon growing since. A large series of B-SO 
training ships (the Soviets call them "training-cargo snips'* , 
for they can and do transport cargo) has been under construction. 
The original order for 3 ships fro- Poland was augmented in 1970 
to a total number of 10 to be delivered daring 1071-1073. Senior 
cadets are receiving practice aboard operational chips of the 
Merchant Marine. 

During the last five year period, 1965-1970, 32,179 
engineers and technicians were trained, and 8,150 specialists 

improved their qualifications in the merchant marine educational 

76 
system. The ship s officers of the Soviet Merchant .Marine are 

relatively young. At the end of 1969 there were I, 6C0 licensed 

captains, of whom 300 were between 31 and 40 years old, 750 

between 41 and 60 years old, and about 40, more than 60 years old. 



7S 

.Morskoy Flot No. 11, 1971, p. ^ 

73 Mcr ■.: o • : h fo. 3, 1971. 



Q 1 O 

t.) O O 



-,- 



i'he captains wore distributed as follows by nationality: 

1,100 Russians, about 200 Ukrainians, 32 Georgians, 32 Jews, 23 

77 

Azerbaijams. The Soviet Merchant Marina even has several 

women officers, and at least three of them have been masters, 
actually commanding ships. Of 1,600 Soviet licensed captains, 
about 700 have higher education. On an average, in the Soviet 
Merchant Marine it takes eight year^- for a graduate from a 

higher nautical school and ten years for a graduate from a 

78 
secondary specialized nautical school to become a captain. 

It is openly admitted that graduates from secondary nautical 

schools have had a progressively growing feeling of a lack of 

education, and many for this reason continue in higher nautical 

schools by correspondence. 

During the 1971-1975 period it is planned to increase 

enrollment in the educational institutions of the Merchant Marine 

Existing higher nautical schools in Odessa and Leningrad are 

being expanded, and the decision was made xo organize a new 

79 
school, the Novorossiysk Higher Engineering Nautical School. 

Apparently there is no lack of young men who desire 

to enroll in nautical schools and become merchant marine officers, 



77 

. No. 50, December 1939, p. 13. 

78 ' - ' oy Fj - - , No. 11, 1970, pp. 44-45. 

A. Y. Voronkov, p. 47. 



/ 

I 



40 



i 1971 there were from 3 to 5 applications (varying from school 
) school) for each of the 10,000 openings available in higher 
id secondary specialized merchant marine nautical schools. In 
le Odessa Higher School there were 2,000 applications for 500 

oenings. In the Kherson Secondary Specialized School there 

80 
<2re 1,200 applicants for 90 openings in the command department. 

The Soviet Merchant Marine educational establishment 
inducts an extensive public relations program. In addition 
3 propagandizing merchant marine service throughout the country's' 
igh schools, a number of higher and secondary nautical schools 
re sponsoring extra-curricular programs in some of them to 
tudy maritime subjects. A few schools went even further. In 
rkhangelsk, for example, there is a high school which introduced, 
Q addition to the regular study program, a maritime program 
liich includes such subjects are navigation, radio communication, 
arine engineering, etc. in the ninth grade. During the summer, 
ale students involved in the program have au opportunity to 
ail aboard nautical school training ships and obtain additional 
raining. The Northern Steamship Company is sponsoring the whole 
rogram. 

As a result, the percentage of male graduates from high 
chools maintaining close' ties with merchant marine organizations 



Vodnyy Transport, 31 August 1971. 



341 



t applying to continue their education in nautical schools is 

l 

onsiderably higher compared with the high school graduates 

81 

vthout such ties. The foregoing permits the conclusion that 

•iere is neither a shortage of applicants for merchant marine 
uutical schools nor there is noticeable shortage of basic 
:;ecialists required by merchant marine, and hence, the system 
£ specialists training in the Soviet Merchant Marine is fulfilling 

* V x 

ts basic task. 

In addition to their educational role, the Soviet nautical 
chools, particularly at the higher level, are involved in 
xtensive research work. But the bulk of research work for the 
oviet Merchant Marine is conducted by two very large institutes, 
he Central Scientific Research Institute of Merchant Marine in 
■eningrad (TsNIIMF) , with branches in the Far East, Baku, and 
[urmansk, and the State Design and Scientific Research Institute 
,f Merchant Marine in Moscow (Soyuzmomiiproekt) , organized in 
i960, with branches in Leningrad, Odessa, and Vladivostok. 

The TsNIIMF was first organized as the Institute of 
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair in March 1929, assuming its present 
title and mission after the fall 1930 reorganization. The 
decision of the Ministry Collegium and Minister of Merchant Marine 
Order No. 475 of 2 December 1955 concerning the intensification 



81 Vodnvv Transport , 3 October 1970 



~- I ■ i~v 



f scientific research work in the merchant marine, allocation of 
reater funds, construction of new buildings and laboratories, 
tc, were important factors in the growth of the role of the 
wo institutes and of their influence in the Ministry, 
pparently this did not come about without the help of the 
oviet Navy and the participation of its leaders, for at that 
ime, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, I. S. Isakov, one of 
he most respected and best educated men in the higher echelon ' 
f Soviet Navy Command, assumed the position of the Deputy 
inister of Merchant Marine for Science and Technology, and is 

redited with playing a crucial role in the preparation and 

82 
he implementation of the decision of December 1955. 

The scope of the work of the two research institutes is 

>o broad that there is hardly any topic or aspect related to 

;he merchant marine which it does not cover. The staff of 

•esearch specialists in each institute numbers in the several 

tundred. 



It is difficult to draw a clear demarkation line between 
;be specialities of the two institutes, for they have both 1 in 
i number of instances been involved in research dealing with 
;he same subject, for example, unitization and containerization 
>f cargo or standardization of ship designs. However, the TsNIIMF 



^Transactions, Vol. 133, pp. 7-10. 



■ / 



313 



is primarily concerned with the mercantile fleet, its ships, 
and problems associated with them. The Soyuzmorniiproekt , on 
the other hand, is concerned with the economic performance of 
the entire merchant marine, particularly over the long range, and 

on the technological side, with shore facilities such as ports, 

* 

repair yards, and systems of cargo handling. Any given problem 
is usually handled by one department of either institute. The 
research findings and proposed solution for the problem are 
reported to the Scientific Council of an institute which, after 

approval, sends the recommendations to the Ministry for practical 

83 
application. During the past several years, both institutes 

have produced a number of recommendations, including those 

dealing with the automation of ships and management control of 

the Ministry, which were accepted and have either been or are 

being implemented. 

There are fifteen nautical schools training unlicensed 

and sub-officer seamen with a period of study of around one year. 

These schools and a number of special courses from a few weeks 

to 3-4 months in length supply the Soviet Merchant Marine with 

a pool of qualified personnel. Many sailors discharged from the 

Soviet Navy upon completion of their service as well as naval 



83 Examples of such recommendations are given in this chapter 
as well as in other chapters, particularly the one on shipbuilding, 



344 



officers separated from the Navy for various reasons often join 
the Merchant Marine, and thus increase the pooi of qualified 
personnel. The romanticism of sea duty, a degree of adventurism 
so common to the young, good pay (better than for shore duty), 
and the possibility for advancement through education are but 
a few of the factors attracting many Soviet young men to service 
in the Merchant Marine. Soviet restriction on travel abroad 
is also a definite factor in making sea duty attractive. 

A system of material incentives is widely applied in the 
Soviet Merchant Marine. In addition to free food, for which 

30-49 rubles per month, depending upon area of operation, is 

84 
allocated, uniforms, better housing for families ashore, with 

a network of kindergartens and nurseries operated by the Merchant 

Marine, seamen are paid bonuses for the successful fulfillment 

of plans and are provided with rest and recreation stays at health 

and rest homes. More than 150 hospitals and 170 polyclinics are 

run by the Merchant Marine Ministry, which employs more than 

85 
5.5 thousand doctors. New Soviet ships, which are in the 

majority, have comfortable cabins for the crew and good 

recreational facilities, including swimming pools in some ships. 



A. V. Voronkov, p. 29. 

85 

Morskoy Flot No. 8, 1970, p. 12 



■•? 



345 



Practically all large Soviet ports have seamen clubs and cinemas 

and some have hotels where families of seamen can 1 stay on visits 

to the ports. The Ministry schedules regular radio programs 

"for sea-farers", with good music and prescribed news and 

propaganda and so called "radio letters" from relatives of the 

seamen. Each ship has its own amateur musical and singing 

groups, and some ships have orchestras. Athletic teams are 

formed from among the crew members. All these groups and teams do 

lot limit their activity to entertainment alone, which certainly 

is a factor, but they perform while visiting foreign ports and 

also participate in sports competitions with their hosts. This 

so called "cultural and sport activity" of the crews is closely 

supervised and directed to produce a favorable effect upon 

foreigners. 

The system of "political organs" in the Soviet Merchant 

Marine, which at the ship level includes the Pompolit (Political 

assistant to the captain) and Party and Komsomol (Young Communist 

i 
League) organizations, is responsible for the organization; and 

/ . ! - 

naintenance of such activity. Ship captains, most of whom', 

together with the senior ship officers, are members of the . y 

:ommunist party, have to support that activity and probably 

find it beneficial to the morale of the crew. 

Propaganda and political education, regularly conducted 

! '■ 

- •» 

31+6 



among crew, are designed not only to indoctrinate sailors in 

Soviet Communist ideology but to make them effective 

i 

representatives abroad. That obligation of Soviet crew members 
is openly proclaimed in the Soviet Merchant Marine, and crews 
of Soviet ships are constantly reminded of it. There are now 

4 

more than 1,250 Soviet crews which are "collective members of 
Soviet societies of friendship and cultural ties" with people 
in foreign countries. Thus, one more form of "profitable" 
employment has been found for the Soviet Merchant Marine. 8 ? 

Shore Facilities 

For normal and, even more important, for effective 
operation, any merchant marine has to have well developed shore 
facilities, particularly ship repair and port facilities. In 
general, the development of shore facilities throughout the 
world lags behind fleet development. There are very few ports 
which can accommodate super-tankers, and the development of 
progressive methods such as containerization is restricted by 
the availability of ports equipped to handle containers. In 



86 

Vodnyy Transport, 19 October 1971. The article by Yu . 

Evfharestov, member of the Ministry of Merchant Marine Collegium 

and apparently in charge of political work in the Soviet Merchant 

Marine, gives a revealing ' description of the political role of 

the Soviet Merchant Marine and attempts to present the "new 

Soviet man" . 



3 it 7 



jeaeral, it appears easier to build a fleet to the appropriate 
size than to develop the necessary -shore facilities, particularly 
Dorts, and the Soviet experience in this respect might be 
considered typical. Even in the past, when the Soviet Merchant 
,iarine was small, the existing shore facilities did not satisfy 
the requirements. With the rapid development of the Soviet - 
Merchant Marine, the gap between th<? shore facilities and size 
)f the fleet widened, not because shore facilities have not been 
developed, but because the rate of their development has not 
Hatched the rate of the fleet growth. Recognizing the problem, 
the Soviets openly stated that the future profitability of the 
Merchant Marine should not be bound to the emphasis on increasing 
its tonnage, but would result from the harmonious development 
of every branch of the industry. For the near future at least, 

that harmony can be achieved only through the accelerated 

87 
development and improvement of ship repair and port facilities. 



Ship Repair 

The Soviet Union started specialization in ship repair- 
just prior to World War II, when all large ship repair yards 
were subordinated to a special department of the ministry, while 
smaller ones remained under the control of steamship companies. 



87 



Morskoy Flot No. 4, 1970, pp. 6-10. 



48 






I number of new ship repair yards were built before the war. 
?he larger yards specialized in major repair as well as .construction 
>f small series of auxiliary ships. The situation remained 
mchanged after the war for over the decade. The three 
jategories of repair, small, medium, and major, continued to be 
Dracticed; the rationale for repair was dictated, by the need to 
aaintain available tonnage and was not justified by economic 
/alidity. 

At the beginning of the 1950 *s, the rehabilitation of 
existing ship repair yards and construction of new ones increased 
the production capacity, 2.75 times over that of 1940. During 
the decade of 1950' s the modernization of ship repair yards 
continued, and a new yard was built in Nakhodka. As a result, 
in 1960 the capacity of Soviet Merchant Marine repair yards was 
3 times greater than in 1950 and 8.2 times greater than in 1940. 
What appeared to be a phenomenal growth actually bears testimony 
to how weak the ship repair capability used to be* 

In 1959-1961, the research and design institutions of the 
Merchant Marhe with representatives of steamship companies made 
an extensive analysis of expenditures for ship repair and 
developed the economic and technological rationale for some 
types of repair. Optimum periods of service for various types 
of ships and the approved schedules for allocation apd amortization 



31+9 



of funds for ship renovation were worked out. In 1961 new 
regulations concerning ship repair were approved and introduced. 
Major and medium ship repairs were excluded as economically 
unsound, and only two types of repairs, a small and large, 
which differ only in volume of work, were introduced. 

In 1957 all ship repair yards were subordinated .to 
steamship companies. Starting in 1962 the development of ship 
repair facilities was accelerated, and capital investment for 

1966-1970 was increased three times over that for the previous 

88 
period. Two new ship repair yards, one in Il'ichevsk (Black 

Sea) and the second in Slavyansk (Far East) , are presently under 

construction. When completed in 1972-1973, the Il'ichevsk ship 

repair yards will, be Soviet Union's largest. During the last 

five year period, 1966-1970, a number of ship repair yards were 

modernized, and many were supplied with large floating docks. 

The above measures, combined with the reduction in number of 

ship types built and the construction of ships in large series, 

i 

considerably improved the ship repair situation in the Soviet 

Merchant Marine. In addition, foreign ship repair facilities, 

i 
i 

particularly in Poland and East Germany, can be and often are ^ 

i 

used. Soviet ship repair yards are specializing more and more in 



88 Morskoy Flot No. 10, 1967, pp. 7-14. 



/ 



350 



he repair of specific types and classes of ships enabling them 
o be better supplied with parts, still in short supply, and to 
ring the improved technology to bear. The modular replacement 

ethod is being introduced, but owing to a lack of spare parts, 

89 
t is still not widely applied yet. * 

The shortage of ship repair facilities forced the Soviets 

;o organize and keep so called ship repair brigades (SRB) aboard 

;he ships which were paid out of ship repair funds. Together 

tith the base technical service (BTO) assigned to the ports, the 

... 

>RB performed about 15% of the total volume of work necessary to 
laintain normal operation of ships and to prolong the period 
)etween repairs at a ship repair yard. It is planned to increase 

the BTO services to 22% of such work in 1975 and up to 37% in 

90 
L980 after wich the SRB will be disestablished. 

The one reason the Soviet Merchant Marine is satisfied 

with the goal of 330 days of ship operating time, compared with 

i 

340-350 days in most of the Western countries, is the still 

i 

relatively weak ship repair and maintenance capabilities, both 
of which are slated to be strengthened. 



89 



90 



Vodnyy Transport , 14 July 1970. 
Transactions, Vol. 133, p. 108. 



351 



/. 



Ports 



There are not many natural harbors iQ ^ ^ ^^^ 
» the European part. For this reason, most of the Soviet ' 
harhors have to he protected by breakwaters. Port facilities W ere 
considerably expand p rior to fforld War n> ^ ^^ ^ 

locations, with few notable exce*nt<„„= 

C exce Ptions, nor their cargo handling 

equipment was good.- Durine World w,,- tt 

6 xorid War II more than 70% of the 

port facilities in the Baltic the D1 , , o 

ie Baitac, the Black Sea, and the Northern 

Basins were destroyed. Many ports, including such large ones ' ' 
as Tallin, Riga, Nikolayev, Odessa, were left without a single ' 
Pier or cargo storage facility. The only undamaged ports were . 
in the Caspian Sea and the Far East. For eleven years (1945-1956) 
most of the funds allocated for ports were spent for restoration, 
and not until 1956 was a new stage in the development of port I 
facilities initiated. 

j The expansion of Soviet foreign trade and the beginning 
of rapid expansion of Soviet Merchant Fleet forced the Soviet ■ 
Union to start a major port facility improvement program. The- .' 
highest priorities were given to expanding bulk-cargo handling ' 
facilities, the construction of deep-draft piers and approaches,' 
bunkering facilities and wide introduction of mechanized 

91 

Morskoy Plot No. 10, 1967, pp. 7-14. 



352 



cargo-handling equipment (gantry cranes, fork lifts) . 

Construction of new ports such as Il'ichevsk, Wrangel' and 
modernization of existing ones has been underway for years.- The 
completion of the third stage of the Port of Il'ichevsk will 
make it the second largest in the Soviet Union. The Port of 
Wrangel', about 20 miles from Nakhodka, being built with Japanese 
financial and technical assistance. The construction plan for 
the Port of Wrangel 1 calls for it to be completed in 19*73. .The . 
new port will have 60 piers for deep-draft ships and a total 

■A 

berthing length of 12 kilometers. Special container terminals 
will be built, and modern cargo transfer equipment installed 

(for example, the coal terminal will process 12,000 tons of coal 

92 

per hour) . The Port of Nakhodka was gradually built up in the 

post-World War II period in an area 100 miles southeast of 

Vladivostok. The port benefits from the Japanese Current, and 

completely ice-free the year round, while Vladivostok sometimes. 

freezes. A special extension of the Trans-Siberian Railroad 

has been built to Nakhodka. The future Port of Wrangel* is being 
/ | . 

called a satellite of Nakhodka, but the Ministry of Merchant 

i 

Marine disputes the term, emphasizing that in the 1980* s it will- 
be proper rather to call Nakhodka a satellite of Wrangel', as 



92 Trud, 22 September 1971. 



i / 
i 



353 



the latter will have facilities four times as great and will 

l 93 
become the largest deep-water port in the Soviet Union. , 

There are now 8 extra class, 21 first class, 17 second 

class, and 19 third class ports in the Soviet Union and about 

100 small ports. All together, they processed close to 300 

94 
aillion tons of cargo in 1970. However, the construction of 



lew ports and the modernization of existing ones has not been 
seeping pace with the rapid expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet, 
ind the port facilities have become a major hindrance to the 
;fficient operation of the whole merchant marine. 

There is nothing unusuai in the present situation, because 
for many years the main attention of the Ministry and its central 
)lanning organs had been devoted to developing the fleet and 
.ncreasing its tonnage. In the ten year period 1959-1968, 
japital investment in the fleet exceeded that in ports by more 
;han 7.5 times. While the Soviets have obtained a rather modern 
nd to a large degree diversified fleet, their ports are incapable 






f serving it properly, and the ships are losing a considerable 

/ 

ortion of their operating time in ports waiting to be processed. 

I 

or example, in 1968, 57% of the total operating time of dry-cargo 






93 

Vodnyy Transport , 7 March 1971. 

1 - ' ' - ■ ■ - % 

94 

V. Voronkov, pp. 35-36. 



351 



/ 



i 



/ 



;hips was spent in ports. Besides the low capacity for processing 

hips there are deficiencies in planned scheduled arrivals of 

t 

oviet ships, further increasing the time loss. 

A ssw^v-UM^MN MUV Ifctffcigft kttdJrfcS is striking. For example-, 
n 1968 Soviet ships lost 268 ship days in foreign ports waiting 
o be loaded or unloaded, which constituted 1.6% of alJL time 
ost in unproductive waiting. In the Soviet ports, they lost 
,341 ship days, or 27.5%, i.e. 24 times as much as in foreign 
torts. In foreign ports, longshoremen await the arrival of ships, 
?hile in Soviet Union ships wait until longshoremen are free to 
mload them. As a rule, longshoremen in foreign ports work only 
>ne shift, while Soviet longshoremen work three shifts, yet 
according to Soviet calculations the transfer volume in Soviet 
ports is only 2% higher than in the foreign ports. 

There are two major reasons for such low performance: the 
degree of mechanization in Soviet ports is still below that in 
foreign and there is a labor shortage. For example, during 
1966-1968 the volume of processed cargo in Soviet ports grew 

/ , L 

by 14.7%, but the mechanical equipment increased only by 1.1% 

95 
and the number of workers by only 2.8%. This is why at the 

1 
end of 1970 the Ministry requested a one-third increase in the 

i 
. 



95 



Morskoy Flot No. 12, 1970, pp. 11-14. 



! / 



355 



.— . 



number of port workers, a request which is uulikely to be 
satisfied. On the other hand, the Soviet love for bookkeeping 
and statistics has produced a huge bureaucracy in the ports, 

resulting in a situation where there is more managerial and 

96 
clerical personnel than longshoremen and port workers. 

The remedy is seen not in reducing the flow of information 

and the bureaucracy, but in automation, i.e. introduction of 

the automated system of control, the ASU. Meanwhile, the 

bureaucracy is at work, and the delivery of each piece of ._ 

machinery to a port is accompanied by more and more, quite often 

completely unrealistic, norms for loading and unloading operations, 

which in turn increased the amount of fine a port must pay for 

the time wasted by ships while waiting to be processed. A 

paradox situation is created, where the port administration quite 






often resists the introduction of new technology, preferring to 

97 
operate according to established norms. 

i 

As stated previously, the problem of disproportionate 

I 

development of' fleet and shore facilities has been recognized, 

/ j 

/ I 

and certain corrective measures, initiated. Already in 1971 
thanks to the measures taken, the time lost by ships in ports 



96 

Vodnyy Transport, 29 August, 1971. 



97 



t 

Vo dnyy Transport , 4 March, 1971. 



/ 



/ 



356 



was reduced, in some steamship companies by as much as 00%, but 
the gap between the cargo carrying capacity of the fleet, and 
the capacity of ports remains a serious problem, particularly-, 
in the Far East. 

During the current five-year period (1971-1975) , it is 
planned to build more deep-draft berths, particularly .in 
ports handling export-import cargos, to gradually replace most 
of the general purpose cranes with specialized cargo handling ' 
equipment with a high rate of productivity, to improve the.. 
scheduled operation of the fleet and to introduce more automatic 
equipment. Ports are viewed as the main point of application 
of the Merchant Marine in its drive to improve productivity. 

The greatest expectations of the Soviet planners in 
realizing this goal lie in the broad introduction of unitized 
cargo processing systems, particularly containerization. The 
development of a universal cargo containerization handling system 
has been called a technical revolution in commercial shipping. 
Eliminating the traditional pier-side sorting, warehousing, and ' 
repackaging of goods, containerization offers vast savings to 
shippers, tremendously increases the productivity of specialized 
ships and ports, handling through specialized terminals. The 
leaders of the Soviet Merchant Marine are well aware of the 
advantages of containerization, and are planning appropriate 



357 



measures. The importance and the complexity of the problem 

deserve special consideration. 

i 

Containerization 

The overall importance and magnitude of the cargo handling 
problem in the Soviet Union can be illustrated by the .following. 
According to recent data, the number of workers involved in cargo 
handling in the USSR in 1970 was eight million, after increasing 
at the rate of 250-300,000 annually. 98 The Soviet Institute of 

Transport Problems states that the total cost of load-and-storage- 

99 
operations is approaching 15 billion rubles per year. The 

annual consumption of some packaging materials in 1969 amounted 

to 600 thousand tons of steel, 48 million square meters of lumber, 

100 

and 450 million square meters of fabric. Bulk transportation 

of cargo has produced tremendous annual losses, including 2 

billion bricks, 18 billion square meters of glass, and 3 million 

101 
tons of cement . 

The Soviet Union has developed an extensive package-handling 



98 

Vodnyy Transport , March 16, 1971. 

99 



Ibid. 

Deribas, A. T. Transportation of Cargo Y/ithout Reloading , 
Moscow; Znaniye , 1970, p.' 4. 

Deribas, op., cit., p. o. 



358 






system including the handling of containers. In 1970 there 

were more than 900,000 continers in use, but most were the small, 

102 
three-ton size. The number of large containers meeting "^-^ ' 

International Standard Organization (ISO) specifications is 

small, and as of 1970 these containers were not being mass 

103 
produced. Moreover, the Soviet transportation system is not 

yet prepared to handle ISO approved containers. 

The problem faced by the Soviet Merchant Marine is even 
more acute due to the rapid introduction of containerization 
among leading maritime powers and their successes in the highly 
competitive charter market. Containerization was introduced 
into conferences of which the Soviet steamship lines are members. 
Due to the absence of specially built container ships, the only 
commodities left for Soviet ships in the conferences to transport 
were small amounts of irregularly scheduled and low-rate cargo 
unsuitable for containerization. 

The experimental use of containers by ships of the Poiava 



102 

The greatest owner of containers in the Soviet Union ■ 

is the Ministry of Railroads, which possesses 724,000 units of 
1.25, 3 and 5 ton capacity. 

103 

The International Standards Organization (ISO) in 

1968 has adopted as standard dimensions for containers an 

8 £ foot height, 8 foot width, and lengths in 10 foot increments 

up to a maximum of 40 feet. 



359 



class and Lininsky-Komsomol class was initiated by the Soviet 

Merchant Marine in the Black Sea in 1967. The use of containers 

i 

was also developed along the Northern Sea Route during the same. 

104 
year. The emphasis on the Northern and Far Eastern Region is 



- 



ogically explained by the short navigational period along the 
Northern Sea Route, prevailing climatic conditions, a lack of 
covered storage facilities, and the shortage of port facilities. 

Beginning in 1969 several Soviet steamship lines began n 

to build up an inventory of their own containers. Utilizing r. 

these containers an unspecified amount of cargo, usually expensive 22 

articles, was delivered to Cuba, Italy, Egypt, Kuwait, and other . _ 

105 
countries. In spite of using small containers, the Soviet ~. 

Merchant Marine's volume of containerized cargo in 1970 reached ~ 

600,000 tons. Starting in May 1970, ships of a Baltic line, 

using Leningrad as one terminal and a suitable European port as s: 

another, were carrying 10 and 20 foot ISO standard containers - 

106 
leased from foreign countries. The transit of containers 

via Trans-Siberian Railway from Europe to Japan has been established zz. 

and a regular container line between Nakhodka and Japanese ports :_ 



104 Morskoy Flot No. 3, 1968 and No. 11, 1970. 
105 Morskoy Flot No. 1, January 1970. 
106 Morskoy Flot No. 4, April 1971.. 



360 



107 
was opened m the spring of 1971. Also, during summer of 1971, 

\ 108 

the container line between Il'ichevsk and Bulgaria was opened. 

Along the Northern Sea Route and in the Northeastern Regions of 

Soviet Far East, special self-propelled barges (Sever type, 14-ton 

cargo capacity and the improved Vostok type, 22-ton cargo 

4 

capacity) carried aboard ships are used for loading and unloading 

. 109 
unitized cargo and containers. 

The Central Scientific Research Institute recommended 

seven new general cargo ships, all of them capable of carrying 

containers. The proposed new ships are designed to operate as 

liners and are self sufficient for handling containers. According 

to the Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine, during the period 

1971-1975, container ships will be built with capacity of 40, 

200, 300, and 700 20-foot containers. Roll-on/ roll-off ships 

and LASH ships designed to take on board 40-50 lighters of 

110 
200-400 tons each are under consideration. The construction . 

of cargo helicopter carriers was also recommended. Among the 

arguments favoring the construction of such a ship is the frequent 

1Q7 Pravda , 4 July 1971. 

108 

Vodnyy Transport , 28 August 1971. 

109 

Morskoy Flot No. 1, 1971. 

Vodnyy Transport , March 16, 1971. 



381 



necessity for unloading cargo at harbors or points on the shore 
lacking cargo handling facilities. A converted A.\:GUEMA-class 
with three KA-25 K helicopters and a specially designed Project ■ 
No. 567 A cargo ship with three MI-8 helicopters were considered. 

Increased reliability of loading and unloading operations of 

* 

those ships was claimed owing to-, their relative independence 

111 

of weather conditions. 

The first Soviet container ship, Svetlogorsk, built in 
Vyborg in 1971, can carry 218 containers. East Germany and 
Poland started to build container ships in the late 1970's/ 

Containerization is planned to be introduced in two stages: 
the first stage, 1971-1975, "organizational-technological 
preparation" will involve building up a container inventory, 
the development of a maintenance-repair base, and experience in 
container utilization. This preparation will parallel the 
construction of container ships, of which 18 have been authorized, 
The Ministry, considering this number inadequate, is arguing 






for an additional eight container ships with a 150-200 container 

/ i - 



The proposed cargo helicopter carrier in conjunction 
with a containerized or unitized cargo system comprises the , 
major elements of the ship helicopter extended delivery system 
(SHEDS) . In addition, most of the new ships proposed for ; 
containierization will be self-sufficient. The two measures 
would result in extra cost, but are extremely important 
militarily. 

-. i / 



382 



capacity for use on short and medium range lines (USSR-Italy, 

USSR-France, etc). In addition, there is a plan to buy from 

East Germany an unspecified number of ships carrying 40 containers 

each (for lines between Germany, Bulgaria, and the USSR). The 

Ministry of Merchant Marine plan envisaged 23,000 20-ton (or 

* 
equivalent) containers by the end of 1975. 

During the second stage, 1976-1980, "containerization will 

become the main means of transportation for general cargo". The 

fleet of container ships will be considerably enlarged to include < 

an unspecified number of specialized container ships with a 

1,200-1,400 container capacity and a speed of 23-25 knots, 20-30 

ships with a 700-container capacity, and 25 ships with a 300- 

112 
container capacity. 

Meanwhile, the absence of specialized container ships 

in the Soviet Merchant Marine, and all the consequences thereof, 

was said by Minister Guzhenko to be "the result of the short-sighted 

» 

technological policy" of the two main administrations of the 

113 
Ministry. Even a partial solution of the containerization 

problem will improve the situation in the Soviet ports somewhat, 

but most of the problems will remain, and the Soviet port 



112 Morskoy Flot No . 4 , 1971, pp. 2-6. 
113 Vodnyy Transport, 14 July 1971. 



363 



facilities will for years to come still be a major obstaclo 
in the Soviet Merchant Marine's course to greater efficiency. 

Some Economic Aspects of the 
Soviet Merchant Marine" 

In spite of the apparent similarities between the 

» 

operations of the Soviet Merchant Marine and the merchant marine 
of any other maritime nation, it is an extremely difficult task 
to compare their performance in economic terms. In fact, such 
basic categories as ownership and the objectives of operation 
differ so drastically that they as often the sole reason for 
rejecting any attempt to compare the performance of the 
Soviet Merchant Marine with its Western counterparts. The 
centralized planning and control in the Soviet Merchant Marine 
are often pointed out as another reason for the impossibility 
of such a comparison, and the rationale of fleet utilization in 
the Soviet case might' be completely different from the Western 
rationale, profit making. According to D. Fairhall "some factors 

/ ! 

are declared to be more rational than others and the nature^ of 

the criteria applied to the planning might have very little in 

114 
common with the familiar Western criteria". What is implied 



i 



114 See D. Fairhall, 'op. cit., pp. 111-114. 



i 

i 
. / 



j. / 

i 



364 






here is the possibility of using the Soviet Merchant Marine to 

achieve purely political and military objectives, ; as certainly 

i 
might be, and occasionally has been, the case. As for the - ^ 

political purpose, the Soviets themselves do not deny the 

importance of using their merchant marine to that end. Moreover, 

« 
the Soviet Merchant Marine is considered to be a part of a 

unified internal transportation system and as such its performance 

and utilization, if measured against the interests of the overall 

system, do not necessarily coincide with Western standards of 

efficiency. 

In spite of the recent Soviet emphasis upon profit, 
profitability, and the introduction of cost accounting in every 
enterprise, when one examines current Soviet Merchant Marine 
statistics, he will find continued emphasis on cargo turnover, 
ton-miles, cargo processed, cargo capacity, etc. 

On the other hand, allowing for the aforementioned 
peculiarities of Soviet Merchant Marine operations, an impartial 

observer cannot fail to recognize the existence of a pragmatic 

j 
understanding of its economic function by the Soviets. In. 

addition to its satisfying the Soviet Union's shipping requirements, 

"liberating the Soviet Union from dependence upon capitalistic 

charter market", and assisting in the development of Soviet foreign 

trade, there is a genuine drive toward greater efficiency in the 



365 



Soviet Merchant Marine which in essence does not differ wuch 
from that in any other merchant marine of the world. They are 
trying to increase the productivity of their ships, ports, ship, ■ 
repair yards, improve ship design, select better propulsion 
units, install more productive cargo handling devices, introduce 
automation, and reduce the administrative apparatus. They are, 
in general, attempting to introduce the best from world maritime 
practice into their merchant marine. Occasional rate cutting, ■ 
either to gain competitive advantages or to avoid returning, 
empty, is not unique to the Soviet Merchant Marine, and has a 
long history in world maritime practice. 

The economic reform, "the new system of planning 
(management) and incentives", launched in September 1965 was 
gradually introduced into the Soviet Merchant Marine during the 
period 1966-1968. First established in a number of pilot 
enterprises, a Latvian steamship company, the Port of Riga, a ship 
repair yard in 1966 and a Murmansk steamship company in 1967, 
the reform gained momentum, and in 1968 the Ministry of Merchant 

Marine completed the conversion of all its enterprises to the new 

115 
system. The introduction of the reform resulted in a greater 

degree of enterprise independence from central control and permitted. 



115 

Communist of Armed Forces No. 21, November 1969, p. 47. 



2CLO 






wider application of economical methods of management. Profit 
and profitability were applied as standards for measuring the 
performance of ships, ports, steamship companies, etc. 

The reform did not grant the enterprises complete control 

over the distribution of profit and the portion left to the 

* 

industries varied. As for the Merchant Marine, 84.8% of the 

1966 profit was left to the Ministry, of which over 70% was 

117 

reinvested. Planning and measuring of merchant fleet* performance. 

in foreign runs in terms of profit was introduced even before the 
reform, and high profitability of operations has been claimed. 

The announced rate of return was 18.5% for 1968, 13.2% for 

118 
1967, 4.9% for 1960, and 3.7% for 1958. 

In 1969 Minister of Merchant Marine Bakayev claimed that 

the Soviet steamship companies' profits could be the envy of 

"any ship company" in the world, that the profit covers not only 



116 

It has been constantly emphasized in the Soviet Union 

that the Socialist state is not at all indifferent to how an 

enterprise obtained a high profit. Not denying at all the 

concept of profit, many Soviet economists emphasized, however, 

that the high profit can be obtained "only through high prices" 

(which, in fact, is a "general law" stated by Marx). Party 

directives did not demand either the maximization of the profit 

or the raising of prices. Increased labor productivity and the 

reduction of production costs have been stressed as the main goals 

117 Morskoy Flot No. 6, 1968, p. 35. 

118 

Communist of Armed Forces No. 21, November 1969, p. 48. 



367 



operational expenses but capital investment for future development 

as well, and that in 196S there was a net profit of 300 million 

i 

119 

rubles. How much of the 300 million rubles was earned by 

charter and how much by Soviet coastal shipping is not clear. 

Bakayev became a strong advocate of a more rational 

planning approach and further reduction and simplification of 

system of indexes, at least in relation to the Merchant Marine. ■ 

He emphasized the peculiar character of the industry's operation, 

the need for a greater sense of responsibility toward customers, 

and broader application of the incentives provided by the reform 

on the basis of a more rational establishment of funds for this 

purpose. He also argued for better coordination of plans between 

the Merchant Marine and its major clients, and the need for the 

party responsible for a. delay to bear material responsibility 

for it. The Minister emphasized the need to use only one index,- 

profitability, as it is more objective and completely indicative 

of efficiency in the shipping companies. The decisive influence 

i 
on profit growth of the rate of fleet expansion was used to. 

/ i 

justify the profit deficiency as an index. Profitability, on the 

other hand, cannot be changed unless the operation of the fleet -. 
120 



is improved. 



i 



119 

Ibid^, p. 49. . 

120 ■« •' 

The profitability is calculated as the ratio of profits 

to fixed and working capital. ; / 

• ■ ■• 

388 ; 



The Minister was also against the application to the 
Merchant Marine of group norms which are established for all Soviet 
industries and which determine the economic incentive funds. .^ 
There is a lack of uniformity among the various Soviet steamship 
companies which is caused by the specialization dictated by such 
factors as geographical location (influencing navigation and 
fleet composition) , which is in turn usually linked to different 
wage levels and material and fuel costs; the prevailing' cargo 
and, hence type of ships; type of service, i.e. coastal or foreign' 
shipping, etc. For example, even two companies, Murmansk and 
Severnoye, operating from the same northern basin are different 
in this respect. The average ship of the Murmansk Company is 
30% larger, the average distance to carry a ton of freight is 

40% farther, and the average wage for workers is more than one 

121 

and one half times higher. The importance attached to the 

Soviet Merchant Marine has been acknowledged, and the majority 
of requests of the Ministry were satisfied. 

In comparison with wages in other Soviet industries, 
Soviet seamen are well paid. In addition to wages and longevity 
bonuses, there is a system of incentive bonuses determined by 
the performance of the ship and contribution of the crew to it. 
In the fall of 1971 a very important regulation for rewarding 



121 

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 25, June 1968, p. 5. 



3G3 



ships operating at reduced manning levels was approved by the 
Council of Ministers. of the USSR. The possibility for management 
to eliminate excess labor was opened by the reform and first ^ - - 
tested on a wide scale by a chemical combine. In the Soviet 
Merchant Marine, the experiment to man ships at a reduced level 
(crew strength has often been in excess of the actual need) was 
initiated in 1969, and it produced a very favorable result in 
that productivity was increased by 11%. The main reason for 
such a phenomenon was purely materialistic, for the remaining 
crew members were paid better. All the wages of the relieved 
members in rubles and 50% in foreign currency (crews on foreign 
runs are paid in both Soviet and foreign currencies) were left 
for distribution among the remaining crew members. As a result, 

the average wage on such ships increased by 22% and crew costs 

122 
dropped by 11.5%. 

The approved regulations not only sanctioned operations 
with reduced crews (subject to approval by the Minister, providing 
that the safety of navigation is not being compromised) , but even 
improved the system of material rewards for the crew paid for 
by the saved funds. 

The 1971-1975 plan visualizes a 23% increase in labor 



122 

Mo rskoy Flot No. 8, 1970, and Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta 

No. 39, September 1971, p. 7. 



370 



productivity on ships, 12% in cargo handling operations, and 

35% in ship repair. In the near futuro it is planned to } reduce 

123 
crew by 20-25% and in the more remote future by up to 50%. 

Party control of the unions, the practical absence of 

unemployment, and the shortage of labor produced a situation 

» 

where the workers not only permit, but welcome, the introduction 
of any labor-saving devices. Surprisingly enough, it is the local 
administration which tries to resist and avoid the introduction 
of such devices, because of unrealistic increases in the norms 
and indicies often accompanying them. As can be seen, apart 
from a few obvious and often crucial differences, many other 
factors determining the economic performance of the Soviet 
Merchant Marine are quite similar to those operating in any other 
merchant fleet. 



123 

Vodnyy Transport, 5 October 1971. 



371 



I 



Conclusions 

The development of theSoviet Merchant Marine over half of 

a century has been extremely uneven. Up to about the middle 

of the 1950's it had not been distinguished either by the rate 

of its development or its size or the characteristics of its 

ships and what Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S.N., wrote at the end 

of the last century " Russia has little maritime 

commerce, at least in her own bottoms: her merchant flag is ^ 

124 
rarely seen" remained generally true. However, the existing 

merchant marine was able to, and to a large degree, did satisfy 

a rather considerable dependence of the Soviet economy and certain 

regions of the country upon sea transport. The size and 

character of the Soviet landmark create such a dependence, 

for in some areas, particularly in the Far East and the Northern 

territories, overland transportation does not exist, and the sea 

is not only the most logical, but the cheapest way to transport 

goods . 

/ | 

In the pre -Wo rid War II period, not until the first Five 
Year Plan (1928-1932) was the Soviet Merchant Marine reinforced 
by a sizeable number of new constructions. During the second 
Five Year Plan (1933-1937) merchant ship construction was curtailed 



124 

Quoted in Reporter, February 10, 1966, p. 25. 



i 



. i 



i 



372 



in favor of warship construction. The attempt to correct the 

i 
situation during the third Five Year Planlost out to the, war. 

After World War II and up to the middle of the 1950 »s ^~ 

there was very little new construction in the Soviet shipyards. 

The procurement of ships abroad, though important, was not on 

♦ 

a very large scale either. 

In 1956 the accelerated development of the Soviet Merchant 
Marine was started. Considerably larger domestic shipbuilding 
capacities were provided and orders for ships abroad increased. 
For 15 years approximately 40% of the new ships were built in 
domestic yards; about 50% were built in Socialist countries, 
particularly Poland and East Germany, and the remaining 10% in 
capitalist countries. 

It is doubtful that the decision to accelerate the 
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine, particularly as far 
as rate of its development is concerned, was the result of a planned 
approach. It strongly resembles a reaction to the existing 
situation, when the requirements for sea transportation generated 
by the relatively fast development of Soviet foreign trade and 
the initiation of economic and military aid were far in excess 
of the Soviet Merchant Marine's capability, and hence forced 
heavy dependence upon the' charter market. The victory of the 
Castro revolution in Cuba, growing foreign trade, and foreign 



373 



economic and military aid sharply increased this dependence at 
the beginning of the 1960's. Restrictive measures against 
ships carrying cargo to Cuba initiated by the American government 
and a boycott organized by Western oil companies against 
non-Soviet tankers carrying Soviet oil to Cuba aggravated the 
situation. The foregoing made an even faster growth rate 
imperative, with the result that the growth for the period from 
1961 to 1966 was labeled unprecendented by the Western 'press. 
Jnprecendented or not, it was still a reaction to a situation 
and not a planned activity. 

The development resulted in elevating the Soviet Merchant 
Vlarine role in the world shipping community. Prior to World 
Var II, the Soviet Merchant Marine was in 23rd place in world 
shipping, in 1960 it moved to 11th and in 1966 to 6th, the 
place it continues to occupy. 

Starting with the middle of the 1960 f s, when the situation 
lad somewhat stabilized, one can validly speak, of the planned 
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine, an assertion which is 
particularly true for the current Five Year Plan (1971-1975) . 

Such benefits of a planned economy as the allocation of 
shipbuilding capacities, construction of ships of approved types 
Ln large series, and greater maneuverability of capital, 
permitting emergency financing of ship procurement abroad, were 



374 



certainly beneficially utilized. The Soviet claim that they 
serve as an example of the development of a national mercantile 
fleet can in general be accepted. 

The present Soviet Merchant Marine is sufficiently large 

and diversified to carry more than half of the Soviet foreign 

♦ 

trade cargo, to deliver military and economic aid, to satisfy 
basic domestic needs in sea transport, and to earn enough 
foreign currency to pay for the Soviet charter of foreign ships 
and even supplement the Soviet need for foreign currency. __ 
It is obviously in no position to dictate terms and determine 
shipping rates in the world shipping community. While occasionally 
providing real competition to ships from capitalist countries 
and representing the commercial power of the Soviet Union on 
the ocean trade routes, the Merchant Marine will for a long time 
be preoccupied with the Soviet Union's own trade needs. 

The Soviet Merchant Marine's share of the world shipping 
tonnage is minor, and compared with the other nations in terms 
of GNP, industrial output, and size, neither Soviet foreign 
trade nor its merchant marine are really great. Of course, 
there is room for growth in the latter. 

In terras of ship composition, Soviet Merchant Marine is 
not well balanced yet, in' comparison with major mercantile fleets 
of the world. It has very few bulk carriers, is just starting 



375 



o receive container ships, and only planning to build lighters 

board ships (LASH) . v 

i 
The smaller Soviet ships are well suited for trade with 

smaller, less developed countries of the world, where modern 

cargo handling equipment is practically absent and volume 

(of trade does not require large specialized ships. In 
containerization and cargo handling and distribution ashore, the 
Soviet Merchant Marine is behind many Western countries-. 
Disproportions between the ability of the merchant fleet to 
carry cargo and ports facilities to process it is well understood 
by the Soviet authorities, and measures to remedy the situation 
are underway. 

Liner service is being rapidly developed in the Soviet 
Union. However, while the unusually high proportion of general 
cargo ships provides the Soviet Merchant Marine with diversified 
capabilities, it is becoming an obstacle and often leaves them 
with a less profitable cargo and the necessity to resort to 
tramp service particularly in international lines and in the 
conferences of which they are members. The planned emphasis 
upon larger specialized ships should improve the situation. 

While membership in various international maritime 
organizations, conferences, and agreements permits the Soviets to 
promote their own interests, in the final analysis it might be 

r 



376 



- 



advantageous to the world shipping community. In general, the 
Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate, and 
many countries understand this. It was reported that the U.S. 
decided to explore ways to encourage more liberal U.S. -Soviet 
commercial shipping arrangements, including greater access to 
each other's ports and reducing ..the lengthy advance notice of 

a ship's arrival (from 30 days to 14 days), thus making sea 

125 
trade between the Soviet Union and U.S. somewhat easier. 

It has been recently proved that people sailed the seas 

126 

for trade ventures 9,000 years ago. Historically, the world 

trade centers and sea routes along which goods have been moved 
have constantly shifted. The main factor determining the shift, 
however, is not the sea routes themselves or the availability or 
absence of a merchant marine in one or another country or regions, 
out the country's or region's industrial capacity, its ability 
to produce, sell, and buy. 

The import-export trade of the Soviet Union has been 
jreatly increased, thanks to the economic development of the 
country in general and industrialization in particular. Other 



125 

Washington Post , September 11, 1971. 

i 26 

Washington Post, September 26, 1971. 



-r 



377 



developments, including the growth of Soviet Merchant Marine 

itself, have been derivatives from these factors. X 

The fact that more than half of the Soviet ships were 

built abroad does not minimize the overwhelming role of Soviet 

industry, whose development created the condition whereby goods 

» 
can be produced for sale, armament and equipment can be built 

for military and economic aid and even natural resources exploited 

and exported as payment for imported goods. Of course,' the 

Merchant Marine is not a simple carrier of all these cargos, 

but also produced effective feedback for further development 

of the same activity, i.e. foreign trade, economic and military' 

aid, for which, initially, it was built. 

In today's world it is difficult to separate economic 

power from political and military power. As an offspring of the 

former the Soviet Merchant Marine is providing considerable 

support to the other two. Its ability to move cargo anywhere 

in the world and to be employed', on-, occasion., in direcc support. 

of the Soviet Navy has definite strategic significance. The 

decade of the 1960's produced three major crises, in Cuba in 1962, 

in Vietnam, and in the Middle East, and in all of them the- Soviet 

Merchant Marine played an important role. Moreover, it can be 

said that without the Soviet Merchant Marine, the Cuban crisis 

would probably not have occurred and those in Vietnam and the. 

i 

■ ■ i ; . 

/ - -378 



Middle East would be of a different nature. 

The auxiliary role of the Soviet Merchant Marine for the 
Soviet Navy is significant. The Soviet Merchant Marine personnel 
policy, which is generally successful, is benefited by steady 
supply of trained men from the Navy. Conversely, the Merchant 
Marine represents a "personnel bank" of trained reserves for the 
Navy . 

During Soviet Navy and Army exercises, a number of Soviet 
Merchant Marine ships usually take part, and contingency plans 

for speedy conversion of merchant ships into military transports 

127 
exist. 

It appears that the economic (commercial) , political, 

and military roles of the Merchant Marine are well understood 

by the Soviet leadership, who are using it as an instrument of 

Soviet national policy. 



127 

Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces No. 11, 1970, 



pp. 75-78. 



373 





155538 


Thesis 




S43227 


Shadrin 


v.l 


Development of 




Soviet maritime 




power. 



155538 

Thesis 

S43227 Shadrin 

v.l Development of 

Soviet maritime 

power. 



thesS43227v. 1 

Development of So 



viet maritime power. 




3 2768 001041007 

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY 



DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MARITIME POWER 
by 
Nicholas George Shadrin 



V 




DUDLEY KNOX LIBR\RY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93940 




ffiH&* , -*"«#**i ■■ » •' I'V* .<].'" »** 



•/ •.*? \*ii;-yi:^^. 



_- 1 



Development of Soviet Maritime Power 

Volume II 
By 

NICHOLAS GEORGE SHADRIN - 

B.S. 1952, the Naval Academy 
.E.A. 1964, The George Washington University 



■ *. 



A Dissertation submitted to 



The Faculty of 

i 

The Graduate School of Art and Sciences 
of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

June, 1972 

• Dissertation directed by 

Vladimir Petrov 
Professor of International Affairs 



:• 



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r*r— 









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4 




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CHAPTER III 



SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 



General Development and Yards 



DUDLEY KNOX LlBR'.Ry 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93940 



The number of ships and the total tonnage of a country's 
merchant marine and Navy are not necessarily indicative of .the 
nation's maritime power or its industrial might. Liberia, for 
example, has the world's largest registered merchant marine, 
and Argentina and Brazil have sizable Navies; however, none 
of these nations can be called maritime powers of magnitude. 
The shipbuilding industry of a country is a better indicator 
of a country's maritime development. 

Pre-revolutionary Russia had a relatively well developed 
shipbuilding industry, characterized by distinct eccentricities 
(1) specialization in naval construction; (2) extensive 
control by foreign capital; (3) dependence (and often far 
beyond necessity) upon foreign technology. Naval construction 
programs, often being more profitable, monopolized Russia's 
shipbuilding capacity, resulting in very few merchant marine 
ships being built in Russian shipyards. In 1913 85% f of the 

' 83G178 

380 



total Russian merchant marine tonnage was comprised of foreign 

1 
built ships. The history of Chernomorskyi Shipbuilding Yard in 

Nikolaev is very illustrative. Completed in 1897, the shipyard 

was owned by a Belgian company. Starting in 1901, the yard 

participated in the construction of a number of navy ships, 

among them the famous Potemkin, and produced steam engines, 

boilers, and turrets. In 1911, the yard became the property 

of a French company and was awarded a contract to build, the 

latest Russian battleship and to supply propulsion plans for - 

another battleship being built by "Russude" (presently "61 

Communars Ship Yard") . The growing demands of Russian naval 

programs required the modernization of the yard, subsequently 

accomplished by the British Vickers Company. In 1912 the 

shipyard built the Krab, the world's first submarine-mine layer. 

Ensuing pressure from the Russian mercantile banks forced the 

company to sell a sizeable block of stock to the Russian 

controlled International Commercial Bank; the resulting joint 

stock company was named the "Society of Nikolaevsk Shipyards". 

During World War I, the shipyards built a large number of naval 

ships of various types and classes. In 1915, the Petrograd 

International Bank, financier of both yards, centralized the 



Sudostroyeniye (Shipbuilding), No. 11, 1967, pp. 31-37. 



381 



administration and therein effectively monopolized the shipbuilding 

2 i 

industry in the southern Russia. 

A considerably larger group of Russian shipyards, located 
in Petrograd, was also heavily involved in naval shipbuilding 
with a relatively minor allocation to commercial ships. Owing, 
in part, to the naval shipbuilding orientation, the technological 
level of the Russian shipbuilding industry remained comparable to 
that of major European maritime powers. Supporting industries, 
receiving less emphasis, were subsequently less developed and 
hence, Russia's dependence on foreign deliveries, particularly 
ship machinery. A number of types and classes of ships built 
prior to the revolution were equal and some even superior 
(eg. destroyer Novik) to comparable ships of the major maritime 
powers. Commercial shipbuilding, to the contrary, was under- 
developed; during the period 1905 to 1917, Russian shipyards 
built only eight merchant ships. 

The Russians did not hesitate to experiment, and at 
the beginning of 20th Century the world's first tanker with diesel 
propulsion, Vandal, was built in Sorraovo. 

The chaos and destructiveness of the revolution and the 
civil war brought the Russian shipbuilding industry's productive 



2 

Sudostroyeniye No. 5, 1971, pp. 45-51. 



• f 



n 



82 



activity close to nil, and most of the shipyards, fell into 
decay. However, in 1921, the first southern shipbuilding yards 
(Black Sea) and in 1922 the Petrograd shipyards began their 
restoration, and gradually resumed the work. In January, 1922, 
the shipbuilding trust was created in Petrograd to "organize 

the work of the shipbuilding yards for the restoration of the 

3 

Navy". Again, as prior to the revolution, the emphasis was 

placed on naval shipbuilding. , It soon became clear tha^t the 
one-sided emphasis on naval construction was beyond the reach 
of the badly damaged Soviet economy. The introduction of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) and urgently needed foreign exchange 
for import payments forced the Soviet Government to reconsider 

the shipbuilding industry priorities and to place greater 

4 
emphasis on the merchant marine. Additionally, the poor 

condition of in-country transportation demanded the hasty 

development of water transports. In 1924, the Soviet Government 

decided to construct timber carriers, tankers, and refrigerators 

5 | 

immediately. /By the beginning of 1925, previously initiated 



3 
Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969, pp. 69-70; No. 4, 1970, pp,. 1-5 

4 
Shipbuilding No. 5, 1971, pp. 45-51. ' 

5 

Shipbuilding No. 11, 1969, pp. 17. 



i 
• / 



383 



efforts resulted in the complete restoration of all remaining 
ships of the nationalized merchant fleet. Ships construction 
began in 1925 simultaneously in Leningrad and in Nikolaev. — ^ 
Early in 1925, the Special Committee of the Consul of Labor and 
Defense presented the first five-year shipbuilding program for 
the years 1925-1930 and the Central Bureau for Shipbuilding 
was organized in Leningrad. The first four ships, timber 
carriers, with a cargo capacity of 3,100 tons were laid' down 
in the Baltic Yard in January 1925. 6 The first tanker of 10,000 
dwt (deadweight tons) laid down in November 1925 in Nikolayev, 
was ready exactly four years later. The relatively long period 
for the construction of this tanker, the Embanef t , was explained 
as being a weakness of the industry, the necessity of utilizing 
only available machinery, and a preoccupation with the naval 
construction which continued in high priority. 

In 1927, the first cruiser, Chervona Ukraina , whose 

7 
construction began prior to the revolution, was completed. In 

1928, all of the suitable remaining ships of the former Russian 

Imperial Navy, were either restored or completed and the Soviet 

shipbuilding industry started to build new naval ships. The 



6 

Shipbuilding No. 11, 1969, and Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969, 

pp. 69-70. 

7 
Shipbuilding No. 11, 1969, and Shipbuilding No. 4, 1971, 

pp. 7-11. 



384 



first Five-Year Plan, 1929-1933, visualized construction of 
216 ships for the Soviet Merchant Marine, 1 floating dock, and 
16 harbor tugs. However, not only was this program not fulfilled, 
but two combined programs, 1925-1930 and 1929-1933, produced 

Q 

only a total of 104 merchant ships. Throughout the 1930's, so 
few commercial ships were built that the programs for their 
construction are not discussed in modern Soviet specialized 
literature. The 15 year period from 1925-1940, resulted in the 
construction of 23 tankers with total capacity of 200,000 dwt. "■ 
A large number Of river boats were built by secondary shipyards, 
and priority programs such as the construction of a few ice- 
breakers were fulfilled. The minimal performance of the ship- 
building industry with regard to the Soviet Merchant Marine is 

casually explained by "this period having coincided with the 

9 
beginning of intensive construction of the Navy". The third 

Five-Year Plan, 1939-1943, devoted somewhat greater attention 

to the merchant marine, but the plan never materialized because 

of war. / 

A number of innovative methods were introduced to the 

shipbuilding industry prior to World War XX. In 1930, in a! 

Soviet Far Eastern Shipyard, the first tug with ari electro-welded 



Shipbuilding No. 11, 1967, pp. 1-3, and No. 4, 1970, ! 



pp. 1-5. 






9 - ' • / " 

Shipbuilding, No. 11, 1967, p. 2. / 



i 



385 



hull was built. In 1932, Admiralty Yard, in Leningrad, while 
building a timber carrier introduced the sectional method 
of hull construction. However, those innovations were, seldom 
widely used in commercial shipbuilding and were primarily * 
employed for naval construction. 

A program for shipyard restoration, primarily for purposes 
of naval construction, was initiated prior to V/orld War II and 
a number of new major shipyards were built. The Nicholaev's 
Yard was modernized; the Sormovo Yard production capacity_was 
extended (primarily for sectional construction of submarines) ; 
two new yards, one in the north, Severodvinsk, and one in 
Komsoraolsk on the Amur were built (both designed to build 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) . Modernization of the 
Leningrad shipyards had been started, but was interrupted by 
the war. 

During the war, the Soviet shipbuilding industry managed 
to complete the construction of ships with a high degree of 
prewar readiness; however, the industry was basically involved 
in the repair and maintenance of ships of the Soviet Navy, some 
yards built tanks and other items for ground forces. 

The war resulted in the severe damage or destruction of 



10 

Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969. 



386 : 

mi. ,ni »i i mi ^w w^ jiii nnuu i .ii 'i i j i HJ i i ip jiwrjw^ i^ ^ ZT 



many of the principle shipbuilding yards, particularly in the 
Black Sea area. Immediately following the war, the Soviet 
shipbuilding yards were among the first enterprises to be 
restored and many considerably modernized. The productive 
capacities of many yards including Zdanov, Sormovo, Severodvinsk, 
and later Kerch', were enlarged, and covered fabrication shops, 
permitting year round production in the northern area, were 
added. Former German yard in Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) v , was 
rebuilt. 

The allocation of shipbuilding capacities in the Soviet 
Union during the first post war decade reminds one of the prewar 
situation; i.e., naval shipbuilding, intensified in 1947, had 
received far greater priority in allocations, while commercial 
shipbuilding was conducted on a residual basis. However, there 
was an increase in the number of smaller yards and the portions 
of the larger ones which were involved in commercial shipbuilding 

Two major decisions made soon after Stalin's death altered 
not only the nature of Soviet shipbuilding, but also affected 
the allocation of capacities. The first decision was connected 
with the beginning of nuclear submarine construction in 1953; 
the second involved termination of the construction of a large 
series of cruisers and conventional destroyers. A number of 
build-ways, previously committed to cruiser and destroyer 



387 



"«M««wni< 



construction, were subsequently vacated. Some of those previou 
involved in cruiser construction in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk 
on Amur were gradually converted to the construction of nuclear 
submarines; part of the others previously allocated to destroyer 
construction were redirected to the production of diesel 
submarines. The remaining vacated build-ways were allocated 
(in Leningrad and the Black Sea Yards) to commercial shipbuilding, 
thus initiating, together with increased orders abroad, *a rapid 
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine. The accelerated 
submarine building program definitely demanded an expansion 

of the Soviet submarine building facilities which, probably, 

11 
took place during the late 1950 's and early 1960's. 

At the present time, the Soviet Union has approximately 

15 major shipbuilding yards, close to two dozen of medium sized 

shipbuilding yards, and many small shipbuilding and ship repair 

yards and shops, the total number of which probably approaches 

a few hundred (including those involved in fishing fleet and 

river fleet repairs) . The major Soviet shipbuilding .yards, the 

type construction (naval or commercial) and geographic location 

are as follows: (1) Northern area - Severodvinsk - practically 

exclusive naval construction specializing in submarines. This 

is one of the newest and most modern Soviet shipyard which, 



~ 



11 Jane , s Fighting Ships 1966-1967 thru 1970-1971 editions. 



388 

/ • " 

..^. . "_ i-.m.. J~= >=« 



according to a probably exaggerated statement by Admiral Hyraan 

Rickover, has "several times the area and facilities of all of 

i 
12 
the U. S. submarine yards combined." (2) Baltic Area - four 

yards in Leningrad: Baltic and Admiralty primarily involved' in 

commercial construction; Sudomekh - submarine construction; 

Zhdanov - both naval (destroyers type specialization) and 

commercial; and one in Kaliningrad specializing in escorts 

construction and performing minor commercial construction; (3) 

Sormovo - primarily submarine construction; (4) Black Sea 

Area: Nikolayev -' both naval and commercial construction; Kerch - 

' \ 
/ 

both naval and commercial construction; Kherson - primarily 

commercial construction; (5) Soviet Far East - Komsomol'sk 

on Amur - primarily naval (all types) construction; and Khabarovsk 

both naval and commercial. 

In addition to the above, there are a number of smaller but 

nonetheless important yards located in Vyborg, Klaipeda, Riga, 

Tallin, Astrakhan', Azov, Sevastopol, Kiev, Yaroslavl, Perm 1 , 

Rybinsk. Most of these yards are involved exclusively in j 

i 
commercial ship construction, and many combine shipbuilding and 

extensive ship repair. 

As can be seen, the major shipbuilding yards are widely 



12 

Fortune, August 1, 1969, p. 122. 



389 



disbursed and all four Soviet Naval Fleets; Northern, Baltic, 
Black Sea, and Pacific, have shipbuilding facilities capable of 
satisfying their basic needs in all types of ship; this is ^ 
particularly true with the Soviet Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic 
Fleets. The preoccupation of Severodvinsk Yard with submarine 
construction does not seriously handicap the Northern Fleet 
because its proximity to the. major shipbuilding center in 
Leningrad and the existence of inland waterways, which facilitate 
the distribution of ships among the other two fleets in the 
European part of the USSR. A major Soviet submarine building 
yard, (Sormovo) , lying deep inland, used to ship newly constructed 
submarines in section by railroad. At present, the yard is 
connected by the system of inland waterways with three European 
Soviet Naval Fleets. 

The sectional method of ship construction, mastered in 
the 1930' s, received wide application in the post-World War II 
development. Later, a large block construction method was added 

which permitted the construction of large ships far exceeding the 

I 
capacity of a building way, through the joining of blocks while 

afloat. In the late 1940 's, the riveted method of hull 

construction was rejected completely. The advanced technology 

of the full construction resulted in a 30% reduction in the nuiaber 

x "13 

of workers involved in the process, while doubling the output. 

* 



13 

Shipbuilding No. 4, 1970, p. 3 



330 



"■'wnimii 



The deadweight of Soviet built ships is being constantly 
increased. A series of Kazbek-type tankers of 11,800 DWT, built 
at the beginning of 1950' s, was followed by the Praga-type with ' 
doubled deadweight and Sophiya-type whose deadweight reached 
49,000 tons. Today, the tanker MIR of 150,000 DWT is under 
construction. During the decade of the 1960's rather large and 
sophisticated war ships of the Kynda, Kresta, and Moskva classes 
were also built. 

A degree of ingenuity and innovation was also widely, 
exercised in the field of propulsion. In the first half of the 
1950 f s as a result of a lack of large powerful marine diesels, 
smaller diesels were employed in electric-diesel propulsion 

systems. A typical ship for such a system was Dneproges laid 

14 
down in 1954. Existing and slightly modified steam turbines 

were also employed for merchant ship construction. A dry cargo 

ship, Pariskaya Kommuna, built largely on an experimental basis, 

was fitted with gas turbine of 13,000 horsepower. The vari^le 

pitch propeller found wide application aboard Soviet merchant 

ships. The speed of many Soviet merchant ships, particularly 

dry cargo ships, was raised to 19 and some to 22 knots. The 

application of automation, particularly to control the main 

machinery of the ships, started at the middle of the 60' s and is 



14 

Shipbuilding -No. 5, 1971, pp. 45-51. 



391 



presently being widely expanded. The search for and experimentation 

with new types of ships, such as katamaran, hydro-^foils and 

i 
air-cushion is continuing; number of ships built on new principals 

are already being widely used by the Soviet merchant marine and 

river fleets. 

The importance of the Soviet shipbuilding industry was 

recognized by the opening of the new permanent "Shipbuilding" 

pavilion in 1967, at the Soviet Exhibition Fair in Moscow, 

VDHKH, where many new and progressive methods of shipbuilding - 

were proudly displayed. The wide application of new materials 

including plastics in Soviet shipbuilding was evident. The 

Soviet Government's support of the shipbuilding industry also 

can be illustrated by the fact that each launching of a new major 

merchant ship is widely publicized and treated as "a victory of 

the labor". 

Research and Development 

The successes of Soviet shipbuilding industry would have 

I 
been impossible without a powerful support received from various 

research and development institutions as well as the maritime 

educational establishment. In addition to several dozen 

scientific research institutes and design bureaus subordinated 

to the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, there are a number of 



332 



scientific research institutes and design bureaus which are 

subordinate to the Soviet Navy and which contribute to the 

t 

various fields of shipbuilding in a very substantial manner, 
particularly for ship propulsion including nuclear systems. The 
educational institutions, such as marine engineering institutes 
and various navigational nautical schools are annually turning 
out a considerably greater number of graduates (marine engineers 
and naval architects) than any other country in the world. 

The scientific research efforts in the area of shipbuilding 
is coordinated by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Institute 
for Complex Transport Problems. The major shipbuilding research 
centers are located in Leningrad and Moscow, but the centers in 
the Gorki, Black Sea, Kiev, and Soviet Far East areas are also 
important. Among the best known Soviet scientific research 
institutions are the following: Central Scientific Research 
Institute of Merchant Fleet (TSNIIMF) ; Central Scientific Research 
Institute imemi Academik A. N. Krylov; Central Diesel Scientific 
Research Institute; Scientific Research and Project - Design 
Institute of Sea Transport, Sousraorniiproekt; Central Design * 
Bureau, Baltsudoproekt; and the Leningrad Central Project - 
Design Bureau., The contribution of the Scientific Research 
Institutes, subordinated to the fishing industry and river transport, 
/ 



333 



15 I 

have also been considerable. 

Over 200 scientists with Doctor of Science and Candidate 

i 

of Science degrees are working for two leading research institutions 
of the Soviet merchant marine, Souzraorniiproekt and TSNIIMF. 
In addition, more than 50 doctors of science and 400 candidates 
of science are working for the higher educational institutions 
of the merchant marine. Research work is also done by a number 

of central project-design bureau and more than 30 specialized 

16 ^ 

institutes of shipbuilding and other industries. 

The Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute is the largest Soviet 

educational institution directly connected with the Soviet 

shipbuilding industry. The institute has 44 departments, and 

during the period of 1946-1967 graduated more than 12,000 marine 

architects and engineers. It was organized in 1902 on the 

initiative of the Soviet academician and ship builder, A. N. 

17 

Krylov. A number of Soviet universities and poly-technic 

institutes have their own shipbuilding departments; the better 
known among them is the shipbuilding department of Gorki 

7 ! 

Poly technical Institute, organized in 1920. The department 1 mainly 



15 ' 

Central Scientific Research Institute of Merchant Fleet, 

Transactions , Vol. 133, Leningrad, 1970. 

16 

Morskoy Flot No. 7, 1971, p. 3. 

17 

Shipbuilding No. 8, 1970, pp. 7-8. / 

! / 



394 



associates with shipbuilding yard Krasnoye Sormovo in Gorki, 

and many of its graduates have occupied the leading positions 

t 

in the yard. Among the recent contributions of the research 

work of department were detailed research on hydro-foil and 

18 
air-cushioned ships. 

Some of the works by Central Scientific Research Institute 

of Merchant Fleet demonstrate the scope and the influence of the 

Soviet research institutions upon the decisions made regarding ' 

shipbuilding and general development of the merchant marine. — ^ 

The basic work for the typification of fleet and the selection 

of minimum necessary number of types of ships was done in the 

19 
institute in the late 1920 f s and early 1930 f s. Immediately 

after World War II, the world shipbuilding experience in construction 

and exploitation of merchant ships was summarized and analyzed. 

The problems of typification and the selection of the appropriate 

technical - economic parameters of ships were among the main 

outcomes of the study. During the 1947-1952 period optimum 

typification of ship, the so-called "Network of Ship's Types", 

was recommended and included eight classes of dry cargo ships, 

five classes of tankers and a number of other ships. A 1955-1956 



18 

Shipbuilding No. 6, 1971, pp. 61-64. 

19 

The institute programs are described in its Transactions 

through a number of years. Particularly descriptive for this 
purpose is Volume 133, Leningrad, 1970. . * 



3S5 



study resulted in selection of the optimum limits of propulsion 

units for various ships and the recommendations to increase 

i 

the deadweight of constructed tankers, which resulted in the 

20 
decision to build the Sophiya class tanker. 

During the 1958-1962 period, the institute worked out a 

plan of general prospective development of sea transport for the 

1959-1980 period. The recommendations of the plan serve as a 

basis for further work in the designing and the construction of 

larger ships with higher speeds, and further reduction in_the~ 

number of types of specialized and universal ships. During the 

1961-1963 time frame, the recommendation for typification of 

merchant marines of Comecon countries were worked out together 

with the selection of types and basic ships parameters. As for 

the 1971-1975 period, the accelerated construction and introduction 

of fast dry cargo liners, container ships, and lighter carriers, 

LASH, "capable of competing with any ships while working on the 

international lines" was proposed and basic design of the ships 

formulated. 

The introduction of so called complex automation on the 

i 

new ships, which could result in a 15-20% crew reduction, was 

i 
i 
i 

strongly recommended. The measures to increase profitability of 

i 
i 

the Soviet merchant marine, with emphasis on the efficiency: of 






20 ■• / 

Ibid ., p. 17. / 

• •■■ . / 



336 



cargo handling devices and container ization, were worked out on 

the assumption that "the sphere of activity of the Soviet merchant 
marine, especially in the transportation of foreign cargo will., • 
be widened considerably". The more detailed plan for the future 
development of the merchant marine for the 1971-1980 period was 
worked out, where the basic types of ships, their parameters, and 
the rate of their construction were determined and the basic ship 
designs worked out. The further increase in the proportion of ^ 
narrow specialized cargo ships, and the further automation- of 
diesel, steam, and gas turbines ships were recommended. The 
construction of transport submarines in limited numbers was not 

excluded. 

Examining past programs and measures proposed by the Soviet 

research institutions and comparing them with the actual ship- 
building performance produces striking similiarities, especially 
in case of shorter range (usually five years) programs. 

Each major aspect of ship design, shipbuilding, and naval 
weapons system development has its own research institute . There 
are separate institutes for hydro-dynamics and ship construction, 
welding, turbines, boilers, diesels, electronics, naval missiles, 
underwater weapons, etc. The observed improvement in the design 
of Soviet naval ships and growing sophistication of their 
weaponry, better' and more economical ships built for. merchant 



337 



i i ii i n... * u .■■■ m i n' i u i ii T ii " i m mm mmm n w » ■* ■>«- 



marine, fishing and river fleets, experimentation and construction 

of new type vessels (such as hydro-foil and air-cushioned) are 

i 

testimony that the research resources allocated to the Soviet 
shipbuilding industry are producing significant results. 

Shipbuilding Methods Employed 

Because Soviet shipbuilding yards were built at different 
times, they can be divided, according to layout and production 
facilities, into three major categories. The first category 
is represented by the yards built prior to the revolution and 
among them are the largest Soviet yards. They have variety of 
shops capable of manufacturing all necessary items for a ship 
under construction. Some of these ship yards have the Soviet's 
oldest and longest (over 200 meters) inclined end launch building 
ways. Two of these yards, one in Leningrad, and the second in 
Nikolayev, have custom building capabilities in facilities and in 
skills. They certainly meet the demand for small quantities of 
individualized ships, such as complicated research vessels or 
sophisticated naval ships. 

The second category of the shipbuilding yards, representing 
the largest group, are those primarily built prior to World War 
II and designed to build naval ships utilizing the components 
provided by supporting industries. Straight line production flow • 



398 



i i i ii i in iii )» » ii j rJii ' *» iii» i »i'ii .» ^» w) i wHi, i < i *^***^ 



is utilized in enclosed, level building positions, and each yard 
has a ship dry docking capability. \ 

The third category is represented by ship yards built or 
modernized after World War II, yards of the most modem design 
employing most productive production practices. Many of ship 
yards in this category are used for commercial shipbuilding. 
It is standard practice of the Soviet Ministry of the 
Shipbuilding industry to limit the assignment of the construction 
for each class of ship to as few yards as possible and thus to 
gain the greatest possible advantages from specialization, 
standardization, and series production. Often, the development 
of a particular yard has been planned with a specific shipbuilding 
program in mind. Those yards engaged in major production programs 
are designed, arranged, and tooled in such a way as to assure a 
smooth flow of series production of a particular ship type. 

The central planning of the shipbuilding programs and the 
production processes 'involved in their materialization provides 
for increased standardization and involves a design process with 
a major goal being to facilitate production. Highly specialized 
design bureau usually located in the vicinity of or nearby j the . 
shipbuilding yard are assigned to design a given ship type which 
will be produced by the yard. 

The majority of the Soviet major shipbuilding yards have 

/ 



399 



mm ^"^****mU*mm*r*'m**m<mrrm'mi i h i .h i . w h.hu i m. -jww 



well spaced and conveniently located shops for fabrication, 
sub-assembly and machining, employing varieties of conveyor 
systems, transversers, and other devices. Some of the production 
lines have been automated. The automation mainly involved steel 
plate processing, fabrication, sub-assembly, and material transport 
Practically all machinery is Soviet designed and built. 

Some hot cutting machines are operating on a photo-electric 
cell principle, and others are controlled by computer. The 
Kristal hot-cutting machine has three modifications, one of 
which employing plasma-arc cutting, or oxygen cutting. A number 
of Soviet shipyards have mechanized the welding of joints and 
framing connections. The automation of production processes 
resulted in a considerable reduction in assembly and welding 
time, and increase in output per square meter of working space. 
The advantages of automated and improved methods of processing 
and fabricating steel are further utilized in a number of methods 
for hull assembly, resulting in cutting down building way times 
and thereby increasing the number of ships turned out without 
increasing the numbers of ways. Complete hull section assembly 
method worked out a long time ago for construction of submarines, 
is widely being used. A some-what modified method employs the 
so-called "block technique". The hull is divided, for example, 
into nine blocks, which later are assembled into sections at 



4C0 



"» i h ii . i «■ 



three positions (each section is assembied fro™ three blocks). 
Later the sections are transferred to the finaX hull assembly 
line where they are joined together and launched. By using 
these methods,, the production cycle of BMRT Mayakovskii was 



21 
reduced to 3.5 months. 



Another sectional construction method called the "Island ■ 

Method" is employed for construction of larger ships. The hull 

. is divided into blocks,' or islands. These islands are constructed 

simultaneously on the building ways with sufficient space -between " 

them for the installation of machinery prior to final assembly. 

The complete utilization of building ways working space is 

achieved. Several variations depending upon a number of islands 

exist for this method. For example, the three islands variation. 

requires a building position long enough for a complete ship 

Plus an additional island. Generally, the process starts at 

the head of the building way with the formation of a stern, island. 

When the completed hull that shared the building ways with I the 

stern island^ launched, the stern island is moved to the (foot 

of the building way. The second, the mid-ship island, is built 

and joins the completed stern island, and simultaneously the third, 

the bow island, is being built, and connected with the mid-ship 

island. Meanwhile, another stern island is started at the head 

21 I j 

Shipbuilding No. 1, 1970. * / 



i / 



401 



i 



of the way, and should bo completed by the time the bow island 
is joined and the completed ship launched, after which the 
entire cycle can be repeated. Employing the three islands -~^^ 

method the construction time of the tanker, Geroi Bresta, was 

22 

cut from seven months to 3.5 months. 

Another method of hull assembly presently being widely 
introduced involves the launching of two separate whole sections 
which later are joined together afloat. First introduced at 

the Rybinsk Ship Yard while building a bulk carrier for river-sea 

23 

navigation, the method is presently employed in construction 

24 
of much larger ships, including tankers. 

Most Soviet ships are built on level ship-assembly positions 

from which the following launch methods are used: 

a floating launch dock; 

a controlled launch/ship transverser-fed facility; 

a floodable basin/building dock combination; 

All methods have a built-in ship retrieval capability. The 

floodable basin/building dock combination includes building docks 

which are connected by water-tight gates to a floodable launching 

basin that has access to navigable water through another set of 



22 

Shipbuilding No. 12, 1970. 

23 

Izvestiya , 16 October 1969. 

24 

Shipbuilding No. 12, p. 8. 



HC2 



water-tight gates or caissons. Each building dock is equally 
suitable for single, large hull construction or multiple, small 
hull production. When construction is completed, the gates to 
the dock are opened and the ship floats into the basin. The 
level of the basin is then adjusted to that of the estuary. 
After that, the outer gates of the basin are opened to allow 
the ship to be moved to the fitting out area. In multiple hull 
production, the dock gates are opened and the completed" ship 
or ships are rolled out dry into the basin, leaving the uncompleted 
hulls behind. The dock gates are shut, and the launching basin 
is flooded to enable the hull to be floated to the deeper portion 
of the basin. Then, the deep basin water level is adjusted to 
the level of estuary and the new hull is moved through the gates 
for fitting out. 

The geographic location of the majority of the Soviet 
shipyards requires weather protection and themajority of the 
shipbuilding positions at major Soviet yards are enclosed in 
heated buildings. A device permitting conventional method hull 

painting and creating a sort of micro-climate on the floating 

25 
docks was introduced in Zdanov Shipyard in Leningrad. The 

device, through a system of ducts, distributes hot air with 

controlled temperatures through the working areas as well as 




25 

Morskoy Flot No. 6, 1971, p. 7. 



403 



1 -rn^-irnr-iTi«titifm«»iM»r»mii— imiihi.mhi tun in ■- ' '-■■ '"•"'■'■" "■"■■ ""■'■ I- 



along the ships hull, creating better working conditions and 

permitting paint drying during the winter. l 

t 

Propulsion Systems and Their Development ^~~^-- 

The continuous reduction in the cost of maritime 
transportation, primarily resulting from the increased sizes 
of ships, improved propulsion systems and the automation (resulting^ 

in the reduction of crew size) will take place in the future as 

26 

well and apparently along these same lines. •— ^ 

The reduction of hull resistance can also bring remarkable 
improvement. The bulbous bow has brought with it, in recent 
years, a marked saving either in power needed to propel a ship 
of certain displacement, or in increase of speed. But in principle, 
the problem is one of converting the flow around the ship's hull 
from turbulent to laminar. 

Friction resistance can be eliminated by creating an air 
cushion between the ship's hull and the water surface, or by 
using hydro-foils which lift the ship's hull out of the water. 
But both methods suffer from a serious shortcoming, for they 



26 

Shipbuilding No. 4, 1968, pp. 11-15. Very interesting 

and revealing discussion of this problem can be found in " Shipping , 
the Next 100 Years ", J. and J. Denholra, Ltd., 1967, and The 
Journal of Commerce and Shipping Telgraph, 1967, 18/1, # 43393. 



404 



require a very high-power output to remain underway (approximately 
half of the main propulsion power generated by hoVer-craft is 
expended in creating the air cushion, while speed has little 
effect on this power) . A hover-craft making 60 knots requires 
100 horsepower per ton of weight, whereas a modern displacement 
ship making 22 knots, requires only two horsepower per 
displacement ton. 

At the present time, the great majority of ships are driven 
by diesel or steam turbine. Diesels are used almost exclusively - 
when low and medium power is required. The steam turbines have 
been used when high power was required. The recent years have 
witnessed more and more diesels entering the high-power field. 
If, in the early 1950's, 10,000 HP was the limit for a diesel, 
today the limit approaches 50,000 HP, meaning that one engine will 
develop all the Power a propeller can absorb. 

In contrast to diesels, maximum power for the steam 

\ 
turbines has never been a problem. Steam pressure in steam 

I 

turbines presently are around 40 to 60 kg/cm and the temperature 

/ i 

is 460°-500 < 7C. The thermal efficiency of steam turbines is 

not as high as that of diesels and presently is in the average of 

j , 

25-27%. In certain cases, it was increased up to 30%, when steam 

2 o 27 

pressure is 70-80 kg/cm and temperature 500-510 C. 



27 /' 

Shipbuilding No. 4, 1968, p . 14 . , I 



i / 



1*05 



Wffwtw .iBWim.IM ... —r**jm&*t*&* " > — ■■ " ■ -•^— mt~t~ mm i*f frf " ■- »i » » ■ » «»- 



The gas turbine might be a good propeller drive. There is 
no problem with feed water or with condensers, bat partially 
because of a still low quality of fuel, the efficiency of gas 
turbines are in neighborhood of 30-32%. More technologically 
advanced gas turbines using better fuels can probably raise the 
efficiency to 40%. 

The existing atomic reactors use a very small percentage 
of the energy hidden in the atomic nucleus. The breeder reactors 
are more promising. The energy obtained in the atomic reactors 
can be used in steam turbines or in closed cycle gas turbines. 
If and when the way to obtain electrical energy directly will be 
discovered, it would result in the most efficient propulsion 
system. Such has been the general trend in the improvement of 
various types of ship propulsion systems. 

Diesels 

The first diesel was produced in Russia at the beginning 
of the last decade of 19th century by Russky Diesel Plant, 
where the production of diesels continues. However, while producing 
a number of diesel types for the various modes of transportation, 
the production of large powerful, contemporary marine diesels 
did not start until the beginning of 1960 f s when a technical 
assistance agreement signed in 1959 with Burmeister and Wain 



40S 



(Denmark) provided the Soviet Union the license to build the 

famous B & M marine diesels. The production was organized at 

* 

the Bryansk Plant. 

Prior to World War II, Russky Diesel produced DKRV 65/69 
diesels of old design with 1,900 - 2,400 HP output, and 110-125 
rpm respectively. During the decade of 1930's production of more 
modern diesels, DKRV 68/120 type with 1,800 - 2,700 HP output 

and 100 rpm was organized. Another plant, Kolomensky, built 

28 
less powerful diesels. After the World War II, diesel propulsion' 

plants for the Soviet built ships were designed on the basis of 

diesels manufactured by Russky Diesel of the following types: 

6 and 8 DR 30/50 with 600 and 800 HP output (300 rpm) , 8 DR 43/61 

with 2,000 HP output (250 rpm) as well as universal industrial 

diesels, D 50 of 900-1,000 HP and D 100 of 1,800 HP. 

The low power output of the Soviet built diesels presented 

the shipbuilding industry with considerable difficulties. A 

number of diesel-electric plants with 7,000 HP were designed and 

29 

built. The diesel electric propulsion plants utilized the output 

of 2-4 diesel generators through a powerful electric motor driving 
the shaft. This type of propulsion plant permitted the Soviet 



28 Shipbuilding No. 11, 1967; pp. 31-37. 

29 

Ibid. , p. 16. 



407 



■ - l -•-• -~..*W-*M«*»M-.«-,.-«~ .~W^-»- .^ .t., ^ ^^,-- 



Union to build the UL (reinforced for ice navigation) class of 
ships needed at the northern areas. , 

The B & W low revolution powerful marine diesels (674 VT^ 
2BF - 100; Soviet code DKRN 74/160, and DKRN 50/110) whoso 
production was mastered by Bryansk Plant in 1961, played a very 
important role. 3 ° The majority of the Soviet motor ships are, 
propelled by foreign built diesels, and ships over 15,000 tons 
nave been using them exclusively. Many of these "foreign built" 
diesels are being manufactured by Poland, (under licensing^ rem 
Burmeister and Wain , Denmark , Sulzer - Switzerland, and M.A.N. - 
West Germany) and Czechoslovakia. 

The first powerful 9,500 HP marine diesel of the Soviet 
design was built by the Bryansk Plant in 1969. " In 1971, the 
21,000 HP marine diesel of unknown origin was built for the first 

-,.,„+ 32 Tt is fair to conclude that without 
time by the same plant. It is lair 

„-e jio^K the Soviet merchant marine 
the foreign deliveries of diesels, xne 



3°Soviet Government permission to buy the ^f^J^es 
diesel apparently was notobtaiued.ithou a strong intervene 

S^^S&^^VbS Lk Pla. £J. --^ration 
TZLtt*?X^~'£ESZ r/dieTels", 



31 Prayda, 28 February 1969. 
32 Izvqstiya, 24 May 1971. 



i^— .— m^r^mm — ■» | i « ii i n» m » hi 



408 



(84% of ships are diesel powered) would be hard pressed for 
propulsion plants installations and many ships would either not 
be built or the rate of the merchant marine growth would be 

slower. 

The naval diesel propulsion installations went through a 
somewhat similar process of development. Of course, the naval 
requirements have been of different nature as for the size, 
power, and rpm. The demand for the reserve power have often 
excluded diesel as the main engine on the combatants. 

Initially in the late 1920's and early 1930's, slow speed, 
four cycle, solid injection diesels of several sizes were 
produced. They were used as main engines in auxiliary ships 
and as generator drivers. Later on, two types of four cycle 
diesels for naval installations were built. The first of these 
were rated at 1,100 and 1,400 HP at 460 rpm and had specific 
weights of 22.7 and 18.9 kg/HP respectively. The second type 
was lighter (13 kg/HP) rated at 600, 800, and 1,100 HP at 600 

rpm. Two cycle diesels with loop scavanging rated at 4,200 HP 

33 

and 6,000 HP were also produced in the pre-war years. Serial 

production of the 30-D and its successor, 40-D diesels was 
organized. The 40-D engine rated at 2,500 HP had a two stage 



33 Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 76-83. 



4C9 

/ . 

! .■— ■■Ill H ill ■ ■» ■ ! II. ' M il » 



super charging system. Compared with the 30-D, the 40-D power 

was 25% greater, its fuel consumption reduced and it was 20% 

34 
lighter. A definite success in the post war years was serial 

production of the Type 61 diesel, a two cycle, 6,000 HP engine. 

The Type 61 diesel, having 1,200 hour service life prior to major 

overhaul, can be used as a pure diesel or in combination diesel- 

gas turbine installations as- a sustainer engine. The M-50 

diesel designed by a Navy bureau have been produced for* many 

years and is now widely used in the Soviet Union. This marine 

diesel is produced in 1,000, 1,100, 1,200, and 1,500 HP sizes. 

Power changes are provided for by stepping up rpra and super 

charging. The specific weight of the M-50 diesel is 1.4 - 1.7 

kg/HP. 

The big success for the Soviet diesel builders was the 

development in early or middle 1960's of the M-503 diesel, which 

have been in the serial production and widely used by torpedo 

j * '■ 

boats, fast patrol boats, and light combatant ships. The M-503 

I 
I 

diesel is 42 cylinder, 7-black star with 6 cylinders in each row. 

/ I 

It is equipped with reverse reduction gearing and is produced in 

i 

several modifications. The main modification develops 4,000 HP 

I 

and has a specific weight of 1.35 - 1.63 kdg/HP. The specific fuel 



34 

Ibid. , p. 79 



! / 



410 '.; 



consumption in the power range from 10% to full is not exceeds 
lW grams/HP/hour (the opting value is 158) . The K-5C* i. 
four cycle diesel ,1th driving turbo-super charger and has ._ 
limited permissible time of continuous operation at maximum 
power. The.engines basic characteristics exceed that of many 

ic n?iat 560 MB-518 Mercedes Benz, 
foreign designed diesels (Fiat 5bu, ws 

24WZ Mitsubizhi) . 

Steam Turbin ° Propulsion Systems ... - 

If the majority of Soviet merchant *lV» taW *b»V 
propulsion, the majority of Soviet major combatants have been 
using steam turbine propulsion systems. Prior to the revolution. 
Russian built steam turbine plants could not satisfy the demands 
of the Navy and many installations were imported. 

The first Soviet built steam turbine propulsion systems 
.ere developed in the late 1920's and early 1930's for escorts, 
and for destroyer leaders. Many of the Soviet first destroyers 
had foreign built turbines. Later in the 1930's, the Soviet 
research work resulted in the design and construction of steam 
turbines for a second generation of Soviet built destroyers. 
After the war a modernized version of pre-World War II design 
steam turbines were installed on Soviet Otlichnyi and SKory Class 
destroyers and Chapaev and Sverdlov Class cruisers. ^ The steam 



Ul 

, . _ i L . jjn i ii i.i . ,rr ~ 



'■ ■'■' ■ ■ 



parameters of those installations were 27-32 kg/cm and 

420-450°C. 

i 

Just before World War II, the destroyer Opytnyi (Experimental) 

with very productive, but not manueverable once-through boilers 

35 
was built. The extensive experimentation with this propulsion 

system continued after the war. During the test runs in 1947 

and 1948, the destroyer Opytnyi developed speed up to 42 knots, 

but the system, because of its poor manueverability , was found 

unsuitable for the war ships and the experiment dropped. _ 

In the early 1950's, a new lighter, more economical and 

raaneuverable system with partially automated controls was designed 

for escorts (utilized on Kola and Riga Classes) . A two stage 

reduction gear was used with the turbines. During the middle 

1950's, a steam turbine propulsion plant, for the Kotlin class 

destroyers, was developed. The further improvement in Soviet 

built steam turbine installations dealt with the following: the 

specific weight of the turbines, the condensers, and the reduction. 

gears dropped considerably; the turbine blade periferal velocities, 

rpm and load on the reduction gear increased. All this made 

possible the reduction of the specific weight of the installation, 

while almost doubling the power of the aggregate and simultaneously 



35 

The boiler was designed by Professor Ramzin, a well known 

specialist, accused leader of so-called Industrial Opposition, 

sentenced in 1932 to jail where the boiler was designed in the 

middle 1930' s. 



/ ' 



increasing its efficiency. The auxiliary mechanisms and' 

heat exchangers were also improved. Obviously, the best 

i 
available steam turbine installations were selected for nuclear 

powered submarines of the Soviet Navy. 

The task to develop suitable steam turbine propulsion plants 

for serial production and installation aboard of large dry cargo 

37 
ships and tankers was set up in 1954. Such installations were 

developed by Central Research Institute of Sea Transport during 
the 1955-1959 period and installed on Leninsky Komsomol class . 
dry cargo ships and Prage Class tankers, and in 1963 on the tanker 
Sophiya. The steam parameters of this installation are 42 kg/cm 
and temperatures 450-470°C. Demands for the steam turbines with 
higher parameters up to 80 kg/cm 2 and temperatures up to 515°C 
have been made and their development during the 1971-1975 period 
should be expected. 



2 



36 For the specific characteristics of some .Soviet boilers 
and steam turbines, see Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 76-83. 



^Shipbuilding No. 11, 1967, pp. 31-37. 



/ 
/ 

/ 



1413 



' « j i. w— — m i ■' ■■ ■ " ■ mn ' H 'i. 



Gas Turbines 

i 
The necessity to build a propulsion system combining the 

advantages of the turbine and the simplicity of using the opefi^- 

heat cycle, i.e. the gas turbine, was well understood in the 

Soviet Union even in pre-World War II times. As was also the 

case in the other countries, the research and design work for 

the creation of marine gas turbine propulsion system were 

conducted in the middle and the end of 1930' s. The Soviet Navy 

designers, particularly the group headed by Engineer-Captain First 

Rank Professor G. I. Zotikov, worked out the theoretical 

fundamentals, and certain design principles, for the naval gas 

38 
turbines. 

The gas turbine advantages in the use as a main propulsion 

engine or additional engine' (a sort of booster) are in the 

following: low weight for large power in one aggregate; good 

maneuverability and Immediate readiness to develop speed right 

up to the limit; smaller number of auxiliaries; suitability for 

a high degree of automation of all processes; simplicity of; 

I 
service. 

■> 

After the war, research was conducted along two directions: 
the utilization of the experience of marine steam turbine building 



38 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp.- 78-83 and Sudostroyeniye 



No. 11, 1967, pp. 31-37 



41U 

l * w — ■— ' ' ^ ^»»w— m i min i i i »^^» .i. i ■ i i p i .i m p i . pi.i. ^ i in m i | i hj i i ■ mull i ii » Ll) |i ii , h i iiiliii ii in i i ) i n mi ■ ■■ 



and the adaptation of the experience of the aviation industry 
where gas turbines produced a sort of technological revolution. 
The aviation gas turbines were first to be used by the Soviet Navy 
when they were installed as booster type engines on torpedo boats. 
The experiments were conducted during 1956 and 1957. Soon, however, 
better gas turbine were developed, built, and installed aboard 
many Soviet Naval ships. During the decade following the initial 
test, the power of gas turbines used by the Soviet Navy v increased 

approximately ten times, specific fuel consumption was cut 1.5 

39 

times and engine life was increased many times. At the present 

time, many Soviet Navy guided missile destroyers, various type 
escort ships (some in combination with diesels) , and boats are 
equipped with gas turbines as main propulsion systems. The 
Soviet Navy occupies a leading position compared with other navies 
of the world in its use of gas turbine propulsion systems 
(definitely quantitatively and possibly even qualitatively) . 

The research efforts for the implementation of gas turbines 

^40 

in merchant marine ship propulsion systems started in 1956. 

/ ■ 

The first Soviet gas turbine driven ships were the series of 

Pavlin Vinogradov class timber carriers built in the early 1960's. 



39 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 78-83. 

40 

Transactions, Vol-. 133, p,. 41. 



i 



/ 
/ 



415 

*^*'^*' ' ■ P mi H n il h. iiii iu m l,n ■ I I i i .iii i i i>-.- i i n » iw< i .i i , ^,» v n.li' > ■> » .. ~y 



The French built gas turbine of approximately 4,000 IIP was used. 
The first domestic marine gas turbine system, 13,000 IIP, } GTU-20, 
designed and built by Leningrad Kirov Plant was installed oh^dry 
cargo ship, Parizhskaya Communa, and widely tested since 1968. 

The gas turbines of the GTU-20 type are expected to be improved 

o 

to a point when gas temperatures of 900 - 1,000 C will be utilized 

41 
and specific fuel consumptions of 165-175 gram/HP/hour achieved. 

Nuclear 



Besides the fact the Soviet Union has several classes of 
nuclear powered submarines, one ice breaker, Lenin, (built in 
1959) and the Arktika Class larger ice-breakers under development 
and/or construction, very little detail is known on the quality 
of the Soviet nuclear propulsion systems. Some information, 
however, generally dealing with chronological data and theoretical 
considerations of the system application, particularly to. the 
merchant marine, have been published. Accordingly, the first 
ship nuclear propulsion systems were worked out at the beginning 

of the 1950' s and from 1953 the Soviet Union began construction 

42 
of nuclear submarines. In 1956, during XX Party Congress, 



41 

Ibid . , p. 146. 

42 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1971, p. 18. 



4-16 



43 



academician I. V. Kurchatov argued for the necessity of having 

a "wide open road for the nuclear energy application for tho 

i 

transport purpose" and that "the initiative of the engineers 
and the designers of ship building industry" should be encouraged. 
During the 1956-1957 period, the Central Scientific Research 
Institute made an extensive analysis concerning the feasibility 

and prospectives for applications of nuclear energy in the Soviet 

,44 

Merchant Marine. In 1968, in the Institute of Complex Transport 

Problems under Gosplan, the plan for developing nuclear power in 
maritime transport was discussed and' the necessity to develop 
economical atomic power installations for merchant vessels, 
1.5-2 times smaller and 4-6 times lighter than the first marine 
nuclear installations, stressed. In general, marine nuclear 
propulsion systems are already beyond the experimental testing 
stage. However, as for the merchant marine application, the 

widening of the sphere of nuclear power was said to be dependent 

45 
on the cost of the reactor, fuel, service and repair. Nevertheless, 

| 

! 

it was concluded that the wide application of nuclear propulsion 
system to the merchant marine is a question of the near future. 



43 



44 



Shipbuilding No. 4, 1970, pp. 51-58. 
Transactions, Vol. 133, p. 42. 



45 



Trud, 31 May 1968. 



/ 



/ 



m 



" ■ " ■ - 



l. l ii , m ] m-rm : - r *,-*->~mtm~ - - 



»^t » i urn — 1 1 I IWWIWW»WW "" I W' I I ' ■ ' ' 



The Central Research Institute tied the problem with the scope 
of the application of nuclear propulsion systems / arguing that 
widely applied experimentation with the nuclear propulsion »ystom, 

even in the case that the systems will not be profitable at 

46 
the beginning, is needed. 

47 
Other Soviet specialists, while recognizing the lower 

limit of economically effective application of nuclear propulsion 

systems as being in neighborhood of 50,000 HP, have emphasized 

that in the next several years it will be difficult for a nuclear 

propulsion systems to compete with those of the diesel or steam 

turbine. In general, the Soviet pronouncements concerning the 

wide introduction of nuclear power in maritime transport up to 

1968-1969 had been more enthusiastic then that they are today, 

whereas the cost factor has been mentioned as a major obstacle. 

Nonetheless, the specialized ships for the specific tasks and 

certain geographical areas, seem to be under consideration and 

may be even under development. 



46 

Transactions , Vol. 133, p. 146 

47 

Shipbuilding No. 4; 1971 



t 

1 



418 



Automation of Propulsion Systems 



l 



The automation of propulsion systems is relatively' well 
advanced. Little if anything is published concerning tl*« ftUtO»aU*» 
aboard the Soviet naval ships. However, already in the middle 
and late 1950' s, most of the propulsion plan of the Soviet 
escorts, destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, had various degrees^ 
of automation. It is logical to assume that the sophistication 
of the automatic devices have been increased together with the ^ 
scope of their application. As for the merchant ships, the 
TSNIIMF began to work with the problem in 1948. The steam turbine 
propulsion plant incorporating various automated devices for 
Leninskii Komsomol, Praga, Sophia class ships were the outcome 

, 48 
of this work. 

From 1958-1963 the efforts were directed to achieve "complex 

automation" of steam turbines and diesel propulsion plants. A 

special system for the repair and maintenance of automatic devices 

49 
„as organized in the Ministry of Shipbuilding. The system for 

the first automated diesel ship, Inzhiner A. Pustoshkin, was 

. worked out in 1963. The system served as a prototype for the 



48 Transactions , Vol. 133, p. 133. 
49 Ibid., p. 115. 



413 



development of automated diesel propulsion ships (Novgorod 
class) . A considerable degree of automation has been achieved 
on the first gas turbine ship, Parizhskaya Kommuna. 

At the end of 1960's the Soviet Shipbuilding Research 
Institutes completed the study determining the "rational degree 

of automation of propulsion systems" which presently serves. as 

50 
a guideline. In 1970 it was "stated that "in the USSR ships 

of various types with completely automated diesel, steam turbine, 

51 
and nuclear propulsion are being designed and built". _ 

The scope of ship automation is being constantly widened in 

the Soviet Union. The automatic stabilization system initially 

introduced in 1955 to the Kotlin Class DD and since widely used 

on many types of Soviet naval ships, has also been installed on 

some commercial and scientific research ships. An automatic 

transverse stabilization system installed on the scientific 

52 
research ship Akademic Kurchatov is typical. 

An automated navigational system had been designed and 

tested. A system for the automated electro-chemical protection 

of ship hulls from the corrosion has been worked out, but no 



50 

Ibid. , p. 25. 



51 

Ibid . , p. 116. 

52 

Sudostroyeniye No. 9, September 1967, pp. 31-34 



120 



i -— — — ■ ^ 



data was published concerning its practical test. 

As of the beginning of 1971, the Soviet Merchant Marine 
had 15 motor ships with so called complex automation, and one^of 
them, the Soviet built Svetlogorsk has an automated navigational 
system in addition to the automation of propulsion plant. 

Leaving aside the quality and reliability of Soviet systems 
of automation, owing to the absence of any data upon which they 
can be judged, it can be said that at least in quantative sense, 
the Soviet Union is among the leaders in the application of ship 

automation. 

To summarize, a considerable research work has been performed 
to determine the optimal types and sizes of propulsion systems 
for the Soviet ships. However, the selection of propulsion systems 
did not always, and in early stages including the past World 
War II period, seldom corresponded to optimality due to lack of 
appropriate engines and in many cases boilers. Quite often what 
is available instead of what is the best was installed. At the 
present, the situation has improved considerably and the concept 
of optimality is being applied to a larger degree. Thanks to 
the availability of larger diesel engines the upper limit of their 
use was elevated from 10-12,000 HP at the end of 1950's and the 
beginning of 1960 's to 20,000-25,000 HP at the present. High 
pressure, super heated steam propulsion systems were also introduced. 



421 

i , | | II | I I - - ' •""••" - 



The Soviet Union considerations and preferences relating 

to maritime propulsion for the decade of the 1970*5, particularly 

i 

for the 1971-1975 period, appears to be reflected in the planned 
deliveries of ships which are as follows: 

Universal dry cargo ships (4.5 - 13,000 dwt) , timber 
carriers (1.5 - 12,500 dwt) , refrigerators (5,000 - 10,000 dwt) 
will have propulsion plants whose power will not exceed 15,000 - 
20,000 HP. 

Increased number of bulk carriers which dwt will reach 
80,000 - 100,000 tons, but propulsion plant will not exceed 
15,000 - 20,000 HP. 

Fast dry cargo ships with speed of 23-24 knots and large 

53 
tankers of 150,000 dwt with propulsion power up to 30,000 HP. 

The majority of propulsion plants (up to 90%) will not 

require more than 12,000 - 15,000 HP, and, therefore it is clear 

that the low revolution diesel will continue to be the most 

• i 

widely used engine. The steam turbine systems will be used on 
large tankers and probably on some fast dry cargo carriers,' 
including container ships. The gas turbine would most likely 
continue to be used on a wide experimental basis. 

The Soviet Union will definitely start the construction of 

i 

larger tankers, bulk carriers, container ships, LASH, etc. in 



53 



Morskoy Flot No. 2, 1971. 



/ 



/ 



422 



1WI»—I— WW » «><l l III 



the near future, and the propulsion systems above 30,000 HP 
would be needed, and gas turbine or steam turbine for theia have 
to be developed. Most likely it will be the latter. In the^ 
more remote future, particularly the 1976-1980 period, the further 
increase in power of ship propulsion plant is expected 
(approximately 50,000 HP for one shaft ships and up to 100,000 
HP for two shafts ships) . Power installations of 10,000 - 30,000 
HP are expected for hydro-foils and 50,000 HP and more for 
air-cushioned ships. The diesels evolution is not expected to 
produce considerable increase in power output much above 50,000 

HP and for this reason, it was proposed to concentrate research 

54 
on turbine driven systems: (a) steam turbines with intermediate 

2 

super heating and high steam parameters (80-100 kg/cm and 

515-540 C with specific fuel consumption of 165-175 gr/HP/hour) . 
(b) gas turbines with prolonged service life and more economical 
(about 175 gr/HP/hour) . Northern latitude navigation is viewed 
as most favorable for gas turbines where the low air temperature 
can help to achieve the most economical specific fuel consumption 
of 170 gr/HP/hour and lower. In the more remote future, the gas 
turbiue is viewed as the most promising. For the hydrofoils and 
lir-cushioned ships it will remain the main type of engine; (c) 



54 

Transactions , Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 145-156 and Morskoy 

''lot No. 2, 1971. 






water cooled nuclear reactors for steam turbines capable to compete 
with the systems on the organic fuel, where power output of 50,000 
HP or more is needed. Power output of above 60,000-75,000 HP 
is considered already suitable for nuclear propulsion. 

Soviet Hydrofoils 

The Soviet Union occupies the leading position in the 
world in the varieties and number of hydrofoils produced. The 
chief designer of Soviet hydrofoils and head of the Sormovo 
Hydrofoils Design Bureau is R. E. Alekseev (the winner of Lenin 
State Prize) . His story is quite revealing in the history of 
Soviet hydrofoils designs and construction. In 1941, as a 
graduate student of the Gorki Polytechnical Institute, he 
presented the unusual graduation (diploma) design - a hydrofoil 
boat. The war interrupted further development and Alekseev 
was sent to work as an engineer at Sormovo Shipbuilding Yard. 
The yard, in its term, soon was switched to tank production. In 
1943, however, while the city was still being bombed by German 
planes, Alekseev was ordered to continue work with the hydrofoil. 
After prolonged experimentation and testing, the first Soviet 

hydrofoil of serial production, Raketa, was introduced for Volga 

55 
and other river navigation in 1956. After the Raketa, 110 



55 

Pravda, 14 July 1971. 



424 



i n — — w. "— ■■ i nn— — pw wm i n .i u i. i t H» » «i . ,|»ip| HI , > »> ,' i.l >i ^u .,.^. " .— ^»>.- ..«_.*. „-». 



*■ 



passengers Meteor, 300 passenger Sputnik, 150 passengers ' 

Burevestnik, 50 knots Chaika, and sea-going 118 passenger 

i 

Kometa, sea-going 260 passenger Vikhr' were designed and built 

in Sormovo. Other design bureau have also worked with hydrofoils. 

In Leningrad, 12 passenger sea-going Nevka, 92 passenger Strela, 

and 100 passenger sea-going Taiphun with automatically controlled 

56 
foils were built. Many Soviet built hydrofoils such as Vikhr', 

Chaika, Burevestnik, were still (at the beginning of 1971) in the 

stage of experimental exploitation and some were modified in 

the process. 

In 1970 the Soviet Union had five classes of hydrofoils in 

serial production, and 150 passenger lines were served by them. 

During the period of 1958-1968 the hydrofoils carried more than 

57 
30 million passengers. Recently, the Alekseyev Bureau designed 

and built two more classes of hydrofoils - sea-going Voskhod, 

58 
and Tsiklon. The latter, instead of propellers, use water jets. 

In May, 1971, modernized Kometa-M cruised from Yalta, Black Sea, 

59 I 

around Europe to Helsinki, Finland, with intermediate stops in 

many major European ports. 



Taiphun has two sets of engines and propellers - for slow 
and high speed and special start foils. 

57 

Sudostroyeniye No. 4, 1970, pp. 37-41. 



Pravda, 14 July 1971. 



59 



Vodnyy Transport , 20 July, 1971. / 



/ 



Air-Cushioned Vehicles 

(ACV, Hovercraft) v 

i 

The idea of air-cushioned motion is not new. The ~-\^ 

theoretical consideration, some with great details, began to 
appear in a number of countries in the 1920' s and 1930' s. In 
the Soviet Union, the idea was first developed by K. E. 
Tsiolkovskii. The initial work of Tsiolkovskii was continued 
by Professor V. Levkov, from Novocherkassk Poly technical Institute 
and since 1930, its director. The air dynamic laboratory of the 
institute started to test a model of chambered ACV in 1927 and 
later (1930) the test continued in the air dynamic tube. In 
1933, a special design bureau headed by Levkov was organized 

with the task of building and testing ACV. The first test of the 

60 
air-cushioned boat, L-l, was conducted in 1934. The L-l 

developed speed of 135 kilometers per hour (over 70 knots) . More 

powerful and heavier L-5, was built and tested in 1937. Both 

L-l and L-5 were capable of riding over different types of ground. 

Some more models of L type ACV's were built; the largest weighing 

15 tons. A naval version of L type ACV existed and was tested 

in the Gulf of Finland in the late 1930' s. The war interrupted 

the work. 



6Q Sudos troyeniye No. 7, 1971, pp. 55-56 and 
Socialisticheskaya Industria, 29 November 1970, p. 4, 



426 



■■« I* >*i H »i I. < || W— »tl I —!■■»- . - « . 



After the end of war, Levkov continued his work with 
ACV's, but in addition to difficulties with design, the Soviet 
economic situation, particularly the low level of technology 
and lack of appropriate engines, did not warrant the success. 
With Levkov* s death in 1954, the experiments discontinued. In 
1957 an ACV of original design by a student at Gubkin Petroleum 
College, G. Turkin, was built- but the test was never concluded by 
the designer who died in 1959 overwhelmed by the problem. 

The decade of the 1960's witnessed a number of attempts 
to solve the problem by various Soviet agencies. The attempt 
to develop Turkin 's idea was undertaken at the Chelyabinsk 
Tractor Plant and its design bureau; it was a failure. The 
same disappointment awaited the attempts of Volgagrad Plant, of 
the Tsagi Research Institute and elsewhere under various 
ministries and departments. By 1962, most of the projects were 
discontinued because, according to the State Scientific Technical 

Committee under the Gosplan, of "poor prospects for hovercraft 

61 
and low technical characteristics of the experimental models." 

/ ! 

In 1963 the work on ACV v/as resumed at the NATI's Chelyabinsk 

j 

affiliate only to be dropped in three months time, whereupon, the 

i 

i 

the USSR Ministry for Tractor and Agricultural Machine building 



Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 November 1967. 



/ 
/ 



k21 



^W* 1 * 1 " " " ■! ■ " « iwwwwwww»ww>— n» i p. j „ ■*<»«■■ ■" t-*«*i|fB*, vr 4w«M. ■ ww.p*** ■ u j >i m, im * "^ •lj ?** » hw J * > * * • * ***>> ! «— »* . >•*-+*»» •*"»£> 



handed over the project to the USSR Ministry for Chemical and 
Petroleum Industry. In the mid-1960's, apparently, the work with 
ACT in the Soviet Union could be described by a single word, a 
mess. A battery of articles, some being very critical, appeared 
in the Soviet Press arguing for the urgently needed machine (ACT) , 
and requesting the resumption of design and experimental work. 
"Where are the air-cushioned machines" became quite a common 
leader in many Soviet newspapers, particularly professional 
periodicals; and sound arguments were presented for the necessity " 

of building them. 

The poor development of the Soviet ground transportation 
system, particularly highways is commonly known. la Siberia, 
Tumen' Oblast, where the oil fields are under intensive 
development, in 1969 there were only .014 kilometer, or 14 meters, 
of paved roads per each 100 sq. kilometers (in India there are 
33 kilometers). Nearly half of Siberia's territory is known 
to be occupied by impassable swamps. The cost of 1 kilometer 
of road is from 340,000 rubles to 1.5 million rubles. The j number . 
of roads which had been built was 14 times as little as the average 
for the country. Western Siberia was called the "ideal testing 
ground for grinding out conventional road transport". Even heavy 
duty trucks and tractors were wearing out after one year of use; 
special vehicles, being used in the oil land, had to.be discarded 



/ 



428 



J ....,„„ -„„,■„-- - ~«~ i » ** •* »• *". 



after a few months service for broken carriers. Helicopters 
were being used at an hourly cost ranging from 2*60 rubles (MI-4) 

CO 

to 1,700 rubles (MI-6) . ' The river transport plays a very 
important role in Siberia, but the rivers are frozen during the 

winter from five to seven months. The cost of transport amounted 

63 
to 17% in 1959 and 26% in 1967 of the total cost of oil drilling. 

Air-cushioned vehicles under the circumstances were found 

even in the second half of the 1960's to be superior in every 

aspect to the transportation facilities which were employed in 

Siberia, and some even called ACV "singularly prospective and 

universal under the circumstances". The passenger transportation 

along the thousands of rivers does play an important role too, 

and in many cases can be provided only by air-cushioned boats. 

The ACV proponents recommended the creation of a united center 

on hovercraft research which, in addition to experimental uork, 

would have the production facilities as well. But for a while the 

State Committee for Science and Technology under the Gosplan 

I 

i 
and a number of ministries resisted the idea referring to 'the 

fact that "up to now, the acceptable technological solutions 

eliminating existing problems of the machine (ACV) have not been 



62 

Komsomolskaya Pravda , 28 February 1969 

63 

Ibid. 



/ 



/ 



429 



64 
found neither in our country nor abroad". Toward the end of 

the 1960's, however, the proponents of the ACV proved that not 

the idea, but the attempted ways of its implementation were 

defective and this was the strongest reason for intensifying 

the research and further experimentation. At that time (1969) 

the proponents had a good argument supporting their battle and 

they did not miss the opportunity to use this in the following 

statement claiming that: "our country is being considerably 

behind the contemporary level of ACV development reached abroad, 

65 .. 

particularly in England", which the opponents could not easily 

refute, for more than technological the matter now could easily be 

interpreted from the position of international prestige and, 

hence, acquired a political overtone. No one in the Soviet Union 

could dare to ignore such a factor and, suddenly, the green 

light for the ACV was open and its bright future "discovered" 

at the top of administrative technological bureauocracy and the 

same State Committee for Science and Technology recommended to 

the Gosplan "to include air-cushioned ships in the plan of country's 

economic development", and also recommended to the Ministry of 

Shipbuilding Industry "to undertake correspondent measures for 



64 1 



Ibid. 



65 Vodnyy Transport , 11 January 1969 



430 



i. ii ■ i m p wii n <mim**<mm 



«****S**wi5^.*--^ -~ ■*"* * ' "•■" 



66 I 
industrial production of a party of such sbips". The ACV 

Sormovich was singled out as a "particularly promising type". 

in all fairness it should be emphasized that the arguments of 

opponents, particularly from the State Committee, were not as 

ridiculous as presented by the proponents of the ACV. First, 

in overall, the research of the air-cushioned principles, though 

not centralized and conducted by various institutions and agencies, 

nevertheless was relatively extensive, and a number of experimental 

models performing rather satisfactorily were produced (Neva, 

Raduga, Sormovich). Second, the technological solution leading 

to the construction of well performing machine was not found and, 

probably, the Soviet industry was not ready and capable to assure 

argued mass production of the air-cushioned machines. 

A powerful support to the ACV proponents was probably 

given by the Soviet Navy which have bad definite ACV interests, 

and a number of models, shown during the Navy Day Parades in the 

late I960', and in 1970, were developed. The Navy's version of 

ACV was used as a means to discbarge the advance party of naval 

infantry during an amphibious operation and for other slmilir 



purposes. 

The following air- cushioned vessels were designed, built, 



and tested: 



88 Ship buildin g No. 2., 1970. 

/ 



431 



!»1 ii i i n . '■ " ' " ' ' " ' " 



So rmovic h - first built iu 1965, 50 passenger, 100 
kilometers per hour, is being viewed as promising \ and recommended 

for production; ...^ 

Orion - average speed 60 kilometers per hour, 80 passengers, 

also recommended for serial production; 

Gor'kovchanin - 50 passengers, slow, around 30-35 kilometers 
per hour, but viewed as very promising and is being produced 
in large number. All the above ACV's are for inland water 
navigation. The navy version, shown in Moscow in 1970, was a 
sea-going ACV with approximate capacity for a platoon of naval 

infantrymen. 

In spite of the obvious interest developed in the Soviet 
Union toward ACV of a rather conventional type, the future, and 
hence long term research orientation is viewed to belong to the 
other type of "flying vessels" - "ekranoplan" (thereafter referred 
as skimmer, surface skimmer system, wing-in-ground vehicle). 
The interest in such a system both from the Soviet Navy and 
Merchant Marine has recently been clearly evident and expressed in 

pry 

the Soviet specialized literature. The various countries 1 , 
including the Soviet Union, research efforts so far clearly 
indicated the two design approaches to the problem's solution: 



N. I. Belavin, Ekranoplany , Sndostroyeniye , 1968; 
Shipbuilding No. 3, 1971, pp. 14-21: Xrasnaya Zyezda, 21 August 



1970. 



ti 32 



"""- ' " ' " ' ' ' " ' ill 11 " '" ii»»iin ii« rm i wn n , ' , 'i m ... ■■ h i- . m . n .M.1. ii ■ un i m .i iii juj i i ii i i mww — i. vn , 



(a) "wing" (flying wins, wing-in-ground) vehicle, with which 
the overwhelming majority of research efforts have been associated, 
including experiments of the Odessa Institute of Engineers of^ 
Merchant Fleet, and (b) fuselage, of which the Airfoilboat 
X-112 is typical. 68 Most of the wing-in-ground vehicles designed 
so far followed to a large degree the Katamaran principle, and 
have a carrying wing with two floats on the ends. Presently, 
the aero-dynamic characteristics of the skimmers are apparently 
low, and, combined with the power plants used, are keeping down 
the speed achieved (about 50-80 knots) . But the ACT requires 
three times more power than a skimmer of the same mass and 
speed. Moreover, the skimmer speed is considerably higher than 
ACV. The major problem is presented by the start, during which 
all the above advantages of skimmer, because of it's air-hydro- 
dynamic qualities, are substantially reduced. The hope for the 
skimmer use in a rather broad spectrum of speed (from 100 to 
200-300 knots) and ranges, requiring only 20-70 HP/ton (presently 
existing skimmers require 75-380 HP/ ton) was expressed. If on 
a distance up to 2,000 miles all of an ACV cargo capacity would be 
used for fuel, a skimmer in addition would be able to carry 500 
tons of cargo. 69 With the increase in size, the skimmers useful 



Dane's Surface Skimmer Systems 1968/1969 - 1969/1970 
69 Shipbuilu.ing Ho. 3, 1971, p. 20. 



4v30 



^w>^— ■ t»»p m tm<mw mm t rnprnm m w i www^.» ' « * w w r'* w " « '^" ^>^- w r.^'^ — 



load is growing considerably while required power per unit 
of weight is diminished. The Soviet development along this 
direction would be quite logical. The appearance of a satisfactory 
model skimmer prior to the middle of the 1970's is unlikely. 
During the current five year plan, the Soviet Union will produce 
a number of ACV types, most of them rather small and suitable 
only for passenger transportation. 



Some Factors Determining 
Designs and Construction 



Often, while analyzing Soviet shipbuilding, conclusions, 
concerning sizes of the ships built, are associated with the 
availability of ani sizes of building ways, experience, and the 
general level of the Soviet technology. While all these 
considerations are certainly valid to a large degree, the economic 
factor, the profitability of a ship the Soviet Union plans to 
build, its suitability to the planned environment of operation, 
are often ignored. However, it was found that all these factors 
are closely examined by the Soviet specialist and the economical 
ones are often adopted; the search for the optimality, taking under 
consideration as many variables as possible, is often conducted 
with the finding used in the decision making processes. A very 



70 



Morskoy Plot No. 7, 1971, pp. 3-5 



434 



i 'i n m**-w**cmm*imi>i*m* % m \*m ■ » « > * -w-«« v . »m * »»■;■ r . 7 . tw , - a ,r, n,., , 



» 'J» . #W L il\.»lW| 'l J Vlt» <*• ■*.» ■*-!-, rWI^MMfM 



demonstrative case is the Soviet Union's approach to tanker 
construction and the composition of the tanker fldet. The 
table below shows the economic performance of various sizes of 
Soviet tankers and includes required capital investment and 
operational expenditures determined on a concrete example of the 
transportation of 1,000,000 tons of oil at the distance of 5,000 
miles: 



435 



■ \ 



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For a 25,000 dwt tanker fleet the cost of transportation 

of 1,000,000 tons of oil for 5,000 miles is 7,190)000 rubles. 

i 

The 50,000 dwt tanker fleet reduces this cost down to 5,470,000 
rubles, or by 24%. However, the corresponding increase in size 

of 50,000 dwt tankers fleet to 100,000 dwt tankers fleet produces 

71 

considerably smaller increases amounted to 10-12%. All data 

representing Soviet cost and are correspondingly valid only for 
the Soviet tankers. Operational realities, i.e. ports {cargo 
handling capacity, their sizes, depths, storage facilities, 
inland transportation, etc.) and requirements of the line(s) 
(availability of cargo flow, demand for it, their stabilities, 
competition etc.) are factors (variables) considered by the Soviet 
specialist in the selection of required ships and their number 
to be constructed or ordered. 

During the decade of the lS60's the size of tankers 
delivered grew from 20,000 dwt to 50,000 dwt. 



/ 



71 ! 

U. A. Gnatkov, Giants of the Ocean Roads , Znanie P.H., 

Moscow, 19 G9, p. 4. 

■ 

/ 



437 



rlass (Country of Cargo Power Speed Draft 

Construction) Capacity , (1,000 (knots) ( M W») 

1,000 tons H.P.) m - 



Velikii Oktyabr' ■ 

(USSR) I5 -° y,y 

Bauska (Poland) 19.0 7.8 15.5 9.2 

Split (Yugoslavia) 20.8 . 12.0 17.1 9.2 

mwv\ 30 5 19.0 18.5 10.65 

Warshava (USSR) ju.o 

Leonardo DeVincbi 11 65 

(Italy) 48.9 19.0 17.4 11.65 

Sopbiya (USSR) 49.4 19.0 17.2 11.6 



Source: M. A. Gnatnov,~op. cit., pp. 24-26. 

At the beginning of 1969, the Soviet tanker fleet was composed 

of: about 20% of tankers with 10,000 d»t or less cargo capacity; 

about 30% of 15-25,000 Art cargo capacity ships; and about 50% 

72 
of 30-50,000 dwt cargo capacity ships. Meanwhile, the process 

of average tonnage growth in the world tanker fleet had started 

during the second half of the 1950's. Most of the giant tankers 

i», tfe* fttlttuwtoe -^r^u^ (Crittli torn &*&&&** «* Jtoiftft****. feutf* 

in the U.S.) were built in Japan: 

Sinclair Petrole - 56,089 Tons - 1956 
Universe Apollo - 104,520 Tons - 1959 
Nissho Maru, 130,250 Tons - 1962 
Idemitsu Maru, 206,000 Tons - 1966 



72 Ibid., p. 24 



438 



II--"!*-"!,!.. I ■ - ■ ■■■'■■ .-..-.-.— — ~~.«~...--- ■>» ■ li OT Xl U' l . | «»|H »»»»I»«. 



This trend was accelerated by the closing of the Suez Canal. With 
more than 50% of the oil imported by Europe coming' from the Middle 
East, cheaper transportation bad to be found, and was. The answer 
was even larger tankers with huge capacities making it economical 
to go around Cape of Good Hope (approximately 11,000 miles) to 
Europe or America. These tankers outgrew both the Suez and 
Panama Canals. Even if previously announced plans to deepen the 
Suez Canal materialize, no more than 200,000 tonners would be able 
to navigate it. (In 1968, 326,000 tonners - Universe Island were 
built in Japan, 400,000 tonners were designed and a plan to design 
a 1,000,000 ton tanker was announced.) Such a trend, could not 
help but influence the leader of the Soviet Merchant Marine and its 
scientific- research and design institutions, and subsequently 
probably s, peed up the consideration for the larger tanker construction 
Initially, in 1968, the 100,000 dwt tanker was favored. Even 
the name of the head-ship in the class, Moskva , was selected, which 

» 

indicates the completion of at least preliminary design. However, 
at the end of that year a number of articles appeared arguing for 
a larger tanker and debates under the general headline: "What the 
new large tanker shall be?", lasting a whole year, started. Among 
the participants were representatives of practically all branches 
of the Soviet Merchant Marine, shipbuilding industry, and a number 
of scientific-research institutes and design bureaus. Many meetings 



439 



and conferences at scientific and technological councils of 

\ 
I 

various organizations., including the participation of hundreds of 
officers of the merchant marine, designers and scientists, were 
held. While tens of various conclusions and opinions which were 
published indicated different approaches to the technological 
details of the proposed ship, the same concerning the size and its 
justifications were quite, and even surprisingly, similar. 
Leaving the technological arguments aside, the arguments' of the 
second group concerning the size can be summarized as follows: 

- the tanker should be able to enter major domestic 

73 
oil ports; 

_ 

- the tanker size and its draft should present no problem 
in the passage of major canals (Suez, Panama) ; 

- the tanker must be able to navigate through major straits, 

■ 

particularly Bosphor, safely, without assistance from tugs and 
interruption of other traffic; 

- the ship should be able to profitably participate in 

foreign trade, transportation of oil among domestic ports and 1 

i 

while being chartered. 

The following arguments were submitted by the TSNIIM?: 



73 

The approved Souzmorniiproekt plan visualizes the 

increase of guaranteed depths of many Soviet ports, assuring 
entrance of ships with the draft up to 17 meters. Morskoy Flot 
No. 12, 1969, p. 20. 



MQ 



^ In spite of the fact that giant tankers will definitely 
be built during the decade of the 1970' s and will carry a 
substantial portion of crude oil, there is no reason to expect 
that they will represent the basic nucleus of the tanker fleet 
of the future, because "they are vulnerable during the war " 
(emphasis added - N.S.) for their low speed, poor maneuverability 
and the huge target area they-. present for the submarine and 
aviation; 

possibility of catastrophic consequences in case of 
accident (damage or wreck) ; 

they cannot comply with the existing International Rules 
of the Road (they are not maneuverable at less than five knots, 
cannot be stopped in less than two to three miles and hence/ 
can do little by themselves to avoid collision in the event if 
another ship is negligent) ; 

they can be used only among few ports, which are specially 
equipped and require a depth of not less than thirty meters; 

the losses of time for any reason are too costly; 

the construction cost, per ton of deadweight while decreasing 
with the growth of tanker tonnage up to 300,000 dwt, with further 
increase in size begins to increase (because the necessity to 
assure longitutlnal strength, non-optimum coefficients dictated 
by the desire to reduce the draft) . 



urn 



v The institute draw the conclusions, that during the 1970' s, 
the basic deadweight of tankers will be between 100,000 to 300,000 
tons. Tankers with 125,000 - 150,000 dwt will have the advantage 

of passing the Suez Canal being loaded, while tankers up to 

74 
250,000 dwt will bo able to navigate it while in balast. 

At the end of 1369, the Collegium of the Ministry of 
Merchant Marine considered the arguments, and "mainly, on the 
basis of economic considerations", selected the tanker designed 
by the group beaded by chief-designer, N. N. Rodionov. The 
main characteristics of the tanker are as follows: 

150,000 dwt (about 180,000 tons displacement); 

propulsion plant - steam-turbine, 30,000 h.p. with the 
reduction gear and variable pitch propeller; 

speed - 16.5 knots; 

dimensions - L=293 meters; B=45 meters; L/B ratio around 6; 

draft 16-17 meters; 

endurance - 20,000 miles (80 days); 

unloading time approximately ten hours, considerable degree 

/ ! 

of automation (machine watch - one man) and computerized navigation, 

75 
crew 36. 



id 

TSNIIMF, T ransactions , Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 60-63. 

i 
Morskoy Flot No. 12, 1969, p. 20; Nedelya No. 48, 1969; 
Izvestiya , 4 December 1969; Le n ing radskay a Pravda. , 1 January 1971; 
Sovetskaya Possiya , 21 February 1971; Sudostroyeniye No. 4, 1970, p. 
18; Votinyy Transport , January 8, 1971. 



W2 



The design incorporates the typificatiou of general 
solutions and larger variations of the tanker, in definite limits, 

f 

can be built after experience in building and service is obtained. 
This would probably not happen before the second half of the 
1970's. So far, the MIR will be the largest ship ever built in 
the Soviet Union. 

A similar approach has been taken in consideration of other 
types of ships, particularly ore carriers. The Soviet Merchant 
Marine, up to the end of the 1960 *s, in reality did not have bulk 

carriers. Their role has been assigned to the universal ships, 

76 
such as the 23,000 ton Zvenigorod class. The first relatively 

large bulk carrier, Baltika with 35,800 ton cargo capacity v/as 

built in the Soviet Union in 1968. The larger bulk carriers are 

presently being built and bulk carriers up "to 80,000 tons are 

planned. 

In the dry cargo ships category, the largest ship up to 

the end of the 1950 's, was the American built Liberty class. 

i 
During the decade of the 1960's in addition to foreign deliveries 

i 
(14,150 dwt Omsk class - Japan; 14,480 dwt Beloretsk class - 

Denmark; 12,375 dwt Vyborg class - East Germany) , the Soviet 

shipbuilding industry built several classes of dry cargo ships: 



76 

M. A. Gnatnov, op. cit., p. 18 and 33. 



; ' 



H3 



' '■ ' ii !■•» imwm*H*« 



i in . ■ m ■ i - i n 



v Leninskii Komsomol - 16, 080 dwt 
Bozhitsa - 12,640 dwt 

Kapitan Kushuarenko - 15,768 dwt x 

Slavyansk - 12,680 dwt * 

all with speeds of 17-18.5 knots. *"*""-- 

Both domestic and foreign built ships were produced by a 

large series. The optimality concept, i.e. size, power, degree 

of automation, determined by the concrete conditions of operation 

with the goal to achieve maximum possible profitability, has been 

77 
fully applied. 

In the never ending search for the improvement of various 
modes of propulsion at sea, nature gives man a good indication 
for optimality: among the many thousands of soa founa, none 
lives permanently on the surface. At the present, there are 
two general tendencies in the development of sea transportation 
(the naval, carrying weaponry, should be included in such general 
term) in order to increase speed and to achieve optimum utilization 
of consumed power - to go up, above the surface, or down, below 
it - both clearly indicating the attempt to break away from the 
service. Following the first principles, hydro-foils and air- 
cushioned ships have been under development. As for the hydro-foils, 
tens h.p.'s per each ton of its weight is needed to maintain it 
above the surface and there is no noticeable decrease in the 



v 



77 

M. A. Gnatkov, op. cit., pp. 33-35. 



' r ■ '"•■ - '" -'•— — "~»-*^ ■■•„•„- "^rr.rr.^. '■■"""" t "r„„ 



specific power requirement with an increase in the, size of the 
hydro-foils. For the large hydro-foil ships hundred of thousands, 
and maybe millions horsepowers will be required and the weight 
of machinery and necessary fuel will exceed many times the cargo 
capacity of such ships. It is logical to conclude that the 
application of the hydro-foil principle will be limited mainly 
for passenger ships with displacement not exceeding 1,000 tons 
or for small amount of valuable cargo, speedy delivery of which is ^ 
required (including relatively light packages of weapon systems 
on board of naval hydro-foils) . 

A somewhat similar, although more promising situation, 
exists with air-cushion ships whose initial specific power 
requirement per ton of weight does not differ much from the 
hydro-foils. However, with the increase in size and weight of 
air-cushion ships, specific power requirements are diminishing, 
raising the expectation that in the future, construction of 
relatively large air cushion ships can be achieved. 

The second tendency in the development of sea transportation 
is more promising. To begin with, the submerged ships are not 
handicapped by weather, their propellers work under more favorable 
« conditions, and the propulsion coefficient is higher. The low 
speed submersibles are less economical than the high speed in 



445 



ii—n ■"" ■ ■ 



comparison with the surface ships. The high cost of construction 
of subnariae transports, particularly the cost of nuclear propulsion 
systems and more complicated navigational equipment, coupled with 
the absence of urgent need for high speed sea transportation for 
the majority of cargoes, ai*e at the present the major obstacles 
for wide application of submarine transports in the mercantile 
practice. The situation, however, might be different 10-20 years 
from now. Various pronouncements in the Soviet specialized 
press give reason to believe that the Soviet shipbuilding industry ' 
is working on the solution of submarine transport navigation, 
particularly for certain areas such as Arctic, and for highly 
specialized ships, such as the submarine tanker, and perhaps 
the submarine container carrier. An original proposal for the 
solution of the pi'oblem was presented by Soviet scientist U. 

Plenkin (Nikolaev Institute of Shipbuilding) for which two patents 

78 
were granted. Even the construction of submersible fish catching 

ships is not excluded in the future and the concept has been under 

79 1 

discussion accompanied by some drawings. As for the under the 

surface submersible, in spite of the obvious attractiveness of 

conventional power plant utilization and some savings in construction 



78 

Trud, 3 August 1968. 

73 

Shipbuilding No. 4., 1970, pp. 12-14. 



1 / 



446 



cost, the large vet surface of such ships and considerable volume 
of displacement requiring use of ballast greatly reduces the 

propulsion advantages. In spite of the fact that the idea was^ 

80 
discussed by the Soviet specialist, its application is doubtful. 

In summary, the development of larger air-cushioned ships 
and submarine transport can logically be expected by the Soviet 
Union, and the appearance of .experimental ships of this kind 
somewhere in the mid 1970' s would not be surprising. 

The efforts of Soviet shipbuilding research and develop- 
ment institutions is supported by a good experimental base which 
includes some specialized ships. In 1968, a small 600 ton ship, 
Issiedovatel' (Researcher) , made an equatorial voyage testing 
various equipment in tropical climates. The results of the voyage, 
according to a number of articles, exceeded all expectations and a 
decision was made to build a "floating base for comprehensive 
research Y/hich will permit sharp acceleration in the process of 
introduction of new equipment to shipbuilding". Named Izumrud, 
the ship was designed by Kherson Tskb (Central Design Bureau) 
"Morsudoproekt" and built by the Nikolaev Ship Yard. The ship has 
10 scientif ic-x*esearch laboratories, 27 research sections (groups) , 
and was designed to test main engine and auxiliary mechanisms, 



80 

Morskoy Plot Ho. 6, 1971, pp. 49-53. 



w 



■ n ■■!■■ — i ■!-, ■»,, ii | i Ml , W | |Hi||ni| H M W It^pw.! K W pij .i nn I I >.. . | | ■ «% « » ■ ■ » ■ I PUiiW X Mn i m^^MM / . , |« ^W WJ WWI H J «| < » H I |I|WW F fii r^ , » * ***8W»lMgpMlg| 



various electronic equipment, crew living conditions, vibration, 
new shipbuilding materials, structures, etc. The ship is. the 
only one of its kind in the world shipbuilding practice known to 

81 
this writer. 

The specialists of the Soviet shipbuilding industry 

presently are often used to provide technical assistance to other 

countries' shipbuilding industries. The methods employed can be 

well illustrated by the example of Egyptian Ship Yard in Alexandria - 

a modern shipbuilding enterprise incorporating some of the latest 

achievement in the Soviet and world shipbuilding practice - built 

with Soviet assistance. The assistance was provided by a group of 

Soviet specialists from various enterprises, but mainly from Kherson 

Ship Yard. In addition, the main effort in the assistance was 

devoted to the training of Egyptian specialists and workers 

through three methods: by sending them to the Soviet Union for 

training on the Soviet yards, educational and research institutions; 

by organizing Alexandria's ship yard training center with the 

capacity to train 600 people per year; on the job training (350 men 

were trained in 1969-1970) . With the participation of Soviet 

specialist, the first ship Alexandria (13,000 ton dry cargo ship) 

82 
was built over a two year period and launched 23 May 1971. Similar 

assistance has been granted to other countries. 



81 
c 



Nedelya No. 29, 1989. 



82 

Trud, 10 Junel971. 



/ 



v. <j i...i ...... ... >. .- .■ < ■■» » - - 



Conclusions 

The Soviet shipbuilding industry is centrally controlled 

by the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and builds naval, 

merchant, fishing, river, and research ships. Historically the 

Russian, and up to the middle of 1950' s, the Soviet shipbuilding 

industry was heavily deviated toward naval construction with only 

15-30% allocated for civilian* production. Starting with the 

late 1950' s, considerable shipbuilding capacities have been allocated 

to civilian construction and the appearance of a reverse trend is 

unlikely. In addition to achieved levels of technology and 

experience, the capacity of the Soviet industry in general and the 

shipbuilding industry in particular have been playing a crucial 

role in determining the output of the Soviet shipbuilding industry 

in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. The intensity 

and the composition of the Soviet naval construction, in turn, has 

been dependent upon the availability of weapons systems, 

occasionally producing a temporarily available capacity for the 

additional civilian construction. Orders abroad have been 

crucial for the civilian, i.e. merchant marine, fishing, and 

I 
research ship construction, and in certain times important j 

(particularly for propulsion systems) for naval construction. 

Together with the Soviet Bloc countries, shipbuilding industries 

of practically all European countries and Japan have provided the 



/' 



443 



*■!■ ^ < I PI W ^W»W 



Soviet Union with massive deliveries of hundreds of various ships 
and assistance (particularly in propulsion - dieseis) . As a 
corollary to this, the utilization of foreign yard capacities- 
seems to guarantee avoidance of a possible future over capacity 
of the Soviet shipbuilding industry. The industry has a powerful 
scientific research institutions supporting it. A number of 
innovative methods in shipbuilding, production technique, and 
original solutions have been implemented. Future growth of both 
naval and mercantile fleets should further stimulate the production 
and experience of the industry resulting in the construction 
of better and more sophisticated ships. 



450 



-. .., ,. . ,, i — ~— — 



.- ■» ■ ». i mim" m m * mn • ^mw < ~»-w 



! 
i 



CHAPTER IV 

1 

OCEANOGRAPHY 

Introduction 

Besides the number of geographical discoveries by, the 
Russians, many of which were associated with commercial under- • 
takings, the first Russian expedition to study the northern and 
eastern shores of the country and to describe the seas, the Great 
Northern Expedition, was ordered by Peter the Great and conducted 
after his death (1725-1730 and 1733-1743) . Around-the-world 
voyages of the Nadezhda and Neva, under the command of Kruzenshtem 
and Lisyansky (1803 and 1806 respectively) also produced 
oceanographic work which was of considerable importance for the 

time . | 

i 
During the around-the-world voyage of the Predpriyatiye 

(1323-1826) /the physicist Lents measured water temperature, 



1 In the Soviet literature on the subject, the terms 
oceanography and oceanology are used interchangeably and 
aresynonomous. The latter seems to be preferred by Soviet 
scientists. : 



/ 



-151 



., .-I ,.,.,,.,„ „■ ,«,.,.., , - ^ ~ ^- w > -« . .^ www « w -„ y ^-«.^ 



2 

salinity, and density. The famous scientific cruise of the 

British research ship Challenger (1872-1876) had a considerable 
influence upon the development of oceanography and especially the 
Russian approach to it. The Challenger expedition, in effect, 
established a methodical approach which has been used in general 
up to the present time. The Russian expedition aboard Vityaz, 
in which a young S. Makarov .participated, was the first Russian 
attempt to follow it. 

The collection of data and facts mainly through expeditions 
is still considered to bo one of the major tasks at this stage 
of development of oceanography. Up to the quite recent past, 
hydrography and meteorology were the two best developed 
disciplines, for they were in fact the ones needed most for 
navigation. The level of development of science and technology, 
particularly the latter, had been the major limiting factor to 
the scope of oceanographic work. The growing world population, 
increased industrial output, the scarcity of 'various raw materials, 
the rapid development of sea transportation, military requirements 
and man's unrelenting drive to discover the new have been the 
major factors stimulating the development of oceanography. 

After "tforld War II, particularly during the'1950's, it 



2 



Medvedev , Suda dly a Is sledo vaniya Mi rovogo Okeana 



(Ships for the Research of the World Ocean) , Sudostroyoniye , 
Leningrad, 1371, pp. 215. 



!j52 



became clear that in addition to making the traditional ocean 
surveys to produce maps and charts, including those of the bottom, 
oceanography had to find, or help to find, ways to solve a number 
of problems: a fresh water from the sea, which contains 96-97% 
of all the water on our planet; power from the sea, where 
considerable energy sources (waves, tidal, nuclear - deuterium) 
exist; protein to feed humans and animals; extraction of 
minerals from the world ocean, where they have hardly been 
exploited at all (with the exception of off-shore oil) . In 
addition to the 36 different elements claimed to found in solution 
in sea water in quantities known to exceed those in land deposits 
(gold, nickel, silver, molybdenum, iodine, etc.), the surface 
of the bottom is covered with a layer of iron-manganese nodules 
(concretions) , estimated by some Soviet scientists to total 

o 
•3 

hundreds of billions of tons for the Pacific Ocean alone. 

It was also claimed that the world resources of cobalt 

on land are about a million tons. There are about a thousand 

i 

i 

million tons of it in nodules alone. The most logical *way ; to 

/ ! 

reach the mantle is from the ocean plateaus, where the earth's 

crust dwindles to five-six kilometers compared to 35-40 kilometers 

4 
oa the continent. 



Academician L. Zenkevich , Th e Wealth of the Oceans , 
Nauka i Zhian', No. 3, 1967, pp. 16-22. 

4 1 bid. •/ 

i 

453 



■»«■— r u n i ■!■ mi v m*i u n,wm n 9n n m v mmm n +m **<.< * *>**»,-,.. ■■«>« " i «. <*V^ -- m ■» *■ ■* «» ' « ■,■ P ,i M.H^rr***- ■*>■ * ■ ^ ■ r ^ , ^.^. — .» — .—* «, -» « ■ . 



The enormous effect of the ocean on the thermal conditions 
in the atmosphere and, hence, climate is well known. By 
comparison, the thermal effect of the surface layer of land is 
negligibly small. On the other hand, the circulation of ocean 
water depends to a great extent on the movement of masses of 
air above the ocean. Many Soviet scientists call the climate 
of the earth an oceanic climate. Man has started to explore 
the expanses of both outer space and the ocean, inner space, at 
nearly one and the same time , in the second half of the 20th 
Century. It is safe to assume that the world ocean has greater 
significance for the life of man than outer space. 

The first International Geophysical Year of 1957-1958, 
and particularly the second International Oceanographic Congress 
held in Moscow (30 May - 9 June 1966) provided detailed information 
on the scope of Soviet oceanography, and attracted world 
attention to the Soviets' intensified efforts in the field. 
During the Congress, the Soviet Union proudly announced the 
creation of "the first system in the world which fully automates 
the process of obtaining and processing oceanographic data right 
on board ship". They refer to the new Soviet research ship, 
Akademik Kurchatov. The reports by Soviet scientists on research 
in the Arctic and the Antarctic dominated the Congress. Considerable 
progress achieved by Soviet oceanography was evident in the 



154 



-.-.,■,, m .„-,— ~ , «, .„ , , .. ., , . . . -~-~«-»~ «mm.*>, -^~~« 



— -».^..»_ .~ . 



relation to the Atlantic Ocean basin (particularly the- physical 
oceanography of the Mediterranean, and the Black, 'North and Baltic 
Sea), the Pacific Ocean arid, to a lesser degree, the Indian Ocean, 
although the Soviet Indian Ocean expedition (starting with the 

cruise of Vityaz in 1959) was among the first, if not the first, 

5 
to begin work in the Indian Ocean. 

At the end of 1968, a U. S. Congressional source reported, 

in somewhat alarmed tone, that in the Soviet Union "200- 

oceanographic vessels are assigned to applied and basic ocean 

research. Nine thousand scientists are utilized in a variety of 

oceanographic programs". The continuing construction of new 

scientific vessels by Soviet, Polish, and East German yards was 

emphasized. The study also referred to the requirement for all 

Soviet ships (naval, merchant, and fishing) "to contribute to 

the country's overall oceanographic effort", a requirement as 

old as sea navigation. One of the study's conclusions was 

noteworthy; "The Soviets also have been in the ocean studies 

business in a more serious fashion for a longer time than the 

United States or its Western allies". 



5 Morskoy Sbornik , No. 8, 1966, pp. 74-78. 

6 

"The Changine Strategic Naval Balance; USSR vs. USA", 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 90 Congress, 
December 1963, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1968, 
Washington, D. C, p. 38. 



t55 



' ■ ■ ■ — 



' - " * —~* ! ~ '. > .!, . ,. ». , . 



Soviet oceanographers were the first to collect data for, 
and to publish a detailed bottom map, of the Pacific Ocean and 

to prepare basic data for a biological atlas of the Indian 

7 ~^ 

Ocean. Extensive writings in Soviet specialized literature and, 

more important the Party and government press, arguing for the 

intensified exploration of minerals and oil from the ocean, and 

the directives of 24th Party Congress for the 1971-1975 plan, 

setting tasks for the work on the Continental Shelf, are 

testimony that the Soviet Union is on the verge of extensive 

efforts to explore the ocean wealth. 

The Soviet Union is already engaged in researching the 

super-deep areas of the earth. More than 20 wells over 5,000 

meters deep have been drilled. Preparations are underway for 

drilling five 15,000 - 18,000 meter wells; one of them will be 

8 
sunk in the Kuriles. 

Soviet oceanography will be considered according to the 

following outline: 

(1) The development and major work of Soviet oceanography; 

j 

(2) Oceanographic vessels; 

(3) Underwater research and equipment; 

(4) Research and plans for the exploitation of minerals 



'Nedelya No. 11, 1971. 
Science and Technology - 71, APN, 1971, Moscow, p. 21. 



456 



■■' i ■ i « » i . , . ., ... 



■* ■ * 



• 



in the sea; 

(5) Organization 



The Development and Major Yfork 
of Soviet Oceanography 



During the first few years of Soviet power, the activity 
of Soviet oceanography was, for obvious reasons, very limited, 

and centered around hydrography. The desperate food situation 

» 

in the country generated the necessity for Kara Expedition of 
1921, the success of which was assured by a well organized 
hydrographical support. In 1922 the Soviet flag was raised 
over the first scientific research ship, the modernized schooner 
Persey, which became the center of the newly organized Polar 
Floating Marine Research Institute (Plavmornin) .. 

Naval (military) hydrographers, whose corps was established 
in Russia in 1827, fox'raed the backbone of early Soviet work 

which was performed mainly in the northern seas. During the 

t 
summer of 1920 they performed a series of current observations 

/ i 

in the Kara /Straits and Yogorskiy Shar. In 1923 a polar 

i 

I 

observatory on the shore of Matochkin Shar was opened. The use 

j 
of aircraft, in addition to ships, for ice observation began in 

I 

1924 along the track of the Kara Expedition. During the Second 

i 

International Polar Year (1932-1933) , rather extensive oceanographic 

- 

: / 
4 5 7 

" *"' """»■■■— " ' ■■. ,, .ii . i. . „ . i ,--..., ,. , .„, , H — ~i .. m., ., m ~ -■■.. ." . ' ,.«. .. I .. ; .■^.■.^... ""Triii^r ." ir . 7 - . - -, .,. , ,„,, ,. L 



.YUHCttV&ii "\ra-s ocmiiuotad. b.y; the Soviet Uaioa. The study of the 
White Sea by naval hydrographers resulted in the publication of 

two atlases, Tidal Currents , 1929, and the second on the 

9 
Ice Conditions , 1932. 

Work in the Black Sea started in 1923, where the Black 
Sea Oceanographic Expedition was organized and conducted its 
work up to 1935. The promoters and the first leaders of the 
expedition were well known Soviet oceanographer Academician Yu.- 
M. Shokal'skiy and naval hydrographer (later engineer - rear-., 
admiral) V. A. Snezhinskiy. 

In the Far East, oceanographic research started in 1924. 
In 1928 the work was enlarged, and a joint expedition of Soviet 
Navy hydrographers and the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by 
L. F. Rudovits, was organized. The expedition, using two ships 
assigned to it, made oceanologic stations in various seasons of 
the year in depths between 3,000 and 3,500 meters. In 1932-1933 
the Bering Sea party of the Pacific expedition made instrument 
measurements of the currents in Bering Strait to determine the 
water exchange between the Bering and the Chukchi Seas. In 
1936-1937 the expedition made the first hydrological survey of 
the entire Kara Sea. 



9 fttorskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1967, pp. 42-50. 



/ 



/ 

u 1 1 1 ■ i ii m i i n ii , — i h i i , i , " ,^ V , ^ - 7 - 



/■' 

U58 



, xpeditiOTS in *. o— - — — bAsan B r oottl 

hydrolo gical surveys o, *. — — -X *■- ~ 

rk „s of great importance in provide toe oasis *» 
Tb o work was 6 -^ 

t. along the Northern Sea Route. The 
forecasts along w» . • 

mW in the vicinity of the 
dri ft station began its .or, in Kay 1037 in 

North Pole. 

Dur ing the 1030's Soviet oceanographers undertook the 

f . ndwaves and surveys of the coastal ,ave motion - 
study of wind waves, 

d in the Gulf of Finland were conducted. 
in the Black Sea and in the 

1 . QnHats v. Makkaveyev 

prior to World War II, two Soviet scxentxsts, 

, d in the theoretical study of wxnd 
aud V. Shuleykin were involved xn 

u , f„r wave forecasting has been 
oaves T he Makkaveyev method for wave 
waves, ine actxon 

i -«'c ^vnerimental sxuuy v-»- 
widely used since. Shuleykxn s exper 

. included a method employing a model of 
f wind on waves xnclude _ ^^ 

,. a v>nc;in was built in ^"« 

„.«,« ... <=-«"- »»»• ■*■"■■ "°"' " | 

was widely used. ,Jwblv 

^v^inded consxdeiaoxy > 
«f tidal phenomena expanaea ^ 
The observations of tiaax ? 



10 Mox^y^WnikNo. 7, 1967, P- 46. 



* i 



\ / 

\ 



453 



■ ^.. . .W ,.! .!. ! ■ '■ .* „, ~~~«~- ■ 



resulting in the publication at tho end of the 1930' s of 

tables and handbooks containing tho characteristics of tides 

i 
for all the tidal waters around tho Soviet Union. In 104 1 

the Hydrographic Directorate of the Soviet Navy published lido 

tables for all the oceans and seas in the world. 

Soon after the war, Soviet oceanographic work began to be 
intensified. In 1947 Soviet scientists began their work aboard 
ships of. the Slava Whaling Flotilla during its operations in 
the Antarctic. Almost 1,000 hydrologic stations were made in 
Antarctic waters during the period 1947-1957. In 1943, the then 
largest research ship, Vityaz, entered into service. In 1949 
Vityaz operated in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Berlciug Seas. In 
the following seven years, the ship made 3,500 oceanologic 
stations, mainly in the Pacific. 

Soviet oceanographic research in the North Atlantic 
began in 1951, utilizing fishing trawlers. It was sharply 
increased in 1954, when the observations began to be conducted 
simultaneously by several ships, assuming the character of 
oceanographic surveys. Soviet oceanography was very active 
during the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1959. The 
research performed from Vityaz resulted in detection of the mixing 



Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1967, pp. 47-49. 



/ 
/ 

/ 



if 



otj 



" ' IU, I .'H»I I| I I ' I M . ., ! ..■-— i ' ■■ ■ '■ 



of the various layers of water in the Pacific Ocean, resulting 

in an intensive propaganda campaign launched by the Soviet Union 

t 
against burying radioactive wastes in the deep water depressions. 

The achievements of Soviet oceanography were noted at • 

the first and second International Oceanographic Congresses 

(1959 and 1966 respectively) , where Soviet scientists were among 

the most active participants. Congresses and various international 

programs helped to extend the international scientific and 

professional connections of Soviet oceanographers, who, thanks to *" 

the extensive Soviet oceanographic work, were becoming more and 

more authoritative and competent. 

In 1959 the expeditionary ship M. Lomonosov discovered 

the subsurface current named Lomonsov in the low latitudes of 

12 

the Atlantic' Later in 1963-1964 the study of the Lomonsov 

current as well as of the subsurface Brazil current was continued 
by the ship. 

In connection with another international program, the 
Soviet ships, Shokal'skiy, Gromova, and Zhemchug (later joined 
by Vityaz) in 1965 began the study of the Kuroshio. The material 
collected during the expeditions provided Soviet oceanographers 
not only with vast amount of data, but it stimulated the 



J ? 
'The current crosses the Atlantic from west to east in ' 

the region of the Equator, is about 2,600 miles long and has a 

maximum speed at the depth of 100 meters of almost 80 centimeters 

per second. 



461 



— - — * ■ ■ " ■■' ' "■ , i . , i,,.,. , i« i .i .» i» «; , ,.. ; . ; ,,', 



development of the theoretical basis of oceanography. The so-callcc 
energy method for calculating tho e lemon ts of wind wavow, worked 
out during the war, was further developed at the end of 1950's 
by the addition of the statistical approach. The theory of oceanic 
circulation was also implemented by a new approach, dealing with 
the interaction of speed of flows and density of waters in the 
ocean and the mechanism of their mutual accommodation, called 
the dynamics of the sea's baroclinic layer. A number of basic 
works was published, including N. Zubov, Dynamic Oceanology ; -" 
Berezkin, Dynamics of the Sea ; Shuleykin, Physics of the Sea 
(Third Edition) ; Morsk oy Atlas (Maritime Atlas) , and the new 
Soviet Physical-Geographic Atlas of the Y/orld , 19 64 . 

A method for computing the vertical distribution of the 
speed of the tidal current (a mean vector from the surface to 
the ship's keel) was proposed for application in shallow seas 
as a practical aid to navigation. Later, an equation was 
obtained for determining the vertical distribution of a tidal 

current speed at any point of the seas as well as for determining 

13 

the speed and direction of ice tidal drift. 

The Soviet contribution to the studies of the equatorial 
system of countercurrents in the world oceans is considerable. 



13 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 73. 



**62 



During the 1960*8, seven years of continuous study of the 
Lomonosov current employing 94 buoy stations with \ automatic 
current meters produced 1.5 million readings. About 1,000 

deep-water hydrological stations, with observations at 22 levels, 

14 
have been established. In 1969 the research ship Akademik 

Kurchatov observed a new powerful undercurrent more than 3,500 

miles long moving in a southeasterly direction along the 

Antilles Islands. 

A method developed by A. Sarkisyan permits computer 

calculation of stable currents (mean - annual and seasonal) . It 

was reported that attempts to calculate the stable currents for 

all the world's oceans on computers were made in Moscow, Leningrad, 

and Sevastopol. The differential equation of mathematical 

physics for an entire energy interdependent "atmosphere - 

15 

ocean-earth surface" system were used. 

The findings of the oceanographic research effort also 
have important military implications especially in undersea 
warfare, where underwater acoustics continues to be the major 
means for detecting submarines. The sound propagation in the 
water depends to a large degree on the velocity of sound. The 



14 



15 



Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1970, pp. 81-82. 
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 81. 



/ i 



463 



" '■ i i. i . ..i . 



velocity, in its turn, is a function of water temperature? , 
pressure (which increasos with the depths), and (salinity. WhJLlo 
the salinity is more or less uniform through various layors. 
of water and the pressure increases uniformly with the depths, 
the changes in the temperature in various layers of water are 
not uniform. So, the temperature is a major factor which in 
certain layers violates the. general rule of increased density 
with greater depths. 

The surface (upper) layer of the ocean waters mixed 
by atmospheric influences has a more or less even temperature. 
The deep layer, not being subject to atmospheric influences, 
also has a practically uniform temperature. Between these two 
layers there is an intermediate layer, whose depths and vertical 
dimensions vary, with a rapidly decreasing temperature, and, 
correspondingly, rapidly increasing density. Russians call this 
phenomenon the density jump, or density leap layer. It is also 
known as the thermal barrier, thermal layer, and thermocline. 
It has a complex multiple-stage structure, whose individual 
sections, in which the density increases sharply with depths, 
are mixed with sections having constant density values. 
Knowledge of the depths of the upper limit of this layer, its 
vertical dimension, or at least the thickness ox the ocean's 
upper layer is very important in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) . 



HGH 



"■ ' — ■- ■ ■ 1 1 «■■-. 



Soviet oceanographic expeditions have in recent years 

collected considerable data on water density. A dense network 

i 

of temperature and salinity observations has been made for the 

North Atlantic, the northern and southern regions of the Pacific 

Ocean, the southern part of the Indian Ocean, and the Carribean 

16 
Sea. Based upon previously collected data and current weather 

observations, the Soviet hydrometeorological center makes up 

to two-day forecasts of the information necessary to determine 

the depths of density or temperature layers in the various areas 

17 — 

of the ocean. 

The systematic investigation of the Baltic Sea in 
accordance with a unified international program began in 1964, 
when a synoptic hydrological survey of the sea basin was first 
made. The work continues in cooperation with several countries 
(Finland, Sweden, East Germany, West Germany, and Poland) . 

Soviet expeditions are not only becoming more numerous 
and of longer duration, but are involving sizable groups of ships 
for the fulfillment of given tasks. For example, a 1968-1969 
Soviet Navy expedition headed by Admiral Vladimivskiy aboard the 
hydrographical ship Polyus lasted 273 days. During the 54,000 



16 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 80 

17 Ibid., p. 78. 



465 



mile oruiso, the Soviotfl Pitnrlierl currents ( tli« chpfnJfsnl 

composition of water at various depths, surface phenomena, winds, 

raiu-squalls, etc., in many areas of tho world ocean. 

During 1970 the Soviet Union staged an unusual experiment 

at the center of the Atlantic Ocean, involving the simultaneous 

participation of six ships, Akademik Kurchatov, Dmitry Mendeleyev, 

Sergey Vavilov, Akademik Vernadskiy, Petr Lebedev, and Vilkitskiy, 

representing various Soviet oceanographic institutions {the 

Institute of Oceanology, Acoustics Institute, Marine Hydrophysics *' 

Institute, and Hydrographic Service) . In the area of study, 

which was 120 x 120 miles, seventeen buoy stations carrying 

automatic instruments were anchored. Every 10 to 30 minutes, the 

buoys measured the speed of the current and the temperature of 

the water at various depths up to 1,500 meters. All information 

was relayed to the computer centers of Dmitry Mendeleyev and 

Akademik Kurchatov. The belief widely held prior to the experiment 

of the existence of stable currents in the area, and particularly 

i 
of a current driven by the northern tradewinds was not confirmed. 

/ ! 

A similar study on a smaller scale was carried out by 

18 

Soviet scientists in the Indian Ocean in 1967. 



18 

The experiments were reported in detail during a joint 

assembly of the five leading international oceanographic 
organizations which was held in Tokyo on September 13-25, 1970, and 
also in Sovet skaya Rossia, 27 October 1970; New Times No. 42, 
1970; and Pravda , 4 May 1971. * / 

i . 
" - • ■ ■■■ » - ■'* — ' 1 1 — -— — — .. . ... ,.'.... ..^; 



Siuce 1968 the Soviet Union has been conducting research 
under the Polar Experiment (Polyamy Eksperiment) 'program. The 
Polar Experiment is an independent Soviet program within the 
framework of Soviet participation in an international program 
for the research of global atmospheric processes, and is planned 
to continue for several years. The program, which is being 
conducted in areas located north of the 50th parallel, includes 
a series of general expeditions in the northern areas of Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans by the research ships of the Soviet 
Kydrometeorological Service and other organizations, expeditions 
to the central Polar Basin, satellites and aircraft observations, 

and also standard observations from meteorological and aerologicai 

10 
stations of the Kydrometeorological Service. 

It was reported that the Leningrad branch of the Central 

Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science 

and the Institute of Oceanology are working at cx*eating a 



mathematical model of the world oceans. The basis of the model 
is a system of special equations for determining horizontal and 
vertical currents, temperature, and salinity of the water. 

Initial tests of the model on the BESM-3 computer in 1369 produced 

20 
satisfactory results when checked against known paramenters. 



19 

Mo rsko y Flot No. 1, 1971, pp. 44-48. 

20 

Vodnyy Transport, 12 April 1969. 



U67 



i^w>+.fm*w>* 



ii •mt im r* " i*+m rv <•• -- 



Satellites and orbital stations are destined to play an 
important role in oceanography, in that they could determine the 

4 

state of the sea, the ice condition, the degree of water pollution, 
location of schools of fish, etc. Thoir role in ocoan 
reconnaissance and ASW may already be significant. The work 

connected with the study of the oceans were performed during 

21 
flights of the Soyuz space ships. In 1970 the processes in 

the ocean depths and in the lower and upper layers of the 

atmosphere were studied simultaneously for the first time from 

the Soviet research ship, Akademik Shirshov, by the crew of space 

22 
ship Soyuz-9 and the meteorological satellite Meteor. 

During the last sixteen years the Soviet Union has been 

involved in an extensive program in Antarctica. The Russian 

expedition of 1813-1821 with two sailing ships, Vostok and Mirnyy, 

commanded by Bellingshausen and Lazarev, claimed to have discovered 

23 

Antarctica. The first Soviet Antarctic Expedition took place 

during 1955-1956, when the first Station Mirnyy was established. 
Annual expeditions usually take place between November-February. 



21 

Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (Aviation and Cosmonautics) 

No. 12, 1970, pp. 34-35. 

22 

Komsomolskaya Pravda , 26 December 1970. 

23 

It is very difficult to prove or disprove the claim, 

since, in addition to the Russian ships, American and British 
ships were sailing off Antarctica during 1820. 



!|G3 



- 



- ■ -■" — --■- «■ ■ . —«—., . ... , , ..n,,.-,......^. 



In addition to Mimyy, the following stations were subsequently 

established by the Soviet Union: Vostok, PionorsKaya, Oaais, 

i 

Sovetskaya, Lazarevskaya (later superseded by Novolazarevskaya) , 
Bellingshausen, Molodezhnaya, and Leningradskaya. As of the 
fall of 1971, a new Soviet Antarctic Expedition, the 17th, 

including three ships, the veteran, OB, an icebreaker, and 

24 
research ship Professor Vize had been under preparation. Not 

all stations are manned permanently and the personnel are 

replaced each year upon the arrival of the expedition. The 

stations are well equipped and there have been wide use of 

aircraft, helicopters, and sled trains. 

While the overall scientific research in Antarctica is 

supervised by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a few dozen Soviet 

scientific research institutions are involved in the work, of 

which the Arctic and Antarctica Scientific Research Institute, 

the Scientific Research Institute for Geology of the Arctic, are 

the most active. The Hydrographic Service of the Soviet Navy also 

sends its ships to participate in expeditions on occasion. Y/ide 

ranging and apparently high quality research has been conducted, 

and the Soviet rich experience in the Arctic has been put to 

broad use. 



24 

Leningradskaya Pravda , 21 August 1971. 



h n 



G9 



" ■ ■■ ■ ' ' ' ■» — ' ■■ " *~- ■■ V ■ ! HI m i ■ ' 



■•'■*— ■ ^«»M- ^> » - W^> W-*. * -! 1 ■■" ». « . i W ..., . w ? ^ l m , .^, < !W i W l ^ w^ w*** * *. 



A certain degree of specialization was established among 
the stations mentioned above. For example, Mirnyy Station 
conducts extensive meteorological research and Molodezhnaya and 
Vostok Stations, aerological research, including rocket probes of 
the atmosphere. The meteorological data from the satellites, 
related to the Mirnyy Observatory and the Molodezhnaya Station, 
are being used. The data are- transmitted to Moscow and other 
meteorological centers of the world. At Molodezhnaya in 1969 
a study was made for the first time of the atmosphere's electron 
density with the aid of artificial satellites. The glaciologists 
and geographers at the Vostok Station carried out deep drilling 
in the ice to a depth of 509 meters, obtaining unique samples of 
ice said to be formed from snow which fell 30,000 years ago. 
A quite extensive study of the Continental Shelf, the Continental 
Slope, and the geology of the sea floor has also been conducted. 
An assessment of mineral resources for future utilization was 
probably done through geological prospecting. While doubting 

Antarctica's immediate value for such resources, Soviet specialists 

25 

do not exclude their exploitation in the future. 

Undoubtedly, some military application can be made of the 
Soviet research in Antarctica. For example, gravimetric and 



25 

Pravda, June 15, 1969. 



470 



"- ' ' ■ ■ ■— ' " ' — ■ ' 



geodetic data collected can be of value to missilery. Up to 

the present, however, nobody accused the Soviets of any violation 

of 1960 Antarctic Treaty. The Soviet Union research in 

Antarctica (at least that selected to be published) has been 

26 
widely publicized in various periodicals and special reports. 

in general, the research work in Antarctica is marked by _ 
satisfactory cooperation among Soviet-American-French-Japanese- 

Australian teams. 

The research in the Arctic has continued, too, witb__the 
largest Soviet expedition, Sever-22, being made in 1970. A 
study of the ocean floor which included geological prospecting 
wa s conducted from a drifting ice field not far from the Pole 
named the "Little Scientific Town on Ice". Helicopters flying 
150-200 kilometers from the camp were employed to deliver 
research parties. 27 Starting in May 1970, a group of skin divers 
participated in under-the-ice observations. 28 An air expedition, 

26 c^ for Pxamole- A. V. Nudelman, Sovi^tJVnjta^ctic 

See, tor example. «. . -, ar ~z~. a r Phprnov 

,.^. tnrr iQM pt-T Nauka Moscow 196o A. <jt. untiuuv 

S toLroti TiSSSSgT-Sgra, Znaniye, Moscow 1966 
Trudy Sov etskoy ^tarotgchegkog Ekspgditsii (Vorks of t»e s.ov 

Intaractic Kxped TtiolT)7^dited by V. H. "riatskxy. Vol. 18, 
Leningrad, Hydrometeorological Publishing House, 1965. | 

27 Nedelya No. 11, 1971. 

28 

Izvestiya , 26 March 1971. 



i 



< 



/ 
/ 



471 



■ wm • . m « n -w p wy-ia-. ro .i ■— ■■ " 



Sever-23, was planned for the end of 1971, which, in addition 

to resupplying drifting stations SP-16, 18, 19, and 20, was to 

1 29 

establish twenty automated radioraeteorological drifting stations. 

Oceanographic Vessels 

The first Russian research ship, Audrey Pervosvannyy , 
was built in 1898 in Germany, for research in Barents Sea. Renamed 
after the Revolution, Murman, and later Mgla, the ship was used 
by Soviet hydrographers for more than thirty years. Two other 
ships, Taymyr and Vaygach, were built domestically prior to the 
Revolution to study the Northern Sea Route. The first Soviet 
hydrographic ships, the Okean class, the Kamchadal class, and 
the Ost class were built prior to World War II. At the beginning 
of the war, the Soviet Union had 73 hydrographic vessels, many 
of which were later used in combat for minelaying, amphibious 
operations, and transportation of military cargoes. V/hile close 

to fifty of them survived the war, the condition of most of them 

30 
was poor. During the 1950' s, many surveying vessels of the 

Soviet Hydrographic Service were ex-German minesweepers, converted 

ex-Japanese naval ships, and even a number of former United States 

steel-hulled fleet minesweepers of the Admirable class. The 



29 

L cningradskaya Pravda , 16 August 1971. 

30 

Sudostroyeniye No. 1, 1970, pp. 63-66. 



H72 



■ ' ' ■ ■ " » — 



■*"■"■■■ ' -' — ».— p.^— I». n.^J W f t^ '» WI ^. ^ - 1 »^- t ^» 1 



Soviet hydrographic fleet was considerably reinforced during 
the decade of the 1960's. 18 units of the Samara class with a 
displacement of about 1,000 tons and a speed of 16 knots were 
built in Poland (1962-1964) . Later, 9 units of the Moma class 

with a displacement of 1,800 tons and a speed of 16 knots were 

31 
added (1967-1968) . 

In 1957 the Mikhail Lomonosov was built in East Germany. 

The ship, with a 5,960 ton displacement, is equipped with 16 

laboratories and is operated by the Soviet Academy of Science. " 

The first oceanographic vessel designed and built in the Soviet 

Union after the war was a naval hydrographic survey ship, the 

Nevel'skoy. During the first half of the 1960's, a large number 

of oceanographic vessels was built: three naval surveying ships 

of the Polyus class, 11 oceanographic research ships of the 

Nikolay Zubov class, and 5 or 6 hydrographic surveying and 

research ships of the Zenit class. All were built abroad, mainly 

32 

in East Germany. The construction of the Nikolay Zubov class 

series was of particular importance, for, regardless how the 
ship is viewed, whether as a hydrographic survey vessel or as 
an oceanographic research vessel, her laboratories and equipment 



31 

Soldat und Technik No. 9, 1971, pp. 522-524. 

32 

Soldat und Technik No. 8, 1971, pp. 460-464. 



hi 



* 



**-— ■ « ...... . i ■ i i i .. —- •— -^ — . . — - — r 



permit a variety of tasks to be performed,, including measurements 
of waves and currents, geological sampling and analysis, 
meteorological studies, and hydroacoustic research. 

In 1959, two expeditionary ships, A. I. Voeykov, and Yu. 
M. Skokalskiy, were added to the Soviet Kydrometeorological 
Service. The ships are suited not only for the traditional 

oceanographic observations, but "for broad general meteorological 

33 
research as well". 

The growth of the Soviet Navy, the Merchant Marine, and " 

the fishing fleet required an intensification of hydrometeorological 

research and better support from the Hydrometeorological Service, 

34 
which, in 1966, had little more than 40 ships. A series of 

research ships of the Akademik class were ordered and at least 

eight were built in East Germany. Originally called the Professor 

Vize class by Soviet Hydrometeorological Service, which received 

four of them, the ships have a displacement of close to 7,000 

tons. Each ship can launch meteorological rockets and has 21 

laboratories. The Soviet Hydrometeorological Service calls them 

"weather ships", capable of conducting prolonged hydrometeorological 

and aerological observations at permanently assigned points of 



33 

Vodnyy Transport , 26 June 1969 

34 

Pravda, 6 January 1969. 



474 



■ " ■ '■ ■- 



world ocean. Two such points were planned for the Atlantic 

35 
Ocean, two for the Pacific, and one for the Indian Ocean. In 

addition, nine weather ships of the Passat class (3,700 ton 

displacement) with 22 laboratories each were built in Poland. The 

ships have complex electronic equipment and an automatic device 

for launching meteorological rockets to altitudes up to 80 

36 
kilometers, and simultaneously perform hydrological observations. 

All weather ships are also assigned to study air and water 

pollution and have the corresponding equipment. . -* 

An extended network of weather stations in the world ocean, 

and the use of meteorological satellites and computers permitted 

a computer-controlled weather routing system to be introduced 

37 
at the end of 1960's. It was claimed that during 11 months of 

1969, 1, 120 merchant ships were tracked by the system with a 

38 
savings of 318 ship days and more than 5 million rubles. 

A large number of specialized ships were employed since 

the end of 1950* s, mainly by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to 

support missile testing in the oceans, projects relating to the 



35 

Pravda , 6 January 1969. 

36 

Vodnyy Transport , 26 June 1969. 

37 

Undoubtedly, it is used by the Soviet Navy in addition to 

the Soviet Merchant Marine and is probably similar to the U. S. 

Navy's Optimum Track Ship Routing System. 

38 

Vodnyy Transport, 7 February 1970. * 



475 



** " ' " " ' " ' ■ l !■■■■ - ■ ! 



■ - . itr*iniinMig|iwii ■■„■■,».. - . . 



study of the upper atmosphere and space and to observe 
satellites. First were four Sibir' class missile 'range ships, 

i 

converted ore carriers. At the beginning of the 1960's two 
Desna class ships designated as missile range instrumentation 
ships were added. In raid 1960 the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
acquired the following vessels: Dolinsk, Bezhitsa, Ristna, 
Aksay , Kirishi and Borovichi classes, all of them either 
converted former merchant ships or built on the basis of an 
existing merchant ship design., Eight units of the Kirishi class ^ 

and four units of the Borovichi class were built in Soviet yards 

39 
on the basis of Vytegrales class timber carriers. In 1967, 

the Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov was added to the fleet. The 

ship displaces 17,580 tons, is 140 meters long, and in addition 

to 114 crew members, accomodates 126 scientific and technical 

personnel. 

In 1970 a new Soviet vessel, Akademik Sergei Korolyov, 

was commissioned. The ship built in the Nikolayev Shipyard is 

182 meters long and displaces 21,250 tons. Accomodating 300 crew 

and scientific personnel, the ship is well equippedfor the 

research of the upper layers of the atmosphere, independent guidance 

of earth satellites and space craft, and launching of scientific 



39 

Soldat und Technik No. 8, 1971 



i*76 



40 
rockets. 



Akademik Sergei Korolyov did not i I 

yov did not long enjoy the title of 

world's largest research ship, for durin , .. 

*■' ° r duri ng the summer of 1971, a 
new Soviet research shin v n ~ 

ship, Kosmonavt Y Uriy Gagarin, built in 

Leningrad, joined the service and h„ 

Ce and became the flagship of the 

Soviet expeditionary fleet R,m + 

leet. Built essentially for the same 

purpose as Akademik Sergei Korolyov, the new .h ■ ■ 

yuv, tne new ship is more than 
-ce as large , with a displacement Qf 45ooo toQg ^ ^ ^ ^ 

2 ; e ; ers - she is by f - *• -«■- — t scieQtific ship BitS 

Ivories and the aeW est e quipment coming not f _ ^ 
P-uctio, Une, but from research aQd deveiQpment iQstitutioQs 

an. is capab xe o f controIUng not OQly earth ^^ ^ 
space ships fl ying to the moon- 41 

Also, during the sumner of 197i the Sov . et ^^ ^^ 
-e arch fl eet was augmented by the „ sfaip ^^ 
Vaiversitet (Moscow „ niversity) . ,„ ^^ ^ & ^ ^ 

iab0rat0ri6S * the VeSSel "« ». «™ computer center, aQd is 
e q uippe d wit ,. two underwater pQrt hoies and pQwerfui 1^ 

devices, for the visual study Qf m ^ iife< ^^ ^^ J 

^rri^ir 5 ^ state university « — Pat J g in 

40 

y^^yy^E^sport, March 2, 1971. 
41 



\J 



477 



the scientific research aboard the vessel. It was reported 
that the Soviet Union is building or is planning io build a 
special ship for drifting in the Arctic ice. The ship's hull 
would be able to withstand the pressure of ice, and have a 
high-capacity (possibly nuclear) propulsion plant, a number of 

laboratories, rocket launching devices, and a computer center 

42 - . 

as its main features. 

Presently, there are no universally recognized standards 

for research ships. There is tendency in the Soviet Union to 

divide research ships into two broad categories, expeditionary 

ships and so-called universal ships. The former are capable 

of performing comprehensive oceanographic research in any area 

of the world ocean, particularly in the less known areas. It 

is recognized that such ships are very expensive and, apparently, 

their number would be limited. The latter are divided into two 

sub-categories: scientific- research and oceanographic ships. They 

are said to be capable of performing both basic and applied 

research according to a prescribed program. The main feature of 

this type of ship is their equipment, which permits not only 

universal application, but replacement upon the fulfullment the 

task of a program. Apparently, cost considerations are forcing 



42 

Science and Technology, Znanie, APN, 1971, Moscow, p. 21. 



478 



the Soviet Union to adopt a more ration.! 

more rational approach to the 

allocation of fund«3 anH +~ 

and to assure better utilization of existing 

and future ships. A number of publish** 

01 published proposals dealing with 

the design and construction of research shm, „ 

43 search ships bear good testimony 

to that fact. 



Xn general, there are two approaches to man's li vlng aud - 
-Hang underwater for prolonged periods: adaptation to the 
underwater enviroment or complete isolation from its iQ fi ueQce 
-inly Pressure. Both approaches have a long history of 
development, but only recent technological progress has registered 
some noteworthy achievements. While the second approach has been 
-Presented by the development of various sizes and designs of 
submarines, the first approach essentially has been the 
sophistication of various diving technics and e.uipment. T he 
-erican "Men in the Sea Program" is the most illustrative' of 



the latter. 



/ 
soviet experimentation in this field started in ^ ^^ 
o* I960. For years a number Qf ^^^ „ uQderwater resea J fa f 

clubs were arguing for the need for such . n 

— __ Program. One of them, 

43 I 

Oceana" d^ZTslLrl^^^^^^^SBO ' 

Leningrad, 1971, pp. 2 15. Ocean), _Sjidp^troyenie, ; 



/ 
/ 



479 



the Donetsk Club, built the underwater habitat Ikhtiandr-66 , 
which was tested in August of 1966 off the Crimean peninsula 
at a depth of 11 meters. Three aquanauts worked in this habitat 

for a total of 168 hours. In the following year, a somewhat 

44 
improved version, Ikhtiandr-67, was also successfully tested. 

Simultaneously, the Leningrad Hydrometeorological Institute 

in cooperation with Acoustical Institute of Soviet Academy of 

Sciences built the underwater laboratory Sadko. The spherical 

laboratory has a diameter of 3 meters and a volume of 14 cubic 

meters, and is suitable for two men working at depths of up to 

50-60 meters. The laboratory was tested in the Black Sea, 120 

45 
meters from shore at the depth of 42 meters. 

During the summer of 1967 a more sophisticated underwater 
laboratory, Sadko-2, was tested. Sadko-2 is composed of two 
spherical bodies 3 meters in diameter joined by steel cylinder 
with a hatch. The upper sphere is used as a compartment for the 
aquanauts and the lower, as an auxiliary compartment. During the 
initial test, /the laboratory was secured at the 25-raeter depth, 
and two aquanauts spent six days in it. 

The Sadko-3 laboratory, designed by the same organizations, 



44 Sudostreyeniye No. 1, 1968, pp. 26-28 and No. 5, 1970, 



pp. 18-22. 
45 



Sudostreyeniye No. 8, 1967, pp. 16-19. 



/ 



480 



was tested in October 1969. Compared to the previous two, the 

Sadko-3 is more sophisticated and has more reliable means for 

i 

decompression as it permits docking with a decompression chamber 

46 
ashore. It has three chambers joined together, one above the 

other, and accomodates four aquanauts. Three men worked in it 

for four days during the initial tests, followed by two days of 

decompression . 

During the summer of 1968 the southern branch of the 

Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Soviet Academy of 

Sciences tested another underwater laboratory, Chernomor, an 

8.4 meter long horizontal cylinder with a diameter of about three 

meters and an underwater displacement of 62 tons. The laboratory 

accomodates five men and is capable of operating in depths of 

up to 30 meters. Research was conducted within hydro-optical, 

hydro-physical, geological and biological programs. Five crews 

spent a total of 140 man-days in the laboratory, leaving it for 

47 
up to 3.5 hours to the distance up to 100 meters. 

In the summer of 1969 an improved version of the underwater 

laboratory, Chernomor-2, was tested. It was 12 tons heavier than 

the prototype, the capacity of its electric batteries was 100 



46 

Sudostroyeniye No. 7, 1970, pp. 19-21 

47 

Sudostroyeniye No. 5, 1969. 



481 



times greater (Chernomor-1 , due to the low capacity of its 
battery, could sustain the work of the crew for only two days) , 
gas-mixture reserves were increased fifty times (Chernomor-1 
had an oxygen reserve for three days) , and water reserves were * 
increased six times. 

The Chernomor-2 is a self-sustained underwater habitat 
connected with a ship or the shore only by telephone cable, 
which also can be abandoned and communication maintained via 
radio buoy. The habitat can be placed under the water at depths 
of up to 35 meters, but aquanauts can work down to depths of 
60-70 meters. During August-September 1971, Chernomor-2 was 

used for a 52-day experiment involving 4 men at a depth of 15 

48 
meters. It has been considered as a "lead prototype" which 

can be mass produced. The cost of the first mass produced 

habitat was given as 100,000 rubles, which would drop to 65-70,000 

49 
rubles in mass production. 

. i 

The opinion was expressed that the application of such 
underwater laboratories or habitats is not limited to oceanographic 

/ I 

research. It was stated also, that, whenever underwater work at 

i 
depths of 30 meters and below required sixty man hours or more 



48 

Izvestiya , November 12, 1971 

49 

Izvestiya, October 11, 1969. 



482 



of labor, the use of an underwater habitat similar to Chernomor-2 
is economically justified. 

In August 1970 an underwater laboratory, Ikhtiandr-70, 

/ 

was used for extensive tests on special diving suit designed for 
a prolonged stay underwater. Medical physiological research 
on the condition of divers during a prolonged underwater work 
was conducted at the same time. A -special diving suit designed 
for this purpose has a dual life sustaining system. The main one 
sustains breathing by a hose connected to an external breathing 
mixture source. The second, which is autonomous, is carried by 
the divers and is incorporated in the suit. Special clothing 
worn under the suit provides good ventilation of the body as well 
as warmth. The diving suit incorporates a sanitary system as 
well as a communication system. During the experiment, two 
tests, one with a duration of 26 hours 15 minutes and a second 
of 37 hours 40 minutes, were conducted. ^ 

Medical-physiological tesrts confirmed the possibility of a 
prolonged (up to 38 hours) stay underwater in such a diving suit. 
The opinion was expressed that such a diving suit system can be 
used for underwater work for a period of two or three days, when 
the installation of an underwater habitat is impossible or 
economically not justified. A plan was announced to build and 
test a completely self-sustained system, without a hose, which 






483 



50 
will permit work at greater depths. 

A number of submarine-like devices have also been developed. 

t 

Sever-1 (the Soviets call it hydrostat) is an apparently one-man 
submersible which is towed by a cable from a mother ship. The 
apparatus was used in the Barents Sea by the PINRO Institute 
for extensive geological observation of the bottom. Maintained 
at .5 to 1 meter from the bottom, the observer was able to 
observe a strip 10-20 meters wide, to photograph it and' to take 
geological samples. It was claimed that the experiment produced 

rich results and is being used for the geological mapping of the 

51 
Barents Sea bottom. 

Another Soviet underwater apparatus, Sever-2, was 

developed in the late sixties, and was tested in the Black Sea. 

During the test, the apparatus reached a depth of 2,185 meters. 

The apparatus is delivered to the operations area by a parent ship. 

It is self-propelled, and one vertical and two horizontal screws 

give the apparatus good maneuverability, with a horizontal speed 

of a running man. A crew of three can observe the enviroment 

/ • ] 

through several port holes, take samples by means of manipulators, 

I 
and store them in special extendable containers. The instruments 



50 

Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 11 March 1971. 

si I 

Leningradskaya Pravda, 19 January 1971. 



/ 



Wl 



carried aboard permit testing of the water, photography, and tape 

recording of sounds emitted by marine life. The apparatus was 

i 
52 
designed by the Leningrad Institute, Giproryhf lot . -^^ 

Another apparatus for the observation and photography of 

underwater objects, the two-man AMS-200 with maximum submersible 

53 
depths of 450 meters, was developed by the same institute. 

The AMS-200 appears to be a further development of Atlant-1, 

54 
widely tested in 1965-1966. 

The underwater laboratory Bentos-300 has been under 

development since 1966. Designed by Giprorybflot Institute, the 

self-propelled laboratory is 20 meters long and displaces 360 

tons. It has crew of ten (a 15-man crew was also reported) which 

can stay submerged for ten days at depths up to 300 meters. After 

being towed to the area of operation, the laboratory can 

submerge independently, stay at the prescribed depths for 

prolonged period of time or lay on the bottom. A battery-powered 

motor provides a speed of 1.5 knots. A special compartment which 

can be separated from the laboratory provides crew with an 

emergency rescue capability. The Bentos-300 can be used for 



52 

Prayda, March 22, 1969. 

53 

Sudostroyeniye No. 2, 1968. 

54 

Sudostroyeniye No. 7, 1967. 



485 



oceanographic research in cooperation with another submersible 
apparatus, TINRO-1 or TINRO-2, designed by the Pacific Research 
Institute of the Fishing Industry. Both were called submarines 
by a Soviet source. TINRO-1 can reach the area of research 
under its own power, while TINRO-2 has to be delivered by a mother 
ship. Another apparatus, similar to TINRO-2 and called a midget 

submarine, Gvidon, was developed by the VNIIRO Institute and 

55 
tested in 1970 in Black Sea. 

The Moscow Aeronautical Institute also developed and built -" 
a miniature submarine, MAI-3. A crew of two can conduct the 
research in depths up to 40 meters. The apparatus is made of 
aluminum alloys and plastic. Two propellers driven by battery- 
powered motors can develop speeds up to three knots; the operating 

56 
time is 1.5 hours. 

The design for an underwater automobile "Makrel", capable 
of carrying divers and with a speed of 6 KM/h sustained over 
several hours at depths up to 40 meters, has been developed by 
Giprorybflot Institute. 

The number of manned underwater apparatuses the Soviet Union 



55 Sudostroyeniy e No. 8, 1965 and No. 2, 1967; Ekonomicheskaya 
Gazeta No. 32, August 1967; Komsomolskaya Pravda ,- November 23, 
1967, and March 20, 1971; Vodnyy Transport , April 17, 1971. 

EC 

Seewirtschaft (Maritime Economy) , Leipzig, July 1967, 
p. 578. 



486 



has been developing is, to say the least, proof that the problem 
has been recognized. Obviously, not all of them are either very 
sophisticated, nor will they be mass-produced and find wide 
application. But at this, still embryonic stage of the 
development, the number of organizations involved and the variety 
of models produced is impressive. Following the pattern of the 
usual Soviet approach, it is logical to expect that the 
development of such apparatuses will be centralized in a few 
specialized organizations. The decision to centralize the 

construction of the accepted apparatus in one ministry, the 

57 
Ministry of Shipbuilding, has already been made. 

In December 1958, Severyanka, a W-class submarine converted 
into a research submarine, became operational. The torpedo 
compartment, converted into laboratory, has a number of port holes, 
searchlights, and electronic sensors. The Soviet Navy has two 
research submarines, Lira and Vega. Both are called hydro- 
graphical submarines and are in extensive use. During the summer 

i 
. 
of 1969, Vega, accompanied by a tanker and motor ship, made a 

cruise of 2^9 days' duration through 8 seas, and the Pacific and 

i 
Indian Oceans. Apparently, the submarine is assigned to the 

58 '■ 

Soviet Pacific Fleet. Another submarine, Lira, assigned to 






57 ! 

Komsomolskaya Pravda , 23 November 1967; Trud , 20 November 197i- 

58 

Soviet Military Review , No. 10, 1970, p. 31.*. 

/ 

487 



the Northern Fleet, was also involved in research cruises, one 

59 

of eight months' duration in 1970. ; 

t 
In the fall of 1970 the existence was reported of one_ 

more Soviet research submarine designed to be "mobile, autonomous, 

independent of weather and service" underwater laboratory. 

It is probably the result of the conversion of one more Soviet 

Navy combat submarine into a research vessel operated by one of 

the Soviet Oceanographic organizations. The crew of the vessel, 

composed of "several tens of experienced specialists, the majority- 

of whom -serve on submarines". The first (torpedo) compartment 

of this submarine has a special chamber for aquanauts. A special 

system of hatches and a lock permits the aquanauts to leave the 

chamber and, hence, the submarine, and return to it. Aquanauts 

used various diving suits, and during the experiment performed a 

variety of tasks around the submarine and on the sea bottom. 

The helium breathing mixture and all the power for the life 

support system are supplied by the . submarine. The chamber is 

also used for decompression, after which the aquanauts leave it 

and enter the first compartment of the submarine. During 

decompression, the aquanauts can communicate with the crew and, 

through a special port hole in the chamber, can see their 

colleagues and can be seen by them. The chamber accommodates 



59 

Xrasnaya Zvezda, 21 July 1970. 



488 



at least four aquanauts. Hot and cold food can bo supplied 
from the submarine compartment through a special arrangement. 
Apparently, the experiment was very successful and met all 
expectations. The wide use of the submarines with similar 
arrangements for aquanauts in the near future was predicted. 60 

Concurrently with their own development, the Soviet 
scientists are eager to obtain foreign technology. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to buy an American research submarine, the 
Soviets turned to Canada. An agreement was signed between 
Sudoimport, purchasing agent for the Soviet Union, and International 
Hydrodynamics Company, Canada, to build a midget submarine called 
Pisces, capable of diving to 6,000 feet. 

A variety of pew instruments for the oceanographic research 
and apparatuses have been recently developed. Two devices for 
measuring hydrophysical parameters, the LKI-3 and LKI-4, the former 
for depths up to 200 meters and speeds up to 18 knots, and the 
latter for depths up to 300 meters and speeds up to 15 knots, were I 
developed by Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. 62 

At least two deep submergence apparatuses with television 

60 

Krasnaya Zvezda T 19 and 20 August, 1970. 

61 

New York Times . March 17, 1971. 

62 o , 

Sudostroyenive No. 11, 1968. 



489 



cameras and manipulators were developed. The first one, krab, 



used primarily for examining underwater structured, was developed 

63 ' 

in 1967. The second one, called Underwater Geologist, is used 

primarily for geological sampling to the depths of 4,000 meters 

(originally the depth was limited by the cable lengths to 

64 
3,200 meters) . 

Istok , a probe for depths up to 2,000 meters with "super- 
sensitive instruments" for measuring hydrophysical parameters of 
the water, was developed by the Marine Institute of Hydrophysics, 
an affiliate of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. The readings 

are instantaneously transmitted via cable to the Dnepr-1 or 

65 
Minsk-22 computers, where they are processed and stored. 

The Special Design Bureau of the Sakhalin Scientific 

Research Institute developed a number of automatic devices for 

underwater seismological soundings. For example, an automatic 

buoy station can either store the information or transmit it 

to the ship, where it is processed. Considerable savings in the 

cost of the research work are expected thanks to the use of such 

66 / 
devices. ' 



63 



64 



Trud , 12 November 1967. 
Sudostroyeniye No. 1, 1969. 



65 



66 



Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya , 18 June 1970. 
Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 26 August 1971. 



1490 



Many devices used by Soviet oceanography are powered by 
radioactive element as energy sources. A number of such 

generators, using Cesium-37," were built during the period ' 

67 "^^> 

1963-1967. Another series of isotope generators using mainly 

Strontium-90 was developed in the late 1960's. for example, 

Beta-3, with a capacity of 880 .kilowatt hours, 'can be used for 

ten years in areas with temperatures down to -70 degrees 

centigrade. Another generator, Ephir. can operate in an 

enviroment with temperature ranges from plue 60 to minus 60 • 



68 
degrees centigrade. 



Research and Plans for the 
Exploitation of Minerals in the Sea 

While the growing world industrial output has generated 

an increased demand for minerals, only a tiny fraction of 1% of 

them come from the sea. Off-shore extraction of oil, on the 

other hand, already represents close to 20% of world oil ' 

production. In addition to the hundreds of millions of tons 

dissolved in the sea water, there are known deposits of minerals 

in the bedrock of the subsoil and right on the sea floor in 

quantities estimated to far exceed anything known on land. Up 

67„ 

Sovetskaya Rossiya . 10 January 1970. 

68 

Sotslalist lcheskaya Industrlya . 18 March 1971 



* 



U91 



to the recent time, the level of technological development 
represented the major obstacle. The present, and 'particularly 
near-future, technology should be capable to provide accelerated . 
process of extracting minerals from the sea. 

The Continental Shelf is bound to be the first place 
where there will be wide extraction of minerals. However, the 
distribution of manganese nodules (concretions), is, in general, 
beyond the Continental Shelf. Soviet oceanographers have been ' 
working for years to determine the distribution and concentration " 
of manganese nodules, particularly throughout the central Pacific 
Ocean. These strange concretions, which look like tubers, are not 
large, ranging in length from a fraction of a millimeter to 15 
centimeters. The biggest sample found by the Soviet oceanographers 
weighed 136 kilograms. Their concentrations on the ocean floor 
are variously estimated to be from 100 to several hundred 
billion tons. Copper, cobalt, and nickel are also found in 
addition to manganese. 

The Continental Shelf of the Soviet Union, representing 
close to 1/3 of the world's total, covers 6.6 million square" 
kilometers. What is more important, approximately half of it 
lies in depths not exceeding 50 meters. However, the greatest 
part of the waters over the Soviet Continental Shelf is frozen 
over during the winter, and in some areas ice is found eight or 



492 



nine months out of the year. 

During the last several years, research and development 
on the exploitation of minerals in the sea has been considerably 
intensified in the Soviet Union. Some initial steps toward 
actual extraction have already been taken. Experimental 
exploitation and enrichment oftitanium ore has been undertaken/ 
in the Baltic, and a marine geological enterprise scheduled 
to start operation in 1972 was formed. % special expedition to 
the Laptev Sea in 1967, after extensive prospecting, made"" 
experimental exploitation of cassiterite and its enrichment 
possible. The decision was made to form a marine geological 
enterprise for cassiterite extraction, with operations starting 
in late 1971 or early 1972. To speed up the exploitation of 
cassiterite, a special vessel dubbed "Floating Geological Combine" 
was proposed which was to have all necessary equipment and living 
quarters for workers -aboard and be powered by nuclear energy. 

The training of marine geologists in the Soviet Union 
accelerated/odessa University in 1971 graduated the first group 
of marine engineer-geologists. A special laboratory dealing with 
problems of engineering geology was organized at the university. 
Conducting experimental work on the floor of the Black Seal the 

Izvestlya . 2 September 1970. 



' 



I / 



i / 

I 

I 

433 'I 



scientists of Odessa University are using the theory of geological 
similitude and modeling, developed by them. To improve methods 

of geological prospecting, a model of the Black Sea Continental 

70 
Shelf and computers have been used. 

The Scientific Council of Moscow State University ' 
coordinates tbe efforts of several departments 'involved in 
geological research in the Pacific Ocean. A special laboratory " 
of the Moscow Geological Institute is working on the solution of 
technological problems connected with underwater extraction'of - 
minerals, and is developing special equipment to that end. The 
departments of 13 universities, the Ministry of the Non-Ferrous 
Metal Industry, and several other Soviet institutes were 
cooperating in this endeavor. A specially equipped vessel, tbe 
Tura, which is suitable for experimental exploitation and 
enrichment of minerals, has been used in the Pacific. Experimental 
exploitation of cassiterite and gold has been conducted, and new 
technology tested aboard the vessel. 71 j 

In the Soviet Far East, a new research center, the 
Sakhalin-General Scientific Research Institute, subordinated to 
the Far Eastern Scientific Center, was organized and is very 

70 

Vodnyy Transport , 6 October 1970. 

71 

Izvestiya . 2 September 1970. 



I • 



m 



active in marine geology. 72 

The need for clo<^ ^ 

close cooperation between land 'and - i 
geologists hnc k« d mar ine 

e-isxs bas been stressed in +h« o 

a in the Soviet Union t + 
emphasized that und^ WaS also 

" Under c ^tain conditions th* 

* ua5 i the sea extM^f,-- 
of minerals mizht h~ u extraction 

lght be Reaper than the land 
j «• former, there i. "traction, for in 

considerable savings in ♦ 

vings m transportation can be ach,„ - 
high c^t ^* ^ achieved. The 

S ° OSt of de velopment in Siberia i- w 

-h considerations. '^ * *"" *. " 

ThS S ° Vlet Uni ° n has ^tensified off-shore oil ~ 
Particularly in tbe no ^ 0l1 *««Pecting 

northern seas and the Far East in ^ • S 
^ the Caspian Sea. where off- shore , 

6XtraCti0n haS b - 
for many years, m tne 

-undin gs to date for ,1 

uaxe for oil and natural „* 

the Bar P nt * * W#W cond "cted in 

e Bare Qts and Kara Seas Th« 

eas ' Th « area of Pechnm r, u ■ 
as +h~ ecnora Guba is viewed 

-the most promising for both oil andgas . 7 3 

The possibility o1 Arctlc •.. | 

s . ri „ , . exploitation is beine 

seriously considered dec •* 

^ered, despite the unfavorable -r • 
the only re 4 ra< . favorable climatic conditions, 

y restraining f actor Qaffl 

xar being: cost m», 
solution of the tp.h , The 

™ e te chnological problems u,h* u 

'"> such expioi, « W ° Uld bG asso ^ated 

cn exploitation is ho-i™ I 

— ___ bSlng ^^ached optimistically. < Xt 




ti nc 



has already bcen proposed tQ coQsider the use ^ autoBatad 
instaUations which are being developed by ^^.^ ^ ^ 

off-shore oi! extraction in the Arctlc . The construotio ; ^ 
special ships, including lnes< fQr the ^^^ o ^ ind ^ 

has also been considered. 

An intensive search for oil Uo u 

for oil has been conducted in the Sakhalin 

area for ten years. Directional h^it 

irectional drilling, a method of drilling 

wells with a deviation from the vertira! ^ 

me vertical of up to several 

thousand meters, was developed and is in wide use in northern - - 
Sakhalin. The Gipro m omepht ■ Institute designed a special 
Piece of e Q uip m ent which would permit concentrating up to 200 ' 
wells made by directional drilling on a relatively small oil 
island. A floating driUiQg rig> Khazap _ for ^^^^^^ ^^ 

in sea depths up to 100 meters is being used] 

in addition to the Northern seas, the Far Eastern waters, 
and the Caspian Sea> certaln areas Qf ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ 

Sea, and the Black Sea are viewed as promising for future oil 

and gas exploitation. The resul+o ~* 

ine results of a number of test drillings 

in the Black Sea were encouraging. 77 ! 



74 

Ibid. 

75 

Izvestiya , 14 May 1971. 

76 

Pravda , 12 July 1971. 

77 

p ravda , 3 October 1970. 



49fi 



The 24th Pnrt„ n~ 

party Congress Directive * 

irectives for the Five-Year 
Economic Plan included a call "to i 

e "^ Pr ° S ^^ wor k ia 
the Shelf zones of sea^ a «,» 

and oceans for discovering oil and .„ 

deposits '- T " e ■"•«* goal seems t0 be 

M .. „ De to star t exploitation 

on the Continental Shelf at *. +u 

11 at de Pths where existing + u , 
^--4* existing technology 

permits and over the next two h. „ ■ 

deC ^ S t0 PUSh exploitation on 
the Continental Shelf to the depths of 9nn 

aepths of 200 meters, while 

"™°° ~ - — , u„„ a „„«. 

The tidal energy of -t-h^ 

, st . + 7 ^ W ° rld ° Cea ° »- conservatively ~ 

»-tx-afd at one billion k± 

*' and the energy of all 
-vers, 850 raillion kUowatts< 

vxet Union xs estimated of 200 billion 
xlowatt hours per year. Ia 1968 th ,. 

tati ' 6 firSt Soviet ^dal power 

f«lou. the 5000-KV, Kislogubskava n 

. eubskaya, near Murmansk, was built. ; 

• W Pr ° Je0ted "— skaya tidal power station i 

^ r stati °n is supposed to 
f»er*te 1. 5 milliou kilowa 

Ulinn „-, • aUnUal ° Ut P Ut Of 6 

•Uxon kxlowatt hours. The potential tidal euer • 
la area i, SY 1U tbe White 

is assessed at 3 6 billion kilowatt hours per year.™ 



78 



78 n 

Zizvdz, 12 July 19 71 
79 



^arrSfff^ *>• •. 1 970 , pp . 23 . 26 aQd ^^ 



4-97 



The Organizat ions 



The overall coordination of Soviet oceanographic aha 
related work is centered in the State Committee for Science^ . 

and Technology under the Gosplan Tho r m .n t 

^ ""' lae Committee has a Scientific 

Council for the study of oceans and seas and the utilization 

of their resources. The Council, together with other specialists 

of the State Committee, is directly involved in the coordination 

of oceanographic research and its application. The research 

itself, however, is directed by the Academy of Sciences of the 

USSR, the Ministry of Fishing mdustry, the Ministry of Merchant 

Marine, the Hydrometeorological Service m h th= u ,, 

6 v-io. oervice, and the Hydrographical 

Service of the Soviet Navy. Basic research is conducted and 

supervised mainly by the Soviet Academy of Sciences through its 

Oceanographic Committee in the Earth Science Department. 80 

Most of the basic oceanographic research is conducted 

in various specialized institutes of the Soviet Academy of 

Sciences, such as the Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, the 

80 T1 . j- 

th»t < S Wldel y claimed in Soviet scientific circles 

esearch ^Hth* ^ VaStly broadened »«*>pe of oceanographic 

aor thf A neither the Scientific Council of the State Committee 
"ould L? C T° S , raPhiC Con »"teo of the Academy of Science^ 
^ X !na E^™ 1 aQd coordi - te tb * e«»rts ofloviet 
>e appuea y ' s a f ?** neW organizational principles should 
U May 1969. example, Pravda, 25 March 1971, and 



1*98 



». -*-. ,„«„„,. , b /; '■•*""• - -- •*—. 

***'*»< cne Acoustic t««*-o. 
Various state university ^st.tute, and there> 

Unl « lw ""l„, such as Moscow and Leaia ^ d 

universities nr.,4 4.L. UJ -"L,raa 

S * " d the Aca ^ ray of Sciences of th » 

^" institutes of th*» *Mo»,.i 

'""*" - — . <— — . .„«„„„. „ , " s ' 

"grapny, independently as w.ti . ■ 
civilian S JOintX ^ wi " their 

cxvxUan counterparts, particularly in th. « ♦ 

***/ in the inters*:* ,-v-p «. 
operations *„+* u - merest of submarine 

UQS ' ant i-submarine warf^ 

6 warfa re, and the employment «* 
weapons. ' Payment of various 

In addition to +h~ 

*°n to the specialization of SMo 
ins+<+ *4 M some scientific 

institutions, such as the Arctic „ 

Arctic and Antarctic Scientific 
Search lQst i tu te, there is trend toward a 

- — orientation of the ^ "*«*«* 

e , the reSearch institutions. For 

tSk Sea ' and h ^ its own fleet of research 

"» fou owing iustltutB earoh vessels - 

institutes are subordinated to the center: the 

rr al ^ 0OeaDOS — ~ « -lo.ical and . " 

— eophy slcs iMtltute6< _ ^ SakhaiiQ ^^ 



499 



81 
Research Institute. I 

In 1967 the All-Union Scientific Research Institute 

of Marine Geology and Geophysics was organized in Riga, Latvia. 

The institute has 12 expeditionary ships incorporated in the 

82 
Baltic Expedition. A branch of the Oceanographic Institute 

of the USSR Academy of Sciences was recently established at 

Odessa with its own expeditionary fleet. The Institute of 

Biology of the Southern Seas has its branch in Odessa, too. 

Branches of the Hydrometeorological Service and of the 

Hydrographic Service of the Navy are also found in all major 

basins. Considerable applied research is conducted by the 

fishing and the shipbuilding industries and the Merchant Marine. 

The Geographic Society of the USSR, one of the oldest in 

the world (it was founded on August 6, 1845) should be mentioned 

The Society consists of the geographic societies of 14 union 

republics, 160 branches and departments and three scientific 

83 
research institutes, and incorporates 18,600 members. The 

I 
society has a/long record of association with the Soviet Navy. 

/ ! 

During its Fifth Congress in December 1970, Commander-in-Chief 



81 

Pravda > 25 March 1971 and Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 
26 August 1971. ~~ 

82 

Vodnyy Transport , 7 June 1969. 

83 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1971, pp. 93-95. 



i 



/ 



i 



5C0 



of the Soviet Navy S. G. Gorshkov stated that "the problem 
of studying and mastering the world ocean is becoming one of 
the greatest scientific-technical problems of the 20th Century", 
and that the Navy's direct link with marine geographic 
research "is still far from complete". Several Navymen, 
including Gorshkov, were elected to the Scientific Council 
of the Society. 

It can be seen that the extensive organizational network ■ 
incorporates numerous scientific, industrial, and operational 
bodies dealing with the oceanography. 



501 



Conclusions 

Between the Revolution and World War II, Soviet 

oceanographic research, primarily hydrographic in nature, was 

conducted mainly in the contiguous seas. Although not far behind 

the world level of that period, Soviet oceanography did not 

distinguish itself, except for the scope of the Arctic research 

and the resulting knowledge. After World War II, however, the 

Soviet Union gradually and steadily intensified its oceanographic 

efforts, placing initial emphasis on expeditions and the 

collection of much needed data. The Soviet research fleet has 

been considerably enlarged. While the fleet was previously 

composed of modified cargo, fishing, and ice-breaking ships, 

during the decade of the 1960's a considerable number of specially 

designed oceanographic research ships were built, and modern, 

often unique equipment was installed in their laboratories. 

The scope of Soviet expeditions was greatly increased, and Soviet 

research ships are now operating in all areas of the world oceans . 

/ 
The expansion^ of both basic and applied research has been 

accompanied by an increase in the number of scientific 

i 
organizations involved in it and in the number of scientific 

workers employed and of those graduated from the educational 

institutions. In the applied research field, Soviet oceanography 

, / 

5C2 



has probably been able to satisfy the demands of an expanding 
navy, merchant marine, and fishing fleet. During x the last 
decade, considerable attention has been devoted to the Continental 
Shelf and the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources. 
There are indications that efforts similar to the "Man-in-the-Sea" 
program are underway in the Soviet Union. 

While it is difficult to differentiate between what is 
purely military and what is purely of civilian interest- in 
oceanography, Soviet attention to particular ocean areas, the 
participation of the hydrographic ships of the Soviet Navy, and 
the nature of the research suggests the fulfillment of Soviet 
Navy requirements, particularly for submarine operations. It 
is difficult to judge whether the Soviet Union is ahead of the 
United States in oceanography, but the near future will tell. 
The scope of Soviet oceanographic research and their extensive 
cooperation with other countries in the field have resulted in 
wide international recognition, and have placed Soviet oceanography 
in one of the leading positions in the world. There is every 
indication that Soviet oceanographic efforts will be intensified 
in the future. . 



503 



CHAPTER V 
FISHING INDUSTRY 
General Developments 



Fish has always been an important part of the Russian 
diet. Prior to the 1917 October Revolution, fishing was rather 
well developed in Russia, especially in the areas adjoining seas 
and along large rivers and lakes. Expensive fish such as 
sturgeon and fish products such as caviar were among the famous 
Russian export items. Most of the catch was brought by individual 
fishermen, though fishing by specially formed communes and 
fishing villages was also quite common. The amount of "fresh 
water" fish far exceeded "salt water" catch. Immediately , 
following the Revolution/the Soviet Government initiated a number 
of measures Resigned to increase the supply of fish. By special 
decree of the Council of People's Commissars, dated December 9, 
1918, the Main Directorate for Fishing and the Fishing Industry 
-own as Glavryba, headed by a special collegium, was organized. 
Soon, however, due to the ineffectiveness of that organization and 
the urgent need to increase the fish supply, another decree of the 



/ 



5C* 



Council of PcodIp'c r>~ j 

people s Commissars of May 31 1901 14 .. 

u »^y ox, ly^l, liquidated the 

state monopoly on fishing and eaV P n 

S and gave Glavryba greater independence 

in the administrative, financial an * k . 

, financial, and business aspects. 

Starting in 1926, Gosplan issued the f irst Vont , +] ^ 

e xirst control figures" 
for developing the fi shing plaQ . 

i»<so, the first Five Year 

Plan for the development of *h» * • ■. • 

P ent of the fishing industry was worked out 

Tne main goals of the plan were: accelerated catch growth, 
reduced cost of fi shiag , developmeQt Qf ^^ ^ ^ 

complete removal of private Soviet canital ♦ 

" et capital from the fishing 

industry (foreign concession rights were left temporarily 
^touched), under a new order from the Soviet Covernment, however 
the Five year Plan for the fishing industry was drastically 
changed in 1 929 . The new requirement _ ^ ^^ ^ ^ 

more than two times over origin*! m 

ver original plan and by 1933 to achieve a 

2.6 times higher catch than the pre-revolutionary level X 
Obviously, the plan was not fulfilled. However, the very 
intensive wor k of many enterprises and organi za tions resulted 

" S ° me ±aCreaSe ^ ^ fish -tch, in modest introduction of ' 

of new technology and in the building of a MBfi1 -, J, 

aing ot a considerable number of 
fishing vessels. 

_J^30j^ rst Soviet steel f , sb . ng ^^^^ ^^ buiit 
"Ribnoj^jcho^astvo (Fishing Industry) No. 2, 1971, pp. 6 . 8 . 



GC-5 



in Leningrad. They had installation for the production of fish 
meal and canning, as well as storage capacities for salted and 
fresh (refrigerated by ice) fish. In 1934 the first Soviet .... 
floating canning factory, Lagan', was built for service in the 
Caspian Sea. The ship was capable of receiving fish from 
trawlers and processing it. In 1937 the first fish processing 
factory ship was built for the Northern Basin. 

During the second half of the 1930s, the construction of 
fishing vessels was slowed down due to the lack of shipbuilding 

capacities, which were taken up by naval construction. The 

2 
total catch for 1940 was 1.4 million tons. During the war many 

fishing ships were mobilized by the Soviet Navy. However, fishing 

3 
continued even during the war, though at a lower intensity. 

After the end of World War II, the Soviet Fishing Industry 

was in a bad state. Many fishing vessels had been lost in the 

war, and those which remained were in poor condition, with worn 

machinery and hulls in need of repair. The problem was aggravated 

by the fact that a considerable portion of the Soviet shipbuilding 

and ship repair capacities, was either destroyed or severely 

damaged. Moreover, the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy 



2 

Vodnyy Transport , July 10, 1971. 

3 

Shipbuilding No. 12, 1969. 



Old 



was also in extremely bad shape, and the country was in dire 
need of foodstuff. Consequently, the fishing industry was once 
again presented with an extensive plan for a fish catch/ 

Starting in 1947, the Soviets succeeded in building a 
series of medium trawlers (SRT) for side trawling and for use 
of drift nets. In the late 1940's the pre-war "catch level was 
achieved. The greatest portion of the catch was obtained from 
internal waters (rivers, Lakes) and close, off-shore, waters " 
of the adjoining seas. Most of the fishing vessels of that time 
were represented by small seiners, employing fishing methods and 
gear which were not very productive. 

The turning point occurred about 1950, after which there 
was an accelerated development of high sea fishing, resulting 
in steadily growing catches. Restoration of the war-damaged 
industry and achievement of pre-war level of production together 
with growing shipbuilding capacities in East Germany and Poland 
assured rapid build-up of the fishing fleet. 4 

It is well known in the Soviet Union that for the same 
amount of protein, fish product requires considerably less capital 

4 
Emerging capability of the Satellite countries to build 
ships, particularly fishing vessels, were very important for 
the Soviet Union because its own shipbuilding industry, though 
mainly restored and even growing, was busy fulfilling orders 
of a extensive naval shipbuilding program, initiated in 1947. 



5C7 



investment than that needed for meat products ^ ^ ^ j 
recognized that in order to achieve a large incase in the Soviet 
catch, the hi gh seas fishing operations would have to 
To he efficient those operations required a special fishing fleet 
consisting not only of trawlers, out mother ships, factory ships, 
refrigerator-transports, and support ships such as tankers, tugs, 
etc. A number of such ships were built in the second half of 
1950 -s in the Soviet and foreign yards. 

The Soviet fishing fleet appeared for the first time in - 
the Northwest Atlantic near Newfoundland in 19 56 and latet T OQ 
the Western Edge of George's Bank. The similar development took 
Place in the Soviet Far East. These efforts resulted in the 
steadily growing Soviet catch: 1950 - 1,627,000 tons; 1955 - 
2,495,000 tons; I960 - 3,051,000 tons. 6 ! 

The experience of operations in remote fishing grounds 
convinced the Soviet specialists that the larger trawlers with 
refrigerating or freezing facilities were needed to improve the 
efficiency of^the fishing operations. Also, the absence of any 
overseas base's and the remoteness of fishing areas forced the 
Soviets to develop methods for processing the catch on the fishing 

^^__ The d6Cade of the ^60-s witnesse d a stea d y increase 

5 i 
Sudostroyeniye No. 12, 1969. 

6 i 
FAQ Ye ar Book of Fishing Statistics . 1962. , 



/ 

I 

/ 



5C8 



in the size and capability of Soviet trawlers and the development 
of the auxiliary fleet, capable not only of supporting a large 
group of such trawlers for months, thousands of miles away from 
the Soviet shores, but also of processing the fish afloat. The 
following measures were initiated to build such an efficient 
fleet: Soviet domestic yards continued to build medium trawlers, 
but their size was doubled compared to those built in the 1950's, J 
all of them have either refrigerating or freezing facilities. ' 
In 1963 the Soviet Union started to build two classes of 
trawlers, the Mayak and the Pioner. Both trawlers have a 
displacement of over 900 tons. In 1967-1969 two more classes of 
trawlers, the Ol'ga and Sargassa, were built, both with a 
displacement of around 1,000 tons. All four classes are capable 
of using a variety of fishing equipment such as drift and seine 
nets, trolls, and purse seines. At the end of the 1960's the 
first series of Soviet stern trawlers was built. The Sudoiinport 
Agency ordered hundreds of vessels abroad. In the early 1960 's 
a series of over eighty Soviet-designed Tropik-class stern-slip 
freezer trawlers were built by East Germany. This was followed 
by the Atlantic-class stern trawler, successor to the Tropik, also 
built in large series. Both classes of ships are equipped with 
the Vostra powered rudder, which gives them exceptional 



7 
Sudostroyeniye No. 12, 1969. 



rr 



C-3 



maneuverability, a„ d sophisticated hydroacoustical gear for fish 
detection, in both the horizontal and the vertical planes. 8 

A Polish yard built a large series of Mayakovskii-class 
stern trawlers under Code B-26, designed and originally bull/" 
by the Soviet Union. 

During the 1960's, the five classes of stem-slip trawlers, 
the Pushkin, Mayakovskii, Leskov, Tropik and Atlantik, were 
delivered in large quantities to the Soviet fishing industry. ' 
They are called BMRT (Bolshoi Morozilniy Rybolovniy Trader) , " 
or large freezer fishing trawler, and are capable of independent 
operation for sixty-seventy days in remote areas of the oceans. 
Supported by .other ships, not only BMRT's, but SRT's, caa stay 
in the fishing area much longer, provided the crews are relieved. 

in addition to freezing and refrigerating equipment, the 
trawlers have fish processing plants. On the fishing grounds, 
the trawlers are supported by factory-mother ships equipped with 
Processing lines and refrigerated storage and able to supply 
the trawlers with food, fuel, water, and medical and recreational 
facilities for its crews. 

Typical of the factory-mother ships is the Zakharov-class 
«hich displaces 16,400 tons, has facilities for canning and freezing 
fish and producing fish meal for animal and plant food. She is 

8 

U «? M! OI \\ detailed description of these fishing trawlers ^ 
JLJS. Naval I nstitute Proceeding . November 1970? traWleiS ' See 



r- 1 r» 



capable of receiving fresh, chilled or frozen catches simultaneously 
from up to eight fishing vessels, moored alongside .' Another 

i 

class of mother ships, the Severodvinsk, built in series by. the 
Polish yards since 1955 (under modifications coded B-62 and 
B-64) , is used as a mother ship for 20-30 trawlers. Construction 
of a more advanced class of mother ships, the Professor Baranov, 
in a Polish yard under Code B-69, started in late 1967. 
Displacing 10,000 dwt, the ship has a fifty per cent greater 
capacity than previous series, with twenty fewer men in the 
crew thanks to the high degree of the automation. Her processing 
plant is capable of preserving about 200,000 cans of fish per 
day in addition to packaging and processing fish paste and fish 

meal. Together with attached trawlers, she can operate at sea 

9 
up to nine months. 

The fish transports also have fish processing lines and 

refrigerated storage and, in addition, deliver turn-around crews 

for fishing trawlers. Typical of such transports are the 

Bratsk-class with a 2,500-ton displacement and the Pervomaisk and 

Sevastopol classes, both displacing 5,000 tons. 

- 

The older whale factory ships, Slava and Aleut, were joined 
by newer ones, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sovetskaya Ukraina, 33,000 
tons and 46,000 tons, respectively. Whereas the former two were 



9 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1971. 



511 



built primarily to process whales, the latter two are a 
combination whale and fish factory. The experience gained 

in operating the whaling "flotillas" «h+k + k *. , ' 

& xxoxiiias , with the whale factory 

ship as conunand and .other ships, mad e a considerable contribution 
to the Soviet experience in developing the expeditionary type of 
fishing operations and in designing and constructing appropriate 
ships for that service. 

The next step in sophistication in fishing m ethods and ' ' 
operations introduced into the Soviet fishing industry was the " 
combination stern trawler-factory ship, Kataliya KoVshova. 
Built by France as the lead ship in a series, she was the largest 
trawler in the world, with a very sophisticated production 
Plant. The cannery is equipped with the PTU-100 Soviet-built 
industrial television system She can re.ain at sea without 

replenishment for 120 dav<? -in in ^. ^ 

days in independent operations. The 

diagram below illustrates one day's caoacitv rt * *• u 

dy s ca Pacity of a fish processing 

Plant of the ship and the types of product turned out: 



j • • 512 



5 tons- 



Fish Meal 
Factory 



«P 

Fishmeal 

for 
Animals 

4 t. 



^ 

Fish Oil 
.5 t. 



r 



Fish Catch 
60 tons 



35 ts 



Cannery 



20 tons 



type S 
50,000 cans 



N si 



Freezer 
Factory 



Frozen 
Fish 
20 ton 



type 
50,000 cans 



Source: Sudostroyeniye No. 9, 1969. 



/ 



513 



1 / 



All these measures brought about a considerable increase 
in the Soviet catch, which reached 6,030,000 tons ; in 1966. The 
Soviet high seas fishing fleet, the socalled Expedition Fishing 
Fleet, in 1966 accounted for more than 90% of the total Soviet 
fish catch. Forty-five per cent of all the Soviet fishing 
industry catch was processed afloat. The Soviet emphasis 
on the larger trawlers and self -sustained fishing fleets paid 
off. When operating near the Soviet shore, e.g. the Barents Sea, 
one of the best Soviet trawlers would bring in one and one-half tons 
of fish per casting, while in the Atlantic a casting brings in 
fifteen or twenty tons. Therefore, the big trawlers could make 
a profit even if the trip to and from the fishing grounds takes 
a month, and costing from 2 to 2.5 million rubles to build were 
amortized in 2.5 years. 

The Twenty-Third Party Congress in April 1966 endorsed 
the recommendations to increase Soviet efforts in developing 
the fishing industry, and increased appropriations to that end 
by eighty-four per cent for the period 1966-1970. This was 
a powerful boost which accelerated the development of fishing 
industry even more. The direction taken was toward more sophisticates 
and more specialized ships. 



10 

Morskoy Flot No. 7, 1967. 

11 

Soviet Life , April 1966, and Morskoy Flot No*. 7, 1967. 



514 



in August of 1963, the Soviet Union was host to the 
Internationa! Fishing Industry Fair, Inrybprom-68! held in 
Leningrad, in which twenty-two countries, including the USA, 
England, all the European countries, and Japan participated. 
Soviet participation in the fair was very extensive. Twenty-five 
ministries and directorates, more than fifty scientific research 
institutes and about 150 enterprises represented. The Soviets 
exhibited ten fishing ships, including the fish factory Uborevich, 

whose automated oropp^cino' i-;„~~ 

xea processing hoes are capable of producing 300,000 ' 

cans per day. 12 

The Soviet search for more efficient and productive ships 

in the 1960 -s resulted in the building of the first and only 

catamaran fishing trawler, Experiment. The specially designed 

fishery system for Experiment has permitted combining two kinds 

of fishing, seining and trawling, and one of the trawl can be 

used constantly, while the ship is only 130 feet long, it has 

a beam of seventy feet, which gives an unusually large deck for 

its size, and permits a large working area for its crew of 

twenty-five. The extensive tests not only met, but exceeded, the 

design specifications, and the decision was made to have a jspecial 

shipyard in one of the Baltic Republics to specialize in the 

12 

Sudostroyeniv e No. 11, 1968. 



I / 



515 



i 



construction of catamaran vessels. 13 

In 1969 the largest f-ich-i«~ u- 

g St flshl *g ship m the world with a 

displacement of over 41 nan ■»- ' 

over 43,000 tons was launched in the Soviet- 
Union. The vosto, factory ship combines in it the ^^ 

capacity of over 13,000 tons; a fish factory ship, with the 
capacity to process 300 tons of raw ma teriais, including the 
Production of 150 ,000 cans and XS0 tons of fro.en fish, fi shmeal 
and industrial oil; a passenger s[]ip ^ & ^^ ^ ^ ^ 

600; a tan.er, and a refri g erator ship. She is able tQ ^ 
four months in tropical waters without replenishment. But 

the most unique feature- of the vostok *»,>+„ 

vostok factory ship is the 

fourteen Nadezhda-class fishing hoats carried aboard. The 

Nadeshda-class fishing boat ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 

null is made of plastic. T hey can he deployed from a mother ship 
to their fishing stations and, while fishing, are supported by a 
helicopter from aboard the Vostok. The Vostok is ^^ Qf 
independent as well as e x peditionary fishing in the most remote 
areas of the world oceans. 

At the end of 1960's, the Soviets also increased the depth 
^etrawlln., Du ring the 1950s and ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ 

13 

Nedelya No. 9, March 1969, p. 21. 



516 



special large refrigerator trawler th. M , 

. Wler ' the Meridian-class, was 

designed. A more powerf.,1 n 

fUl propuls *°° Plant drives the ship 
a speea of six knots whlle t The trawl _ . / 

to Z.200-1,500 meters 14 The „ ,„ 

«• The Mendian-class was f<> 

number of <5iin<~»v .*.>.•, * 

r ox super trawlers. The f lrst o onn . 

St ' 8 ' 000 tons Gorizont-class 
has an underway speed of fif teen k ' , 

"teen knots, ls equipped with the 

processing plant producing thirtv **, * 

. 6 thirty-fxve tons of f ish per d 

the tropics, while a third th» n 

. t 15 ' the Baren t^vo More, i„ northerQ 

waters. According to the 1971-1975 m»„ . 

to ,. 5 Pian ' Sovie t fishermen are 

fxsh to depths of 5,000 meters and the 
„.„, e oorres Ponding fishing 

vessels and equ ip m ent are heing planned. 16 

A »" « - -11 and modern fishiag ,_,_ ^ f 

:;; Io ; ed seas - suoh - - —• - - .** se a S , aQd a i SO 

!^^- r -lers have heen design and ^ ^ 



14 

^°s*™yeni2e No. 12, 1969. 

^ iSSinii^felca^Pravda, April 30> ^ 
l6 Nedelva No. as, July 5-11, i 971 . 



517 



increase in the tracer fleet has been accompanied by a 
corresponding increase and sophistication in fish 'processing 

factories and refrifrpM+ a ^ *- ' 

a refrigerated transports. The fish factory, 

Korablestroitel' Klopotov, has a fish processing plant with 

a seventy-four percent higher productivity than that on the 

Zakharov-class. Displacing is inn +~ 

Piacmg 15,300 tons, the ship has a crew of 

only 120, thanks to the high de^rpp o-p 

mgn degree of automation. The ship is 

designed to operate only i„ northern and temperate latitudes. 
For wor, in tropics and e q uatorial waters, another ship, the 
Khaharov, displacing 22 , 600 tons, was built. The ship production 

plan is designed for sopriaiiv^n. • 

specializing in expensive fish and producing 

high-quality canned fish. To sat-i^fv +-h« 

10 satisfy the growing Soviet need 

for fish meal, a series of Pos'et-class fish processing factories 
is being built. Displacing 28,200 tons, the Pos'et is equipped 
with special submersible fish pumps, and is capable of receiving 
np to 800 tons of fish per day from the trawlers. Its plant 
turns out 120 tons of fish meal per day in addition to other 
varieties of fish products, including fillets and cans. 17 I 

A series of twelve 12,500 dwt refrigerated transports has 
been ordered and is under construction in Prance. The ship has 
a very powerful refrigeration plant providing a temperature of 
»^s 30°c and a powerful propulsion system which drives the 

Sudostroyeniy e No. 12, 1969. 

: / 



518 



ship at a speed of nineteen knots. Some of the ships of the 
series, which have already been constructed, are planned to be 
used on the Soviet Far East-Black Sea line to deliver fish 
products to the European part of the Soviet Union. 18 A series 
of refrigerated transports, the Karl Libnekht class, is being 
built in East Germany for service in the Soviet Northern Basin. 19 
i The world-wide extension of fishing by the Soviet Union 
through the socalled expeditionary method, which employs 
large fishing flotillas centered around and supported by 
factory mother ships, considerably reduces the unit cost of 
sea food by processing the catches afloat. Besides the obvious 
economic advantages, self-sufficient flotilla operations represent 
the most logical solution, for the geographic factor dictates it. 

The Soviet Union has no overseas bases from which fishing 

20 
operations can be conducted. 

' Vodnyy Transport. July 8, 1971, and November 24, 1970 
19 

Vodnyy Transport , February 18, 1971. 

20 

During the decade of the 1960 's Soviet efforts resulted 

n an agreement with Spain to use a port in the Canary Islands 
*s an overseas operating base. Cuba can be mentioned as a 
;econd such place. A number of countries such as Nigeria and 
■.auntius, provide the Soviet fishing fleets with the right 

o make port calls, where some minor repairs can be performed. 

«, in general, those are rather minor exceptions compared 

Uh the magnitude of Soviet fishing expeditions, some of which 
^voive up to several hundred vessels in a given area 



519 



The operations of a large fishing flotUla.for example 
in the southeastern Atlantic, described recently resembled the 
operation of a large naval fleet headed by the colander' (chief 
of the expedition) and divided into formations (flotillas) ^" 
each headed by its own commander. 

A captain's conference held via radio resulted in the 
decision to switch fishing grounds to an unidentified area " 
nearby Walvis Bay. A number of ships were sent ahead for fish 
reconnaissance. After searching for fish with the help of 
hydro-acoustical gear and supported by data obtained earlier 
from research ships, oceanographic details, and fisheries 
exploration data, the reconnaissance ships reported its 
findings to the mother ship, which supplies direction and 
guidance to fleet operations. After schools of fish were 
found and caught, the trawlers headed to the mother ship or 
the refrigerated transport, where the catch was unloaded. 
According to a schedule, some fishing vessels went to Lagos, 
Nigeria, where their crews were relieved and flown back home. 
The expedition lasted for the six months. 21 

The operations of each expedition and fishing flotilla 
are controlled from Moscow, where the main information center 

*«ma^ 1 5?!'^ 1 iis i y i s;!;. T '"" , " triTj '' *<»■*«■". »*>. «* 



520 



of the fishing industry not only has the location of each fishing 
vessel, but collects and analyzes the amount and qualities of the 
catches and, hence, the effectiveness of the operations/ The - 
center was described as follows: behind the panels of computer 
tbere is a huge operational map of the fishing fleet. The 
information showed that in the distant waters there were 
1,929 Soviet fishing ships, of which 1,420 were fishing, 103 
were underway (to or from fishing areas) and 149 were in ports. 22 
Their catches for a day, a week, and from the beginning of. the" ' 
fishing cruise, as well as loads including fish, fuel, and other 
supplies, were known. The center resembles the work of an 
operations department of a naval staif . 

In 1970, 7.2 million tons of fish was caught in the seas 
>nd the oceans (not counting the catch in the internal waters) - 
» increase of close to fifty per cent over 1965. The growth 
)f the Soviet Fishing Fleet and its technological sophistication 
)bviously contributed greatly to such a catch. However, the 
■enlevement would not have been possible without the tremendous 
ffort of the Soviet scientific research and development 
rganizations supporting the Soviet Fishing Fleet. Now we shall 
xamine the history and the development of the Soviet efforts 



11 this area. 
22 



Sovetskaya Rossiya , May 19,1971. 

/ 






521 



Research and Development 



l 



It is now generally accepted that the success of fishing 
industry depends upon two factors: efficiency and knowledge^ 
While the former, efficiency, mainly is a product of 
technology, which was briefly discussed above, the latter, 
knowledge, comes from the marine science research. Many experts 
in the field are agreed that the quality and emphasis of Soviet 
research in support of fisheries exceeds that of any other 
country and, especially in recent times, the Soviets have made 

considerable progress in the application of modern science to 

23 

ocean fishing. 

The first Soviet Scientific Research Institute of the 
Fishing Industry, Plavmornin (Floating Marine Scientific 

Institute) was organized in 1921 with the tasks of "broadly 

24 
ranging research in the Arctic Ocean and adjoining seas". The 

importance attached to the research in the interest of the fishing 

industry can be illustrated by the following: the decree which 

established Plavmornin and was signed by Lenin provided the 

23 

See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman, "The Soviet Turn 
En if^x'' ^^-^Ji^Seas (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Tti L 1968) ' and Gilbert McL. Chapman, Fishery Resources in 
^ishore Waters", The Law of the Sea : Offshore Boundaries a nd 
illiLZpnes (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967). 

24 

Pybnoe Khozvaistvo No. 3, 1971. ' 



522 



nstitute with equipment, fuel, and food on the same basis 

s "utmost important state agencies". As a result of more than 

t 

hirty expeditions in the Barents, White, and Kara Seas aboard 

*■» 
he Persei, the first Bathymetric chart was created, the current 

ystem was studied, and considerable knowledge of the biological 

roductivity of the waters and the sea bottom was obtained. 

uring the period 1921-1926 a network of specialized laboratories, 

ubordinated to the CentraOL Institute of the Fishing Industry 

n Moscow and serving the fishing regions around Murmansk, the 

ar East, the Caspian, and the Black Sea was created. 

Of considerable importance for the development of fishing 

n the Barents Sea was the organization of GOIN (State 

ceanographic Institute) at the end of 1929. In 1932 the 

pecially organized Murmansk Herring Expedition established 

he possibility of drift fishing for herring in the Barents Sea. 

t the end of 1933. this expedition was merged with the Murmansk 

etachment of GOIN, and the PINRO (Polar Scientific Research 

nstitute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography) was created. 

i 
In 1926 the Pacific Scientific-Fishing Station was 

Tganized "to study the fish reserves of the Far Eastern seas 

or the purpose of commercial fishing". In the late 1920's, 

he Pacific Station concluded studied of the biology and 

distribution of Kamchatka crabs. Based upon the findings of the 



59 7 



OZ 



station a rather sizable industry for catching, processing, and 
canning of crabs was established in the area. In'the 1930's, 
canned crab was one of the important items of Soviet export. 
In 1930 the station was reorganized into the Pacific Scientific 
Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (TINRO) . 

In the late 1920' s and early 1930's, considerable 
attention was devoted to the study and improvement of fish 
processing methods, including salting processes, and quality 
of salt. The work of the fishing industry research institutes 
made an important contribution to the development of the Soviet 
salt industry, thereby precluding the need for importation of 
salt from abroad. (Salt used to be an important item in Russian 
and later Soviet import) . The institutes also developed new 
technological processes for the processing of caviar-the first 
item of the fishing industry sold on export. 

The fishing expeditions of 1936-1939 proved the profitability 
of herring fishing in the open sea and discovered rich herring 
grounds in the Northern and Pacific waters. The methodology of 
long-term forcasts for bottom fish and herring was worked out. 
As a result of work of the scientific institutes prior to World 
War II, the Soviet Union had developed a good picture of the 
nature and volume of the fishing resources in the seas adjoining 
her waters. 



52H 



In the post-World War „ 

scientific institutes was «. Perl ° d ^ ^^ WOrk °* the 

. was con centrated 
sea and oceanic fishin, * ^ develo P^nt of 

wishing as well ac «,k , ., * 

u as whaling in -m~ a 

— • T ne ir contribution to the • " * *— *<= 

«""- *- the re raot e ar eas of th " -""*-"» 

teas of the world 

"ey have been constantly inv , " immeasu "»le. 

ctutxy involved in f^H 

tne discovery ot aev re <=°-aissance and 

wishing grounds, th*. *+ ^ 

- — - «, «,«„„„„;:;,;"*■ -*• - • 

'" methods of f ish ,„ ' thS deve lopment of • 

iishmg, including th a 

iU 6 tne use n-p «t 

lght ' aDd *-*»,.««* sounds _ el6Ctrioal ««.«. 

Today there are eight 

*"" — ry. Their wo r is reSear0h iQSUtUteS ° f - *~« 

wonc is conducted * n n 

" - -iet Ac ade.y Q f Sciences and ^'^ 

d ^-eteorlogical i nstltute 

—3. IB addit . " UteS —— to the other 
additl0Q to the above m P n + - 

' -t important institut '"" "* ™> 

institutes are: 

VNIro - Cth^ h 

sSSrr^ ^Tt ta A £ &*-«** in d„ str y ' - - 

' ° f FlSheri - and 'ftJSiJS SOieUUfiC Resea -«i 

n * PiihiTiii" ann n ° Scien .ti£c Research t 

S and °oeanography * ese arch Institute of 

AzcherN'IRO a 

a ^ne HaSF i ;.~S!. Ck Sea Scie *tif ic Research r 

and 0ce anography research Institute 

>riii - Las Pian Scientific R««* a u 

C Rese arch Institute of 



KIKIMBP - Scicntif „ 
the FiSiTlHdustry X ° Resea rch and Design Institute of 

o* ^terprises and iJSZ^STA^^ "* ^«— • 

/ w xne Fishing Industry * 

Giprorybflot - Stato n~ • 

=an be seen ea oh major Soviet basln has 
assigned to it. ° ne lnst "ute 

- PINR0 lMtltate - pres ; ntly conduots up to . 

—ions annually, during wMch ^^^ ^ socaii ^ | 

;; e r eraPhl ° "*«~ « — d and large amounts of ' 

biological data collected Cm ' ' 

"-tj-eciea. (Mass survey nf *,• ,. ~ 
1 ic„ „„„ urveys of fish are nearing 

1,150,000 samples per year) Th» < u 

' lnst "utes owns sixteen research 

ships. Siaoe 1958 lnstl • Sear ° a 

' . . + baS beea conducting work on 

acclimatization of Pari in „ 

Pacific salmon in the White anrt » 25 

lte and Barents Seas 
The TINRO owns a fleet „f tM , 

thirty-six research ships and 
conducting research on all known or potential 
la the Pacific Ocean. ^ ^^ 

*»e Soviet Fishing Research. Xastitutes work out new 

:z::r* B processing especiaiiy — - — 

- factory ships. Such methods include smoking i n a ^J 

V ° ltage fi6ld iQ section with head processing • ' 

rays Th „ Processing usmgmfra-red 

ays. The gamma radiation process for „= • ' 

process for canning is under 

development, and an experimental installs- 

._ _ tax installation called Stavrida 

25„. 

fishi ng Industry No. 3, 1971 

- / " ■ .. '. 

/ 



I 
I 



was successfully tested in 1970 aboard the scientific ship 
Akademik Knipovich, built in 1964 specifically for research 
in the remote areas of the ocean, where the potentialities of 
future fishing grounds are determined. Research work has 
begun on determining the best means of utilizing Antarctic 
Krill for human nutrition. (This represents the first attempt 
to use plankton as a human food). The ship's processing plant 
produced a special cheese containing krill protein. 

In addition to the surface research ships, the industry "" 
since 1958 has been using a converted W-Class submarine, Severyanka, 
for the research. This submarine gathered considerable data on 
fish habits as well as the efficiency of trawling methods. 
In May 1971, the decision to build two more submarines for 

fishing research was announced. One will be of long range and 

26 
endurance and the second, a midget type for short dives. 

Also the Soviets are using anumber of submersibles, such as 

Sever-1, with working depths up to six hundred meters; Sever-2, 

a self-propelled type equipped with a manipulator and working 

depths of more than 1,000 meters; and the Gvidon self-propelled 

"underwater laboratory with submergence depths of several 



26 Nedelya No. 21, May 17-23, 1971. 



/ 



527 



hundred meters" An rt +u 

wcto . Another devirp a-;^,-*, 

aevice aiding i n the study of the 

behavior of the trawls as well as of f • u A 

^11 as of fish is the Sathyplane 

Atlant, which, with a man aboard is +™ * . 

aooard, is towed behind the fishing 

vessel and is capable °* "— aphing and reporting on the 

fishing process itself. 

The Atlantic Scipntifi« r> * 

o^xenriiic Research Tn<s^ +,, + ~ u 

U1 institute has special 

department of marine electronics Th« „ 

tromcs. The department designed and 
developed a number of underwater TV « • 

erwater TV equipments which automatically 

observe the behavior of the trawl and transmit th , 

transmit the picture to ' 
the trawler. Two c,,^ ^ 

such equipments, IGEK and PRITSEL, are said 

to improve trawx productive by more thaQ thirty per ^^ 
- toe latter is capable of seeing ^ ^ ^ ^^ 

of meters away from the trawl 28 a „. u 

*rawi. A number Qf sophisticated 

sonars for finding schools of f*~u u 

b cnools of fish have been developed. 

o- of them, the Kala?r , is ^^ Qi detecUQg a siQgie 
at depths up to 800 meters. 29 

I- order to attract fish and to concentrate a fish school 
»USt prior to the tra w l, a special rocket W hich spreads an i 

!r!^l! en USe " ° riginally ' the "<**** -re | 
27 c 

SpveJskayj^Rossiva, July 12, 1968. 
28 

^^XJ^n^port, April 29, 1969. 

^P^£2^niye No. 12, December 1968, pp. 27 l30. 



S2& 



propelled by solid fuel an n 

UGland — ° f the. were expendable. 
Later, a special steam propell^ 

«~t. « can be used p " rocket was —*" which 

06 iS US6d t0 «tuat. the sprayer. 30 
It was reported that by imit,*- 
Soviet fish- "bating sounds of predators 

Soviet fishmg V e SS ei s can force *«.„ * 

ho** t0 the "ottom, where 

bottom trawl catches th= 

*"-" es them. in tha*- ,„ 

that way, the effectiving 
of the fishing K ear 1= • "octiveness 

S gear is increased by 300-500% A n . 

tb. Caspian Sea tested the effe „ " * 

zne effectiveness of }-i<rh + 

—X. at the cost of b ^ " ""^ 

°° St of abo «t one-third that of 
Tho * ° f a net operation. 

The previously genera n „ 

V generally accepted belief that th» 

*« a limitless source of f ish re 

of the ^sources is now disputed. One 

of the reasons for this is that -„ 

expand- W ° rld fiShiQ S e "^s are 

expanding at such a rapid rate that th 

* -stain it The d , 

iX ' The depletion of fish«*.„ 

F actofl ife For • f " he ^ —s became the 

e * F °r example, in idaa ~ 

" S takeQ 1G N ° rthe - Atlantic, while in 1 969 the t 
*ount to a little ° atch 

little over two million tons T« + u 

art of * h . the Nor theastern 

rt of th e Atlantic wher* ^ u 
_ c, where f ishing is perfonaed priinarily ^ 



31 




523 



the Soviet Union, Iceland n 

'celand, Denmark, and Norway the 
"erring catches decrea.^ ^^ 

^creased catastrophically : , 

Iceland, more than lq * • 

57,000 tons); 3 tlmes ( f ™m 770,000 to 

gggH:. close to seven times- 
0£SR_l more than ><, +• tJ - rae s, 

75,000 tons). tlmeS (fr °°> 500,000 to 

Each side bl ames the other. 32 . . 

The Soviet Union ordered 

complete halt to herrin* 

— — - ».«»...«.„ „ u „ tio . s 2* " '» - 

exists in the S« • situation .. 

the Soviet *ar East, where at th 

ti. vvnere at the end of the f-i-p + - 

there were fn,^ u sixties 

were lour huge schools of h^ • 

s ot he rnng, and now thp~ • 
°™ in the Okhotsk Sea. 1S ° Uly 

J S °viet scientists warned the f is h • 

xne flsh mg industry on the 
Possibility of th« ,, , 

7 0± tne ^Pletion of Pacify h 

i-aciiic herring- t^~ 

for conservation practice necessity 

practices was wpIi „~ 
dentists a lo -co g n lzed by Soviet 

l0ng tin ' e ag °- *° 1938 (!) Academician KniD , 

' r0te -- "There used to be a time „ ^nxpovxch 

oe a tlm e when even bio- „„ 
^enti ficworldwere . x . 

^ ^ C ° nSider th * »-lt h o* the ' 
U Uallmited - ™° time for such naive iUusi ■ 
»evit ably the results lllUS1 ° ns - ■«<* are 

tS ° f a s "Perficial knowledge of nat ' 
is pas^p,] ,- qq se ox nature, 

Passed irreversibly" 33 » I1+ 

U-. But ' eve n at the preset n 

present time the 

32 
j isyestiya, December 13, i 970 . 

^^^i^naya Gazeta No 4 2 n * , 

"O. 42, October 15, 1969. 



/ 

/ 



S2n 



opinion of scientists concerning the maximum level of fishing 
which the oceans would be able to sustain differ widely. 
Some conclude that the world fishery production could be 
increased up to two hundred million tons without any radical 

development such as fish farming, and the ocean would be able to 

34 
sustain it. Other scientists, including many Soviets, put the 

maximum sustainable level somewhere between one hundred million 

and 150 million tons. But the growth in world population, the 

steadily increasing number and size of ships involved in fishing - 

together with the sophistication of fishing equipment, and, 

finally, the growth, though at a slower rate, of fish catches, 

have convinced the majority of the scientists that, if the present 

practice continues, the ocean might become a biological desert. 

Moreover, it was clearly stated in the Soviet press that the 

traditional methods of catching fish in the world oceans will 

not meet human needs in the future. It was also emphasized 

that in spite of existing possibility of increasing catches in 

inland waters considerably, its capability, will be limited. 

Strong arguments have been made in the Soviet Union for drastic 

changes in fishing, to switch from the methods of simple hunting 

of fish to rational and scientifically based methods of fish 



34 ,_ 

Milner B. Schaefer, "Economic and Social Needs for Marine 

Resources," Ocean Engineering: Goals, Environment, Technol ogy, 

New York: Wiley, 1968, p. 6. — — — 



531 



35 

harvesting. m order to achieve such a rational use of the 

ocean wealth the following has been proposed: » 

- to study and master those areas of the ocean and catch 
those forms of the aquatic life which has not been used 
intensively; 

- to increase fishing in the middle layers as well as 
pelagic fishing were considerable resources of anchovies, 
mackarel, tuna, marlins, sharks, and other types of fish 
exist; 

- to improve methods for determining fishing resources in 
order to establish maximum sustainable level of catches* 

- more rational fishing in relation to the size and the 
age of the fish caught; 

- considerably increase catches of small previously not 
used fish and such form of sea life as krill, for production 
of protein or fish protein concentrates (FPC) ; 

- to increase the practice of transportation of certain 

fish from one area of the ocean to another (primarily off-shore 

i 
areas) and to assist fish in acclimation; 

- to intensify the use of the Continental Shelf and to 
create there a sort of aquaculture which would potenially become 
a major marine food production areas. 



35. 



Vodnyy Transport , July 1, 1971. 



532 



Presently, to exercise conservation practice, research 
hips are being sent to the prospective fishing grounds, ahead 
f the arrival of the fishing fleets, where they determine not 
nly the quantity and type of fish available, but also measure 
ish size and determine fish age. This procedure is claimed 

o minimize the possibility of catching young fish and decreases 

36 -- 
he chances of over-catch. As was stated above, the production 

rocess for fish protein paste from krill has been developed 

ad the needed equipment tested. It has been claimed that 

he catches ofkrill measured in protein units may produce twice 

37 

s much protein as presently obtained from all world fishing. 

Some steps are being initiated in the direction of 
eveloping aquaculture. From the experimental grounds of 
zcher-NIRO, some forms of sea life and sea weeds are being 
arvested at half the cost of the conventional methods at sea. 
oviet scientists have long been working to improve the breed 
f the fish, and recently a major success was reported. A 
rolonged experiment had resulted in the hybrid of a beluga and 
sturgeon. It was claimed that nature's barrier had been - 
vercome, and a new fish called bester, whose "parents" are the 
eluga and the sturgeon is very viable and fast growing. In 



Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya , July 13, 1971. 

37 

Vodnyy Transport, July 1, 1971. r 



533 



1966 the second generation of this fish was developed from the 
roe laid by the bester. It is now claimed that the bester came 
out of the experimental state long ago and is ready for natural 
breeding and reproduction, prospects for which were considered 
very favorable. 

Fishing by -Kolkhozes and in Inland Waters 

In addition to the fishing enterprises subordinated to 
the Ministry of the Fishing Industry, there are hundreds of 
fishing kolkhozes (collectives, organizationally similar to 
the agricultural collective farms) , involved in fishing in 
inland waters as well as at high sea. Under the Model Statue 
of the Fishing Kolkhoz, approved by the Council of People's 
Commissars on 16 February 1939, all motor and sailing boats 
used for fishing and transport, machinery, fishing gear and 
net-making equipment were collectivized in the Fishing Kolkhoz. 

An important role in the operation of Kolkhozes used to 
be played by the socalled motor-fishing stations (MRS) . By 
the end of the 1950' s however, the methods of allotment of 
technical production equipment to Kolkhozes by the MRS were 
found inadequate, and the system was changed. All equipment 
formerly belonging to the MRS's was sold to the Kolkhozes, and 
the MRS's became technical stations for the repair. Since that 



53^ 



time, the ships, fishing gear, etc. have been sold to the 
kolkhozes on a cash or credit basis. 

In 1969 the total kolkhoz fishing fleet had about 10,000 
fishing vessels and accounted for about one-quarter of the total 
Soviet fish catch. Only in Kamchatka and Sakhalin are there 
more than five hundred fishing kolkhozes, and more than 180 
of them are involved in sea and ocean fishing. Their fleet has 
a relatively small number of large freezer trawlers (BMRT) , a 
few hundred medium refrigerator trawlers (SRT) and a few hundred 
ocean-going seiners. Working for the kolkhozes there are over 
2,000 captains and navigators with regular certificates. The 
reason that the kolkhozes fish in distant waters (concurrently 
and quite often together with the expeditions of the Ministry 
of the Fishing Industry) is not for their love for navigation 
or even the better quality of fish there, but the absence of 
fish in nearby off-shore waters. The Far Eastern regions of the 
Soviet Union are a classical example, but their case is especially 
typical for another reason. Several years ago, not to mention 
the p re-World War II period and the first decade following i fish 

was found in abundance in those waters, but ever greater plans 

i 

for catches, the real demand for fish in the country, good pay 
(frequently many times over that in the agricultural collective 
farms) promoted not only a rapid development of the fishing fleet 

/ 



535 



in the kolkhozes, but unreasonably large catches which often 
considerably exceed the processing capacity of the fishing 
industry. In all fairness, it should be stated that the Soviet 
fishermen are not alone responsible for the overexploited waters 
of the Okhotsk Sea, around Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands; 
Japanese fishermen made their own considerable contribution. 
Soviet scientists made, what appeared to be, a correct prognosis, 

set a quota of fishing and warned against excessive catches, 

38 

but they were ignored. As a result, all that could be done was 

for the kolkhoz fishing fleet to follow Ministry of the Fishing 
Industry and to fish all over the world. 

However, to that end a qualitatively different, much more 
sophisticated and expensive fleet of ships was needed, which 
was developed but to such a degree that it does not now differs 
much from the fishing fleet of Ministry of the Fishing Industry. 
The kolkhoz fleet uses the same type of refrigerator-transports 

and similar methods of fishing used by the Ministry's flotillas. 

i 
i 

The economics of the state-owned fishing, enterprises and the 

/ : ! 

kolkhozes, however, differ sharply, as does the pay received 

I 

i 

by the fishermen, as illustrated by the following, hypothetical 

example: Let us assume that Ivanov is a fisherman of the 

i 

State-Owned Fishing Flotilla, and Petrov is a fisherman of a 



38 

Literaturyaya Gazeta No. 39, 40, and 42, of October 1969 

/ 



ob 



Kolkhoz. From the very beginning of a fishing cruise they are 
in unequal positions. While underway to the fishing ground 
Ivanov receives socalled "navigational pay" of approximately 
160 rubles per month; Petrov is paid nothing. If the fishing 
is extremely poor and Ivanov catches little or nothing, he will 
still be paid his guaranteed salary (seventy-five per cent of 
navigational pay), plus an "area differential". 

Length of service in the state fishing industry is well 
rewarded. For example, in the northern areas, fishermen receive 
a ten per cent increase in their basic pay every six months. 
Petrov receives none of those benefits and is paid only for the 
fish caught and delivered ashore or aboard a ref rigerator-transport 
It is true that kolkhozes pay their fishermen more per unit 
of fish caught than the fishing industry pays its fishermen, but, 
on the other hand, the State pays the kolkhozes considerably 
less per unit than it' pays to the State owned fishing enterprises. 

How do kolkhozes manage to exist under those conditions? 
The "secret" is quite simple - by the considerably higher 
productivity of their fishermen, by better and cheaper maintenance 
and repairs, primarily performed by their members, and a very 
normal desire of the Kolkhoz fishermen to make money. Kolkhoz 
fishermen are making 400-600 rubles per month, considerably more 



537 



than the average wages of a Soviet worker of 140-160 rubles per 

month. A smaller administrative superstructure and simplicity 

of accounting methods and control make Kolkhoz overhead costs 

considerably lower than those of the State owned enterprises. 39 

It is a common practice that fishing kolkhozes in the 

Soviet Union are assigned to a State owned fishing combine 

(fish processing factory), whose existence is to a large degree 

due to the kolkhozes. The system was designed in order to get 

kolkhoz monies into the State budget, and works as follows; 

The combine acts as a broker between the kolkhozes assigned to 

it and buyers of fish the kolkhozes caught. Regardless of to 

whom the kolkhoz catches are to be delivered, whether a domestic 

or a foreign customer, this catch is counted as partial fulfillment 

of the combine's plan, and the combine is paid for it by the 

buyer. From the money received, the combine in turn pays the 

kolkhozes, but a considerably smaller sum than received from the 

buyer. By just such a practice, in 1969 in Kamchatka alone 

the combines "-received" from the kolkhozes twelve million rubles. 

But being on a self-accountability basis and because of their 

lower productivity, in addition to the twelve million rubles 

i 
they received a nineteen million ruble subsidy from the state. 

Proponents of the new economic reform launched in the 



i 



39 

Li teraturnaya Gazeta No. 43, October 22, 1969. / 

/ 



r;^ 



iR 



Soviet Union in 1965 raised the natural question: If kolkhozes 

are managing to pay for their own operation and make a considerable 

t 
profit, and in effect are subsidizing the combines, maybe it is 

40 
more logical for them to own these combines. Naturally, this 

question remained unanswered, because if the proposed "transaction" 

were to go through, the next logical step would be to buy 

regional, state-owned fishing enterprises and ultimately to 

buy out the Ministry of the Fishing Industry. Another idea 

proposed in the Soviet Press was to assign only off-shore fishing - 

to kolkhozes, reserving pelagic fishing for the State-owned 

fishing industry. But, as stated earlier, there are not many 

fish left in the off-shore waters around the Soviet Union. 

The notoriously inadequate Soviet price system is hurting 

the kolkhozes badly. The July 1967 price reform elevated the 

prices for metal and metal products. A seiner which used to 

cost 400,000 rubles prior to the reform cost 750,000 rubles 

after reform and a BMRT which used to cost 2.5 million rubles, 

now costs 3.6 million. Even though the prices for a ton of 

fish remained the same, the kolkhozes managed to operate at a 

considerable profit by exercising initiative and ingenuity. 

For example, after ship repair prices were raised, the kolkhozes 

began to repair their ships themselves, and established a number 



40 

Literaturnaya Gazeta No. 43, October 22, 1969.. 



539 



of their own small repair yards, saving up to 100,000 rubles 

on the repair of a BMRT compared with the cost of ' the repairs 

at a state-owned ship repair yard. But because the socalled 

"state interests'* always prevail, the initiative of the kolkhozes 

in these directions is constantly being restrained. In spite 

all of these, the kolkhozes catches are large, and the operational 

cost lower. 

The efforts of the State Fishing Industry and the- fishing 
kolkhozes resulted in a steady increase of Soviet catches during 
the five year period 1965-1970, with the total catch for the 
five years exceeding 34 million tons, or fifty-five per cent 
more than the preceding five years period. The annual Soviet 

per capita consumption of sea food increased by 36.5%, to 17.2 

41 
kilograms (thirty-eight pounds) in 1970. 

But sea fishing, though known and practiced in Russia for 

centuries, has only recently become the predominant, for ( 

traditionally, a considerable amount of fish was caught in the 

inland waters (rivers, lakes, and other fresh wa.ter bodies) as 

well as closed seas. In contrast to the steadily growing 

I 
catches in the seas and oceans, the catches in inland waters 

are steadily declining. For example, the catches in Sea of Azov 

were: 1936, 158,000 tons; 1946, 52,000 tons; 1956, 25,000 tons; 



i 



41 

Fishing Industry No. 4, 1971, pp. 3-6. 



540 



: / 
/ 



and 1965, 14,000 tons. The picture is not better in lakes and 

rivers: prior to the Revolution, in 1913, 614, 006 tons of 

t 

fish were caught in them: in 1962 the figure was 426,000 tons, 

and in 1968, 270,000 tons. (These figures reflect the catches 

42 
of only expensive fish, such as sturgeon, beluga, sterlet, etc.) 

The declining catches have been the direct result of depletion 

in fish stock, which have assumed alarming proportions. Compared 

with 1937 the catches of certain fish decreased as follows: 

sturgeon, two times; sundre, seven times; salmon, five times; 

Caspian herring, thirty times. Continuous pressure from ever 

increasing plans forced inland fishermen to catch more and 

more small fish. In 1937, 254,000 tons of small fish were caught, 

while in 1967 this figure reached 560,000 tons. B ut it is 

well known fact that large fish eat small ones, and because of 

the catastrophic decrease in the latter, the potential damage 

to overall inland fish resources increased considerably. The 

problem was aggravated by the pollution inevitably accompanying 

industrial development, which, in addition, required more and more 

electric power. Consequently , the large number of hydroelectric 

stations and dams built on the Soviet rivers violated the regular 

fish migration routes. It must be said that a number of provisions 

to eliminate the problem were planned and implemented. Bypasses 



42 

Literaturnaya Gazeta No. 30 and No. 50, 1968, and No. 10, 

1969. / 



541 



and elevators were built at the dams, but fish quite often 
refused to take a free ride on elevators or follow prescribed 
channels and stubbornly tried to return to their spawning 
grounds through familiar ways which were blocked by concrete. 

Complaints are being voiced that the best scientists and 
experts have been employed by the fishing industry involved 
in the sea and ocean fishings and not enough funds have been 
allocated for research in the interest of inland fishing. 
Another problem, and this is of a typically Soviet nature, is 
the administrative or organizational problem. It is impossible 
to determine who is responsible for the inland waters, their 
purity, and the preservation of fish. This was admitted by no 

less an authority than the Minister of the Fishing Industry of 

43 

the RSFSR. The Soviet Ministry of the Fishing Industry is 

nominally in overall charge of all matters concerning fishing. 
Keeping waters free of pollution lies with the corresponding 
ministries of the various industries, to whom the fulfillment of 
the plan is the primary goal and anti-pollution measures, in 
spite of the existing regulations, a remote, secondary goal at 
best. The Ministry of the Fishing Industry, overwhelmed by the 
problems associated with sea and oceanic fishing obviously does 
not and, in all objectivity, probably cannot pay enough attention 



43 Pravda, May 31, 1969. 



542 



to inland waters. For these reasons, the republic ministries 
and administrations are arguing that they alone should be 
entrusted with matters associated with inland fishing, and not 
only responsible for the catches and fulfillment of plan. In 
reality, the arguments, of course, are centered around of control 
of funds research facilities. At the end of 1960's, only four 

per cent of total capital investment in the Soviet fishing 

44 
industry was allocated for the development of inland fishing. 

Certain measures aimed at correcting the existing situations- 
have been undertaken. At present, the Main Directorate for 
Fishing and Fish Farming in inland basins coordinates the efforts 
of republic fishing ministries and directorates in their fish 
preservation efforts. Ten scientific research institutes of 
the Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the USSR and a group of 
scientists from the Soviet Academy of Sciences are searching for 
a solution and are experimenting in order to stabilize inland 
water fish resources and to promote their growth. One hundred 

and twenty fish factories and farms have been established J One 

/ ! 

such enterprise occupies an area of 13,000 hectares and is capable 

of producing 18,000 tons of fish for consumption and to growing 

more than eleven million fish to one year of age. 

The fresh water fish in the Soviet Union have traditionally 






44 

Pravda, May 31, 1969. , . 

i ' 
/ 



U *3 

4 VJ 



been considered a better fish, and certain types definitely 
are. The possibilities for well organized fish farming in the 
Soviet Union are very bright indeed. Its largest republic,-^^ 
the Russian, has 400,000 kilometers of rivers, about twenty 
million hectares of lakes, and more than four million hectares 
of artificial water reservoirs. At present, it also has close 
to 40,000 hectares of fish ponds. 

In 1971, the Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the USSR 
inaugurated a new scientific industrial enterprise which is 

charged with the task of increasing fish resources in Sea of 

45 
Azov and the Don River. In 1970, sixty-eight million juvenile 

sturgeons, 760 million salmon, and about six billion other fish 

were produced by the above mentioned 120 fish factories and farms 

and released into Soviet inland water basins. A low catch limit 

46 
for the inland waters has been established. 



45 Izvestiya , Ma'y 24, 1971. 

46 

Fishing Industry No. 4, 1971, pp. 3-6 



5W 



Organization 



l 



The Ministry of Fishing mdustry of the USSR is a Union 
Republic ministry. In contrast to All-Union Ministries, which 
have administrative power over the entire territory of the 
Soviet Union, the Union Republic ministries coordinate similar 
industries in the Republics T>ut directly control only a specified 
number of enterprises, the list of which has been approved by 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
J The Ministry is headed by the Minister assisted by the 
central apparatus. 

J On representations made by the Minister, the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR approves the collegium of the Ministry for 
"collective examination of the most important matters relating 
to fisheries". The collegium is chaired by the Minister, and 
its members are the Deputy Ministers and senior officials 
of the Ministry appointed by the Council of Ministers. Decisions 
of the collegium are implemented by the Minister's orders. 
| The structures of the Ministry (USSR) comprises five Main 
Basin Administrations, four Main Branch Administrations, fourteen 
Administrations, six Departments and two Main Inspection 
Apartments. 

| The Main Administration of Fleet Mainte nanr^ is » to assure 
'lanned, preventive repairs of vessels and the manufacture of 



545 



spare parts." 

The Main Administration for Fish Breeding and Conservation 

i 

(Glavrybvod) is concerned with the preservation of fish stocks, 

the designing and implementation of measures for their 
reproduction and the regulation of fishing. 

The Main State Inspection of the Fishing Fleet (Glavgosryb- 
f lotinspektsiya) ensures the observance of the Soviet Merchant 
Shipping Code in the fleets of the fishing industry and. the 
fishing kolkhozes fleet, as well as of rules, regulations and 
instructions concerning the safety of navigation and fishing. 
It also administers the salvage service. Glavgosrybf lotinspektsiya 
carries out the tasks assigned to it through Basin State 
Inspection Departments. 

Main Basin Administrations of the Fishing Industry were 
established in 1962 for local direction of the fishing industry. 
These Main Basin Administrations ( Zapryba - Western Administration 

# 

of the Fishing Industry - in Murmansk; Dal* ryba - Far Eastern 

j 
Administration of the Fishing Industry - in Vladivostok; Kaspryba - 

Caspian Sea Administration of the Fishing Industry; and - | 

Azcherryba - Azov-Black Sea Administration of the Fishing Industry • 

I 

in Sevastopol) are a part of the central apparatus of the 

i 

Ministry. 

Production administrations of the fishing industry of 

: / 



c 



46 



Union Republics or territories are directly subordinate to 
the Main Basin Administration. For instance, Zapryba is in 
iirect charge of the Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian and 
(aliningrad production-administrations, which in their turn 
iirectly control shore fish-processing enterprises, fishing 
seaports, plants for repair of ships, etc., within their respective 
•egions, as well as trawling, refrigeration, transport and 
tuxiliary fleets. 

The Administration of Industrial Fishing pursues a uniform ^ 
echnological policy. The Administration is responsible for: 
1) adequate distribution and maximum utilization of the 
ishing fleet; (2) opening up and developing new sea regions 
or fishing operations; (3) introduction of modern fishing 
ethods; (4) perfecting sea-exploitation projects and fishing 
ear. 

The Shipbuilding Administration lays down the technological 
olicy for the construction of fishing vessels, for the utilization 

ad development of the production capacity of shipbuilding yards 

i 
ad controls the implementation of the shipbuilding plan. 

The principal functions of the Administration of Fleet 

nd Por ts Utilization are: (1) development and improvement of 

leet and fishing ports activities; (2) introduction into the 

leet and fishing ports of the latest achievements of sciences 



5 it 7 



and technology; (3) distribution and full utilization of the 

refrigeration and transport fleet. l- 

i 

The Administration of Fishing Kolkhozes is responsible for 

the full exploitation of fish stocks by kolkhozes. It carries 
out the following functions: (1) examines the work of the 
kolkhoz fishery fleet; (2) participates in developing of new 
types of vessels and fishing gear. 

The Administration of the Sea Transport Fleet, Mortransf lot , 
is responsible for taking delivery of vessels built for the 
Ministry of Fishing Industry at Soviet and foreign shipyards, 
and to carry out production tests on the vessels so delivered 
during the guarantee period. It gives technical assistance for 
training crews of foreign firms which have purchased the Soviet- 
built fishing vessels. 

There are also: The Main Administration of Material 
and Technical Supply; the Administrations of Economic Planning, 
Finance, Fish Produce and Modern Technology ,. Personnel and 
Training Institutions, Capital Building and Projects, Scientific 
Research Institutes, Wages and Labor, Reserve Cadres," External 
Relations; the Department of Signals and Search Techniques, 
the Transport Department. 

The Ministry of Fishing Industry is widely represented 
abroad. In addition to various representatives in the UN 



5i*8 



organizations, those involved in the foreign trade and ship- 
building, observing fulfillment of various agreements concerning 
fishery, there are three important categories of representatives 
whose existence and duty are illustrative, for they show the 
scope of the Soviet fishing industry activity. 

In accordance with bilateral agreements between the 
government of the USSR and the governments of certain foreign 
states, the Ministry has representatives residents abroad, whose 
duties are defined by the contractual obligations of the Soviet 
Union in each particular case. 

The Ministry's representative at Dakar, the Republic of 
Senegal: (1) supervises the performance of Soviet obligations 
under the provisions of the Soviet-Senegalese Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Field of Marine Fishing, of 22 March 1965, 
and of obligations under certain other agreements to the extent 
that the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR is involved in them; 
(2) attends to making arrangements for the calls of Soviet 
fishing vessels in Senegalese ports; (3) coordinates with 
Senegalese representatives all matters connected with the 
servicing of USSR fishing vessels in their ports; (4) takes 
care of the interests of Soviet fishing vessels in Senegalese 
ports; (5) assists Soviet fishing and cargo ships in the 
implementation of fishing and fishery-production plans; (6) helps 



5^3 



Soviet foreign trade organizations to solve operational problems 
connected with delivery of fish produce to Senegal; (7) acquaints 
the captains of Soviet vessels with the local port, customs, 
sanitary and other rules and formalities, and with the 
arrangements for servicing and supplying their vessels; (8) 
renders the Soviet captains assistance in the organization of 
"politico educational and cultural" work among the crews of 
their vessels; (9) is authorized to represent the Ministry 
in its contacts with the Senegalese; (10) is responsible for 
the strict observance, by the crews of Soviet fishing industry 
vessels, of Senegalese regulations, statues, instructions, and 
legislative acts. 

The representative in Cuba: (1) ensures the performance 
of Soviet obligations under the Soviet-Cuban agreements on 
cooperation in developing marine fishing and in constructing 
a fishing harbor; (2) directs the servicing of Soviet vessels; 
(3) deals with questions connected with the processing and 
deliveries of fish and fish produce to Cuba; (4) supervises 
the servicing, repairs and supply of Soviet fishery vessels 
based in the fishing harbors; (5) assists in and controls the 
activities of the operational group of the Kaliningrad Expedition 
Base of the Oceanic Fishing and Refrigerator Fleet; (6) 
coordinates and directs the activities of all Soviet fishery 



.550 



specialists in Cuba; (7) looks after the interests of the 
Soviet fishing fleet in Cuban ports. \ 

The operational group of the Ministry in the United Arab 
Republic: directs the activities of Soviet fishing, transport and 
scientific vessels engaged in fishing and fishery research in 
the waters of the Red Sea and in the northwest part of the 
Indian Ocean. The second "operational group" is stationed in 

Suez, and is charged with the training, on board of Soviet 

47 
vessels, the UAR citizens. 

Problems, Trends of Development, Plans 

In just the last five year period (1965-1970) the Soviet 

fishing industry received 3.5 billion rubles of capital 

48 
investment, of which seventy per cent was spent for ships. 

The interest of the State in the development of the fishing 

industry and the importance attached to it can be seen in the 

hundreds of rewards to fishermen- usually presented during a 

specially proclaimed holiday, Fisherman's Day, celebrated in 

July. The Soviet fishing industry annually receives thousands 

of young specialists educated in the numerous institutions 



47 

A. A. Volkov, Morskoe Pravo (Maritime Law), Pishchprom, 

Moscow, 1969, pp. 29-31, 58-73, 84-88. 

48 

Vodnyy Transport, July 10, 1971. 



551 



subordinated to the industry. There are five institutions of 
highest learning, fourteen marine schools and other educational 
institutions, with a total of 60,000 students and cadets. Two 
maritime academies are training future captains and navigators. 

And yet, in spite of the above figures, which apparently 
represent the power of the Soviet fishing industry, there are 
a number of serious problems. The nature of these problems 
can be divided roughly into two major categories: the first 
is associated with the Soviet centralized system of planning 
and control, and the second, with the fast development in the 
industry (what the Soviets called "problems of fast growth") . 
The existing problems resulted in the violation of certain 
proportions in the development of various branches of the 
fishing industry and the declining effectiveness of capital 
investment in recent years. For example, in 1965 the State's 
income from the fishing industry exceeded expenditures by 168 
million rubles, while in 1968 expenditures exceeded income by 
twenty-one million rubles. The main reason for the declining 
profit, and, in fact, operating at a loss, was found to be 1 in 
the ineffective use of the existing fishing fleet and the 
declining catches per ship. For example, in 1965 the average 
catch for a BMRT was 7.3 thousand tons, while in 1970 it was 
6.7 thousand tons. The time spent on the fishing grounds by 

/ 

552 



ships dropped from 71.3% in 1962 to 64.3% in 1968. 

Complaints have been made concerning the availability 
of refrigerator-transports, especially in the Far Eastern 
enterprises. Although these ships are badly needed on the 
fishing grounds, they spend fifty-five to fifty-eight per cent 
of the time in ports waiting to be unloaded or under repair, 
and only seven to eight per cent of time receiving fish at sea. 
Effective utilization of refrigerator-transports is handicapped 

by the low capacities of the Soviet ports as well as of the 

49 
railroad system. 

Available ship repair facilities obviously do not meet 
the needs of the fishing fleet. Tire Ministry was accused of 
spending too great proportion of allocated funds for shipbuilding, 
neglecting a corresponding increase in ship repair facilities. 
Previous major repair of a trawler required 146 days, presently 

227 days are needed. In 1969, 90,000 ship-days were lost because 

50 

of low quality of repair. Even- the -decision of Ministry to 

build mother-ship, Vostok, the ship which evoked such epithets 
as "fantastic" in the world press, was severly critized in the 
Soviet press and on seemingly good economic grounds. According 



49 T 

Izvestiya , March 20, 1970. 

50 

Pravda, April 8, 1970. 



553 



to estimates, Vostok was supposed to cost 37.5 million rubles, 
but, as early as the spring of 1970, it was clear'' that the ship 
could cost no less than 50 million rubles, for which fifteen 
to sixteen BMRT's could be built with the capacity to catch 
2.5 to 3 times more fish than the mother ship Vostok. 

The Soviet price system as well as the wage system have 
also adversely influenced the productivity of the Soviet fishing 
fleet, and urgent calls for modification have been made-. The * 
centralized command of the Soviet fishing industry frequently ■ 
interferes with the decisions of captains by switching ships 
and sometimes whole flotillas artibrarily from one fishing ground 
to another. The time lost because of this practice is probably 
considerable. Another factor is still poorly organized fish 
reconnaissance. It is argued that a good reconnaissance preceding 
the arrival of the fishing flotillas would eliminate the 
unnecessary concentration of large numbers of ships whose 
fishing capacities far exceed the? available* resources at a given 
fishing ground, and minimize losses of time spent underway from 
one fishing ground to another. Also, some of the fishing gear 
has been found to be of low effectiveness, and the electronic 
equipment employed to control them are in short supply. The 



51 

Izvestiya, March 20, 1970. 



554 



necessity for to swtich from the over-fished Continental Shelf 

zone into the deeper areas of the world ocean is oeing well 

recognized. The development of the Soviet fishing industry has 

clearly demonstrated adherence to such a trend. The trend would 

in turn continue to generate a demand for the construction of 

primarily medium and large-. fishing vessels. As far as number 

of large fishing ships, the Soviet Union is already in first 

place in the world with 2,900 totalling 3,605,000 GRT. 5 ^ Also, 

the further remoteness of the fishing areas from home bases 

would certainly require an even more accelerated development of 

ships for the auxiliary fleet such as refrigerator-transports, 

fish processing ships, tankers. The total tonnage of the world 

fishing fleets during the last ten years grew 2.8 times, but 

catches only 1.8 times. The Soviet Union expects this trend 

to continue and, according to their forecasts for 1980, despite 

the predicted growth of fishing fleet by 2.5 times, catches will 

grow only 1.5 times, and, hence, fish will cost more. 

It is expected that new methods of fish processing and 

canning will be introduced soon, including pasteurization by 

i 
irradiation, freezing by liquid nitrogen, and so on. 

I 
Containerization of fish cargo and solution of the problem of 

handling containers at sea, if necessary with the help of 



52 

Sudostroyeniye No. 9, 1970, pp. 14-19. 



ERR 



artificial suppression of waves, is expected. To elevate the 

catch level two measures are proposed: (a) man's active 

i 
assistance to "King Ocean" through more rational fishing and 

development of aquaculture, and (b) increased harvesting of 

other forms of sea life, including krill, the shrimp-like 

creatures which are frequently mentioned as the most promising. 

The future development of the fishing industry during 

1971-1975 is planned along these lines: 

more complete and rational mastery of the world ocean 
wealth and intensified fishing in inland basins; 

the 1975 fish catch is planned to reach 10.3 million 
tons, representing a growth of forty -seven- per cent over 1970; 

Soviet per capita consumption of fishery produce is 
planned to reach twenty-three kilogram per year; 

the main attention and primary fund allocation will be 
to further development of ocean fishing, but considerable 
development of inland fishing is,- planned as well; 

special attention will be paid to the development of 
fishing farms on ponds and lakes, with production of 2.5 to 3 



53 



53 

Sotsialisticheskay Industriya, May 29, 1971. The 

Soviets estimated that approximately 150 million tons of krill 
were formerly consumed annually by Antarctic whales. With 
the near disappearance of the whale, krill have multiplied 
considerably, and 150 million tons is mentioned as a possible 
catch level. 



556 



tons of per fish hectare of water; 

it is planned to build and reconstruct forty-three 
fish growing enterprises and their annual production in 1975 
should reach the level of 150 million sturgeon, up to 850 
million salmou, and up to nine billion other young fish; 

- more than 900 new ships for the fishing industry will 
be built in Soviet shipyards and ordered from East Germany, 
Poland, Denmark, West Germany, France, and other countries; 

- to change the designs of all basic types of fishing 

54 , 
ships operating in the high seas. 

The main design organization of the Soviet fishing industry, 

Central Design Bureau, Morpromsud, in Leningrad, is already 

working on the design of ships for the next Five Year Plan, 

1975-1980, including a specialized fish meal floating factory, 

a catamaran, a trawler with a displacement of 1,000 tons, a 

trawler-factory (canning) ship with a displacement of 10,000 

tons, a trawler-mother ship with two fishing vessels aboard, a 

I 
trawler for Arctic waters capable of working in not very dense 

/ I 

ice field, a special high-speed ship for fish reconnaissance 

55 

with modern equipment and two helicopters. 



54 

Rybnoe Khozyaistvo (Fishing Industry) Nos . 5 and 6, 1971; 

Vodnyy Transport , issues of March IS and 20, 1971 and July 10, 1971; 

Pravda Izvestiya , July 11, 1971; and Nedelya No. 28, July 5-11, 1971 

55 i ' 

Leniugradskaya Pravda , May 9, 1971. T / 



c 



57 



The socalled super trawlers with a cargo capacity of up 
to 2,000 tons and speed up to fifteen knots are being developed. 
Such ships will be capable of independent operations up to 
10,000 miles from their bases. They will be an improved type 
of existing super trawlers, Gruraant and Rembrandt, and an 
improved version of the Atlantik-class trawler," Atlantik-3. 
Fish canning will be done exclusively afloat, aboard special 
fish processing factory ships and canning trawlers. The fleet ' 
of refrigerator-transport will be enlarged and mother-factory 
ships with equipment capable of processing 300-400 tons of fish 
per day will be built. The number of ships of the Kamchatskie 
Gory class with over 12,000-ton cargo capacity and capability of 
delivering to the fishing rounds about 2,500 tons of fuel and 
produce and the production of about 100 tons of fresh water 
per day will be increased. 

It was also decided for reasons not given to greatly 
increase the fishing fleet of the Lithuanian Republic, which 
is supposed to receive one hundred fish processing factories 
and refrigerator-transports during the current five-year period. 
This new Soviet fishing fleet will be fishing inthe Atlantic, 
using the most modern ships and fishing gear (such as fishing 
with electric current and trawls capable of operating up to 
a depth of 5,000 meters) . 



558 



All large Soviet fishing trawlers will be equipped with 
electronic equipment controlling the eff ectiveness'of the trawl 
in the process of fishing. The capacity of ship repair ' 
enterprises should grow more than 1.7 times, the volume of 
shore freezers and refrigerators, by 1.6 times, and the capacity 
of fishing ports, by fifty-six per cent. 

Considerable attention is planned to be devoted to the 
organizational problems of the fishing industry. Further 
development of centralized and computerized, automatic control 
systems (ASU) for the fishing industry is planned. More 
attention will be devoted to scientific forecasting in the trends 
of development and operation of fishing industry. The role of 
the scientific research institutions of the industry will be 
further elevated. 

It appears that the Soviet Union fishing industry well 

understands the problem of future fishing in the considerably 

depleted areas of the world ocean, and is making appropriate 

i 
provisions for not only sustaining the present level, but ^or a 

considerable increase of catches. 

The Soviet Union provides technical assistance to a 
number of less developed countries, particularly in Africa, 



/ 



/ 



559 



56 
to some Asian countries, Mauritius, and recently Peru. Soviet 

i 

assistance in the development of Cuba's fishing industry has been 

substantial. The Soviet Union in return is obtaining considerable 
benefits from the countries to which assistance was granted, and 
many Soviet fishing vessels are being serviced in the ports 
of these countries. In the absence of foreign bases, the right 
of the Soviet fishing vessels to make those port calls are of 
obvious importance. 



56 In June 1971 an agreement was signed by the Soviet 
Union and Peru which provides for technical aid to the latter 
in the construction of a fishing port, the sending of a 
scientific research vessel to study fishing resources in the 
proximity of Peru's shores, and the training of fishing industry 
specialists in Soviet educational institutions. Vodnyy Transport , 
June 12, 1971. 



5G0 



Conclusions 

Long before the growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine and 
Navy caught the world's eyes, the Soviet fishing fleet had been 
seen in various areas of the world's oceans remote from Soviet 
shores. A high degree of imagination and innovation in the 
development of the Soviet fishing industry, primarily for the 
bulk of it operations in the high seas, has been demonstrated. 
The first trawlers built in the early 1950's were of rather- 
small size, but new programs generated in late 1950' s' and I960 's 
produced a fishing fleet capable of operating thousands of <> 
miles away from their bases for up to six to eight months. 
Whereas the fishing vessels of many Western countries, including 
most of the U.S., have to return to port after five to seven 
days to deliver their catches, the Soviet fleet processes most 
of the fish afloat, right in the areas where it was caught, 
turning out all varie-ties of sea food products ready for 

consumption. I 

/' | 

The fishing gear employed by the Soviet fleet is among 

/ j 

most efficient and advanced in the world. The development ;Of 

i 
I 
the industry is not only being fed with considerable 

i 
appropriations permitting vigorous foreign orders for ship • 

! 
constructions and utilization of available domestic shipbuilding 

: / 

561 



facilities, but is supported by the world's most powerful 
research and development efforts, highly qualified scientific 
personnel and a well developed large educational system turning 
out about 10,000 specialists per year. It appears, that the 
most of the problems associated with such a rapid development 
of the industry, with the notable exception of "those associated 
with the nature of the socio-political system, have been 
recognized, and a search for the appropriate solutions and 
implementation of corrective measures is underway. 

The level of the Soviet catch reached 7.8 million tons 
in 1970 and is steadily growing. The Soviet Union is now 
catching more fish and other forms of sea life than the U.S., 
Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Canada combined. The 
fear once expressed in the Western press that the Soviet fishing 
industry would ignore conservation practices seems to be 
unfounded. The advanced Soviet fishing technology certainly 
provides an advantage over the fishermen from many other 
countries, and provides the Soviet Union with the larger catch, 
but it can hardly be criticized. It seems, that the Soviet 
Union is honestly trying to observe fish conservation practices 
and is an active participant in international agreements, 
conventions, and organizations concerned with research, 
regulations, and conservation practices.' There are now eighty 



562 



international agreements concerning fishery. The Soviet Union 
is party to forty of .then.. The present Soviet fishing industry 
is certainly a tool for advancing national interests of the ^ 
Soviet Union and it has great potential not only for supplying 
needed protein for the country's population, but for being an 
instrument of foreign aid. -- 

The military and primarily naval value of the Soviet 
fishing fleet is a less easily and clearly defined phenomenon. ' 
While the great opportunity provided by the fishing fleet 
operating in the high seas on a year-round basis for training 
of sailors for the Soviet Navy, and the fact that many of the 
fishing fleet ships have a para-naval value ; is certainly 
recognized, the problem should be viewed in the light of hard 
facts concerning contemporary naval warfare and existing 
geo-political realities. It is probably fair to say that the 
only small portion of the Soviet fishing fleet can be used 
effectively by the Soviet Navy in a case of an armed conflict. 
The "side effect" of huge Soviet fishing fleet in relation to 
military is, of course, considerable. The meteorological and 
basic oceanographic research involving the collection of data 
on water temperature and its distribution through various layers, 
salinity, density, and distribution of plankton, the employment 
of modern sonars and other equipment and' the plotting of the 



563 



bottom charts, etc. is invaluable to the Soviet Navy. It 
may also be true that the thousands of Soviet fishing ships 
operating in all corners of the world ocean can be, and probably 
are being the eyes and ears of Soviet intelligence. They also 
provide good cover for the intelligence gathering operations 
of several dozen Soviet Navy intelligence (ELINT) trawlers 
employed by the Soviet Navy's special "Intelligence Divisions". 
But in any case, the economic and political values of the Soviet 
fishing fleet greatly outweigh the possible military factor, and 
are, in the final analysis, of much greater importance. The 
development of the Soviet fishing industry illustrates the 
growth of Soviet maritime power and the nature of its challenge 
at sea. 



i- ^ i, 
0b4 



I 



CHAPTER VI 
RIVER TRANSPORT 



About two thirds of the total number of rivers iu Europe 
and Asia flow through the territory of the Soviet Union. They 
became natural transportation arteries around which the' economic 
development of Russia, particularly European Russia, was to a 
large degree centered. Moreover, the vastness of the territory 
and the poorly developed land transportation system made rivers 
iudispensible for the transportation of goods, raw materials, 
and people. In many areas, particularly in Siberia, river 
transport has been the only practical means of transportation 
in extensive use. During the 18th and 19th centuries, a number 
of artificial waterways (canals) were built. Use of the steam 
engine on the Russian rivers dates as far back as the early 19th 
century. Ia the second half of the 19th century, the mass 
transportation of oil was being conducted on the Volga River 
°a a regular basis. It may therefore be said that pre- 
cautionary Russia had a fairly well developed inland water 
transport system. 



CCr 



The river transport system was badly damaged by World V/ar 
I. the Revolution and particularly the Civil War.'. Nevertheless, 
a considerable number of river steamers survived and were put in 
extensive use by the Soviet government, which nationalised ull 
means of water transportation soon after the Revolution. 

The first Five Year Plan (1928-1932) provided the 
beginning of what was termed the "reconstruction of river transport- 
on the basis of wide introduction of new technology". Although 
not much new technology was introduced, particularly as far ■ - 
as ships were concerned, some improvements in the waterway" 
system was achieved, the major such improvement being the 
construction of a large dam on the Dnicpr River is 1932. A 
year later the Belomor (White Sea-Baltic) Canal was built. 

The second Five Year Plan (1933-1937) demanded a 
considerable increase in the cargo transported by the river 
fleets, from 26 billion ton - kilometers at the beginning of 
the period to 63 billion tons - kilometers, a figure never 
achieved, prior to World War II. 1 m 1913 (last year prior to 
World War I) 28.5 billion ton - kilometers of cargo was transported 
by the Russian river fleets, but the figure for 1940 was only 
36.1 billion ton - kilometers, i.e. there was little growth over 

Rechnoy T ransport (River Transport) No. 4, 1970. 

I 



a period of nearly tweuty years. 

An extensive program for the construction of canals was 
planned for the second five-year period. At the end of the 
period, in 1937, the construction of the Moskva Canal was 
completed. Later, during the third Five Year Plan, the Dniepr - 
Bug Canal was rebuilt. During the 1930' s, river passenger service 
was considerably expanded. 

The war not only interrupted the development of Soviet 
river transport, but inflicted considerable losses on it. More 

than 4,300 various vessels were lost, and hundreds of river ports 

2 
and docks, 300 dams, and more than 60 locks were destroyed. 

River fleets actively participated in the war, making a noteworthy 

contribution to the efforts of the overall Soviet transportation 

system. 

A decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 

September 1, 1947 approved a special program for the accelerated 

development of river transport, which played an important role. 

The program envisaged the accelerated construction of new river 

/ I 

vessels and also the reconstruction of ports and a number of 
important waterways. 

The directives of the fifth Five Year Plan approved by the 



2 

Rechnoy Transport, No. 4, 1970. 



.' 



1)0 i 



19th Party Confess (1956) considerably increased the 
appropriations for river transport and allocated a greater 
portion of the domestic shipbuilding facilities for the ' 
construction of river vessels. A special provision was made for 
reinforcing the Siberian river fleets, a goal which was reached 
later by the transfer of a considerable number'of vessels via 
the Northern Sea Route. 

But the most rapid development of Soviet river transport 
took place in the sixties, when the river fleets received 
thousands of new vessels. New waterways connecting all the seas 
washing the European part of the Soviet Union were opened, 
making Moscow a real "port of the five seas". A new mode 
of water transport, the socalled "mixed river-sea" was developed, 
and thus river transport gradually became involved in carrying 
foreign trade. In 1969 the river fleets alone carried more than 
290 million tons of cargo with a cargo turnover about 150 billion 
ton - kilometers, and transported 112 million passengers. 3 : 
Furthermore, the development of the rivers in Siberia and the Far 
East, so essential for the exploitation of the rich natural 
resources in those areas, was accelerated. This, in brief, is a 
historical review of the development of Soviet river transport. 

3 

Recnnoy Transport No. 4, 1970. 



568 



The more detailed analysis of the Soviet Union inland 
water transportation systom will bo made according to tho 
following outlino: 

Organization and control structure; 

Natural waterways and their navigability; 

Soviet canals and the artificial waterways; 

Mixed river - sea, transportation; 

New ships of the Soviet river transport; 

Military role. 

Organization and Control Structure 

Up to 1956, Soviet river transport was controlled 
either by the Ministry of Merchant Marine or by the Ministry 
of the River Fleet of the USSR. In 1956, in conjunction with 
Khrushchev's experiments with "decentralization" , the Ministry 
was abolished and in- its stead, organizations to control the 
river fleet were created in individual Republics. By far the 
largest has been the Ministry of the River Fleet of the RSFSR 
(Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) , and Administrations 
(Directorates) for River Transport in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, 
and. Kazakh Republics. In the Latvian Republic, river transport 
is subordinated to the Ministry of Automobile Transport. The 



bbU 

I 



— n 



river transport in the Middle Asian Republics is subordinated 
to the Ministry of Merchant Marine of the USSR in \ spite of the 
fact that none of these republics has access to the sea. 

This experiment with decentralized administration resulted 
in confusion as to the responsibilities of the various organizations 
for maintaining waterways and exercising unified policies. For 
example, river transport on the Dniepr is divided between two 
republics; in the upper Dniepr it is subordinated to the 
Belorussian Republic, while in the middle and lower Dniepr it io 
subordinated to the Ukrainian Administration for River Transport. 

The Ministry of River Transport of the Russian Federation 
controls the greatest part of the totao- USSR:, river fleet. This 
Ministry has 22 steamships companies organized on the basin- 
territorial principle. All major rivers, such as the Volga, 
Kuban*, Lena, Ob', Yenisey, and Amur have correspondingly named 
steamship companies. Regions incorporating several rivers, such 
as the Northwestern and Sast Siberian, have their own steamship 
companies. In spite of the fact that the RSFSR Ministry of the 
River Fleet is obligated to coordinate the efforts of the various 
Republic administrations in charge of their corresponding river 
fleets, the administrative isolation of these organizations 
handicaps the practice of a unified technological policy. 

By its nature, river transport should cooperate with other 



biU 



'— ■ i — ■ ■ 



■ i . ■ i M ■ I ■■ wiw ' 



modes of transportation such as the railroads and the merchant 
marine, both of which are centrally controlled. Starting in 
1971, demands were made for a central agency. A special 
committee, created by the order of the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR, in cooperation with the Academy of Science and with the 
participation of representatives of all the transport ministries 
made a number of recommendations. One of the recommendations 
dealt with administrative problems and the necessity to. have a 
central agency (All-Union Ministry or a Main Administration 

subordinated to the Council of Ministers of USSR) to control and 

4 
coordinate activity of all river transport. 

The accelerated development of tbc- northern areas of the 
Soviet Union and particularly Siberia, elevated the role of 
river transport considerably. In spite of a considerable 
increase in its cargo turnover, Soviet transport system still 
does not satisfy the growing demands of the newly developed 
economic regions. 

The importance of river transport is also evident from 
the low cost of the transportation it provides. For example, 
in 1969, ten ton - kilometers cost 4.1 kopeks on large Siberian 
rivers and 6.7 kopeks on small rivers. By truck,- the same volume 



4 Vodnyy Transport, March 20, 1971. 



/ 



571 



«»wnw»n>iwwi«^«jw«»w^iiwpw>^wri«w<wi»ww«.^ , ""> l1 |l " «' u* ' i ii 



5 

cost 56 kopeks. . 

Another problem closely associated with the l administ ration 
is the automated control (ASU) of river transport. Implementation 
of the ASU has already begun, but it is not well suited for the 
relatively loosely associated river fleet administrations of the 
various republics. In 1966, the first Main Calculation Center, 
based on the URAL-4 computer, began operation for the River 
Fleet of the RSFSR. At the end of 1969, the Ministry of the 
River Fleet already had 11 regional calculation centers and 62 
computerized calculating bureaus serving more than 200 enterprises 
and organizations, under the control of the Main Calculation 
Center. As of the end of 1970 other calculation centers oxistod 
in Moscow, Gorki, Novosibirsk, and Leningrad, and work began on 
organizing a computerized system of control through various 
steamship companies and ports. It is planned to link all 

elements of Soviet river transport to the ASU during the decade 

• \ 



of 1970's. 7 



/ 
5 Rechnoy Transport No. 11, 1970, pp. 1-3 and No. 12, 1969, 
pp. 10-11. . 

Rechnoy Transport No. 2, 1969, pp. 14-16. 

7 
Rechnoy Transport No. 9, 1970, pp. 3-4, and Vodnyy 

Transport, 24 April 1971. 






572 



Natural Waterways and their Naviu 'f.blAjLtv 

In spite of the apparent abundance of natural waterways 
ia the Soviet Union, the growing demand for river transportation 
las been forcing the Soviets to introduce larger vousoIm, ami, 
;his, in turn, has created a demand for deeper, more diroct, and 
>etter navigable waterways. The construction of large hydroelectric 
stations and dams increased the navigable depths of many Soviet 
Ivers. On the Volga River, this type of work permitted the 
avigation of river vessels with a 5,000 ton cargo capacity and 
f so-called sectional trains with a cargo capacity of 7,500 tons 
nd drafts up to 3.5 meters. When the Volga-system hydrolectrical 
tations are completed in the next five to six years, navigation 
ill be open to ships drawing up to four meters. The planned 
onstruction of six hydroelectrical centers on the Dniepr River 

ill increase navigable depths up to 3.5 meters. 

» 

Intensive economic development of Siberia, particularly 
ts western part, generated an enormous demand for river 
ransportation. In addition to the large Siberian rivers, a great 
umber of smaller rivers have to be made navigable, and very 
<ctensive dredging operations and work on straightening the 
breams have been underway. During the 1966-1970 period, only 



Q 

Vodnyy Transport, 13 February 1971. 



5 (o 



— „,-.,■ „ ■ . — .. .— ... I ..» . ~ — 



in the Irtysh Basin, with its 17,000 kilometers of waterways, 
3,100 kilometers of new waterways were mastered by a tremendous 
amount of dredging often done through permaf rosted ground and by 
straightening the sharp turns in the rivers. As a result, the 
rich oil regions of the Tumen' District and other Western Siberia 
areas were connected by rivers with existing transportation 
systems. The completion of hydro-electric stations on the 
Angara River rapids and construction of Baikal-Angara River 
waterway is being planned. After completion of the Middle Yenisey 
and Osinovsk hydroelectric stations, navigation to the river ports 
will be open not only for large river vessels, but for high sea 
ships. In the future it is also planned to connect the Ob' River 
-vith the Yenisey River and the Angara with the Lena. When the 
Kama River and the Irtysh River are connected, the two great 
waterway systems - the European and the Siberian will bo morgod, 

and the so-called "unified inland water transportation system" 

9 ' 
ivill be completed. 



9 

Rechnoy Transport No. 9, 1970, pp. 3-5. 



57' 

"* m> ' ' 



--■■■-■ ■ " 



i 

M l - ' ' 



Soviet Canals and the Artificial Waterways 



The construction of the canals connecting various f rivers 
and creating prolonged water-ways began in Russia in early 18th " 
century. Following the Order of 1703 by Peter the Great, the 
first canal was built in 1709, establishing a waterway connection 
between Moscow and Petersburg. A~"nuniber of canal systems were 
built later in the 18th and 19th centuries, but at the time the 
devolution, only the Mariinsky Canal System still maintained its 
sconomic value. 

The White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, completed in 1933, was 
>uilt for non-self propelled wooden barges with a cargo capacity 
>elow a thousand tons. The canal connected Leningrad with 
.rchangelsk,. shortening the route between the two points hy 
»ver 2,000 miles (as compared with the route around Scandinavia), 
'he canal was damaged during the World War II and, soon after, it 
as restored. During the 1950's and 1960's a number of 
odifications were made, resulting in greater navigable depths of 

he canal and an improved lock system, making the canal suitable 

10 
or modern vessels. 

The next large project was the construction of the Moskva- 



Rochnoy Transport No. 6, 1969 and 2x T o. 10, 1970. For 
•ie general description of the Soviet canals as of the middle 
JLXties, see also U. S. Naval Inst itute Proceedings, July 1967 
P. 33-44. B - ' 



C7C 



olga Canal, thus connecting Moscow to the Caspian Sea through 
he major Soviet river, the Volga. The canal was' completed in 
937. ... 

In 1953 the construction of another important canal, the 
olga-Don, was completed thus connecting the Volga River and, 
ence, the Caspian Sea with the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. 
t the end of the 1960's, it was decided to increase the depths 
if the canal and the Tsimlyansk Reservoir to four meters, which 

ii.ll assure the traffic of large river vessels of the Volga-Don 

11 

ype carrying the maximum load. 

The major step toward completion of Unified Inland Water 
'.^asportation System for the European part of USSR was made in 
!)64 when the Vclga-BALT Waterway was opened. The Volga-BALT 
:ivolved the reconstruction of the old Mariinsky System; 
onstruction in 1933 of the Lower-Svirsk hydroelectric center, in 

])41 the Rybinsk, and in 1952 the Upper-Svirsk hydroelectric 

12 
enters, and completion in June of 1964 of Volga-BALT Canal. 

T.e total length of the canal is 361 kilometers, only 66 of which 

£*e repx-esented by artificial canals and 295 by the artifical water 

13 
fcservoirs. The system connected five seas - the Baltic Sea, 



11 

Rechncy Transport No. 3, 1970. 

12 

Rechnoy Transport No. 4, 1969. 

13 

Vo dn y y Transport, 11 December 1969. 



576 



Jiite Sea, Caspian Sea, Sea of Azov, ana tho Cluck Soft. In 

970 almost fifteen million tons of cargo were transported 

14 ' 

long the Volga-BALT waterway system. Many small and medium 

ized ships of the Soviet Navy can transmit this sy^em to and 

rom the Baltic and Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 

Soviet river ships are presently sailing to ports in 

ligland, Sweden, Germany, Bulgaria, Iran, and other countries, 

n far as Egypt, using what is called the mixed, river-sea, 

civigational method (to be discussed later) . The already existing- 

c.nal system, carrying over 60% of the river transported cargo, 

p.rticularly the White Sea-Baltic Sea, Volga-Don, and Volga-Baltic 

cnals, closely approaches the planned Unified Inland Waterway 

15 
Sstem of European Part of the USSR. Six thousand kilometers of 

te existing inland waterway system already permits navigation 

16 
o ships with draft up to 3.5 meters. The announced and widely 

dscussed future plan includes the direct connection of the 

Back Sea and the Baltic Sea through existing waterways on the 

Jlepr River and the Pripyat' and Neman Rivers. New European 

wterway systems, some planned, and some already under construction, 

s\zh as the Rhine-Main-Danube, will certainly benefit and improve 



14 

Rechnoy Transport No. 4, 1971. 

15 

Vodnyy Transport , 27 February 1971. 

16 

Rechnoy Transport No. 10, 1970. 



577 



\o operation of the Soviet-European Waterway System. The 
jw European waterway systems will permit navigation from 
>tterdam to Ismail and will pass through the Netherlands, 

jrmany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, 

17 

ilgaria, and the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet plan to build a canal in the Far East connecting 
le Amur River with the Tatar Strait was announced in 1969. 
ie total length of the proposed canal will be 90 kilometers, 
it it will shorten the distance from the Amur River to the 

cific Ocean (Tatar Strait) by up to 1,500 kilometers and make 

18 
vigation cheaper. 

Mixed, River - Sea, Transportation 

The soviet term "mixed, river - sea, transportation" is 
If -explanatory and means precisely what it says - the ability 
ships, in this particular instance river ships, to engage in 
ver, or inland, as well as sea navigation. True, sea navigation 
i always, and quite often severely, restricted by the limited 
uworthiness of the ships involved. The planned use of the 
;rer ships in the direct transportation of cargo from the 
i'er ports to seaports began in the middle 1950' s with the opening 



? Pravda , 13 July 1971. 

18 

Trud, 29 November 1969. 



/ 
/ 



"' -- ■ -- ■ -- ■ ■ ' * ,— -. — ■.- — , , , — ■ ——» ■■ .■ ■ ■ ! ■ ' " ■■ ' 



r *78 



of the Volga-Don Canal, and greatly accelerated after the 
opening of the Volga-Baltic waterway. Mijre d navigation is now 
developing by a gradual increase in the sea areas uaviga'ted by 
the river fleet, and construction of special seagoing ships 
suitable for navigation on inland waterways. So-called 
conventional ships, either. for sea or river service, are poorly 
suited for this type of navigation; the former, because of its " 
greater cost, and more important, deeper draft, and the-, latter,' 
mainly for the reason of very poor seaworthiness. The limits 
of rational use of such ships were determined, with the prediction 
that the volume of cargo carried in the three basins (Volga-Caspian- 
Blac* Sea, Volga-White Sea-Baltic, and Aaur-Sakhalin-Oktots* Sea) 

by them will soon reach 20 million tons per year and in the not 

19 
too distant future, 50 million ton<? at~~ •* 

, -v iuj.Ao.ion xons. Also, it was argued that 

the LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) type ships are very suitable for 

that mode of transport. With two or three loads of lighters for 

each LASH ship, lt will be possible to utilize up to 90% of its 

time underway and to have unlimited seaworthiness. 20 \ 



/ 



19 i 

fa- o Se ? A * I " Kovale v, "Direct Water Tra nsports™ 

do ^hf^.°* Carg g "' Tran «P° rt • «°s«™ . 1S69 . This study' 
aeoc.ibes the optimum approach to such a mode of transportation 
and represents the results of celebrated research SploylS 
mathematical methods. «apioying 



20 

Vodnyy Transport . 22 August 1970. 



i 



• 



i 



I / 
! / 



J 



579 



A number of ships of the river register, such as Project 
fo. 791 ("Volga-BALT" class) motorships with a cargo capacity 
>f 2,700 tons; Project Number 558 ("Volganeft" class) tankers^ 
•ith a cargo capacity of 5,000 tons; Baltiysky, Project No. 781, 

dl-ore carriers; Project No. 1553, and others were specially 

21 
esigned and are being successfully used in the mixed navigation. 

hese ships are allowed to sail at sea with waves up to 3.5 meters 

ud at distances of up to fifty miles from sheltered areas. 

art of the river-sea fleet is used in the Baltic and Black 

eas during the winter when most of the rivers and canals are 

22 
rozen over. This service includes carrying foreign trade cargos. 

Two categories of ships for river-sea navigation were 

ound most suitable. The first category includes ships capable 

f navigating year round in the closed seas practically without 

imitations, and the second category is composed of light and 

aexpensive ships used only during periods of river navigation 

ad capable of navigating in off-shore sea regions not far from 

heltered areas. Typical of the first category are ships of 

i 

-IS III SP class with a cargo capacity of 2,000 tons; typical 
'f the second category are pushed trains with a cargo capacity of 



21 

Re ch no y T ran s po •■-.- 1 Ho. 5, 1971. 

22 

Rechnoy Transport. No. 3, 1071. 



5RH 



,000 tons, and L'S? class ships (limited in closed sea to fifty 

2° 
ties from sheltered areas and in the open sea to' 20 miles). 

The mixed navigation opened broad possibilities for a new 

ypo of activity for the river fleet - participation in 

ransportation of export-import cargos, as well as the chartering 

f Soviet river ships by foreign shippers. An agreement on the 

ransit shipment of Iranian goods via the Soviet Union was 

igned in 1963 and an agency, Iransovtrans Ltd., was organized. 

a average of 2-3 weeks are saved carrying goods from European 

ountries to Iran compared with the traditional route around 

urope, through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. With 

he Suez Canal presently closed, x.ne importance oi this direct 

oute is obviously increased. Foodstuff cargoes from Bulgaria, 

reece, and other countries are also being shipped to the 

24 
candnavian countries and ports of northern Europe. Oil, oil 

roducts, ore, and metals from the USSR now are carried by the 

25 
iver fleet to various European countries and even as far as Egypt. 



23 

Sudostrayeniye No. 11, 1970. 

24 

Vodnyy Transport , 24 October 1970. 

25 

Vodnyy Transport , 12 April 1969 and 3 June 1971. 



/ 

t 

581 



mm . - ... . .,„■■■,»_■ 







New Ships of the Soviet River Tran-jport 

During the 1966-1970 period the construction of new river 

ships was accelerated. In 1969, Catamaran Brat'ya Igrotovy, 

Project No. R19 GTSKB, was built. The vessel with a thousand-ton 

cargo capacity has a cargo deck area of 900 square meters and 

is capable of carrying 450 containers, twice as much as a motor 

ship with a cargo capacity of 2,000 tons. Smaller Catamarans 

26 * 
with a 600-ton cargo capacity are also being built. 

In 1967 a river motor ship with capacity of 2,700 tons, 

Sormovskiy Class, capable of carrying timber and bulk cargos 

vas built. The ship made a few cruises from Arkhangelsk to 

27 

England with a cargo of timber. 

In 1970 an experimental river ship with a unique hull made 
from the three long cylindrical tanks welded together, was built, 
it is a combination of tanker and dry cargo ship with the 

)Ossibility of carrying containers in addition to oil. Greater 

28 I 

lull strength has been claimed for the ship. 

The desire to prolong the navigation period has created an 

/ i 



irgent demand for river ice-breakers, and a number of them 



were 



26^ , 

Recnnoy Transport No. 1, 1971, pp. 6-11. 

27 

Rechnoy Transport No. 4, 1970, pp. 6-7. 

28 

Vodnyy Transport, 10 October 1970. 



582 



built. In addition to the conventional method of breaking the 

29 
ice, a special ice cutting machine was designed and built. 

* 

Another device permits the conversion of regular pusher tugs into 
a sort of ice-breaker, thanks to the special mechanism generating 
intensive vibration of the ship's hull and thus crushing the 
Lee ax-ound the vessel. With the duration of navigational period 
for most rivers not exceeding 55% of the calendar year in the 

European part of the USSR and 45% in Siberia, the need for river 

30 

.ce-breakers is obvious. 

The State Committee for Science and Technology recommended 

ider introduction of pushed vessel trains "to increase the 

31 

roductivity of the river transport". It is anticipated that 

uring the current Five Year Plan (1971-1975) the use of the 
ushed-vessel trains in the Soviet inland water transportation 
ystem will be increased considerably. 

A number of new classes of passenger ships, including a 
umily of large hydrofoil types which have been in operation 
since the middle of the 1950' s have been developed and built. 
i large series of semi-skimming boats (Zarya class) with water 
j$t propulsion is being presently produced. The shallow draft 



29 See Chapter, Northern Sea Route, for a description of 
tie machine . 

30 Vodnyy Transport , 20 January 1970, and Rechnoy Transport 
N. 4, 1970. 

31 

Ekonomicheskaya Gaseta No. 28, July 1971, p. IS. 

i 

' r - P. ? 

<j o o . 



>f this boat, which carries GO passengers, peraits operation in 

32 
small rivers with depths not exceeding .6 meters.' Another 

lass produced passenger ship is the air-cushion Gor 'kovchanin, 

>roject No. 3435. It carries 48 passengers. Presently, 

:onsiderable attention is being devoted to the development of 

33 • 

,ew classes of air-cushion passenger ships. 

Plans for the Future 

V 

In 1970, the Soviet river fleet transported 358 million 

ons of cargo. The total cargo turnover amounted to 174 billion 

34 
on - kilometers. In 1971, according to the plan, the RSFSR 

iver fleet alone is supposed to carry 318 million tons, with 

argo turnover amounting to 168 billion ton - kilometers. It 

s also planned to transport about 122 million passengers. The 

argest increase in the transportation of cargo by river fleet 

is planned to take place in the northeastern region of European 

hssia and the Siberian rivers (particularly western Siberia) . 

! 

(a.rgo for the oil-rich regions of western Siberia through 



32 

River Transport No. 4, 1970. 

33 

The development of hydrofoil and air-cushion ships is 

Jialyzed in the chapter entitled "Shipbuilding". 

34 

Rechnoy Transport No. 3, 1971. 



/ 

584 



...... u. .. II " - ' ' " " ""• 



Ob'-Irtysh Basin will amount to five million tons in 1071. 35 

In 1975 total Soviet river transport cargo turnover is 

planned to be 216 billion ton - kilometers. Considerable 

improvement is planned for passenger service. Presently there 

ire more than 150 passenger lines served by high speed boats 

[mainly hydrofoils) . The number of passenger lines is planned to 

»e increased considerably with primary attention being paid to 

;he small rivers where wide introduction of air-cushion ships 

ith speeds of 50-60 kilometers per hour, and later up to 250 

36 
Hometers per hour, is planned. 

Until recently, the low cost of river transportation 
as the main advantages of this mode of transport. However, 
uring the last decade, the rate of decrease in transportation 
osts in the river transport slowed down. While during the six- 
:sar period 1960-1966, the Soviet railroad system managed to 
ower transportation costs by 11 percent, the decrease in river 
ransport for the same period was only five per cent. 

Since 1966 there was no trend toward further decrease in 
1-ansportation cost. The most important reasons are the following: 

35 , 

Sotsiali sticheskaya Indust riya, 26 March 1971 and P.echnoy 

l^nsport No. 1, 1971, pp. 1-5. Details of 1971-1975 plan 

*re discussed in Vodnyy Transport 19 January 1971 and Rechnoy 
T ransport No. 1, 1971. 

36 

Vodnyy Transport , 24 April 1971. 



585 



(J.) The capacity o£ existing port a ttiui Uiuii » ...... «.... 

does not match the number of ships alroady in operation, and 
lags behind in rate of development. More than 36% of navigation 
time is spent by ships in ports. 

(2) A number of technologically advanced ships designed, 
and some even with prototypes tested, were not built or were 
delayed in construction due to the lack of allocated shipbuilding 
capacity. 

(3) The previous plan (1966-1970) to supply river fleets 
with new ships was not fulfilled, and 140,000 tons of total 
cargo capacity of tankers and dry cargo vessels as well as 
380,000 tons of total cargo capacit7 of ncn*-oc2f-pi*opelled 
vessels were not delivered to the river transport. 

In accordance to the new plan for 1971-1975, accelerated 
construction of river ports with the introduction of technologically :r. 
advanced cargo handling equipment and increased allocation of 
the shipbuilding industry capacity for river vessels were 
promised. Party directives specifically projected delivery 
of river vessels with larger cargo capacity, including a 
considerable increase in ships of mixed navigation. The construction z~z 
of dry cargo - tanker ships employing the cylindrical method with 
cargo capacity up to 9,000 tons as well as container ships and 
self -unloading bulk carriers is being planned. 

/ 586 

I 



Considerable work to improve the navigability of inland 

/aterways along the lines discussed previously are visualized 

37 * 

>y the plan. 

Military Role 



In addition to its tremendous economic importance, the 
oviet river transport has a number of military applications 

hose significance was well demonstrated during World War II. 

• 

he river ships of the Don and Kuban* Steam Ship Companies were 

ubordinated to the Azov Naval Flotilla commanded by Admiral 

38 
orsbkov, and many were used for amphibious operations. 

n fact, all river transport of the European part of the USSR 

djacent to the front was controlled by the Soviet Navy. A 

umber of river flotillas were organized, and actively participated 

n the war. Many of the ships of those flotillas were formerly 

iver vessels converted into warships. During the defense of 

talingrad, the Volga River Flotilla and river vessels of the 

I 

olga Steamship Company played a very important role. 

At the, present time, the role of river transport in military 

i 
transportation is still considered important. Special departments 



37 

Vodnyy Transport , 24 April 1971. 

38 

Vodnyy Transport, 29 July 1971. 



/ 

/ 



587 



mmwm-* - ** - wmmmao w *- 






n charge of military transportation exist in every Soviet 
ilitary district. Incorporated in such departments are branches 
esponsible for the transportation of troops and hardware on the 
nland basins. They are also responsible for maintainance of 
iver vessels in a constant state of readiness for military 
ransportation, and the majority of river vessels have special 
quipment, not used during normal operations, needed for 
ilitary transportation. It is also the duty of those branches 
o see to it and require that "not a single vessel would leave 

heir shipbuilding or ship repair enterprise with defective 

39 
pecial equipment." Undoubtedly the river fleet is being and 

ill be used for the delivery of supplier to- the Soviet Armed 

orces. Particularly important are the "sea-river" ships. 

The existence of an extensive network of deep inland 

aterways makes it possible to shuttle naval ships up to DEsize 

s well as some classes of submarines among the various seas of 

he European part of the USSR. Seme types of river vessels are 

uited for the auxiliary naval combat role in coastal warfare, 

acluding mine laying and mine sweeping. Familiarity of the river 

leet personnel, particularly their captains and navigators, with 

he theater of operation makes them ideal reserve personnel for 

he Navy . 



39 

Tyl i snabzhen ie Sovetskikh Vooruzenn ykhsil - Rear Service 

ud Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces, No. 1, 1970, pp. 81-83. 



588 



i _ _ . ... . i. .. i ■ ii i m mm n .- 






t 
CHAPTER VII 

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 

The Arctic Ocean differs sharply from all the other 
regions of the world ocean with respect to its climatic and 
especially its ice conditions. The development of the Polar 
Regions and the Northern Sea Route, Soviets consider as one of 
the brightest pages in the history of Russia. Recognizing the 
important contribution by foreigners, historically Russia, and 
by succession, the Soviet Union was the major discoverer of 
most of the Arctic Islands and lands, and first to achieve 
practical mastery of navigation along the Northern Sea Route. 

The first complete passage of the Northern Sea Route from 
East to West was made in 1915 by two Russian ships, Taimyr and 

Vaigach, under command of Captain Vil'kitskiy . The expeditions 

/ 
of 1910-1914/ established a number of routes to the Northern 

/ i 

Regions of Russia from its Pacific Coast. 

In September of 1916 a note by the Russian Foreign 

I 

Ministry was sent to all nations ascerting the Russian claim to 

all territories explored and unexplored, discovered and 

■ 

I 

/ 

/ 

583 \ 

i . ... . . . . ... . ._ ■ i ii ii. i inrr«n . 



undiscovered between the Russian Coast on the Arctic Ocean and 

the North Pole, with the exception of previously recognized 

1 

territories of other nations. Thus, the recognition of economic 

and strategic value of the region was clearly demonstrated by 
the Russian government. 

As was pointed out by Captain 0. P. Araldsen, Royal 

Norweigen Navy, "the October 1917 Revolution changed many things, 

2 
but not the Russian preoccupation with the Arctic". Practically 

from the very beginning of its existence, the Soviet government 

has recognized the economic and strategic value of the Northern 

Region. In January 1919 a commission for the study of the north 

was created under the Scientific-Technical I/i recto rate of the 

Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKH) . In December 

1919 the Russian Academy of Sciences worked up a plan involving 

measures for the revival of hydrographic work in the northern 

seas. During the same year, the famous Kara Expeditions for the 

delivery of Northern Siberian grain, were organized. In the 

course of the expeditions, the Northern Sea Route was opened up 

from the West to the mouth of great Siberian rivers, Ob and Yenisey 



For the details of this diplomatic move see: Constantine 
Krypton, The Norther Sea Route and the Economy of the Soviet North , 
(Praeger, New York, 1956), and Ost rov Vrangelya (Wrangel Island), 
Moscow, Glavsevmorput, 1946, pp. 35-36. 

2 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1967, pp. 49-57. 



r*t" 



530 



l.l l I ■ ■ ■ ! . I 1 1 '■■ 



udimentary ice service and weather sorvico stations wora 

rgaaized along the route of the expeditions. s 

Soon, in the East, the ships also bogan to make raoro or 

ess regular voyages from the East to tho mouths of Kolyma 

,nd Lena Rivers. In 1921 twenty-three detachments of the 

orthern Scientific Fishing Expedition were operating in the 

3 
lorthem waters and on the islands of the Arctic Ocean. On 

[ay 4, 1920, the Soviet Government declared the White Sea to be 

ts internal waters. A year later on May 24, 1921, a degree of 

;he Council of People's Commissars signed by Lenin claimed the 

?ight of the Soviets to exclusive exploitation of the fish 

resources and sea mammals in the White Sea and in the Arctic 

)cean along the shore from the State boundary with Finland to 

4 
the Northern extremity of Navaya Zemlya. On 4 November 1924, 

following unsuccessful attempts of Canada to lay claim to 

ffrangel Island? a memorandum to all states was sent by Soviet 

Government reiterating the 1916 notification from the Russian 

Minister of Foreign Affairs and calling attention to the Eastern 

boundaries between Russia and the U.S. established by the 



3 Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88 
C. Krypton, op. cit., p. 32. 



5 Ibid., p. 38 



o %-> A. 



— — - — 






6 

Convention of 1867. 

In 1924 the first ice-air reconnaissance was made in Kara 
Sea. Two years later landing and taking off from the ice was 
mastered. Gradually, the aviation began regular ice-air 

n 

reconnaissance and thus Polar Aviation was developed. The 
aetwork of Polar Stations had been growing steadily. In 1932, 
an expedition headed by 0. Schmidt aboard Sibiryakov completed 
a voyage through the Northern Sea Route during one navigational 
season. In December of the same year, by the special resolution " 
3f the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Main 
directorate of the Northern Sea Route, Glav Sev Mor Put', was 
organized. This organization, with extremely wide range of 
responsibilities, played a very important role in the development 
>f Soviet Arctic in general and Northern Sea Route in particular, 
[n 1934 the loss of the Cheluskin and rescue operation for the 
lembers of expedition and ship's crew, performed by aviation, 
resulted in awarding for the first time the highest Soviet 
iecoration, Hero of Soviet Union, to the seven rescue pilots. 
:n 1936 Arctic Seas were navigated by 160 ships, including some 
;hips of the Soviet Navy. In that year two destroyers accompanied 



6 Ibid., p. 46. 



7 

Morskoy Flot No. S, 1967, pp. 9-11. 



R o o 



by ice-breaker Litke (the Russians call it ice-cutter) , ice 
reinforced steam ship Ana dyr 1 , and tanker, Lok-Ba-ftan , wore 
transferred from Kronshtadt (Baltic Fleet) via White Sea - Baltic 
Canal to Vladivostak where they became the first sizeable 
surface ships of newly created Soviet Pacific Fleet. The 

destroyer's hulls were reinforced with already tested lumber- 

8 - 
metal protective layer along the water line called Shuba. 

During World War II, in 1942, the transfer of three ships from 

Pacific fleet (destroyer leader - Baku , and two destroyers) 

9 

to the Northern Fleet was achieved. The Soviet mastery of the 

route was demonstrated in 1939 when in addition to navigation 
by ships of the merchant marine, r.grcip of i^ucise^-aredgers, a 
suction-dredger, and a number of tugs were transferred from 
Murmansk to Nikolaevsk on the Amur. Those were the ships of 

the so-called Technical Fleet, poorly suited not only for ice 

10 
navigation, but even for off-shore navigation. Prior to 

World War II, duration of navigation reached over a hundred days 

in the Western part of the Northern Sea Route and over seventy 

days in its eastern part. The first and to the best knowledge of 



Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88. 
9 Sudostroyeniye Ho. 7, pp. 65-67, No. 8, pp. 69-70, 1966. 
Sudostreyeniye No. 8, 1969, pp. 71-72. 



5S3 

_ _ ... - i. i.u iii r i ii |i| u i. M Miii nr il HI 'l 1MM.1 - 



this writer, the only passage of foreign warship along the 
Northern Sea Route took place in 1940, when after 'signing of 
Soviet -German Pact, a German raider, classified as Auxiliary 
Cruiser and called "Ship 45" (Comet) made a successful passage 
to Pacific, assisted by Soviet pilotage and ice-breaker, Stalin . 
While in Pacific the Ship-45, in cooperation with other German 
raider Ship 36, and alone sank several allied and neutral 
merchant ships. During the war the route was used to all 
possible extent, including the transportation of lend-lease 
supply from the United States, initially delivered to the Soviet 
Far East. Each year tens of ships passed from the Pacific 
toward the West being accompanied la the western part of the 
route by convoys. German's effort to interrupt this rather 
important transportation artery by employing submarines, raiders, 
and aviation, though resulting in some losses, was generally 
unsuccessful, due to a number of factors among which climatic 
conditions, size of the forces employed, and lack of reconnaissance 
were the major. 

After the war the efforts for further mastering of the 
Northern Sea Route continued. Systematic, planned research 
in the Arctic was intensified during the period of 1948-1951, 
followed by three years of passivity. After 1954 the Soviet 
Union has maintained at least two drifting stations on the ice. 

/ 



i 

■»," " ■» »I H I I J H I II l| . 'l I.M I »«M ». -.■■ I. .- .I. I . I, I ■J M 



The total number of these stations in a 34 year period, 

11 
starting with 1937 I. Papanin Station has been 20 1 Polar 



1 



aviation was reinforced with a greater number and better 
quality of aircraft. By the mid 1950 's the Northern Sea Route 
was fully operational. 

Icebreakers 

The first Russian Icebreaker, Ermak , was designed by 
Admiral Makarov specifically for Arctic navigation and was built ' 

in England in 1899. Makarov's efforts were supported by the 

12 

famous scientist Mendeleyev. Many ideas incorporated into the 

design of Ermak are still valid and being used in construction 
Df contemporary icebreakers. Ermak, which was called the 
'Grandpa cf ice-breaker fleet" served 65 years, was awarded 
3rder of Lenin and, after final retirement in 1964, has been 

iistinguished by memorial in Murmansk. 

• 1 

Before the revolution of 1917, Russia had eight ice 

i 
i 
>reakers and a number of steam ships reinforced for ice navigation. 

/ 
lost of the ships survived the revolution and civil war, but 

lajor reinforcement of icebreaker's fleet did not come until 



11 

Vodnyy Transport , 15 December 1970. 

Sudostroyeniye No. 9, 19S9, p. 57. 



535 



1938 wheu four ice-breakers of the Stalin class (presently 

Sibil'' Class) wore built. 

t 

The next reinforcement of Soviet Ice-breaker's Fleot 
came in the mid 1950 's when three ice-breakers of Kapitan 
class ( Kapitan Belousov, ; Kapitan Voronin, Kapitan Melekhov ) were 
built for the USSR by Finland. In 1959 the nuclear powered 
ice breaker, Lenin , the most powerful ship of this type, was 
ouilt. During the decadeof 1960 's five units of Moskva' class 
Lce-breakers were built. 



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As of 1970, the Soviets divided icebreakers into three 
ajor categories: , 

(1) Harbor Icebreakers with propulsion plant up 
to 5,000 - 6,000 SHP (Shaft Horse Power) 

(2) Auxiliary Icebreakers up to 12,000 - 15,000 SHP 

(3) Liner Icebreakers above 15,000 SHP 

ucb a classification reflects Soviet experience in the Arctic, 
bere not as much displacement, although a factor, but power 

3 needed and icebreakers above 15,000 SHP, preferably in range 

13 
if 30,000 - 40,000 SHP, are required. 

All, but one (Lenin) , post war Soviet icebreakers were 
hilt in Finland. Presently, there are only six liner 
tiebreakers in the Soviet Union. But, there are only three more 
jjebreakers in the entire world fleet which would fall in this 
ategory. They are: American Glacier, and two Canadian ships, 
Luis S. St. Laurent and John A. MacDonald. 

In the decade of the 1960 's, the Soviet Union built two 
icebreaker type hydrographic ships - Petr Pakhtusov (1966) and 
Gorgii Sedov (1967) - both with 5,400 SHP. A large series! of 
Lrbor icebreakers, V. Pronchisctsev-class, was also built in 



3 A. Arshenevsky " Ledokoly " (Icebreakers), Transport, 



H'Scow , 1970 . 






/ 



SS3 



14 
the decade of the 1960's. 

Soviet experience in the Arctic, however, convinced then 

that more powerful ice breakers and in greater number are needed 

in order to prolong navigation along the Northern Sea Route and 

make it more reliable. As a result, the Soviet Union ordered 

three large icebreakers to be built during 1971-1975 period by 

Wartsila, Finland. The 20,000 ton ships will be powered by 

diesel-electric plant of 36,000 SHP. They will be among • the most 

15 
powerful motor ships in the world. Another Soviet plan visualizes 

construction of two nuclear powered icebreakers of Arktika Class. 

With their help, it is planned to prolong navigation along the 

complete Northern Route up to six months', and to make navigation 

in the route's western and eastern areas uninterrupted during the 

whole year. In addition, it is planned to double the speed of 

16 
the ships following the new nuclear icebreakers. But, it would 

be incorrect to assume, that nuclear icebreakers would soon 



14 

There is no internationally accepted classification of 

icebreakers. Canada, for example, divides its icebreakers into 

two major categories, full icebreakers, and light icebreakers. 

Roughly, the first category would include Soviet Liner Icebreakers 

and Auxiliary Icebreakers and the second category would include 

Soviet harbor icebreakers. 

15 

Vodnyy Transport , 15 October, 1970. 

16 Izvestiya , 21 February 1970. 



bsy 



represent the backbone of the Soviet icebreakers fleet, More 
likely, the conventionally powered icebreakers will continue to 
play the most important role. Increased power of their propulsion 
plants and improved hulls would make them as reliable as nuclear, 
but much cheaper. 

No country in the world is afflicted with so much loss 
and inconvenience by winter as the Soviet Union. Almost every 
sea which washes Soviet territory freezes over. The Baltic in its 
eastern part in severe winter is frozen up to 140 days. Even 
Odessa, a Black Sea port, is sometimes frozen in for up to 100 
days in a year. All this demands constant efforts to search for 
new means of cutting ice. 

During the last several years, a number of new means to 
cut ice were designed. A new type of special vessel, which appears 
to have very little in common with the icebreaker, but nevertheless 
serves the same purpose, was designed by the Ice Laboratory of the 

Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in Leningrad by a group 

i 
j 

headed by Professor Peschanskyi. The bow of the ship slopes 

/ ■ ! 

forward below the waterline, forming a kind of slip-way. Mounted 

• i 

on the bow are four rows of large rotary cutting discs which 

j 

bite into the ice and cut out large bars of it as the ship moves 
forward. These bars are forced up the slip-way where they are 

crushed, picked up by a conveyor system, and thrown ovor the side 

i 

; / 

i 

SCO ' I 

mi . II. ..... ... ... i i ■».,..■—. 



,nto the ice, well away from the ship's side leaving an ice-free 
aanel. Though, theoretically, the new device can saw through 
ze of any thickness, calculations have shown that it would be 
apractical to use it on the ice of more than two feet in thickness 
icause of slow speed. 

Another new method to fight the ice is the water jet gun; 
daimed to be capable of pulverizing ice barriers more than three 
:?et thick. It was said that the two new methods are planned to 

h used for keeping channels and port approaches free of ice, 

... 

uile conventional icebreakers will do the job in the open sea. 
A method to keep ice bound ports free of ice was said to 
fe also developed. It is achieved with the help of pipes laid 
own on the bottom. Air, which was fed through the pipe, bubbled 
p through the water and constantly mixed the warm lower layers 
<f the water with colder upper ones and so inhibited the formation 

P A 17 

it ice. 

In addition to weather and navigational aid services and 
leet of icebreakers, another essential element for successful 

/ . ! 

ivigation in the Arctic is ice reconnaissance. The best, of 
Durse, and most productive is air-ice reconnaissance, and Soviet 
olar Aviation has been employed for this purpose for many years. 



17 

Sputnik (from magazine Znanie-Sila) No. 1, Moscow, 1968. 



/ 

801 

" ■ -' ■' ■ ■ ■ ■ * * 



b to recent times, the major means of ice reconnaissance were 
isual and photo reconnaissance - both depend heavily upon weather 
onditions. 

Recently the system called TOROS (translated ICE HAMMOCK) 
:>r the ice reconnaissance and assiAing ice breakers and ships 
| ice navigation was successfully tested. The system, installed 
sioard an aircraft, incorporates as its major element side-looking 
a.rborne radar. All weather operation and the ability "to see" 
tirough the snow and observe ship tracks in the ice field was 
c. aimed for the system. The high resolution picture is simultaneously 
rgistered on the scope and video-tape and via photo-telemetry 
Vansmitted to ships and to shore c^-troi points^ Simultaneously 
u.th the picture, the system produces the exact coordinates of 

lie aircraft which carries it. The system was successfully tested 

18 
i 1970. 

Another radar equipment designed to measure the thickness 

c! the ice field from an airborne .helicopter was tested during 

3'71. A cross section cut of the ice field is displayed on 

tie screen of the equipment. Many Soviet icebreakers and some 

orchant ships, particularly those with ice reinforced hulls, 

ve carrying or are capable of carrying helicopters. These 

i'licopters equipped with the above device (especially coupled 



18 



Pray da, 3 May 1970; Morskoy Plot No. 9, 1970, pp. 27-28, 



6G2 



with photo telemetry capability) would help not only to improve 
and simplify ice reconnaissance but would increase 'productivity 
of ice breakers by permitting them to select thinner ice for a 
passage. The equipment could, under certain conditions, permit 

ships with ice reinforced hulls to navigate alone without 

19 
assistance from icebreakers. 



Legal Aspects of Soviet Arctica 
and Northern Sea Route 



The Soviet government has issued a series of legal acts 
related to the status of Soviet Arctic and to the exploitation 
and organization of the route. In addition to the above mentioned 
reinforcement of the Tsarist government acts concerning Arctic 
possessions, the resolution of 15 April 1926 by the Presidium of 
the Central Executive Committee of the USSR proclaimed the 
establishment of the geographical boundaries of the Soviet Sector 
of the Arctic between "meridians 32 04 '35" East longitude and 



168 o 49'30" V/est longitude. Within the boundaries of the 

/ 
indicated sector, the Soviet Union claims to exercise full 

' i . 

sovereignty of all "land and islands located in the Arctic Ocean, 

! 20 
north of the coast of the Soviet Union, as far as the North Pole". 



19 

Trud, 12 June 1971. 



20 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-SS. 



803 



! ■!■■■ riw i-y Hi i wwmnww uw w ii^ii iii >wf t i n i fw*rwi^:''iM..^V, 



/ 



The navigation along the Northern Sea Route is treated 
jf the Soviets as navigation in Soviet Territorial ^Waters. To 
apport such a claim the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi 

i;as, through which the Northern Sea Route passes, are viewed as 

21 
'>road, shallow bays with specific ice conditions", surrounded 

i the cost of the Soviet Union. The exceptionally severe 

c.imatic conditions of the Siberian Seas and straits and the 

pesence of ice during the greater part of the year "serving as a 

strt of continuation of Soviet territory" are used to substantiate 

lie Soviet arguments. The majority of the straits through which 

tie Northern Sea Route passes are said to be within the Soviet 

territorial waters, particularly Karskie Vorota, Yogorskiy Shar 

aid Vil'kitskiy Straits. The Straits of Dmitri Laptev and Sannikova 

22 

s*e considered as belonging to the Soviet Union historically. 

Colossal expenditures by the Soviet and previously Russian 

■ 
sates, are also cited in defense of the claim that the Northern 

£.a Route is the national route . The cost involved in the 

23 
n.intenance of the route is of course considerable. 



21 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1969, pp. 80-88. 

22 

Ibid . 

23 

As an example, the "SEVER-69" upper-latitude expedition 

involved dozens of airplanes and helicopters. The expedition 
laced seventy drifting automatic radio-meteorlogical stations 
4 addition to existing stations. 



^ 






The Northern Sea Route is compared by the Soviets with" 
tie Norweigan Indreleia Sea Route which the International- Court 
it Justice of the United Nations in its decision on 18 December 
:)51 recognized as an inner national Route of Norway. Canada's 
daims of sovereignty over the passages between. the Arctic Islands 
right be used by the Soviets as another precedent. 

The Canadian concern over the possible pollution in the 
i^ctic is shared by the Soviets. Unsuitable ships, especially 
ji the absence of icebreaker's assistance, have definitely" 
pesented the ecological hazard, for it can easily be damaged 
ad so cause the pollution. Following the Canadian Prime Minister 
1'udeau's visit to USSR (May, 1971), the development of Soviet- 

Cindian relations and future cooperation including that in the 

24 
^ctic were praised by the Soviets. 

The present Soviet claims can be summarized as follows: 

The Northern Sea ftoute belongs to only one nation, the 1 

I 
£>viet Union, as an internal national route which guarantees the 

I 
ction's vital economic, political, and defense interests in 

tie Arctic region. (b) The special geographical location of 

te Northern Sea Route, the most vital sectors of which pass 

i 

trough Soviet Territorial and Inland waters, gives the Soviet 



?4 

Typical was an article in Pravda , June 18, 1971, 
andshake Across the North Pole". 

! I 
: / 

i 805 ' 

,■ I _. i i i ..-■■-, ■ l- J f i i ir i i i --,--■ u i ii I . " ■■'" ■""■ ' "*- ' — ■* **-" - 



jaion an indisputable right to regulate in it the regime of 

25 

lavigation by foreign merchant and naval ships. v 

The seriousness of the claim and uncompromisiveness of the 
Soviet Union was demonstrated in the summer of 1967, when two 
J. S. Coast Guard Icebreakers, Edisto and Eastwind , after 
jnsuccessful attempts to pass north of Severnaya Zemlya were 

forced to enter the Vilkitskiy Straits and were turned back by 

26 
the Soviets. 

The importance of the Northern Sea Route is elevated by 

the numerous navigable rivers of the country (Pechora, Ob, 

ifenisey, Khatanga, Olenek, Lena, Yana, Indigirka, Kolyma and 

3thers) connecting it with the northern regions of the USSR. 

There are an extensive network of ports, the majority of which 

have been developed during the years of Soviet power. Among those 

of particular economic importance are: in the Barents Sea - 

Pechenga, which exports copper-nickel ores, and Nar'yan-Mar, a 

port for the export of bituminous coal from the Vorkuta Basin 

and timber that has been rafted down the Pechora; in the Kara 

/ ■ - 

Sea - Kilson and Dudinka, which provide an outlet to the sea for 



2^ 

Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88. 

26 

The detailed description of this voyage is given in 

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1968, pp. 74-79. 



/ 



80S 



te production of the Noril'sk mining region, and Igarka, the 
lrgest center of timber export; in the Laptev Sea'- Nordvik 
Katanga, and Tiksi, the maritime gateways to Yakut; in the 
EJst Siberian Sea - Ambarohik *iu| l>ev*k, riuUuly ^mU^ H»M|MttM 

ad industrial centers o£ tho Northeast. 

The Soviet North is tho richest bn*;o for tho wood » 
cemical industry, a world exporter of timber. It is also 
rch in useful minerals - mineral fuel, iron ores, phosphates, 
vrious construction materials, bauxite, copper, and a number 
o other nonferrous and rare metals. New industrial regions are 
bing rapidly developed there. 

The Twenty-Fourth Party Congress Directives for the five 
y&r plan (1971 - 1975) projected further development of the 
£>rthern Region. The special attention in the directives was 
i-ven to Norilsk Metallurgical Combine. The industrial development 
c: the region which started in the decade of 1960's had already 

osorbed 24 billion rubles of capital investment, exceeding the 

27 
nm spent in the previous forty years, 1920-1960, more than twice. 

The development of the Arctic region has been accompanied with 

; number of original solutions. An urgent demand for power, 

or example, generated design, construction, and beginning of 

pe rat ion in the end of 1970 of Floating Gas-Turbine I'ower Station, 



27 

Komsomol ' skaya Pravda , 14 March 1971. 



607 






Drthern Lights (20,000 KW) . A decision was made to build a 
:jries of such power stations which can be placed anywhere 
Mere there is waterway (bay, chaunel, river) which permit 
lissage of a ship with 1.55m draft. 

Combined with the rapid development of Soviet Arctic 
I;gions, where water transport is still, for all practical 
firposes, the only means of transportation, the importance of 
r>rthern Sea Route to Soviet Union is obvious. The Route has 
ben used practically exclusively by the Soviet ships and legally 
obody challenged it. With the growth of its merchant marine, 
bwever, and the development of much wider cooperation with 
niritime organizations of the world, the Soviet Union is starting 
1» change its position. Convinced that the mastery of the 
i>ute in general has been achieved and navigational period 
iicreased and probably from the desire to obtain some reciprocity 
i»r the Soviet merchantmen in the other part of the world, the 
£>viets, starting with 1966, but particularly after the closure 

c the Suez Canal in 1967, began the promotion of the route for 

/ ! 

i-reign shipping. The economic advantages for certain shipping 

i 

t use the Northern Sea Route are obvious. The length of the 
t'Ute from Murmansk to Provideniya (southern part of the Bering 
Srait) is 3,400 nautical miles. Murmansk - Vladivistok distance 

va the route is 6,100 miles, while via the Suez Canal, more 

i / 



6G8 



in 12,000 miles. From London to Yokohama via the route is 
,30 miles shorter than via the Suez Canal. In spite of some 
)uction in speed while transiting the ice a ship saves 
laverage of 13 days in one direction via the Arctic Transit 
mi London to Yokohama compared with that via the Suez Canal. 
1 1967 the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine announced the 
L;i to open traffic along the Northern Sea Route between ports 
i .Yes tern Europe and the Pacific Ocean. The use of Ice-class 
v.ps was proposed. The navigation was promised to be supported 
assigned icebreakers, polar aviation, by the Hydrographic 
2;/ice, and by special "scientific-operational groups" from 
at Hy drome teoro logic Service. Referring to the difficult 
ligation and the ice situation in Volkitskiy Strait, the 
dilatory icebreaker and pilot use was specified for the convoys, 
ojthern Sea Route Sailing Instructions were published for the 
oifoying of foreign ships. The scale of fees for the icebreaker 
Q( pilot were announced. The Northeastern Administration of 
b« Merchant Marine was established in the center of the Arctic 
Hi headquarters in Tiksi with primary mission to support 
rasportation and further development of navigation along the 
Mfce . 

The strategic value of the Arctic including the Northern 
to Route was well understood long before the revolution. The 



609 



icious Russian scientist, D. I. Mendeleev wrote "When it would 
oi possible to transfer fleets or even part of them from Atlantic 
tc Pacific Ocean and reverse, the naval defense of the country 

Kjj.1 gain a lot, for Russia should keep strong fleets to defend 

28 
Lt; vital interest in the both oceans" . Soviet war ships can 

jeand have been transferred between Europeans and the Pacific 

Sciet Fleets avoiding the necessity to enter foreign waters 

u.or to World War II, during the World War II, and after World 

tof II. The number of transferred ships has not been great, 

icever. The transfer of submarines is another matter, and this 

icloubtedly is done on a more regular basis. The calls for 

:cistruction and use of the large transport submarines for 

reir-round delivery of cargoes and oil have been made in Soviet 

29 
/con for many years. 

The Arctic became one of the major places where Soviet 

ii' Defense Units are located and quite extensive network of 

)bervation radars and communication centers have been built. 

■4- 

^From the Scientific Archives of D. I. Mendeleev, cited 
^ Mastering The Extreme North , Volume I, Academy of Sciences 
rtthe USSR, Moscow - Leningrad, 1960. 

29 

A detailed study, dealing with feasibility of such 

>iject was completed by Professor Pokrovskii in 1955. Since 

tijit time, the problem was repeatedly mentioned by the Ministry 

>j Merchant Marine and its Central Scientific Research Institute. 

te, for example, its Transactions, V. 133, Leningrad, 1970. 



610 



.■ w ww .«i » w n-n > m»,niw i nnrtr 



pesently hardly a month would pass without Soviet Military 
pess mentioning harsh duty of Air Defense Units, performing 
i Arctic Region. 

To summarize: (1) The Soviet Union successfully continued 
te Russian efforts of long duration to master the Northern Sea 
Rute and advance in the Arctic Region; (2) the development 
o Arctic and Siberia regions with their wealth of natural 
rsources drastically elevated the importance of the route; (3) 
cnstantly increasing Soviet foreign trade, associated with fast 
gowth of Soviet Merchant Marine, added to route's importance; 
() the use of the route by foreign shipping, though up to now 
sow in developing, would probably be intensified in the future; 
() the military role of the Arctic Region and the Northern 
Sa Route is significant for the defense (Anti-Air and ASY/) 
ad as a communication artery. 



J 



61 1 

v •■*- X 



I. 

t 

EPILOGUE 

Soviet maritime power of today is the result of more 
than fifty years of the Soviet Union's development as a state. 
The magnitude of Soviet maritime power historically has generally 
reflected the level of the Soviet economy or, more correctly 
of the industrial capacities. More particularly, however, the <* 
naval element of Soviet maritime power in a number of instances 
swung upward in its development from the general level of the 
Soviet economy. Traditional Soviet preoccupation with defense 
matters has for a long time produced a peculiar combination of 
modernity and backwardness in its economy in which the armament 
sector has received the best production capacities and priority 
allocation of resources. The civilian sector, on the contrary, 
being supplied on a residual basis, has been developing much 
more slo?/ly and still has a technological level below that of 
most developed countries. Analyzing the IChruschchev period, 
Michel Garder observed: "Thanks to him, the Soviet Union's 
military power could frighten, but its internal economy could 
not inspire envy. Hitler at least produced cannons in order to 
seize the butter of other countries; the Soviet arsenal was intended 



612 



o protect a butter which in the Soviet Union romainod an uncommon 

ommodity" . v 

Together with the seizure of political power in tho' course 

f the 1917 Revolution, the Communists inherited a considerable 
aritime tradition. Historically, the Russians have demonstrated 
.any times a thorough understanding of the importance of tho 

ea and were among the early pioneers of the sea. The drive toward 

he sea was an essential element of Russian policy for centuries. 

t is enough to recall Russian stubborness and consistency in 
.ttempts to gain control of the Straits or rights to uninterrupted 
lassage to doubt the claim that Russian development was marked 
>y a lack of understanding of sea power. One may ask what they 
leeded the straits for - to march their regiments through? The 
leglect of maritime power by certain rulers was well compensated 
>y the achievements of Peter the Great and the skillful employment 
)f navy under Catherine ghe Great. The Russian Imperial Navy 
/as a center where innovative scientific thoughts often found 
mderstanding and many were implemented. In turn, the navy 
)roduced a considerable number of officers who distinguished 
themselves in exploratory and scientific work, and some in the 
theory of naval art as well. One of the main reasons that Russia 
failed in the past to achieve a degree of world sea power was 
the backwardness of her technology and the general weakness of 



613 



■ ■«■■!■ ■ " '■ ' "■ -— 



tffi economy. The same factors had kept the Soviet Union froa 
booming a recognized world maritime power, despite 1 the fact that 
its importance has always been understood and despite two . -~_ 
attempts to develop at least the naval element of miritime power 
11 excess of her economic capability. 

The rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union interrupted 
bj the World War II was resumed after the war and the economy, 
^stored. The death of Stalin permitted a major revision of Soviet 
nreign policy, not in respect to the goals, but to the means 
f<r achieving the same ends. Mastering of nuclear energy and 
tb beginning of the introduction of nuclear armament probably 
seeded up the realization by the new Soviet leaders that the 
od policy of uncompromising confrontation, keeping the country 
o the brink of war, was dangerous and, in the long run, 
unproductive. The proclaimed course of peaceful coexistence 
btter suited Soviet interests in the rapidly changing world. 
iVile continuing to be antagonistic to many basic interests 
o the West, the new course implied the development of Soviet 
miritime power as an essential element. Thus, the accelerated 
dvelopment and gradual coordinated application of the Soviet 
n.ritime power, which permitted Soviet political, economic, and 
ii.litary influence to be extended over a wide range and with far 
Lss direct risk, started in the mid-1950' s. 



6iu 



pmwm*****-- 



Particular atteatioa has been paid to the underdeveloped 
orld, specifically the non-allied countries in it) Combining 
plitical support for key countries with economic and military 
ad, Soviet foreign policy in the selected areas of the Third 
\>rld was in most cases quite pragmatic, demonstrating the 
tcistence of a mutually interacting relationship between Soviet 
ams and capabilities. H. Dinerstein distinguished three types of 
i>viet activity: 

(1) denial of influence in neutral areas to adversaries; 

(2) intrusion into the opponent's sphere of influence; 

(3) promotion of a revolutionary situation. 

jt is not difficult to see that the marxxime power is needed for 
;L1 three of them. 

The Soviet Union's own economic interests, evident in her 
apidly growing foreign trade and the development of remote areas 
<£ the country rich in natural resources needed to support the 
jrowing industry, as well as defease interests were among the 
ajor factors generating the quite rapid development of maritime 
;^wer, during the second half of the 1950 's and the decade of the 
360 's. Although having the longest coastline in the world washed 
/ 12 seas, the Soviet Union's access to the open ocean is 



K. Dinerstein, Moscow a nd the Third World: Power Politics 
r Revolution? ; Problems of Communism, January-February I96S, p. 52 



615 






handicapped by the peculiar geography, which, while restricting 
to a degree the employment of maritime power, particularly its 
naval aspect, does not prevent it. 

Moreover, the Soviet Union is not strategically located 
in relation to the world trade routes. These routes, however, 
are not the result of geography alone, but to the large degree 
of the econimic development of certain regions of the world, 
particularly their industrial capability to produce for export . 
and their purchasing power for imports. Historically, trade 
routes are constantly shifting, depending upon the emergence 
or disappearance of those factors in certain regions of the world. 
It seems that the ability of a military power, and historically it 
has been a naval power, to adjust the distribution of trade 
routes is rapidly disappearing. The system of military alliances 
has produced a number of examples where two opponents belonging 
to the opposing camps and exercising their navies to combat each 
other, might be quite faithful trade partners. Such a situation 
not only has contributed to the development of Soviet foreign 
trade, but has helped the development of Soviet industry, which, 
in the final analysis, makes trade possible. The trade also 
provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity to buy advanced 
technology from the industrially developed countries of the Vest. 
The direct assistance of these technologically advanced countries 



616 



»■«»■<■ « ■*>■ 



t> the Soviet effort to develop its maritime power, particularly 
ue merchant marine and fishing fleet, was quite substantial. 
Iiradoxically , the same countries, in the raid-lOSO's realizing 
tie momentum and scope of the Soviet maritime development and 
bginning to feel its competition started to scream, "The Russians 

re coming!". In fact, some had invited them. 

- 
The role of the Navy as one of the leading forces has been 

dearly recognized in the Soviet Union and, as evident from the 

Ktensive naval programs of the last seventeen years and the 

ontinuous appearance of new, more sophisticated ships, the Soviet 

livy has neither a shortage of allocated industrial capacity nor 

it funds for research and development. The Soviet leadership's 

atisfaction with the Navy's performance appears to be expressed 

a the continued presence of Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of 

be Soviet Navy for 17 years, his membership in the Central 

lommittee of the CPSU and the presence as candidate-member in the 

entral Committee of two Commanders of the Soviet Fleets, the 

orthern and the Pacific. The top echelon of the Soviet naval 

ommand holds the highest ranks ever in the history of the Soviet 

avy, including one Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, 

hree fleet admirals, and a considerable number of full admirals. 

Even the top echelon of the Soviet Army has explicitly 

ecognized the importance of the Navy, and through the Commander- 



617 



■ 



;i 



in-Chief of Ground Forces expresses its "constant rcadic 
support the Navy," a complete turnabout from tho tradit: 
treatment of tho Navy as "faithful helper of tho Army." Minister 
of Defense Marshall A. A. Grechko recently said, "under modern 
conditions combat operations on the oceans and seas are acquiring 

special significance. Navies can have an enormous impact on the 

2- 

entire course of a future war." 

The role of the Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the 
strategic delivery system is growing, as evident from the 
intensive Y-class program presently underway. Because of the 
relative invulnerability of the submarine-based system to 
preventive attack, it is unlikely that their role- will decline 
in the foreseeable future. For several years, the Soviet ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBNs) have been considered next in importance 
only to strategic missile troops. The importance of the number 
of SSBNs on station seems to be well recognized by tho Soviets, 
as witness the increased total number of submarines and the 
attempts to increase the ranges of their missiles, which would 
make them even more invulnerable and reduce transit time and 
hence, increase time on patrol. While alleged Soviet desire to 
have an advanced base in Cuba for their ballistic missile 
submarines, similar to the US base at Holy Loch, cannot be 



Marshall Grechko in Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1971, p. 5. 

/ 

Rl R 



pjjected out of hand, it does scorn to be a very remote possibility. 
/llle available port facilities in the areas of nav.al forces 
doloyment are utilized, the basic trend appears to be to avoid 
doendence upon bases. Even the employment of tenders based in 
jioa and replenishing submarines on the high seas (more likely 
tan a base for SSBNs) seems to be questionable;' even if they 
wre so employed, it would be only in an auxiliary capacity. 

The thesis that the Soviet Navy can operate only behind 
te shield of the full power base of the USSR seems to be outdated 
Te Soviet Navy itself has become a very important element of the 
Sviet power base, and the question "would the Soviets risk the 
blocaust of a nuclear war?" cannot bo applied to the Goviot 
Uion alone anymore. The most logical answer, of course, is "no"; 
tit who would? It follows that at any point of confrontation 
viere the naval forces in an area are the main representatives 
C the military power of a state, and they alone have the 
(ipability to be employed world-wide, the need for a credible 
:>vel of these forces is evident. It appears that the principle 
i not only understood, but is being implemented by the Soviet 
avy. If such an assumption is accepted, the logical step 
laid be a new vision of the Soviet naval policy in the direction 
f "further to the ocean", i.e. more ships with a self-contained 
apability in remote deployment, more submarines for close 



61b 



cooperation with such deployed forces, and inevitable emphasis 
on the availability of air power - long-range naval aviation for 
the striking role and reconnaissance, and ship-borne aviation 
(VTOL aircraft and helicopters) for air defense, including anti- 
cruise missile defense, and local ASW. This would not mean a 
drastic revision of the previous Soviet decision not to build 
attack aircraft carriers, for ships carrying VTOL's and helicopters 
would not be employed in such a role. 

It is questionable whether the Soviet Navy would try to 
acquire an intervention capability, for there is hardly any need 
for it. By preventing intervention and supplying arms to friends 
to deal locally with the opposition as well as to resist 
intervention by a country whose forces have either outmaneuvered 
the Soviet Navy or even ignored it, Soviet Maritime power would 
fulfill one of its important roles. The Soviets have demonstrated 
a good understanding of the potential of naval power in peacetime 
to achieve the desired effect in support of national policy. 
They have found that it is cheaper, less dangerous, and more 
promising to grant protection from the sea, while supplying enough 
armament to build up a client country's capability to fight on land. 

Any notion of superiority actually pursued by an opponent, 
or just interpreted as being part of his policy from a position 
of strength, has been met with irritation by the Soviet Union. The 

/ . 

620 



Soviet government statement on 21 August 1963 declared: "As 
a result of intensive efforts by tho Soviot people^ and Soviet 
scientists in the development of nuclear weaponry, tho American 
nuclear monopoly has been broken, the world Socialist system, 
has acquired its own nuclear shield, and the imperialist powers 
have been deprived of the material basis for conducting their 

policy of nuclear blackmail and .their policies from a 'position 

3 

of strength', in relations with the Socialist countries." The 

discussions of the ULMS system in tho US and the Washington Post 
claim that "the hawks and the doves in Congress have found 
common ground in pushing for strategic weaponry that promises 
to draw enemy fire away from the continental United States and 
toward the sea" produced an extremely negative reaction in the 
Soviet Union. Several reasons were seen by the Soviets behind 
the alleged US attempt to adopt an "oceanic strategy": 

continuous reliance on force as the chief means of 
attaining foreign policy goals which "remain unchanged", i.e. 
allegedly "imperialistic and aggressive"; 

the desire to obtain unilateral military advantages while 
talking about "sufficiency" and equal security; 

"to divert a retaliatory strike away from the (continental) 
US"; 



3 
Pravda, 21 August 1963. 



R21 



"to improve the geography", particularly the maritime 

;ography, which, with the advance of ballistic missiles,' 

aegedly became unfavorable to the US ascompared to that of the 
4 

m. . . 

Krasnaya Zvezda stated that the calculation to achieve 
uilateral military advantages" did not materialize in the past, 
il will not materialize now and "any attempt by anyone to assure 
liLitary superiority over the USSR will be met with a corresponding 
urease of military power to guarantee our defense". The official 
lcjazine of the Soviet Navy, Morskoy Sbornik , was more specific: 
"here is no doubt that the Soviet Navy, in developing itself 
.1 the future on the basis of the latest achievements in science, 
;ohnology, and production, will increase its strategic capabilities 
>t the scale necessary to. reliably protect our homeland and the 
icmtries of the Socialist community. And if the U.S.A. adopts 

i 

ir 'oceanic strategy' as a new course of the "grand strategy," 

I 

n? navy will, of course, be on a level which will ensure the 
solution of problems in the new situation that will arise on the 
>4s and oceans." 



4 

"The Nixon Do ctrine: D ecl arations and Realities " , a 

i:;cussion at the Institute on the US of the Academy of Sciences, 
JoR. USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. Moscow, No. 2, 
^oruary 1971, pp. 18-48; Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 July 1971; Rear 
^iiral Stalbo, The Zigzag s o £ American Grand Strategy , Morskoy ■ 
Sftrnik No. 8, 1971, pp. 96-S9. 

/ 






Admiral Gorshkov's article in P ravda of July 25, 1971, 
proclaimed: "Vain hopes! No strategy, including the socalled 
'oceanic' will save from condign punsihment any aggressor who 
would risk starting a war against the USSR". Basically the same 
idea was advanced earlier, criticizing the alleged desire of the 
US strategy to divert Soviet retaliatory strikes to the ocean-based 
strategic delivery system by asserting that "American politicans 
understand that if it comes to a matter of strategic nuclear warfare 

between the tv/o super powers, then all the socalled strategic *" 

5 

limitations will remain basically on paper." 

It has become a standard assertion in the Soviet Union 
that the Americans have always bees disturbed by the advantage 
of the Soviet Union in the size of its territory, in that the US 
"by expanding its naval forces, has, figuratively speaking, 
attempted to expand its territory". It was claimed that "the 
U.S. transition to an 'oceanic strategy* should also be viewed 
as an attempt to extricate itself from the difficult situation which 
has arisen due to the fact that geography (as expressed by Vice 
Admiral Rickover) , following the emergence of intercontinental 
missiles, played a "nasty trick" on the U.S.A. - the oceans have 
ceased to protect her territory from the vicissitudes of war." 



5 USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology , No. 2, 1971. 
Rear Admiral Stalbo, op. cit., p. 98. 



^0 



The foregoing Soviet reaction illustrates a sensitivity oi the 
Soviet Union to any attempt by its main opponent, real or 
imagined, to change the balance of naval forces. The open emphasis 
on the strategic delivery system in the framework of "oceanic 
strategy" allegedly emphasized by the United States is not 
convincing, for, in reality, Soviet concern about the possible 
growth of general purpose naval forces in the US Navy is not 
less, and perhaps, is even greater. While the possibility of an 
all-out war at sea seems to be clearly rejected by the Soviet Union', 
as it has been in pronouncements of some US officials, the 
growing importance of naval forces in general, particularly general 
purpose forces, is clearly recognized. 

Besides the military purpose, the role of the world ocean 
in supporting the life resources of mankind is being viewed hy 
the Soviet Union as extremely important, and their emphasis on 
the simultaneous development of other elements of maritime 
power, besides the Navy, is not accidental. The planned 37% 
increase in merchant marine during the 1971-1975 period (5.3 

/ 

million dwt; 550 new ships) represents a continuing drive to - 
develop efficient sea transportation, capable not only of 
assuring the Soviets a pattern of commerce, but also of 

implementing Soviet foreign policy mainly through economic and 

i 

/ 



i 



• 



621 



Military assistance. Greater emphasis upon more efficient ships 
inevitably results in their specialization, a trend evident in 
the current Soviet shipbuilding and from their orders abroad.. 

The fast expansion of Soviet foreign trade and the demands 
of domestic transportation generated by the development of new 
economic regions in the North and the Far East are creating an 
increasing demand for sea transportation. The Soviet Merchant 
Marine does not have excessive tonnage in relation to the total * 
demand and while the drive to increase the chartering of Soviet 
ships by foreign shippers continues, and will most likely 
increase, the chartering of foreign ships cannot at the same 
time be reduced substantially. Moreover, while the size and 
composition of the Soviet Merchant Marine are capable of 
influencing shipping policies in certain regions, they are not 
considered great enough to dictate those policies, particularly 
world-wide. The Soviets are also interested in the profit to be 
gained, and they are unlikely to operate on uneconomical terms. 

As members of various international shipping organizations, the 

i 

Soviets are obliged to observe the rules imposed by them. j * 
It is logical to assume* that the Soviet Navy views the 

civilian ships as a reserve, and contingency plans to utilize 

7 
them in war time, after conversion and arming, have long existed. 



See, for example, Admiral V. A. Alafuzov critical review 
of the book, Military Strategy , Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1963, p. 96 

825 



\± further specialization of the ships and their growing tonnage 
jirticularly tankers) , directed toward satisfying >the need of 
;(imerce to be competitive and profitable, makes their military 
i», even after conversion, questionable. 

The inability of Soviet agriculture to meet requirements 
c protein will most likely continue. This factor alone 
oresents a strong stimulus for" further development of a Soviet 
j;h sea fishing fleet despite a declining fish stock and rising 
i.t cost. In addition, the demand for higher efficiency and 

cger fishing ships and the necessity to search for new fishing 

- 
nunds, which also requires larger and more sophisticated support 

ihps, will intensify. Soviet cooperation in conserving 

i£'ine resources is virtually assured. 

Soviet oceanographic efforts represented by the joint 

search of numerous scientific organizations and coordinated by 

;b Academy of Sciences has no equal, at least in its scale. 

kiefits obtained by the merchant marine and the fishing fleet 

1 
'*>ia oceanographic research are numerous and growing. Heavy 

/ ' ! 

^mhasis on military oceanography and its benefits to the Soviet 

£7, particularly to submarine operations and ASW, while 

ii:ficult to measure quantitatively, must be considered substantial 

j 

"b scope of the Soviet work to master the depths for exploration 
uj exploitation of marine resources is being widened. Intensive 



62G 



-) of converted submarines for testing; equipment and concepts has 

.u known parallel in the West, and as an idea seems to be very 

8 ' 

Demising . The simultaneous coordinated use of several ships, 

i:rcraft and weather satellites for oceanographic research in a 

;./en region is becoming a routine Soviet practice. 

The Soviet shipbuilding industry continues to perform 

3;tisfactorily , being neither overloaded nor under utilized. 

[•3 output supplemented by sizeable foreign deliveries appears 

l< be satisfying the Soviet demands for ships, both naval and 

:;/ilian. Compared with the previous five-year period, either 

acause of enlarged production capacities coupled with increased 

Lbor productivity, or because of a planned reduction in naval 

sip construction which is unlikely, or combination of the two, 

i: the current 1971-1975 five year period it is planned to 

i crease the domestic share of civilian ship production by 30%. 

Lrge Soviet orders for ship construction abroad have played a 

altiple role. Not only did they provide conditions for the 

rpid development of the merchant marine and the fishing and 

i 
oeanographic fleets, and permitted the Soviet shipbuilding 

idustry to implement extensive naval programs, but they assui-ed 

8 The latest experiment, during which four aquanauts "who 
ir the first time ever left the submarine at depths measured in 
tree-digit numbers" (in meters), and who were in. the water "for 
sveral hours" daily for many days was described in P ravda , 
irch 19, 1972. 

627 






the avoidance of an overcapacity in the shipbuilding industry. 

Of particular importance has been the rolo of the Y/arsaw Pact 

t 

country shipbuilding industries with a considerable degree.-- 
of specialization in cex*tain types of ships built and mutual ' 
deliveries. In general, Soviet shipbuilding has been quite 
innovative, and a number of new methods in hull assembly and 
propulsion technology have been employed. 

In addition to its important economic role, the development 
of maritime power has provided the Soviet Union with a tool to 
be employed in competition for political influence on a world-wide 
scale. In the Soviet approach, each element of maritime power 
contributes to a specific political objective. Y/hile the main 
task of the Soviet Navy's general-purpose forces is to neutralize 
the US Navy influence through selective containment in carefully 
selected regions, other elements do their job in a coordinated 
effort, i.e. delivering economic and military assistance, promoting 
trade, conducting research in waters adjoining a specific region, 
building ports, teaching how to fish, etc. Quite often such 
coordinated efforts produce desirable results for the Soviet Union, 
but Soviet success, whenever and whereever it has been achieved, 
cannot be explained l>y their effectiveness along, for the 
mistakes and ineptitude of the West have played no lesser a rolo. 
As Hans Horgcnthau observed: "In large parts of the world there 



828 



exists today an objective revolutionary situation. This 
revolutionary situation would exist even if Communism had never 
been heard of ... that this national and social revolutions are 
largely identified with Communism is primarily the result of the 

West's failure to identify with them morally and to support them 

9 ... 

materially." The Soviet Union definitely took advantage of a 

number of opportunities, and maritime power played an important 

role in their exploitation. 

The growth of Soviet maritime power has not been marked by 

size alone, but also by innovation. Its development has rested 

on a powerful scientific and a reasonably well developed 

technological base, both supported by the world's most powerful 

maritime educational establishment, which graduates specialists 

on a production-line basis. More important, with the obvious 

support from the leadership, innovative maritime thinking was 

not only made popular, but encouraged and well rewarded, both 

morally and materially. Such an attitude should and did produce 

positive results. In the United States, on the contrary, when 

/ I 

the economy slows down, the scientists whose efforts should be 

essential in restoring the momentum of the economy are fired 

i 

first. Even while business is normal, those whose research made 



9 

Hans Morgethau, A New Foreign Policy for the US , Praeger, 

New York, 1969, p. 149." j 

; /' 



629 



design and production possible are often paid less than those 
who sell the product, thus, in effect, being economically penalized 
for thinking. Such practices result in adherence to outdated 
concepts, lack of innovativeness, and extrememly high cost of 
new systems. By way of example, during the post-war period, no 
single nation ever bad more than one fifth of the aircraft 
carriers than the US Navy did. The carrier became the major ship 
around which, in effect, the United States Navy had been, developed. 
Of three major innovations, the angled deck, the steam catapult, 
and the mirror landing methods, each drastically improving the 
carrier as a platform for launching its singular weapon system, 
its aircraft, not one was of American origin; all were British 
inventions. It just happens that Great Britain has been the 
closest ally of the US, but the fact by itself is alarming. 
At present, in factors such as variety of submarines, cruise 
missile armament, types of surface ships, and propulsion systems, 
it is not the Soviet navy, but the US Navy, which has to catch up. 

The development of Soviet maritime power has been product 
of the industrial and technological base of the country and 
skillful use of foreign technology, often obtained under adverse 
political relations with the West. Conceptually, it is wrong 
to speak about the sudden awakening of the Soviet leadership in 
understanding the importance of maritime power; it is more correct 



630 



WWi'i*«ip qi nij»itH«, 



tc speak of the realization of the long-cherished Russian and 
Mfiet dream to be a great maritime power, achieved by skillful 
ail innovative application of efforts and considerable resources. 

The further sophistication of the Warsaw Pact mechanism 
;;s, in the decade of the 1960's, resulted in the appearance of 
cabined pact fleets, particularly in the Baltic Sea, and of 
isort of integrated merchant marine, no small asset to the total 
srength of Soviet maritime power. Under the present complex 
international relations, each increment in Soviet maritime power 
3 in that of her allies is in harsh reality detrimental to the 
interests of the US and its allies, providing Moscow with 
iditional options in the framework of the proclaimed. "competition 
> the two world systems." The challenge to the West resulting 
fom the Soviet maritime development is constantly increasing 
troughout the whole maritime spectrum. 

N. V. Gogol', a prominent Russian writer of 19th century, 
:>mpared Russia to a fast moving troika . In "Dead Souls" he 
vote, "Russia, whither flyest thou? Answer! She gives no 
stswer. The ringing of bells melts into music; the air, torn 
iito shreds, whirs and rushes like the wind, everything that is 
:i earth is flying by, and the other states and nations, with 
!>oks askance, make way for her and draw aside." In the 
Dntezaporary world, there is a new Russia, the Soviet Union, the 



631 



m " ■■—■'■ p ■ ■■ ■ —■■ - ■■ ■ i, ■»■ ■ 



- 



;t.te with a different ideology which is alien to the West. 
; v ry thing in that state, including the economy, traditions, 
is;ional pride and aspirations, is directed by and subordinated 
;c the interests of this ideology. Often chaotic in the past, 
;b gait of the old Russian troika has been replaced by a v/ell 
patrolled and coordinated movement, over foreign courses, of a 
ya troika. Recently, for the foreign "drives", to the tired, 
^ng and not very effective thill horse of Communist ideology, 
;v> young and growing trace horses were added: one of them is 
.h Soviet economy manifesting itself in the form of growing 
:c:eign trade, technological assistance, and economic and 
ditary aid, and the second, although a by-product of the first, 
La Soviet maritime power. The future will show if "other states 
ui nations" will "make way and draw aside." The decision is 
;i2irs.- 



/ 



G32 



/ 



" " •• •> - — -■■ 



APPENDIX I ' 

WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES 

e chant Marines 

The Counsel for Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA, began 
ordination of the. economic plans of its members in the 1950 T s. 
nil 1965 this coordination was exercised on the basis of 
leady approved national plans, but starting in 1965, the-- 
ordination of plans preceded their approval by each individual 
entry government. In the course of such multilateral coor- 
i.ation, the countries have exchanged information on the key 
e.tures of their national long-term plans. For example, in 
S'O and beginning of 1971, the CMEA countries have completed 
ck on the coordination of national economic plans for 1971- 
S'5. Bilateral coordination between the USSR and other CMEA 
cintries has also been arranged and formalized in the signing 
fa series of protocols. Compared with the preceding five 
ars, the Soviet Union's trade with other Comecon countries 
r 1971-1975 is to increase as follows: by 57$ with Bulgaria, 
.oe than $0% with Hungary, 56$ with East Germany, about 65$ 
'in Poland, over 35$ with Rumania, and over 40$ with 
^choslovakia. 



J- New Times No. 4 , 1971. 
/ 

/ 



833 



The trade among Comecon countries relies upon the long 
tpm contracts and consistent promotion of socalled Socialist 
ionomic Integration. The latter has been especially actively 
pomoted by the Soviet Union since the decision of the special 
3rd Session of the CMEA, held in April 1969. Total volume 
y Soviet foreign trades with CMEA countries in 1971-1975. 

oriod is planned to exceed 76 billion rubles (growth of lj 

2 

:.nes compared with previous five years). The Bucharest's _ 

2ph Session of the CMEA considered a long range program for 
:'.e integration of countries' economies in the next twenty 

/ars. 

In the past members of the CMEA were acting on the 

tfrld charter market practically exclusively as importers of 

3 

?:oduction of sea transport. With the growth of their merchant 

nrines, they are becoming more and more exporters of it. In 
tja economic terms, the goal is to achieve &z least a positive 
3<Lance and thus not being forced to spend foreign currencies 
fjr sea transport. Another goal is more political than 
ionomic - "liberation from the dependence upon capitalist 
Gantries, in the area of sea transportation." I 

About 65% of the total volume of Communist countries' i 
t:ad'e is among themselves. The volume of goods transported by 
s<i is constantly growing. Presently more than 1+0% is carried 



^ New Times~~No. 3 , 1971. 

^By chartering foreign ships and permitting charter of 
tfiir ships, the merchant marines of the Communist countries 
&t conducting export and import of production of sea transport. 

/ 
/ 

631 



-- 



j; sea and, in general, the rate of development of sea transport 
jjceeds that of land transportation. 

The attempts to coordinate activity of the CM£A countries' 
tenant marines goes back to its creation in 1949 in spite 
x the fact that both the merchant marines of the member 
:untries and the foreign trade were very weak. The acknowledged 
ml of such cooperation is the rational use of tonnage, 
:ordinated action in charter market, and, in general, increased 
;:fectiveness of foreign trade and improved balance of payments. 
A 1952 it was decided that the conferences of organizations 
j/olved in charter market will be held on the annual basis. 
[] 1957 j the 3tb Session of the CMEA organized a working 
pup for transport, whose function among others, was to 
^ordinate plans for the foreign trade transportation. The 
L ( 5$ 9th Session of CMEA established a commission for 
Gnomical, scientific, and technical cooperation in the area 
): transport. Commission coordinates plans for capital 
Li/estment in transport development, research, and is responsible 
ft mutual efforts to create scientific research centers and 
i*3ign bureaus. During the period of I962-I965 the Commission 

:ordimted plans for the development of sea transport of all 

4 

-mecon members for 1966-1970 period. 

Considerable attention was devoted to the ship-building 
iiiustries. It was decided to reduce the number of ships types 
bilt by CMEA countries from sixty down to eighteen and to build 



Hi. D. Mozharov, " Cooperation of Socialist Countries 
i the a rea of Sea Transport ", Transport PH, Moscow, . 19o9> 
Pi 76-80. 



635 



socialized ships in large series assuring their technological 
Jdernity and suitability for the needs of the CMEA countries. 
In 1963 the Bureau for Coordination of Ships' Charter was 
coated. The Bureau with headquarters in Moscow assisted in 
dafting the organizational principles of joint shipping lines. 
Ge of the reasons behind the coordination of ship charter is 

; 'o apply active influence upon world charter market through 

5 
cordinated action". The proposals for creation of CMEA 

carter center and liner conferences were under considerations 

ij 1970. 

The CMEA organizations dealing with their merchant marine 

rsemble the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping 

Kown as PBOS. The PBOS purpose has been to mobilize ocean 

^ing shipping in a single pool and aliocaxe, it on a world-wide 

osis in time of emergency. The Defense Shipping Authority, 

stablished by the Board, is to insure the effective use of NATO 

sips, which participating governments should, in war time 

urgency, place in a central pool for allocation by the 

Dfense Shipping Authority. Existing organizations and 

ahieved level of cooperation among Warsaw Pact members in 

aea of their merchant marines has all provisions if not more, 

the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. In December 1971 

a important agreement -concerning the CMEA countries cooperation 
i shipping was signed by all members. The agreement is to 
asure the coordinated transportation of all foreign trade 

1 S lbid . , p> 82. 

I 

I 636 . 



-- -■ 



urgos of the CMEA me ml- , rational distribution of cargo 

low awontf r > •>• oj.' various noimtr.inn .. il ill ' ■ ■ riliiji linow, 

In general, the development of the CMEA countries merchant 
urines has been as following: In 1951-1955 period, when the 
sa trade began to develop, the increase of their merchant marines 

v, s practically negligible (from 2.2 million tons in 1950 to 

I. 

2p million tons in 1955). This growth was far behind the 
dmands. The period witnessed a considerable dependence upon 
chartered ships. The United. States introduced a number of 
rstrictions demanding special permission to charter American 
sips for the Soviet and Chinese cargos and published list of 
srategic goods which were prohibited to carry on American 
sips and ships of the flag of convenience to Communist countries. 

In the period of 1955-1960 the foreign trade of the CMEA 
cuntries continued to grow, including that with the developed 
capitalist countries. The growth of merchant marines (2.2 
tmes during the period) approximately correspondent to 
ie tempo of their foreign trade development. However, it 
ws not enough to overcome lack of tonnage developed in the 
peceding period. The situation not only improved, but 
agrevated in the early sixties. Victory of the Castro 
Involution in Cuba generated considerable pressure upon the . 
3EA countries and their merchant marines. During only one 
yar, 1961, socalled trade with Cuba grew from 192 million 
rbles to 314 million rubles or 4.3 times. One of the major 



"^Ibid., p. 84. See also Vodny Transport , January 4, 1972. 



r\ '-• -; 

00 ( 



—— — - — — --— — _ -■— v. ■-'»■■ 



argos has been oil. The economic sunctions aggrevated already 
ad situation with tonnage. For example, Standard Oil of 
ew Jersey warned the associations of ship owners 'and brokers 
hat it will not charter tankers involved in the transportation 
f oil to the Comecon countries and Cuba. A number of decisions 
y the U.S. Government applied pressure upon countries whose 
hips were involved in the delivering cargos to. Cuba. All this 
.orced the CMEA countries to accelerate the development of 
heir merchant marines and to improve their effectiveness. 
he task "to assure independence of foreign trade from * 
apitalist charter market, to decrease spending of the foreign 
xchange for charter and to increase effectiveness of the 
oreign trade" was proclaimed. The task to eliminate the 
harter of foreign ships was never set up. The available 
tatistics shows, that simultaneously with a fast growth of 
he CMEA merchant marines and the steadily increasing number 
f the Communist ships chartered by foreign countries, the 
MEA countries charter of foreign ships is being increased 
oo. 7 During decade of 1960 r s, the CMEA fleet tonnage 
ncreased more than twice, while foreign trade grew by 1.5 
•imes. There were qualitative changes as well. In 1963 more 
nan 40% of the ships were less than five years old, of modern 
iesign, suitable for the needs of the CMEA foreign trade. The 
breaking point in the fulfillment of proclaimed task was 
ichieved in 1963 , when the percentage of tonnage of chartered 
'oreign ships was reduced. In 1966 the ships of Comecon 

.. 

Y lbid . , p. 87 • * 

633 



ountries carried four-fifths of the cargo sold by CIF and 
jjught by FOB. 

During the second half of the 1960 T s there was steady 
rowth of tonnage and percentage of the CMEA ships chartered 
V foreign countries, i.e. the growth of the "export" of the- 
reduction of merchant marine. 

A brief review of the development of merchant marines 
f individual CMEA countries (with the exception of the 
oviet Union) now in order. 

Post World War II developments of Polish Merchant Marine 
egan in March of 1946 when twenty-five ships, total capacity 
f 92,000 registered tons, returned to the country. In 1947 
oviet Union transferred to Poland 15$, of 56,000 registered 
ons, of ships received by reparations. During the six years 
Ian, 1950-1955? the growth of Polish Merchant Marine was slow 
nd mainly achieved through buying old ships from the Western 
ountres. Communist victory in China aggravated the situation 
n Polish Merchant Marine. Trade with China grew during period 
f 1950-1955 more than eight times. In addition, Poland was 
major country training China's Merchant Marine crews. The 
oint lines, ships of which were men by the mixed Polish-Chinese 
rews, were organized. During the first five-year plan, 



"' 8 Ibi~ p. 81, 134-147. 

^For the details see: l) B. B. Gorozontov, "T ransport 
nd Internationa l Social istic Div ision of Labor", Moscow, 
anaie", 19677 2) "Sea Transport of the USSR during 1966-1970", 
•oscow, Transport, 1967. 3) "Fifty Years of Sea Transport of 
h g S oviet Un ion," Mo 3 c ow , T r a n s po r t , 1 9 67. 4 ) Lloy d r s Re gister 
l Ohipping, St atist ical Tables, 1950,1955, I960, I'WT * 5) T. D. 
joins rov , £ojlIJt^Ill:k9ILJJJ^^ in the Area of Sea 

Iran sport ,_, Transport Publishing House, Moscow, 1969. 






GO q 
o u 

._. , — . 



956-1960, domestic •shipbuilding industry provided half the 
onnage, and the percentage of old ship:: bought declined, 
uring the second five-year plan, I96I-I965, the percentage of 
omestically built ships delivered to Polish Merchant Marine 
;rew up to sixty-three. Starting with 1966, over 95% of the " 
rowth of Polish Merchant Marine was achieved by delivery of 
ew ships, the majority of them built by the domestic yards. 
he growth of Polish Merchant Marine tonnage (thousand tons, 
ead-weight) was as follows:. 1949-206; 1955-392; 1960-326; 
965-1,233; 1967-1,603. 10 In the middle of 1960 T s a number 
f advanced ships were ordered aboard. 

All these measures resulted in quantitative renovation 
nd improvements in economic performance of the Polish Merchant 

iarine. At the end of 1960 r s the future of the Polish Merchant 

11 

iarine was widely debated. A special committee of the 

[erchant Marine Ministry recommended a plan of merchant marine 
:evelopment up to 1935. According to plan, "the development 
)f sea transport of the country should be oriented mainly on 
•he earning of foreign exchange", and its tonnage in 1935 
Should reach 3.5-9 million dwt, out of which 3-5-4 million 
iwt should be allocated for "export", i.e. for the purpose 
)f earning foreign exchange. The main task of the 



1"0n. D. Mozharov, "Cooperation of Socialist Countries in 
;he Area of Sea Transport", Transport PH , Moscow, 1969, p. 94. 

Morski Rocznik Statystyc zny; B. Polkowski. Stan 1 
;tn jktura polskie.i f loty trans porv. owe 1 3-1 grudr.ia .I9 o7, V. r yd. 
JULLl-lt u ■: u M o r s k j . o ■ : o , G a a n s k , 1 9 o 8 . (Maritime Statistical 
Yearbook. 3. Polkovski, "The Condition and Structure of 
polish Merchant Marine, 31 December 1967", Published by 
Maritime Institute, Gdansk, 1963. 



S^iO 






n-rchant marine of the country was formulated as "protection 
•• balance of payment of the state and active support for its 

,r I 2 
improvement" . 

The Polish Merchant Marine industry is relied upon its ^ 

uil developed ship-building industry. There are three major 

nip-building yards in Gdansk, Gdynya, and Stettin. As of 

addle of 1970 a thousand ships were built in the Polish yards 

[it of which were more than 700 ships sold. As of 1969; 

14 
8% of ships sold were delivered to the Soviet Union. At 

he beginning of 1971, Gdansk shipyard had built for export 

66 ships out of which 425 were built for the USSR. The 

SSR bought close to three million tons of Polish built ships 

raring the decades of 1950 's and 1960's. Presently, about 

10% of Soviet Merchant Marine tonnage are represented by 

15 

ships built in Poland. 

The size of the Polish built ships is being constantly 
increased.- Polish ship-building techniques is quite advanced 
and many innovations (including welding of ship-s sections 
afloat) are employed. Toward the end of 1970, the following 
types of ships were under construction or planned: three types 



'Technology and MaritlmVtlallagement- J, ±9o/., wo. 

"i ^ ^ T-.-.V.O q l Q70 and Economicheskava 
•^ Sovetsk a ya Rossiya , June 9, xjfv, emu _± _ 

Gazeta No. 27 , July 19~69 . - 

1/f Pravda , April 16, 1971- 

15 Isvestiva, February 12 and February 25, 1971. 



841 



- 



of tankers, the largest 94,500 dwt ; seven types of bulk 
carriers, the largest 75,000 dwt; twelve, typos of general 
cargo ships, some with seppd of 22 knots; three ty»pes of 
refrigerator ships. Soviet Union continues to be the major 
customer of Polish built ships and in 1971 additional orders 
were signed with Polish foreign trade enterprise Centromor. 
According to the agreement, in a period of 1972-1975, Poland 
will built thirty-five universal ships with total cargo 

capacity of 262,000 tons and nine large fish processing 

16 

factories. 

Most of the propulsion plants for Polish built ships 
are domestically produced. Poznan's Cegieiski plant is one 
of the largest European diesel building enterprises. Most 
of the diesels are built on foreign licenses from Zulzer, 
Burmeister and Wain, and Fiat. TLe second enterprise, Zgocla, 
builds smaller high revolution diesels of 1,500 to 3,000 
horsepower output. A rather extensive network of education, 
research, and design institutions support the Polish Merchant 
Marine industry. 

At the end of 19?0, the Polish Merchant Marine consisted 
of 259 ships, with total cargo capacity of more than 1,900,000 
tons. More than half of this tonnage was represented by ships 
less than five years old. According to the 1971-1975 plan, 
Polish Merchant Marine will be enlarged by 99 ships and in 
1975 its tonnage should reach 3.5 million tons. A' new "Northern 
Port" in Gdansk, capable of handling ships up to 100,000 dwt 



Toibid. 



fill 9 



■*"T— * ' 



(and in future up to 250,000 dwt) will be built. The con- 
struction of this port proclaimed to be a national task. 7 

East Germany ( German Democratic Republic - G\)R ) has the 
third largest, after the Soviet Union and Poland, merchant 
marine among Warsaw Pact Countries. At the end of 1955 East 
German Merchant Marine had 9 ships. In 1957, the first two 
domestically built ships entered the service. The urgent need 
for a greater number of ships forced the East German Government 
to adopt in 195$ a decision for accelerated development of 
its merchant marine. During 195&-1960 period, fourteen "old 
ships were bought agroad and twenty new ships were built at 
domestic yards. Two tankers were built in the Soviet Union. 
All these measures resulted in the rather rapid growth of 
East German Merchant Marine. If in 1950 it had 1.3 thousand 
dwt, in I960 it has 277,000, in 1965, 794,000, and in 1970 
it was 1.3 million dwt. Between 195& and I967 

cargo turnover of East German Merchant Marine grew more than 

19 

fifty times, and in 1967 it was 23,603 million ton-miles. 

Simultaneously, East German port structure was rapidly developed. 

According to a special decision of October 1957, the construction 

I 

of Rostok port was proclaimed as a national task. This port, 

i 

the largest in East Germany, became the major East German port 



^ Yodnyy Transport , July 15, 1971. 

-^Stat 1 st iches Jahrbuch der Deutschen pemoktattschen 
R epublik , T90S". ( "German Democratic Republic's Year cook 
of Statistics", 1966', 1970). 

19 



1 



new Times No. 17, 1969- 



/ 



__. 






to service cargo to Cuba. According to new 1971-1975 plan 

in 1975 East German Merchant Marine should grow to 1,750,000 dwt. 20 

East German ship-building industry is no less, important. 
There are twelve ship-building yards. The major of them 'are 
located in the Rostok area: 

1. The Warnow Yard in Warnemunde, employs over £,000 
workers, and specializes on construction of dry 
cargo ships up to 16,000 dwt. Total annual 
production close to 200,000 dwt.. 

2. The Neptune Yard in Rostok specializes in building 
dry cargo ships up to 11,000 dwt, research vessels ■ 
and auxiliary ships. Total annual production close 
to 100,000 dwt. 

3. The Stralsund Yard employs over 6,000 workers and 
specializes in building fishing vessels. Annual 
output is more than £0,000 reg. tons (74,369 reg. 
tons of 1970 output went to the Soviet Union). 
Quite advance methods of ship-building - sectional 
and block, automated steel processing - are employed 
by the yard. 

4. The Wismar Yard also employs over 6,000 workers, 
but it specializes in building of passenger liners 
up to 25,000 reg. tons, fishing factory-ships, 
refrigerators and expeditionary ships. Annual 
output is 50,000 dwt. 

Two machine building factories, one in Rostok and second in 

Magdeburg, are producing diesels for all types of ships. 

Presently, East German ship-building industry completely 

satisfies the needs of its merchant marine, and the bulk of 

the production is going for export. The major consumer is | 

the Soviet Union. 

During twenty years more than 3,000 ships were built. 

Twenty-six countries have ordered ships from East Germany, 

particularly famous for its fishing vessels (19$ of world T s 

total are East German built). In 1970 92$ of the newly 



ft 



ftorskoy Fiot No. 11, 1970. 



/ 
/ 



844- 



<- W ~- *■ ■ ■■ ! 



21 
onstructed tonnage went for export. According to all agree- 

ents signed between USSR and East Germany only in 1970, the 

otal delivery of ships amounted to 800,000,000 rubles. East 

erman ship-building industry was first to initiate construction 

f container ships among Communist countries. At the present 

oo 

ontainer ships up to 23,000 tons are built. The industry 
s supported by an extensive network of research institutes. 

As a result of World War II, Rumania lost practically 
11 of its merchant fleet. In -1950 eight ships were obtained 
nd, later, up to I960 Rumanian fleet did not grow. In -the 
>eriod of 1960-1965 the fast growth of Rumanian fleet was 
chieved, mainly by the deliveries of domestically built 
hips. The growth of Rumanian fleet can be illustrated by 
he following figures: 19.60-31,000 dwt; 1965-166,000 dwt; 
.970--around 600,000 dwt. 2 ^ 

Rumanian ship-building industry is quite advanced and 
'ast growing. During 1971-1975 its output should be tripled, 
:ompared with 1970. There are six ship-building yards, major 
if them located in Galati, Turnu-Severin, and Constanta. 
Soviet Union has been 'the major customer of the Rumanian ship- 

milding industry. However, in the last two or three years 

24 
Soviet's orders have been reduced. 

^ Vodnyy Transport , June 15, 1971; Sudostroyeniye No. g , 
.971, pp. 72-73. 

22 Vodnyy Transport , May 3, 1971; Pravda , March 2, 1972. 
23 N. D. Mozharov, pp. 107-103. 
2 Hodnyy Transport , October 21, 1971. 



/ 



/ 645 



—•—-■—- 



Up to I960 development of the Bulgarian Merchant Marine 
was slow, but was vastly accelerated during the decade of 
1960 f s. If in I960 total deadweight was 60,000 tons, in 1965 
it was 576,000 tons and in 1970 it exceeded one million tons. 
Beginning ifl 1967 Bulgarian Merchant Marines became profitable 
and started to earn foreign exchange. The growth of Bulgarian 
Merchant Marine has been mainly achieved by domestic ship- 
building industry. In 1950 a joing Soviet-Bulgarian ship- 
building and repair enterprise, Korbso, was set up. In 1954 
it became a Bulgarian enterprise which merged with three other 
shipyards in Varna and became known as Georgi Dimitrov 
ship-building yard and ship repair yard. Another ship-building 
yard, in Burgas, is presently being enlarged. Bulgaria 
builds ships for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, 
China, and Norway, but its major customer has been the Soviet 
Union. Presently, different types of ships are being built, 
including bulk carriers up to 33,000 dwt. The Bulgarian 
Merchant Marine should be doubled during the 1971-1975 period 
primarily by the deliveries at domestic ship-building industry. 
It is also planned to 'increase the use of Bulgarian ships for 

charter and the task to increase foreign currency earning 

25 

power .of merchant marine has been set. 

Hungary has two types of merchant fleets - sea and mixed, 
river-sea, navigation. Total tonnage of both fleets in 1967 
exceeded 23,000 dwt. Hungarian ship-building industry builds 

^5 vodnyy Transport , February 14, 1971. 
2 °N. D. Mozharov, p. 113. 



646 






hips up to 2,000 dwt. Seventy-five per cent of its production 
s going for export. Most ships have been ordered by the 
oviet Union. However, orders from England, Belgium, Italy, 
uba, Greece, and other countries have been received. 

Even Czechoslovakia has its own merchant marine. As of 
.967 its whole fleet - ten ships of some 150,000 tons was 
-ployed in liner shippings, serving two linos J, Far Rasfcerni 
rom Black Sea, and Baltic-Cuba (joint with East Germany, 
luba , and Poland ) . 

Growing foreign trade of Comecon countries, among them- 
selves as well as with capitalist and developing countries, 
;he desire to economize on the transportation, particularly 
Ln terms of foreign exchange, the need to participate 
In programs such as economic-military aid, assistance to 
tforth Vietnam, and Cuba forced the CMEA members to accelerate 
the development of their merchant marines. None of them 
excludes charter of foreign ships, but the policy of 
"positive balance in the sea transport charter" has been 
vigorously pursued, particularly by Poland, Bulgaria, and 

East Germany. 

If, in the past, considerable percentage of ships for 
their merchant marines was bought from Western countries an'd 
Japan, the development of domestic ship-building industries 
has reduced it considerably, and the majority of CMEA countries 
are ship's exporters. By large, the major portion of their 



7/N ew York Times , March 7, 1967. 

— ~ * * 

2 N. D. Mozharov, p. 124-125- / 



847 



^lip-building capacities is occupied by the Soviet orders 
nich certainly stimulated the industries' development and 
live helped the Soviet Union to develop its merchant marine, 
Ashing, and oceanographic fleets. Parallel to the constantly 
^creasing tonnage, the measures designed to improve effective- 
uss of the industry have been implemented. At the present, 
ne coordination of the CMEA countries' Merchant Marines, 
,)int nature of their operation and control exercised from - 
bscow are such, that to a certain degree one can speak of 
integrated fleet, or CMEA's Merchant Marine. Effectiveness 
<f it has been particularly well demonstrated by the 
^interrupted delivery of cargo to Cuba, North Vietnam, and 






* k_«.V«N 



hvies 

The development, or more precisely, the gradual restor- 
oion of the navies by the present East European members of 
tie Warsaw Pact- was initiated soon after the end of World War 
"[. The Soviet Union granted major assistance initially to 
Ue Polish and Bulgarian navies, and later to the East German 
ad Rumanian navies. The initial order of battle of the 
hst European countries' navies represented a not very 
lamerous collection of old, mainly obsolete ships with the 
ame quality of armament. Soviet deliveries of warships 
:> these countries could not and did not change the situation, 
or in the main they, too, were old and to a large degree 
osolete ships. The situation with the personnel of East 



648 



jropean navies was, however, different. A large number of 
ijlish and Bulgarian and later East German and Rumanian 
r.val officers were trained in Soviet naval school's and the 
Aademy. Since the early l 9 50's these countries initiated 
te training of future naval officers domestically, but 
avanced training, although on diminished scale, continued 
i.the Soviet Navy education establishment. 

While the Polish, Bulgarian, and Rumanian navies had - 
;on developing openly, the East German Navy officially did 
u: come into existence until January 1956. Nonetheless, 
ft East German naval forces, although not numerous and 
strong, have been in existence since late 1940 f s when the 
'Ht units of the socalled Sea Police were organized. 29 

With the creation of the Warsaw Traaty Organization (WTO) 
>rl4 May 1955, a new course was set for the development 
d East European navies. Much closer cooperation between 

East European and Soviet navies has been established, 
aalleling the renovation of forces. An operational system 
c posed of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Pollah Navy, ,md 

h East German Navy, which in the event of a war would 

1 be subordinated to a joint command, has been established 

30 
nthe Baltic. During the second half of the 1950 T s the 

oiets delivered warships to Poland (Skory-class destroyers, 

~ 2 9 M ar i ne R unc ischau No. 1 , 1969, pp. 16-33. 

30 

Praeglad Morski (Polish M a r itime Review) No. 6 , 

us 19bb', pp. 29-41. 



SH-d 



iss 



submarines and torpedo boats) and East Germany (Riga-cla: 

escorts, torpedo and patrol boats) . On a somewhat smalle: 

scale, Soviet ships were transferred to the Bulgarian and 

Rumanian navies as well. Simultaneously, domestic construction 

was initiated of warships outfitted with Soviet armament " ^ 

and equipment or produced according to Soviet designs. 

Gradually, starting in the late 1950 's there have been joint 

exercises of the Soviet Baltic Fleet with the Polish and 

East German navies and the Black Sea Fleet with the Bulgarian 

and Rumanian navies. While Rumania .has refrained to a large ■ ' 

degree from joint exercises, in late 1960 l s Bulgaria, in 

contrast, went further than ever before, exercising her ships 

together with the Soviet _ Mediterranean Eskadra. s * 

In the Baltic, the cooperation of Warsaw Pact navies is 

particularly extensive. After acquiring an amphibious 

capability, development of which started in the early 1960's, 

a number of joint landing exercises have been observed, 

including one during exercise Sever (1968-), in which forces 

from all three navies participated. The Polish Navy has a 

shore defense division trained for amphibious landing while ; 

East Germany uses specially trained army regiment for this 

31 
purpose. In the summer of 1971 joint Soviet-Polish 

and East German naval forces for the first time carried out 

exercises in the Skagerrak off southern Norway. 32 



nJHne RurA schau , January-February 1972. vo. 91-97; 
and No. 1, 1969, pp. 32-33. 

32 

Internatlon Defense Digest No. 4, 1971. » 



850 



The decisions of the March 1969 Budapest meeting of the 
"TO Political Consultative Committee established the Committee 

f Defense Ministers, and outlined new provisions 'concerning 
he combined (Ob'yedinennyye ) armed forces and combined 
arsaw Pact command. The necessity for wider application of 
ommon principles in military theory, training methods, and 
.ilitary education were emphasized during the meeting. The. 

nits for the combined naval forces of the WTO are allocated.. 

33 

'rom the navies of member nations. The March 1971 Budapest 

meeting of the Committee of Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers 
onsidered the further improvement of the WTO armed forces 
nfrastructure, the further development of means of control 

.nd prospects for the joint development of their armies and 

• 34 

.avies. 

Recently, the Warsaw Pact navies have been supplied with 

tore sophisticated armament and better ships, both domestically 

nd Soviet built. Thus, it was reported that East German 

'.SW Forces are being reinforced with new ships propelled by 

. combined gas turbine-diesel plant. The Polish Navy 

• 1 
■eceived its first missile armed ship, a converted Kotlin- 

35 

:lass destroyer armed with SAMs. 



3 Marshall Grechko in Pravda, February 23, 1970; and 
>rmy General Shtemenko, Combined Brotherhood, Krasnaya 
vezda, February 22, 1970. 



! 



^ Izvestiya , March 5, 1971* 

^Politik ur.d Wirtschaft No. 95, 10 December 1971. 



/ 



851 



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cv 

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/ 



The naval strength of the Warsaw Pact countries illus- 
' rated by the table obviously augments the Soviet Navy poten- 
ial for coastal operations in the Baltic and Black 3ea areas. 
t also provides the Soviet Navy with a legal pretext for' the 
dvance (300-400 miles) base system. The East European navies 
osess types of ships in considerable number which are essen- 
ial for fulfilling certain tasks assigned to the naval forces 
f the Warsaw Pact, including amphibious operations, mine and 
ounter-mine operations, ASW and limited support of Soviet 
ubmarines, and support of the army flank. The Warsaw Pact 
>rovides the Soviet Union with better opportunities to improve 
.ts strategic position in the two maritime flanks of the Euro- 

\-acv* "^ *»* ^ c ^~ d "►"* /"> "* ^.*C T* 



3oSee Dr. R. A. Remington, The War saw Pact : Case Studies 
in Communist Conflict Resolution, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
K.I.T. Press, 263 pp., 1971. 



53 






APPENDIX II -^ 

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID 

'oreign Trade 

Pre-revolutionary Russia traded with many countries, 
mt only a few major European countries and the United States 
>layed a decisive role. Germany was the most important 
-rading partner, accounting for nearly k.0% of trade turnover 
jb 1913". 

Soon after the 1917 October Revolution, all foreign and 
Liiternal debts were counselled. In December 12, 1917, "the 
Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC) adopted the resolution 
'on interim order in the field of foreign trade" under 
vhich the export and import activity could be conducted only 
}y permission of the export department of the SNEC. By the 
29 December 1917 resolution of the Council of People's 
3ommissars the foreign trade department of the People's 
Oommissariat of Commerce and Industry was granted exclusive J 
right to issue licenses for export and import. Finally, by 
a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 22 April 191$ 
foreign trade was nationalized, thus creating a state monoply. 
During the first years of Soviet power, trade relations 

^-Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) No. 6, 1967, pp. 3^-53. 



654 



arere maintained only with few neutral countries, mainly Sweden. 

During the first three years, 1913, 1919, and 1920, the 

exports totalled only 7.5 million rubles and imports #7.5 million 

rubles, thus creating an £0-million ruble deficit. In January 

L920 the Entente Supreme Council resolution permitted the 

exchange of commodities with Russia on condition that trade 

:e carried out with the Soviet cooperative organizations 

rather than directly with the Soviet government, which was 

lot recognized. 

The Soviet government then began its diplomatic maneuvering. 
I peace treaty signed with Estonia on February 2, 1920, was 
in important step in the development of foreign trade, for 
.t helped the Soviets to come out on the West European markets 
ind thus reducing the impact of the .Enieniie. Supreme Council 
"esolution. The peace treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, 
''inland, and Poland served the same purpose, because the 
treaties were followed by the organization of foreign trade 
igencies abroad in the form of the trade delegation of Soviet 
Uissia. The result was that in 1921 Soviet foreign trade was 
sight times greater than that- of 192Q-, exports- growing 14 times 
ind the imports more than seven times. (In 1921 the import 
)f food stuffs constituted 60% of all imports and played an 
.mportant role in easing the famine.) 

But the Entente resolution continued to handicap the 
levelopment of Soviet foreign trade a great deal. Under the 
:ircumstances, the Soviet government decision on December 2, 1922, 
•ranted the Centrosoyuz (The Central Cooperatives Union) the 
'ight to administer its foreign trade through national 



K K 



ba 



Doperatives associations and also through any international 
■riolesale purchases cooperative union. On December 5, 1921, 
he People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the* Centrosoyuz 
igned an agreement under which the latter acted as the 
ommissioner of the Commissariat in foreign markets. 2 The 
alance of foreign trade continued to be unfavorable to the 
oviet Union, and in 1921 reached a deficit of 150 million 
ubles, which has to be covered by the sale of gold, reserves 
f which were very limited. What the Soviets needed were 
redits, which were refused until the Soviet government - 
•ecognized the pre-war and wartime debts of Tsarist Russia 
.nd the Provisional government. During the Genoa Economic 
lonference, the Soviets were presented with a bill for Id. 5 
>illion so called gold rubles, whereupon the Soviet delegation 
^resented a countcrbill, indicating that tho Allied inter- 
vention and blockade, and the Civil War which they supported 
for more than three years had caused losses to Russia of 
39 billion rubles. Obviously, the Conference was deadlocked. 
The Rapallo Treaty signed on April 16, 1922, helped the 
Soviet Union in developing its foreign trade. Even more 
favorable development resulted in -1924 after the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Britain, Italy, Austria, Norway, 
Sweden, China, Denmark, Mexico, and France. v Total foreign 
trade turnover in 1924 reached hflO million rubles, in 1925, 

ZVo prosy Istorii No. S, 1967, pp. 42 -4#. 



5 b 



.,123 million rubles, and in 1928, 1,377 million rubles, 
luring the four years of the first Five Year Plan (1929-1932), 
he turnover of Soviet foreign trade was 5,900 million |* w hl&B, 

'ollowing a policy of promoting rapid industrialization, the 
ommodity group "plant and equipment" represented close to 
•0% of the entire Soviet imports during the period and was 
qual to the total amount of plant and equipment imported 
.uring the period of 1918-192$. 

The major stress, however, was placed on the policy 
>f so called liberation of the Soviet Union from import * 
iependence by developing domestic industry. The most 
'evealing example of such a policy can be cited in case of 
tractor production. In the early 1930 T s, forced collectivi- 
sation of the Soviet agriculture required, machines, mainly 
;ractors. In 1931 the tractor imports were already 2.5 times 
greater than in 1929. 

The first large industrial enterprise built during the 
first Five Year Plan was the Stalingrad, now the Volgograd, 
Tractor Plant, stocked with American equipment which cost 
28 million rubles to import. The. Kharkov Tractor Plant, 
//hick was built two years later, was partially equipped with 
Soviet made machinery, while the value of imported machinery 
tfas only 12 million rubles. While in 1924-1931 180 million 
rubles were spent to import 86,000 tractors, in 1934 the 
Soviet tractor producing enterprises produced 93,500 tractors 
at a cost of 58 million rubles. Starting in 1933, the tractor 
imports into the Soviet Union were stopped. 

/ 
" 3 vop r osy Istorii No. 6 , 1967, p. 41. 

r» r- "7 



During the second Five Year Plan (1933-193$) and in 

general up to the beginning of World War II, Soviet 
foreign trade had been consistently declining (with the 
exception of 1940, when trade with Nazi Germany somewhat ' 
increased total foreign trade turnover after the signing of 
the Soviet -German pact). There were a number of reasons for 
this. Soviet authors liked to emphasize industralization as 
a major one. While this is an important factor, it should 
be stressed, however, that a number of political reasons were 
no less important in the curtailment of Soviet foreign trade. 
Before the Nazis came to power, Germany was the biggest 
trading partner of the Soviet Union. Also important were 
trading relations with Italy and Japan, which degenerated 
sharply after 1933. Moreover, the major export items were 
raw materials, which the Soviet industry, involved in an 
extensive military build-up, needed for itself and hence 
the shortage of foreign exchange. The trade figures in 
millions of rubles were as follows: 

Year Export Import Turnover 

1930 313 #3'0 1,643 

1933 38$ 273 661 

1935 288 139" 477 

1940 240 242 4^2 

Source : Voprosy Istorii No. 8 , 1967. 

The first post-war years produced drastic changes in the 
orientation of Soviet foreign trade, which began to grow 
steadily soon after the restoration of the Soviet economy, 
which was basically completed az the end of 1940 T s. ( If in 

/ 



858 



%6, total trade turnover with Western countries amounted to 
/?1 million rubles of which 304 was with the United States; 
:i 1950 it was 440 million rubles, of which only 5,0 million 
ubles was with the United States. Meanwhile, the trade' 
iLth socialist countries, especially after the creation of 
fie Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) has played 
(decisive role, as can be seen from the table below. 

POSTWAR SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 
(Millions of rubles, in prices at the time) 



1950 



1955 



I960 



1965 



fatal 


a 
b 
c 


2,925 
1,615 
1,310 


5,333 
3,033 
2,755 


10,071 
5,005 
3,5*1 


14,593 
7,350 
5,049 


'ith all socialist 
countries 


a 
b 
c 


2,373 

1,270 
1,023 


4,662 
2,453 
2,209 


7,371 
3,790 

3,5*1 


10,043 
4,999 
5,049 


ith CMEA 
countries 


a 
b 
c 


1,753 
93S 
315 


3,267 
1,722 
1,545 


5,469 
2,331 
2,533 


3,471 
4,210 
4,261 


ith developing 
countries 


a* 

b 

c 


112 
29 
S3 


272 
123 

144 


733 
302 
431 


1,743 

1,009 ! 
734 

1 


ith developed 

(capitalist) 

countries 


a 
b 
c 


440 
236 
204 


904 
502 
402 


1,917 

913 

1,004 


2,306 

1,341 i 
1,465 


Source - Voprosv I 


a - Turnover 
b - Export 
c - Import 

storii No. 3, 1967. 




i 



/ 



G59 



,-T, ,,„„ 



SOVIET TRADE WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 

(In millions of rubles) 



1946 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970 



Ttal 


491 


440 


904 


1,917 • 


2,306- 


4,700 


Bitain 


36 


12S 


216 


271 


399 


641 


Fnland 


62 


55 


211 


264 


408 


531 


list Germany 








43 


286 


243 


544 


F'ance 


35 


6 


86 


183 


202 


413 


ialy 


0.5 


34 


30 


173 


225 


• 472 


iieden 


14 


31 


41 


90 


93 


235 


'dtzerland 


0.7 


10 


11 


13 


28 


61* 


astria 


1 


23 


44 


116 


102 


155 


blgium 


6 


28 


35 


46 


74 


149* 


blland 


1 


■ 5 


60 


63 


35 


154* 


apan 





4 


4 


124 


326 


652 


ana da 


6 


0.3 


4. 


•14 


240 


131- 


5A 


3C4 


53 


22 


76' 


25 


m S- 



- 1968 figures 

ource - International Affairs #12 , 1969; New Times #14 , April 1971; 
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta #24 , June, 1971. 



/ 



6G0 



After the Communist victory in China, Soviet trade with 
that country grew steadily, reaching its peak in 1959, when 
total turnover was 1,850 million rubles. However,; the decline 
since 1959 was considerably faster than the growth during the 
previous period. Between I960 and 1965 the volume of Soviet- 
Chinese trade dropped to nearly one-fifth and in 1965 it 
amounted to only 376 million rubles. In 1969 the trade 
between two Communist giants reached its lowest point (around 
50 million rubles). At the' end of 1970 a trade agreement 
between the Soviet Union and China was signed resulting •• in the 
cv:*u-v,^vU- i;;oro;U^vi cvu^;"C ©Jf Cr^oc Cci" Che- I?©1I©W&K3$ ye&r« 

Soviet deliveries of industrial raw materials played an 
important role in trade with the CMEA countries. Between 1955 
and I965 the USSR delivered 16$ million tons of iron ore, 
5.5 million tons of manganese ore and more than 25 million 
tons of coke to the CMEA countries. Trade between them has 
been conducted on the basis of long-term agreements. 'During 
the decade of the 1960 T s East Germany replaced China as the 
Soviet's biggest foreign trade partner. 

Khrushchev's decision to intensify the development of 
the Soviet chemical industry at the end of the 1950 r s contributed 
to a considerable increase in the Soviet foreign trade with 
the developed countries. But the availability of credit 
remained to be a major obstacle. The method of bilateral 
trade and clearing accounts applied for the first 'time after 



%Fonomicheskaya Gazeta No. 24 , June- 1971, and izvestiya, 
26 August 1971. 



SGI 



- 






he war in trade between the Soviet Union and Western countries 
ks replaced during the 19oO T s by accounts in freely convertible 
urrency. Under these conditions, the problem of balancing 
xports and imports became less acute. ' 

However, it has always been general Soviet foreign trade 
olicy to strive to balance its receipts and expenditures for 
ny given individual country. Soviet imports from the 
ndustrially developed 'countries consist mainly of machinery^ 
nd equipment and sophisticated manufacturers. The major 
oviet problem in trading with industrially developed countries ' 

s the structure of Soviet exports, which has been mainly 

5 
epresented by raw materials. . 

The structure of Soviet exports and imports has also 
een changing in the post World War II period . The share 
if plant and equipment in export has been growing and as 
:arly as 1965 amounted to 1,472 million rubles. Oil and 
)il products had been the next largest item in the Soviet 
ixports. During the period of 1955-1965 more than 36O 
lillion tons of oil and oil products valued at 6,300 million 
^ubles were exported.' The third biggest Soviet commodity 
^roup, accounted for over 10$ of the total export, was iron 
ind steel. 

On the whole, the turnover of Soviet foreign trade during 
:he period of the Seven Year Plan (195^-1965) had been 
Increasing faster than planned. According to the plan, Soviet 
foreign trade in 1965 was to exceed the 195^ level by 50$ but 

^Tr.t.nr-nfU-.innal Affairs No. 12, 1969, PP. 29-33. 



i GG2 



tie actual increase during the period was 1.9 tir.es. 

The 23rd Party Congress Directives for the 1966-1970 
I.ve Year Plan demanded a further increase in the Soviet 
i>reign trade with the improvement of the structure of 
<>viet exports to be achieved mainly by stepping-up the export 
if machines, equipment, instruments, transport, and commun- 
ication facilities and other finished goods of the processing 
jidustry. 

As can be seen from the table, Soviet Foreign Trade, 
:?65-1970, the volume of Soviet foreign trade during the 
jjriod 1966-1970 exceeded 91,000 million rubles compared 
iLth 64,000 million rubles in I96I-I965. The average annual 
:icrease of Soviet foreign trade during that period, 8.8%, 
Kceeded the rate of growth of national income, 7.1%. 

The Soviet Union is trading with over a hundred countries. 
at, nearly two-thirds of the trade turnover in 1966-1970 
50, 600 million rubles) was with the Socialist countries 
CMEA countries amounted to 51,600 million rubles). Nearly 
alf of the machinery and equipment exported by the CMEA 



ountries were bought by the Soviet Union including 85% of 

7 
he shipping tonnage and marine equipment. 

While the volume of trade with the developed countries 

uring the five years increased from 2,800 million rubles in 

965 to 4,700 million rubles in 1970, their share in the total 

olume of Soviet foreign trade decreased somewhat toward the 

nd of the period from 21.9% in 1969 to 21.3% in 1970. 






Kconomichoakaya Gazeta #24 , June 1971. 
7 Mgw Times #50, December 16, 1970. 



6 h 



"tr 



SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE, I965-I97O 

(OOO million rubles, in prices at the time)"' 

1 

1965 196 6 1967 196^ 1969 1970 

H.6 15.1 16.4 ia.0 19. £ 22.1 



r )tal turnover 



With Socialist 10.0 10.0 "ll.l 12. 1 12.9 ill 



countries 



Uh CMEA d.5 d.4 9.3 10.3 11.2 12.3" 

:ountries 



ith developing 
countries 


i.s 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.0 


ILth developed 
[capitalist ) 
countries 


2. a 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.7 


Source - New 
£4, June 1971. 


Times #50, 1970, and Economicheskaya Gazeta 



664 



Trade with Japan during five years, 1966-1970, amounted 
to 2,600 million rubles. In 1970, it stood at 653 million 
rubles, placing Japan first among Soviet trading partners of 
the developed countries (Great Britain, with 641 million' 
rubles, was second). Nearly 96% of Soviet exports to Japan 
were raw materials and less than 1%, engineering products. 
Soviet imports from Japan, in contrast, were mostly manufactured 
goods. The new trade agreement signed at the end of September 
1971 envisages a total turnover of 4,750 million rubles over 
the five years 1971-1975. The 1975 annual target is set at 
1,000 million rubles. Joint development of the Port of 
Wr angel, with its facilities designed to handle 10 million 

-->„- .,_-» ~~ c ~ inn ~ " ~ «« - -"• r,Trmrt o>1r -" r - a-rA 1 Ld fWl r*nni'£ J f ■*&■*& 

annually and Soviet approval for the transshipment of 
containerized cargo across Siberia between Japan and Europe, 
should further increase the volume of Soviet-Japanese foreign 
trade. The general agreement concerning the development of 
the Port of Wrangel Bay was signed in December 1970 with the 

IV Kabushiki Kaisha firm acting on behalf of fourteen 

9- 

cooperating Japanese companies. 

Trade with the developing countries during 1966-1970 
amounted to over 11,000 million rubles - 4,000 million more 
ihan in I96I-I965, - representing 13.5% of the total Soviet 
foreign trade. In 1970 total turnover with Egypt was 606 million 
rubles, with India, 365 million rubles, Iran, 231 million 



" New Times ^42 , 1971, pp. 20-21. 
9 Ibid . , p. 21. 

! 8S5 



•ubles, Algeria, 113 million rubles. 

In 1970 Soviet exports amounted to 11. 5 billion rubles, 
'he task set by the 23rd Party Congress for a considerable 
.ncrease in export of machinery and equipment can hardly 'be 
:alled fulfilled, increasing from 20% in 1965 to 21.5% in 1970. 

In 1970 imports amounted to 10.6 billion rubles, of 
hich more than one-third was spent on machines and equipment. 
h 1970 more than 600 million rubles were spent for ships 
nd ship equipment and 297 million rubles, for auto transport. 

According to directives of the 24th Party Congress, foreign 
rade during the period of 1971-1975 is supposed to increase 
y 33-35% with the main role, as always, assigned to the 
ocialist countries. In 1975 > annual foreign trade turnover * 
s supposed to reach approximately 30 billion rubles. Total 
rade turnover with the CMEA countries for 1971-1975 period 
s planned at over 76 billion rubles, an increase of more 
han half compared with 1966-1970. An unspecified increase in 
olume of trade and greater scientific and technical 
ooperation with the developing countries was also promised, 
number of long-term' agreements signed with France, Britain, 
inland, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and other developed countries 
hould certainly produce a considerable increase in trade. 
he availability of long-term and rather large credits from 
he developed capitalist countries, particularly for a truck 
uilt plant, large diameter oil pipes, and the development 



±0 



Economicheskaya Gazeta No. 24 , June 1971. 






/ 
/ 



6GB 



of Siberia might help to generate a considerable increase in 
the Soviet trade. 

For years, the Soviet Union has been active in oil 
exports, the majority of which have been seaborne. 
Oil exports have brought a considerable amount of hard 
currency and have also generated the demand for a rather 
sizeable tanker fleet. In the period between the two world 
wars, the USSR exported 50 million tons of oil and oil products 
After the war the export of oil was resumed in 1955.^2 a 
considerable portion (approximately l/3 ) of the Soviet oil 
export goes to the Socialist countries, particularly to the 
CMEA members. The remaining two-thirds are sold to West 
European countries and Japan. Starting in I960 the Soviet 
Union began delivery of oil to Cuba (approximately 4 million 
tons per year). Soviet oil to Poland and East Germany, with 
the further possibility of delivering it to some West 
European countries, is pumped through the Druzhba (Friendship) 
pipeline. In 1966 the Soviet export of oil amounted to 
73 million tons, of which 41 million tons were sold to the 
developed countries. ^ The Soviet Union presently operates 
a few oil corporations, which might be called international, 
NAFTA-A in Finland and NAFTA-B in Belgium. In Belgium the 
Soviets hold 60% of the company's stock with an investment 



; ll Economicheskaya Gazeta #24 , June 1971, and New Times 
£14, April 1971. 



12 Econornicheskaya Gazeta No. 39 , 1967 . 
13 Ibid. 



867 



f 750 million Belgian francs. A Soviet Company, NAFTA 
united, exists in Great Britain. 

The Soviet Union has 1S,600 miles of oil pipelines, 
^presenting 13% of the world T s total. New pipelines from 
estern Siberia oil fields are planned. In addition to the 
astern line, the 3, 700-mile eastern line would bring 
iberian oil to Nakhodka, which is about 400 miles from 
a pan. It was reported that the Soviet negotiators tried 
1) persuade Japan to participate in the construction of 
iiese pipelines, arguing that the 1.9 billion dollars needed 

1) built the line would be a small price to pay for reduced 

15 ' — 

ependence on Middle East oil. y 

The plan for stepped-up cooperation with the Soviet Union 
:i exploiting Soviet natural gas and oil resources was 
anounced in Tokyo. The agreement, reached on September 7, 
$71, reflected the decision of Japanese business to go 
ciead with two projects to explore oil deposits in Tyumen', 
Astern Siberia, and to secure stable natural gas supplies 
i>r Japan through a pipeline from north Sakhalin and Yakutsk, 
hstern Siberia. | 

Construction of a refinery at Nakhodka oil base had 

17 

£.ready handled 4 million tons of oil. It is planned to 

" 1Z| - Vodnyy Transport , July 17, 1971- 
■^ Washington Post , February 28, 1971- 
16 Washing,ton Post , September 9, 1971. 
17 Vyshka , June IS, 1971, p. 2. 



! 

68b 



.ncrease the base capacity by 150$. Large off-shore gas 
ind oil deposits were discovered in the Sakhalin area. 

During the previous five-year period an important oil 
ixport base was established in Ventspills on the Baltic Sea 
rith a capacity to export 6 million tons a year. It is 
>lanned to double this capacity during the current Five Year 
Ian. The Soviet oil output for 1975 is planned to be 500 
tillion tons, so it would be logical to expect an increase 
n Soviet oil exports. 

At the end of 19&3 the Soviet Union entered negotiations 

ith a number of foreign ship owners for the delivery, of 

1& 
oviet built ships. The Soviet Union had delivered ships 

some foreign, mainly Communist, countries, previously, 

ut their number was small. Since. the, rrJ.dd.le 19&Q T s, the 

hip export has been growing steadily. During the last 

our years, Sudoimport sold to a number' of countries, including 

est Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, 26 dry cargo ships, 

wo tankers (one fifty thousand tonner), eight production and 

ransport refrigerators. A hundred or more Kometa passenger 

ydrofoils have been exported since 1967 to Yugoslavia, 

est Germany, Finland, and since spring 1970, to the Western 

emisphere, when International Hydrolines Incorporated of 

ew York, bought the first vessel and started hydrofoil 

ervice in the Virgin Islands. The company expressed 

19 
eadiness to buy eight more of the vessels. A number of 

^ The New York Times , February 17, 19&4- 

•^ Washington Post , April 4, 1970. 

/ 



/• 



t 



QQQ 






Regoletto-class ships have been built for Sweden in an 
apparent barter deal. 

The Soviet drive to accelerate the export of technological 
products can be illustrated by her recently expressed readi- 
ness to sell enriched uranium and atomic reactors to anybody 
in the West who will pay for them. Moreover, the quoted 
price ($27.00) was almost $5.00 less than the U.S. unit 
price for enriched uranium. The Soviet Union has also 
been conducting a vigorous compaign for the sale of Soviet 
made commerical jets. In September 1971 it was reported 
that Moscow made an attractive offer to that end to Chile. 20 

Economic Aid 

Since 1954, the Soviet Union has extended an estimated N 
7.2 billion dollars in economic aid. to over LQ developing 
countries. The ten top recipients in the 1954-1970 period 
are India, (1.6 billion), Egypt (1.1 billion), Afghanistan 
(700 million), Iran (560 million), Turkey(370 million), 

Indonesia (370 million) , Iraq (320 million) , Pakistan 

21 
(265 million), Syria (235 million), and Algeria (230 million). 

Providing an alternative to Western aid, Soviet economic 

aid probably helped to create a climate for neutralizing 

Western "influence, and thus provides Moscow with a sort of 

leverage in international affairs. In general terms, the 

20 Washington Post , September 11, 1971. 
21 Washin,g-ton Post , May 30, 1971. 



[ 67 U 

1 



program was neither a roaring success nor a dismal failure, 
and successes seemed to outnumber the- failures. 

With time, the Soviet Union has become more sophisticated 
in the distribution of its economic aid, and during certain 
periods, much tighter with her purse, developing a more 
business-like approach to the program. Such changes occurred 
during the middle of the 1960 f s when extensive surveys prior 
to making nev; aid commitment were conducted and a considerable 
portion of commercial credits were distributed with the 
design to promote exports of Soviet machinery and equipment. 
Moreover, in 1967 there was a decline in the economic aid 
commitment to the developing countries. The decline probably 
did not constitute any fundamental change in the Soviet 
attitude toward foreign aid and should probably be attributed 
to the large backlog of unexpended credits which were still 
available from the allocations of the two previous years. 

During the last two years of the 1960's and in 1970, 
the economic aid figures have been growing. In the spring of 
1971 during the 14th Annual Meeting of the UN Economic 

Commission for Latin America, the Soviet Union offered 

22 ! 

technical and other aid to Latin America. As reported by, 

the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations under the 

/ - 
Soviet Council of Ministers at the beginning of 1971, the 

Soviet Union had economic and technical cooperation agreements 

23 

with IS Asian, 20 African, and 2 Latin American countries. 



-22 



Washington Post, May 30, 1971. 



23 New Times, No, 3 , 1971, pp. 13-20. / 



671 



- — 



The distribution of Soviet aid among the basic branches of 
the economy of the developing countries is as follows: 



j 







Industry and. power 63.7$ 

Agriculture 6.2$ 

Transport and communications 10.0$ 

Geological prospecting 10. 

Education, culture, public 

health, and sports 4.2$ 

Housing construction and 

municipal services 0.4$ 

Other branches 0.5% ' 

Total 100.0$ 

Source - New Times 7 7 /3 , 1971. 
In total the Soviet Union has helped with the construc- 
tion of more than 700 industrial enterprises and other projects, 
of which some 340 have already been put into operation. The 
openly proclaimed goal of the Soviet aid is to help to 
• create and extend the state sector of the recipient country's 
economy, particularly heavy industry enterprises, for which 
more than half of the total aid is going. In most cases 
the Soviet credits are of long duration and at relatively low 



interest rates (2.5 - 3$ annually) applied only on credits 
actually used. 

In many cases the credits are repaid in the developing 
country's traditional exports and, in some cases, in 
national currencies, for which the Soviet Union is buying some 
raw material and consumer goods. A statement by V. Sergeyev, 
Vice-Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Relations, emphasized that "Soviet economic and technical 

2 ^-Iew Times No. 3, 1971, p. 19. 



87 2 



aid to the developing countries benefits both sides and in 

25 

no sense is a matter of charity". 

The exported Soviet machinery and equipment has few buyers 

in the industrial countries, but are in demand in the * 

developing countries. In addition, many developing countries 

found that the Soviet Union represents a market for their 

agricultural, raw materials and foodstuffs. Thus, the Soviet 

economic aid to the developing countries and trade with 

- 
them has a rather sound economic basis and very likely 

will not only continue, but grow. 

Soviet Military A id 

■ --■■— ■■ , 

While economic aid represents a phenomenon originating 
mainly in the post-Stalin era (Afghanistan, in 1954, was the 
first country to receive aid), Soviet military aid to 
"promising" movements goes back to the early years of Soviet 
power. During the 1920 T s the movements led by Kemal 
.Uttarturk of Turkey and Chiang Kai-shek of China received 
Soviet military aid. During the second half of the 1930 r s, 
a considerable amount of ammunition, arms, and advisors were 
sent to the Kuomintang in China and the Spanish Republicans. 
If ter World War II, the goal of undermining Western countries' 
position led to the supply of arms to Israel. Later, however, 
;he rigidity of the doctrine pronounced by Zhdanov in the 
'ominform session, the weak economic situation of the USSR, 
"-he beginning of the Cold War and the opposition of the 
Tnited States and its allies clearly expressed in the Truman 



2 ^:ew Times No. 3 /1971. P- 20. 

/ 



Q 



73 



Doctrine, forced the Soviet Union to refrain fro-, active arms 
support in late forties and early fifties (excluding, of course, 
Korea type situation). 

In the mid-1950' s, however, the situation had changed, 
and rather drastically: Stalin was dead, the military sector 
of the Soviet economy improved considerably. 

Tn the spring of 1955 Mikoyan visited Yugoslavia. 
Obviously designed to prepare the ground for Khrushchev's 
meeting with Tito, tfhe visit produced an unusual classified 
letter from the CPSU Central Committee. The letter reported 
the results of Mikoyan 's meetings with Tito, emphasizing 
Tito's advice concerning the number of non-allied nations 
and their leaders. In particular, Nasser was mentioned as 
a strong anti-imperialist quite in need of support. Events 
followed one another with remarkable speed. Shepilov, who 
was considered as the best Soviet export in the Middle East, 
made a trip to Cairo and was soon appointed Soviet Foreign 
Minister. A number of military aid assistance agreements 
were signed, thus initiating what has become an essential 
instrument of Soviet foreign policy towards the underdeveloped 

world . 

/ 
/ 

Initially, the Soviet Union preferred to remain in the 
background, using Czechoslovakia and Poland as inter- 
mediaries. Czechoslovakia signed an initial arms agreement 



2 ^Many leaders of neutralist countries used to be viewed 
at that time by the Soviet propaganda as counter-revolutionary, 
at best, or "imperialist puppets". 

! / 



a 



74 



with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. 27 

Toward the end of the 1950 <s such ill devised camouflage 
was dropped, and the Soviet Union began supplying arms to 
various countries, and primarily the Arab World, openly. 'The 
first Soviet naval ships arrived in Egypt just prior to the 
Suez Crisis of November 195*. Starting in 195* an arms deal 
with Indonesia was closed, and the first groups, of Indonesian 
naval officers and crews started to be trained by the Soviet- 
Navy in Poland. During the next five years, one Sverdlov- 
class cruiser (Ordzhonikidze) , seven Skory-class destroyers, 
12 W-class submarines, 7 Riga-class destroyer escorts, about 
two dozen torpedo boats, a number of minesweepers, Komar-class 
missile boats, and auxiliary ships were transferred to the - 
Indonesian Navy. Neither were the majority of transferred 
ships suitable for the environment and operational requirements 
nor was the Indonesian Navy ready or capable of operating- 
them properly. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Indonesian 
needed such a collection of naval armament. The Soviet Navy 
at least was honest in the deal involving the cruiser, trying 
to persuade the Indonesians that they did not need it. As 
for "the rest of the ships transferred, the majority of them were 
obsolescent and the Soviet Navy was glad to get rid of them, 



^'instead of "military aid", a more accurate term would 
be military Loans" for almost all Soviet agreements involved 
long-term, low-interest loans. For a detailed analysis of 
Soviet supplies of arms, see: Arms for the Third ■.•. r o^'ld : 
Soviet Mi litary Aid Diplomacy by IVynfred Joshua and Stephen 
P. Givert; Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, I969. 



675 



lot a difficult task in the case of such an eager "buyer" as 
Sukarno vras. 

In 1961 the Soviet Union began to supply arms, to Cuba. 
Irms shipments were especially substantial during the second 
lalf of 1961 and 1962, up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, after 
rtiich it was continued on the basis of maintaining a certain 
legree of combat capability of the Cuban armed forces. During 
;he I960' s, arms were also supplied to a number of African 
iations. 

The first agreement for the delivery of Soviet arms to 

India was reached in I960, but the agreement on naval ships 

2$ 
[as not signed until 1965-. Apparently, India was reluctant 

,0 be dependent upon Soviet arms supply and for a while tried 

.o reach an agreement with Western countries, particularly 

iritain. The Soviet Union had long before expressed her 

•eadiness to cooperate. In February 1957 a Soviet military 

lission headed by Marshall Zhukov visited India and toured 

-he Indian defense establishments. During July of the same 

-ear, a return visit was made by a group of high ranking 

Indian military officers, headed by General Timaya, then 

Ihief of the Indian General Staff. The group was not only ! 
/ ; 

■ery well received "as personal guests of Marshall Zhukov" 

in July 1957 this had significance), but it was also given* 

. good look at the Soviet ships and naval establishments. 

.nother high ranking Indian delegation visited the- Soviet Union 

nd was given a good opportunity to see the Soviet's Navy in 

he middle of the 1960 r s. Apparently, the second delegation 

.; ._ : ■ ! / 

2 "Arms For The Third World, p. 87. / 



67 6 



was decisive, and a plan to acquire a number of submarines and 
ships was worked out. The Soviet Union not only delivered 
four large attack F-class submarines and a number ,of small 
surface ships, including some missile boats, but off ered ; to 
help India build its own submarines and other ships. 2 ^ ~"^ 
Presently, it looks as if India's dependence upon Soviet 
armaments, which might lead to a dependence upon tactics, is 
growing. 

The supply of Soviet arms to North Vietnam, very substantial 
in volume, though restricted in nature, is common knowledge. 
Dther countries of the Indochina Peninsula, Laos and Cambodia, 
tfere also given Soviet military aid. In the case of Laos," 
a I960 emergency request from the regime of Souvanna Phouma v 
tfas met by an arms airlift. 

Toward the end of the 1960 T s the list of Soviet military 

31 
aid recipients included 25 countries. While, in general, 

the arms were supplied to neutralist, former colonial, countries 

nost of which were openly anti-western, there were some 

exceptions (such as the case with Iran and Pakistan). As 

Soviet military aid programs progressed, they were justified 

32 

on the basis of aid to movements of national liberation. 



00 

' International Defense Review , Vol. IV, No. 1, February 1971, 

p. 21. 

30 

., Arms for- the Third World , p. 56. 

31 Ibid. , p. 34. 

32 Lt. Col. G. Eskov and Col. Priiepskii, "World Socialist 
System: A Decisive Contemporary Factor," K ommur.i s t Vo r uz h e nn ykh 
Sil, No. 22, November 1964, ?V- 34-41. 



877 



■ 



Neither the infrequent failure to produce reliable 
friends fas was the case with Ghana, the Congo, and recently 
Sudan), nor poor prospects of repayment, nor the cpsts of the 
programs prevent the Soviet Union from continuing military aid, 
particularly to certain key countries in given areas. Geograph- 
ically, the; scope of the Soviet military aid has also been 
widening. The competition with China for the influence in 
the Third World has definitely been a factor, and, materially, 
the Soviet capacity compared, with the Chinese is considerably 
greater. As for the quality of the armament supply, in ..general, 
it was adequate for the needs of the recipient countries. 
In a number of occasions in the past, certain key recipient, 
countries (particularly Indonesia and Egypt) were supplied 
tfith the better armaments than the majority of the Warsaw Pact 
nembers. Egypt, which to a certain degree represents a special 
:ase, prior to the June 1967 war possessed and at present 
still possesses many weapon systems still in use by the Soviet 
irmed forces. The increased sophistication of the armaments 
supplied through the military aid programs was to be expected 
since technological advances resulted in more rapid changes 
in Soviet weapon systems and hence, the ready availability of 

•"eplaced systems for the military aid programs. But the 

- 

technological progress of developed countries produced even 
1 greater gap between them and the developing countries. Such 
i gap and the sophistication of the weaponry received in turn 
;enerate a greater dependence on the part of the recipient 
;ountries upon the arms suppliers. 



678 



Military assistance has become an essential instrument 
of Soviet foreign policy toward many developing countries, 
and will definitely continue in the foreseeable future. The 
obviously unchanging goal of the Soviet Union of undermining 
Western positions might even intensify the military aid program. 
Conclusions 

During the very first years of Soviet power, the state 
monopoly on foreign trade was established. Since then it ' 
has been viewed as one of the "commanding heights" of the 
economy and closely' guarded. After the so called economic 
reform of 1965, the number and specialization of foreign 
trade associations were increased and some of them were 
transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to other 
organizations (including some in the merchant marine). 
However, no further steps to give producing industries direct 
access to foreign markets were permitted. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union has exercised a close watch over the situation 
concerning the state monopoly on foreign trade in other 
Socialist countries, openly admitting that "if the foreign 
trade monopoly were lifted even in one Socialist country, ' 

The very strictest maintenance of the foreign trade monopoly 
has been viewed as the necessity to achieve the close inter- 
weaving of the foreign political and foreign economic tasks 
of the Soviet government, admitting that "in developing its 
foreign economic relations, the USSR cannot fail to take into 



33 " Foreign Trade ", The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
July 196?, p. 6. 

/ 
/ 

679 



account the position which one country or another occupies 
in relation to our country and to states allied with us." 

Soviet foreign trade, particularly since the .end of 
1950 T s, has been growing steadily and rather rapidly. The bulk 
of it has been with CMEA countries. Trade with developed 
Western countries and Japan, especially during the last five 
or six years has been considerably increased too. While the 
main export items to the developed countries continued to be 
raw materials, particularly oil, natural gas, timber, and 
other minerals, imports from them come mainly under the., 
heading of machinery, plant, and equipment or, in general, 
advanced technology. The recent Soviet trade agreements with 
Italy, Austria, Japan, and other countries indicated that 
such a trend will continue, at least for a while. Since the 
middle 1960 f s, the task to increase the export of machinery 
was set, and while its total volume increased (mainly thanks 
to exports, to the developing countries), it's share in Soviet 
foreign trade did not. But foreign trade inevitably helps 
to improve the efficiency of domestic production which in 
turn further stimulates the trade itself. A number of Soviet 
owned banks were established in many European countries, the 
most important being the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd. in London. 

Since the middle 1950 T s, the Soviet Union has been 
involved .in economic and military aid to the developing countries 
As a rule, the recipients of the Soviet military and economic 
■aid are also trade partners, representing about 14$ (3 billion 



"^ Izvestiya , April 21,' 19&3. 

G80 



rubles in 1970) of total Soviet trade turnover. As the Soviets 
themselves acknowledge "the significance of the Soviet Union's 
ties with Asian, African, and Latin American countries is 
measured not only by figures. These ties promote the break-up 
of obsolete forms, the development of society's new productive 
forces and the early winning of economic independence. Today, 
although the positions of the West in foreign trade and 
economic ties with the Third World are still strong, the 
external economic policy of the Soviet Union and other Socialist 
states has deprived imperialism of its monopolistic position 
in trade, the provision of technical assistance and technical 

know-how and also in. the purchase of export goods from the 

35 
developing states." A portion of the Soviet economic aid ^ 

has been devoted to the development of maritime industries 

of the recipient countries, particularly ports, thus, 

benefitting not only the Soviet Merchant Marine but in a 

number of cases the Soviet Navy as well. The growth of 

the Soviet foreign trade and the Soviet Union's involvement 

in economic and military aid have definitely influenced the 

development of the merchant marine. 



^Inter national" Affairs ,- January 19&9, p. 14. 

681 



APPENDIX III 

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MARITIME LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 

The growth of the Soviet maritime power has been naturally 
accompanied by wider Soviet participation in various inter- 
national maritime organizations, and intensified development 

of various aspects of the Soviet Maritime Law (in general, 
relevant aspects of international law as well). The Soviet 
system of normative acts governing internal and territorial , 
waters, jurisdiction over foreign vessels, concept of 
innocent passage, various treaties and statutes, etc., has 
been considerably widened. ¥. E. Butler, in his survey of 
Soviet maritime legislation and practice had found that 
"there have been and are significant even creative differences 
of opinion among Soviet lawyers with respect to international 
legal questions which' can have an impact on Soviet state 
practice, Soviet positions in maritime disputes with other 
states, and the Soviet approach to study of international law 
in general". 

While restraining from any attempt to undertake analysis 
of the jurisprudential foundations of Soviet Maritime Law, 



Willieam E. Butler, The L aw of Soviet Territorial Waters ; 
A Case Study of Maritime Legislation and Practice, New York, 
Frederick Praeger, 19'o7> p. 192. 

t 

/ 

I p.?,? 



- 



it is desirable to outline the major Soviet normative acts 
and State Practices, for they definitely constitute an 
inseparable part of the development of Soviet maritime power. 
Similarly, the oceans are being taken more and more into'' 
the sphere of politics and the legal norms of states quite 
often are, or even in more cases might be, sources of 
international problems. 

In general, both principal sources of international lav/, 
the customary international law, (the practices of states, 
precedents) and conventional international law (formal > 
agreements, treaties) are widely practiced by the Soviet Union.. 
The Soviet Union is a member of various international maritime 
organizations. Since 195&, it has been a member of the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). 
At the beginning of 1971 > some Soviet ports were accepted 
into the International Association of Ports and Harbors. 2 
A number of socialist countries and their ship lines organized, 
in June 1970, the International Association of Shippers - INSA. 
At the end of 1963 , the Soviet Association of Maritime Lav/ 
was founded with the task "of protecting Soviet merchant 

marine interests". In May 1969, the Soviet Union was made 

3 

the 31st member of the International Maritime Committee. 

An important source of the Soviet Maritime Law is the 
Soviet Merchant Shipping Code (KTM - Kodeks Torgovogo 
Moreplavaniya) which was prepared by TsNIIMF (Central Scientific 

^ Vodr.yy Transport , 20 February 1971. 
3 Morskoy Flot No. 2 , 1971. 

oo3 



Research Institute of Merchant Marine) and approved by the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1963.^ The 
code contains norms applicable to the right of sailing under 
the Soviet flag, the right of ownership of sea-going vessels, 
the registration of vessels in the Register of Shipping, the 
crew composition of sea-going vessels, etc. The Code also 
contains provision relating to contracts of carriage by sea, 
general and particular average, compensation for damages 
resulting from collision, rewards for rendering assistance 
at sea (including salvage), and maritime insurance. The, 
provisions contained in the Code are amplified by subordinate 
legislation: ordinances of the Counsel of Ministers of the 
USSR, orders of the Ministers of Merchant Marine and Fishing. 
Industry, tariff regulations, etc. 

According to the Code, the Ministry of Merchant Marine 
is obligated to control adherence to laws on mercantile 
navigation- and to agreements signed by the Soviet Union. 
The USSR Registry of Shipping, also administered by the USSR 
Ministry of Merchant Marine, executes independent (irrespective 
of the ownership of ships by various ministries and departments) 
technical control over sea-going ships and their preparation 
and construction. The Registry is also responsible for the 

classification of ships and for issuing ship documents as 

5 
provided by international agreements and conventions. 

■ ^TsNIIMF Transactions , 1970, Vol. 133, p. 2. 

^A. A. ■Vnikov. - Morskoe Pravo (Maritime Lav;), PischProm, 
Moscow, 1969, pp. 14-16. 



DO 4 



It has been a standard Soviet claim, that Soviet ship 
lines are judicial persons and are lawful owners of the Soviet 
merchant ships. Simultaneously Soviet merchant sh,ips are the 
property of the state and hence, have privileged immunity. 
Article 10 of the KTM recognizes the person who uses the 
vessel as ship owner irrespective of whether he is its actual 
:-j\-\cr or whether he r.akes use of it on ser.e other legal 
-round. Soviet legal publications assert that the immunity 
)f state property in general, and state owned vessels in 
^articular, results from the principle of the equality of 
sovereign states and hence, no compulsory measures against 
»tate property can be undertaken. Article 20 of the KTM 
>rovides that state vessels may not be arrested or sued without 
he consent of the Counsel of Ministers; Article 77 of the 
TM directs that the rules regulating detention of a vessel 

t the request of plaintiff do not apply to the vessels owned 

7 
y a foreign state. 

The Soviet Union is a party to various international 

onventions including older ones such as, The International 

onvention for the Protection of Submerged Telegraph Cables 

igned in Paris in 1881+, The Brussels Convention of 1910, 

he Lisbon Agreement of 1930 (concerning maritime signals), 

he International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, and 



6 Ibid . , pp. 14-16. 

7 With the exceotion of cases specified in the Article 
<L of the Basic Provisions of Civil Procedure of the Soviet | 
hion and Union Republics. 






/ 



G85 



rhe International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 

signed in London in i960. The Geneva International Convention 
3f 195B dealing with, the territorial sea and the continuous 
sone, the high seas, and the continental shelf, were signed 
:y the Soviet Union and ratified by the Presidium of The 
Supreme Soviet. However, the provisions outlined in Article 
>0 of the Geneva Convention of 1953, on the territorial sea 
md the contingious zone, recognizing the right of coastal 
states to take proceedings against and to arrest foreign 
ships in the territorial waters was found inconsistent with 
ihe principles of international law by the Soviet Union and 
.s regarded as unlawful. While signing the convention, the 
Soviet representative stated that "the state vessels in 
'oreign territorial waters enjoy immunity and therefore, 
.pplication to them of measures mentioned in this article 

tay take place only with the consent of the state under 

9 
r hose flag, the vessel sails." 

Certain provisions of the Geneva Convention of 195& on 

Ishing and conservation of living resources of the high 

eas were found unacceptable by the Soviet Union and were 

ot signed. The Soviet Union is a member of various inter- 

ational commissions dealing with fisheries. A number of 

ishing regulations were recognized and officially approved 

y the Soviet Union. 

erritorial Waters 

The Soviet Union for a long time was the only major power 



u Volkov, p. 138. 

9 Ibid. , p. 34. •. 

bob 



jlaiming a 12 mile extension as the base line for its 
territorial sea. During the decades of the 1950' s and 1960 f s 
[particularly after the 195S Geneva Convention) there has 
>een a notable tendency to expand territorial waters. At' the 
leginning of the 1950 f s there were only three states claiming 
,2 mile limits, the USSR, Columbia, and Guatamela; toward the 
nd of the 1960 f s the number had increased to 41 (Columbia 
eanwhile reduced its claim to six miles), and more than 
states claimed more than a three mile limit. Many states, 

ncluding the U.S., while still maintaining three mile v 

10 

lmits, extended their authorities over fisheries to 

egions beyond their territorial waters up to a total depth" 
f 12 miles. 

The legal regime of the Soviet territorial waters is 
ainly constituted in The Statue on the Protection of the 
tate Frontier of the USSR, approved by the Supreme Soviet 
a December 22, i960. The statute provides that the territorial 
uters of the USSR are comprised of a 12 mile-wide belt 
£ coastal waters measured from the low water mark both 
;Long the mainland and around islands, or from the line 
onstituting the outer limit of the interior waters of the 
I3SR. The outer limit of the Soviet territorial waters is 
onsidered as the state sea frontier and the vertical extension 
C this line is the frontier of Soviet air space. Foreign 
vir ships require prior permission of the Soviet Government 



oa 



It may be assumed that for all practical purposes, the 
tiited States recognizes claims up to 12 miles as valid by 
tiling to challenge the claims. 



687 



for passage through the territorial waters and for entry to 
the interior waters of the USSR, and must observe special'' 
regulations published in the "Notifications to Mariners". 
Foreign submarines, permitted to visit the territorial ' 
and interior waters, must stay on the surface and not submerge. 
The right of innocent passage through the territorial waters 
of the USSR, which is defined as sailing through the terri- 
torial waters for the purpose of -traversing them without 
entering into interior waters, or for the purpose of leaving 
the interior waters and entering the v high seas, is given, 
exclusively to foreign vessels other than warships. The 
passage is considered innocent if the vessels follow the ~~ . 
usual navigational course or one recommended by the competent 
organs of the USSR, and if the vessels abide by the prescribed 
regulation and avoid regions closed to navigation (such 
regions' are usually announced in "Notifications to Mariners") .^ 

The Soviet Union has taken a negative stance on the 
tendency to extend territorial waters beyond the 12 mile 
limit, stating the practice "infringes on the principle 
of freedom at sea and*, constitutes a violation of international 
law", For example, the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires 
declared on January 25, 196?, that "the Soviet Union does 

not recognize as lawful the Argentine Government's recent 

■ 

decision to extend the territorial water limit to 200 nautical 

i 

i 

i 

11 A. Volkov, p. 6£. 

12 " ! 

"Territorial waters and international lav;", International 

Affa i rs No. 3 , 1969, pp. 7S-81. 

■ —————— / 



888 



miles. " 

The protection of the Soviet state frontier at cor, is 
conducted by the frontier forces of KGB (the State Committee 
for Security). Frontier servich ships are authorized to * 
pursue and detain offending vessels not only within territorial ' 
or interior waters, but also on the high seas until a 
pursued vessel enters foreign territorial waters and to 
use arms if the violation cannot be stopped. 1/f * 

The Soviet Union has widely exercised the concept of 
interior waters and" "historic" bays. 15 For example, the 
White Sea is considered as interior waters based on historic 
tradition. The Bay of Peter the Great has been called ~ 
historic bay and special permission of the Soviet authorities 
is required for foreign vessels to navigate there with the 
exception of calls at (and departure from) the port of 
Nakhodka. There were attempts to consider the Sea of 
Okhotsk as an internal sea. The official Soviet navy magazine 
stated that "in points of fact, many historical, economic, 
foreign policy, military, and legal arguments confirm the 
rightness of fixing the status of the Sea of Okhotsk as 
both a closed and an internal sea, coming under the international 
law concept of historic waters". But in spite of the claim that "the 



-kJ Izvestiya , February 7, 1967. 

14. 

A. Volkov, pp. 71-72., 

15 

According to the Geneva Convention, interior waters 
are those situated between the coast and the base line from 
which the extent of territorial waters is measured. 



889 



question of closing the Sea of Okhotsk to foreign military 
navigation and flights of aircraft is not a farfetched one" 
no official declaration has been made. 1 

Continental Shelf 

The 195S Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
specifies that the coastal state has sovereign rights over 
the Continental Shelf in order to explore and to exploit 
its natural resources. The term shelf was used to designate 
the sea bed situated beyond the territorial waters up to 
a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit up to a point 
where the depth of the water allows the exploitation of 
natural resources. But the growing technological development 
already left very few regions of the world ocean, and soon 
will probably leave none, where man cannot penetrate. The 
ability to mine and harvest the resources of both the 
Continental Shelf and the deep sea bed has created the 
possibility that large areas of oceans will be used by a 
few technologically developed nations for their own benefit, 

tothe detriment of the' less developed states which are in , 

.... 

the majority. The. existing ambiguity in the definition of 

/ I 

the Continental Shelf, in the part stressing the limit of 

expolitability, generated legitimate concern in a number of 

Western states, particularly among some American scholars 



1 f) 

Morskoy Sborr.ik Mo. 8, 1967, pp. 14-15. 



I 



/ 



6? f 



u 



and specialists in international law. 17 However, no similar 
concern was expressed in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
on February 6, 1963, in effect expanded the definition of 
the Continental Shelf given by the 1953 Convention, adding 
that "the sea bed and the sub-soil of depressions situated in 
the Continental Shelf of the USSR irrespective of their 
depths shall be part of the Continental Shelf of the USSR". 1 ^ 

The Counsel of Ministers of the USSR instructed the 
corresponding ministries and departments 'to work out the. 
necessary regulations and instructions for rational use and " 
protection of the natural wealth of the Soviet Continental" 
Shelf and to pay special attention to the Organization of 

Control over the observance of the law operating in the 

19 

USSR on these questions". It was further stated that 

"foreigners may exploit the natural wealth only on the basis 

of inter-governmental agreements or special permits issued 

by competent Soviet authorities." 

The Joint Declaration on the Baltic Continental Shelf 

" 
was signed in Moscow on October 23, 1963, by the Soviet Union, 

! 
i 

^ 



The problem was discussed in great detail during the 1 
International Symposium held in Stockholm, June 1965. See 
Towards a Better Use of the Ocean , Contemporary Legal Problems 
in Ocean Development by Professor W. T. Burke; Comments and" 
Recommendations by an International Peace Research Institute. 

13 

Moscow T ASS International Service in English 1L17 GMT, 

14 December 19oo, ana William E", Butler, " Edict on Continental 
Shelf , Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 6 February 1968; 
"'' American Journal of International Lav; ", January 1969, p. 104. 

19 Ibid . 


ssi 



Poland, and East Germany. It was declared that the Baltic 
Continental Shelf must be used for peaceful purposes only 
and that the signatories will consult with one another on 
matters of mutual interest relating to the shelf, and the 
particulars of the bar on its military use. 20 

The declaration does not establish the actual boundaries 
of the Continental Shelf appertaining to different Baltic 
States, leaving determination to the provisions of the 
195$ Geneva Convention. Further, the participants agreed 
not to give over parcels of the Baltic Continental Shelf to 
non-Baltic States or to citizens or firms of those states 
for the purpose of exploration, exploitation, etc. 

Apparently, the attempts to persuade certain Baltic 
states to join the declaration were made. During the summer 

of 1969 visit of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme to Moscow, 

21 
the declaration on the Baltic Continental Shelf was discussed. 

But, as was later stated in Stockholm, "the difficulty in 

carrying out this work lies in the fact that Sweden and 

other Nordic countries have no diplomatic relations with 

the GDR. A solution heeds to be found to make it possible 

22 

to conclude an agreement with Sweden on an official basis." 

The USSR possesses about 20% of the world Continental Shelf 
and for this reason alone, any legal steps initiated by the 
Soviet Government are important. 

^.'ew 'Jimes No. 47 , 1963, pp. 6-7. 

^ international Affairs , February 1971, pp. 11-17- 

22 • 

Ibid. 



P9 



Cooperation, Treaties, Agreements 

Fishing in certain regions of the world ocean has been 
carried on with excessive intensity and too often without 
regard to the state of fish stocks. The expected result 
was the sharp decrease in the catches in certain areas. The 
increase in fishing efforts is by itself a major factor in 
fishery jurisdictional problems. Fishery development and 
conservation, mainly thanks to the United Nation efforts 
supported by the major states, have been strengthened consid- 
erably during the decade of the 1960 T s. The Soviet Union, 
it seems, supports the effort. In May of 1965, a joint 
American-Soviet inspection team, the first joing inspection 
by the two nations, spent thirteen days cruising, the Georges 
Bank fishing grounds in the Northwest: A.t lan-tic^- The joint 
inspection was result of plans made to exchange law 
enforcement officers at the 1964 meeting of the International 
Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. It was reported 
that the Soviets offered American fishermen free emergency 
medical care aboard their ships and also suggested "that 
disputes between American and Soviet fishermen could be 
solved on the spot". 

The Permanent International Counsel for the Exploration 
of the Sea is the oldest international organization concerned 
with fishing and fishery research. Established on 22 July 1902, 
at a conference held in Copenhagen and attended by represen- 



"33 The New York Times, May 30, 1965 



2/f Ibid. 



8S3 



tatives of Russia, the counsel presently enforces over 60 
international agreements relating to fishing, and the 
Soviet Union is a party to many of them. Apparently, the 
most difficult area, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, 
and where interest with other states have collided more 
often, is the Northwest Pacific. 

The Soviet-Japanese Convention on the High Seas Fisheries 
in the Northwest Pacific was concluded on May 14, 1956, and 
in its subsequent development a Soviot-Japanoso Northwest 
Pacific Fishery Commission was established. It spite o£ 
this, it became common practice in the Soviet press and 
in official government statements to blame the Japanese si'de 
for overfishing and violating the conservation practice. ' s 
In the spring of 1971, Japanese fishermen and, indirectly, 
the Japanese Government were accused of overfishing for 
herring in the Sea of Okhotsk and of being in violation of 
existing agreements on crab catches. Japan was reminded 
that the permission for its fishermen to catch fish and 
crabs in the Sea of Okhotsk is an act of good will on the 
side of the Soviet Union, and that the provisions of 195# 
Geneva Convention as well as the Edict of the Supreme Soviet 

of February 6, 196S concerning "the sovereign rights of 

25 
Soviet Union upon its continental shelf" applied. ^ 

An inter-governmental agreement on the settlement of 

claims with respect to damage to fishing gear was -signed in 



^ Izvostiya , I? April 1971, and Sevetskava Rossiya , 
IS April 1971. 



634 



Moscow on December 9, 1939 between the governments of the USSR 
and Norway. Two special commissions, one in Moscow, and another 
in Oslo, were set up to deal with claims made by tjieir 
respective fishermen. The commissions were not competent 
to hear cases of damage to fishing gear which occurred within 
the territorial waters of the state, since they fall into 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state in whose territorial 
waters the damage occurred. In case of dissent with the 
Commission's verdict, either by plaintiff or defendant, the 
Commission could address both parties with a proposal to 
settle the dispute by way of voluntary arbitration. Such 
arbitration would take place before the Maritime Arbitration 
Commission in Moscow if the defendant were a Soviet ship 
owner, and in Norway if the defendant were a Norweigan ship 
owner. (Norway has no permanent Maritime Arbitration 
Commission and hence, a special arbitration tribunal would 
have to be set up for each concrete case). Fishing in the 
Soviet waters is regulated by the statute on the Conversation 

of Fish Stocks in Water Bodies of the USSR No. 1045, approved 

26 • I 
by the Counsel of Ministers on 15 September 1958. 

The Soviet Sea Rescue Service is composed of the rescue 

/ i 

services of the Soviet Merchant Marine, Fishing Industry, 

and the Emergency Rescue Service (ERS) of the Soviet Navy. 

The Service has been coordinated by the ERS and in January 

1971, celebrated its 50th Anniversary. The Soviet Union has 

eight agreements with its neighbors for rescue at sea; the \ 



2o A. Voikov, Maritime Lav; , p. 69. 



895 



cooperation is particularly well organized in the Baltic 

Sea where joint exercises are held occasionally with Poland, 

27 
Sweden, and other countries. In October 1965. the Soviet 

Union and Denmark signed a new agreement on salvage and * 

ship raising operations. The Agreement, in addition to the 

mutual obligation for help to a ship in distress, provides 

the rights for rescue ships of one country to be called into 

the territorial or inland waters of the other in case of 

necessity. 

The International Convention for the Prevention of 

Pollution of the Sea by Oil concluded in London in 1954 and 

amended in 1962 was signed by the Soviet Union, but so far"" 

has not been ratified by the Supreme Soviet. Rather extensive 

measures exercised to prevent oil pollution have been reported 

by Soviet Press and at least for one sea, the Caspian, it 

was claimed that the oil pollution has been halted. The 

special types of ships, one to clean the harbors and another 

to clean storage tanks on tankers and whaling factory ships 

have been employed by the Soviet Merchant Marine and Fishing 

Inaustry. 

The Sea Bed Treaty 

- / The decade of the 1960's witnessed intensified interest 
in national rights and international obligations relating 
to the oceans, their sea beds, and their resources. During 
the second half of the 1960's, the subject of the military 



•2P- 



/ d ny y T r a n s - r t , 7 'January 1971 and October 11, 1967. 



06 

• Vodnyy Transport , IS February 1971. 

6S8 



use of the sea bed was of prime concern. The August 1967 
United Nations Malta Resolution proposed a "declaration 
and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful 
purposes of the sea bed and the ocean floor". The United: 
Nations Ad Hoc Committee of 35 nations to study the peaceful"^ 
uses of the sea bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction was established. The Soviet memorandum 
of July 1, 196&, on some urgent measures for stopping the 
arms race and for disarmament, proposed that the sea bed and 
the ocean floor be used for peaceful purposes only. On 
March Id, 1969, the Soviet Union placed before the 
Disarmament Committee a treaty draft on the prohibition of", 
the implacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction on the sea bed, the ocean floor, and the 

sub-soil. This draft was accepted as a basis for the 

29 

Committee T s work on this problem. As a result of the 

negotiations within the framework of the Disarmament 
Committee, a joint Soviet-American Treaty Draft was worked 
out and submitted for the Committee's consideration on 
October 7 r 1969. The -Soviet draft proposed a 12 mile off- 
shore zone, contending this took due account of the 
security interest of the coastal states while insuring the 
maximum coverage of the sea bed area by the treaty. The 
Soviet-American draft also proposed the 12 mile limit for 
the widest contigious zone provided for by the 195$ Oeneva 
Convention. During the course of debates, various proposals 



"^International Affairs No. 1, 1970, pp. 41-45.* 



68*7 






by other states, including the U.S. proponnl. mruln ),y 
President Nixon in Kay 1970, were argued anain^t . 3 ° The 
Soviets claim that "there can be little doubt that once the 
U.S. has established "deep water bases or sea bed fortifications 

it will sooner or later use them to back up its claims to' "^^ 

. ,.■, '31 

sizable portions of the world ocean". The United States 

had been accused of allowing the Navy to dictate policy. 
Towards the end of 1970, however, the Geneva Sea Red Arms 
Talks showed definite progress, especially when the United 
States and the_Soviet Union came up with a new draft on the 
treaty in September 1970. The Soviet-American draft 
envisaged a ban on the implacement of mass destruction weapons 
over the whole sea bed outside the 12 mile coastal zone. 
Finally, on February 11, 1971, the treaty was signed by the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and some 60 other states. 
Luring the signing ceremony in Moscow, Soviet Premier Kosygin 
referred to the agreement as the "first step toward complete 
demilitarization of the ocean floor". 



^ u It should be noted that the initial position of the 
United States at the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations 
and some articles which appeared in the American Press made i 
good ammunition for Soviet propaganda. For example, during 
the third meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States 
set forthe the view that peaceful purposes did not preclude 
military activities "in pursuit of peaceful aims or in 
1' fulfillment of peaceful intents, consistent with the United 
Nations ' charter and the obligation of international law". 
An article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in May 19&9 
entitled The Paper Torpedo , claimed that "the United States 
has a huge stake in the outcome of the U. N. sea beds 
discussions" and demanded that "the U.S. Navy's voice must 
'come through loud and clear and above all effectively", and 
argued against the Malta Resolution and in effect -the proposed 
treaty. 

31 New' Times' No! '27 , pp. ltf-20, 1969. 

688 



*r 



In July 1971, the Soviet delegation to the Geneva 
Committee for peaceful use of the sea bed proposed a preliminary 
draft of the treaty for peaceful use of the sea be.d beyond 
the Continental Shelf. The proposal stressed the necessity 
to keep the shelf open, if already closed, for undiscriminated 
exploitation by all states and prohibiting its use for 
military purposes. It was claimed that particular attention 
was being paid in the draft to the interests of the developing 



countries and the interests of all states regarding navigation 

32 

and flights in the area of international straits and fishing. 

A number of bilateral shipping agreements exist between 

the Soviet Union and other countries. The first one was 

concluded between USSR and France in Paris, on April 20, 19&7> 

and became effective on September 1, 19&7. ^ n addition to 

the express desire of both sides to ensure first and foremost 

the coordinated use of their merchant marine, the promotion 

of the normal development of international shipping on the 

basis of freedom of mercantile navigation was also stressed 

as an aim of the agreement. Article III of the agreement 

states "the parties to the agreement again confirm their 

1 
adherence to the principle of freedom of international maritime 

shipping and .agree to refrain from any action of a discrim-| 

/ 
inatory character, since they are confinced that such actions 

may cause harm to the development of international trade". 

The agreement also emphasized that both sides will- encourage 

? 2 ?ravda , 29 July 1971. 

-^ Vodnyy Transport , August 31, 19o7- 



S3 



the participation of Soviet and French ships in the transpor- 
tation of cargo between their ports, and neither side will 
hamper the participation of the ships of other side in 
carrying cargo between its ports and third countries, etc\ 
The agreement also made the provision for a joint commission 
to observe the implementation of the agreement and to discuss 
unsolved problems. Somewhat similar agreements were signed 
between the Soviet Union and" Great Britain in 1965, and 
between the Soviet Union and the Netherlands in 1969. 

Beginning in 1965, the Soviet steamship companies have 
been entering various freight (rate fixing) conferences. 
The process has not been a smooth one and has been accompanied 
by numerous accusations. Western ship owners accuse the 
Soviets of attempted rate cutting, unfair competition, 
untrustworthiness, etc. The Soviet Ministry of Merchant 
Marine, in turn, occasionally employing an aggressive 
tactics demanded fair treatment, blamed the West for the 
blockades, black lists, a desire to maintain a monopolistic 
position, etc. Debates were particularly heated on the 
Soviet entrance to the Australian conferences. Finally, during 
I969, the disputes were settled and it seems that the original 
fears of Western ship owners were not justified. In the long - 
run ^ it might be even beneficial for world shipping to have 

the Soviets inside and cooperative, than outside and rate 

. 34 . * 
cutting. 



"~~~ 3 Vr 7iVO o-j :i ya> xarch 16, 1969; Vo dnvv Transport , 10 Octobe: 

196S; Morslcby Klot No. 2 , 1970, pp. 80-S2; ana No. 3 t 1970, 
pp . 0O-64. 

/ ■ • . 



ma 



r 



Since 1956, the Central Scientific Research Institute 
of Merchant Fleet, TsNIIMF, became the center for work 
dealing with Soviet and International maritime legal problems. 
The TsNIIMF prepared recommendations and working papers for 
the Soviet delegation to 195£ Geneva Conventions, the i960, 
1965, and 1966 London Conferences, the 12th Session of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law in Brussels in 1967, 
etc. The Institute plan for 1971-1975 visualized extensive 
work on the problems of maritime law, including recommendations 
concerning the relations between Soviet steamship lines and 
ports with foreign shipping companies; recommendations 
concerning the safety of navigation, and protection of ~~ 
property and Soviet merchant fleet interests in case of 
collision, and other works dealing with the general improvement 



of Soviet maritime legislation. 



35 



o- 



It may be concluded that the Soviet Union's development 
of its merchant marine, fishing industry and other aspects 
of maritime power, and their unavoidably broader association 
with the world's maritime community have produced considerable 
intensification of, and the necessity for much wider partici- 
pation at various international organizations dealing with 
the maritime problem and corresponding development of Soviet 
maritime legislation. 



35 • 

TsNIIMF Transaction, 1970, p. 32 



701 






/ 



SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY 
iOOKS 



ichkasov, V. I., Basov, A. B., arid others, Boyevoy put T 

Sovetskogo Voyenno - Morskogo Flota ( "Combat Path of 
the Soviet Navy" j . Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1967. 

mdrassy, J. , International Law and the Resources of the 
Sea/ New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. v 

?he Military Balance , all 1960s editions and 1971-1972. 
London: The Institute for Strategic Studies. 

telov, M. I. , Istoriya otkrytiya i osvoeniya Severnogo 

Morskogo Puti ("History of Discovery and Mastering of 
the Northern Sea Route"), 4 "Vols., Morskoy Transport 
and Gidpometeoizdat, 1971. 

3reyer, Siegfried, Guide to the Soviet Navy , United States 
Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1970. 

Sutler, W. E., The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 

Subcommittee on Foreign Policy, Joint Economic Committee, 
Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the 
Soviet Union. A compendium of papers , Sept. IS, 1970. 



V/ashington, 1970.. 295 p. (Jt. Com. Print 



T 



ilrickson, John, Soviet Military Power , London: Royal United 
Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1971. 

? airhall, David, Russian Sea Power . Boston: Cambit, 1971. 

r riedman, W. , The Future of the Oceans . New York: Braziller, 
-1971- 

Iretton, Sir Peter, Vice Adm., Royal Navy (Ret.), Maritime 
Strategy . New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 

luzhenko, T. B., Minister of Merchant Marine, USSR, Morskoy 
FIct v vos'rr.oy pyatiletke ("Sea Transport during Eighth 
Five Year Plan") . Transport, Moscow, 1971. 



702 



Herman, L. M. , The Postwar Expansion of Russia's Fi sh:i jig 
Industry . U.S. Government Printing -Office. (88th 
Congress, 2nd Session, Senate), 1964. 

Herrick, R.'W., Soviet Naval Strategy , United States Naval 
Institute, Annapolis, 1968. ~~ 

Heizlet, Sir Arthur, Vice Adm. , Aircraft and Sea Power . New 
York: Stein and Day, 1970. 

; Idyll, C. P., The Sea Against Hunger . New York: Crowell. 
1970. 

Istoriva Velikoy Otechestvennov Voiny Sovetskogb Soyuza 
1941-194 ? ("History of the Great Patriotic War of 
the Soviet Union, 1941-1945" ) , 6 Vols., Moscow, 
Voenizdat, I96O-I965. 

Kuznegsov, N. G-. Nakanune ("On the Eve"), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 
1966. 

Kuznetsov, N. G. Gody Voiny ("The War Years"), Octyabr f , _ 
#3, 9, 12, 196S" or Voyenizdat, 1971. 

Khesin, S. S. 3 Oktyabr T skava Revolyutsiya i Flot ("The 

October Revolution and the Navy";, Nauka, Moscow, 1971. 

Jane T s Fighting Ships, Jane's Weapon Sv s tems, Jane's All the 
World's Aircraft, Jane's Surface Skimmer Systems, Jane's 
Freight Containers . Jane's Yearbooks, England. 

Iagovskiy, A., Strategiya i Ekonomika ("Strategy and Economics"), 
Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1957. 

Lifshits, IT." L., Tekhnika podvodnoy debychi poleznykh 

Ickopaemykh ("Technology of Underwater Extraction of 
Minerals" ) , Znaniya, Moscow, 1971. 

Martin, L; W. , The Sea in Modern Strategy . New Jersey: 
Praeger, 1967 • 



Medvedev, N. F. , Su da dlya issledovaniya mirovogo okeana 
("Ships for the Research in the World's Ocean"), 
Sudostroyeniye, 1971. 

Mikhailov, S. V., Mirovoy okean i chelovechestvo ("Humanity 
and the Ocean Tf ) , Ekonomika P. H. , Moscow, 1969. 

Moiseyev, P. A., Biologicheskiya Resursy Mirovo okeana 
("Biological Resources of the World Ocean"), 
Pishchprom P. H., Moscow, 19&9. 



j 703 



Mozharov, N. D. , Sotrudnichestvo Sotsialisticheski kh stran 

v oblasti norskogo transnorta (''Cooperation of Socialist 
Countries in the Area of Sea Transport''). Transport 
P. H. , Moscow, 19o9. 

1 

Nurok, G. A., Dobycha nolesnykh iskoraemykh so dna rr.oroy i 
okcanov ( "extract-ion of i-iinerais from the Bottom of' 
Seas and Oceans"), Nedra, Moscow, 1970. 

Osvoyenive Mirovogo Okeana ("Mastering of the World Ocean"), 
Collection of Articles, Voyenizdat, 1971. 

Pavlovich, N. B., Rear Adm. , Flot v Pervoy Mirovoy Voyne , 

("The Navy in the First World War") , Vol, 1, Voenizdat, 
Moscow, 1964. 

Petrov, M. A. , Podgotovka Rossii k Pervoy Mirovoy Voyne na 
more ' ("Preparation of Russia for the First "World War 
at Sea"), Voyenizdat, 1926. 

Podvodnoye Korablestroyeniye v Rossii 1900-1917 ("Submarine 
Construction in Russia 1900-1917"); Sudostroyeniye , 
1965. 

Stalbo, K. A., Rear Adm., ed., Istoriya Voenno-Morskogo 

Iskusstva ("History of Naval Art"), Voyenizdat, Moscow, 
196^ 

Strokov, A. A., Istoria Voennogo Iskusstva,- ("History of 
Military Art") , Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965. 

Sokolovskiy'V. D. (ed)., Voennaya Strategiya ("Military 
Strategy")', Voenizdat, 3 editions. 

Trusov, G. M. , Podvodnyve lodki y Russkom i Sovetskom Flots 
( "Submarines in the Russian and the Soviet Navies"), 
Cubpromgiz, Moscow, 1963. 

Pechenik. L. N. , Troyanovskiy, F. M. , Syr T evava baza tralovogo 
rybolovstva na materikovom sklone severnoi Atlantika 
("The Trawling Resources on the North Atlantic Conti- 
nental Slope"), Murmansk Publishing House, 1970. 

Wolfe, Thomas W. , Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 - Baltimore 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 

Yakovlev, V. DV, Vice Adm., Sovetskiy Voenno-Morskoy Flot 
("The Soviet Navy"), Moscow, 1969. 



PERIODICALS 



United States Naval Institute Proceedings , Annapolis. 

Naval Review , all 1960s, 1970, and 1971 issues, United States- 7 
Naval institute, Annapolis. 

-7on 



Marine Corps Gazette 

MAGAZINES (In Russian) 

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil ("Communist of the Armed Forces"), 
semimonthly, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet 
Army and Navy, Moscow. 

Morskov Sbornik ("Naval Digest"), since 1^43 , monthly, the 
Soviet Navy, Moscow. 

Morskov Flot ( "Merchant Marine" ) , since 191S, monthly, 
Ministry of Merchant Marine, Moscow. 

Okeanologiya ("Oceanology") , monthly, the USSR Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow. 

Rybnoye Khozyastvo ("Fishing Industry"), since 1920, monthly, 
Ministry of Fishing Industry, Moscow. 

Rechnoy Transport ("River Transport"), since 1913, monthly, 
Ministry of River Transport of RSFSR, Moscow. 

Sudostroyeniye ("Shipbuilding")",' since 1910, monthly, the 
USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding and. JL*. N-- Kryiov" Scien- 
tific and Technical Society of Shipbuilding, Leningrad. 

Tekhnika i Vooruzheniye ("Equipment and Armament"), monthly, 
the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow. 

Tyl i snabzheniye ("Rear Services and Supply"), monthly, 
the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow. 

USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology , monthly, by the 

Institute of U.S. Studies of the Academy of Sciences 
of the USSR, Moscow. 

Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal ("Journal of Military History"), 
monthly, the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow. 

Voprosy Ikhtiologii ("Problems of Ighthyology" ) , the USSR 
Academy of Sciences, Moscow. 

MAGAZINES (In German) 

Marine Rundschau ("Naval Review"), bimonthly, Verlag E. S. 
Mi ttler & S ohn , P . H . , Frankf ur t / ma in , FRG . 

Militaertechnik ("Military Equipment"), monthly, Minister 
of Defense, GDR.. 



705 



Z£l ^^^^ Economics"), semiweekly, 

Soldat und Tochnik- ("Soldier and Equipment"), monthly, 
Umscha-u Verlag, P. g. Frankfurt/main, FRG. ■ 

V ° lkS GDR? S - ( " PeopleTs Arm y"^> ^ekly, Ministry of Defense, 

l ' mR wfffi iSC n e ' I " f °r mat:i ori . ("Military-Political Information") 
weekly, Dr. Lather Lahrish, publisher, FRG. x * id «-°n >> 

MAGAZINES (In Polish) 

Morze ("The Sea"), monthly, Ministry of Merchant Marine 
Warsaw. . ' 

Przeslad Morski ("Maritime Review"), monthly, published *by 
Polish Navy, Gdynia. J 

Wojskowy Przeglad Technicznv ("Military Technical Review" )7 
monthly, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw. 

NEWSPAPERS (In Russian) 

Pravda ("Truth"), daily, CC CPSU, Moscow. 

Izvestiya ("News^), daily, Soviet Government, Moscow. 

Nedelya ("The Week"), weekly, supplement to Izvestiya . 

Krasnaya Zvezda ("Red Star"), daily, the USSR Ministry of 
Defense, Moscow. 

Economicheskaya Gazeta ("Economic Gazette"), weekly, CC 
CPSU, Moscow. ' 

Sotsialisticheskaya Idustriya ("Socialist Industry"), CC 

CPSU, Moscow. 

Vodnyy Transport ("Water Transport"), the USSR Ministry of 

Merchant Marine and the RSFSR Ministry of River Transport, 
Moscow. 



70S 



GLOSSARY 

Attack carrier striking forces : Naval forces, the primary 
offensive weapon of which is carrier-based aircraft. Ships, 
other than carriers, act primarily to support and screen 
against submarine and air- threat, and secondarily against 
surface threat. (D., p. 35)* 

Deployment : In a strategic sense, the relocation of forces 
to desired areas of- operation (D., p. 95) 

V 

Displacement : The weight of a ship, in long tons. It is 
equal to the weight of the water displaced. 

Gross tonnage (GT) : The entire internal cubic capacity of 
a ship expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton. 
Certain spaces such as ballast tanks, inner bottoms, deck 
shelters, wheel houses and the like are included. 

Dead weight tonnage (dwt) : The total weight"- carrying 
capacity of a ship in 2240 pound tons. Tt includes cargo, 
fuel oil, fresh water, stores, crew, etc., which brings 
the ship down to its maximum permissible draft. 

Knot : The sea-going unit of speed and is one nautical mile 
To080.27 feet) per hour. 

Draft of a vessel : The vertical distance in feet between 
the waterline and the keel. It is indicative of the load 
carried. 

Strategic mission : A mission directed against one or more 
of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of 
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's 
war-making capacity and his will to make war. Targets 
include key manufacturing systems, transportation systems, 
communications facilities, and other such target systems. 
As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are 
designed to have a longer-range, rather than immediate, 
effect on the enemy and his military forces. (D., p. 2&6) 



*D. - Dictiona r y of Military 'and As so ciated Terms . 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff., January 3, 197*2. 



707 



Submarine striking forces : Submarines having guided or 
missile launching and/or guidance capabilities 

launch offensive nuclear strikes. (D. , p. 289)* 



ballistic 
formed to 



Surface striking forces : Forces which are organized primarily 
to do battle with enemy forces or to conduct shore bombard- 
ment. Units comprising such a force are generally incorpor- 
ated in and operate as part of another force, but with 
provisions for their formation into a surface striking 
force should such action appear likely and/or desirable. 
(T)., 0. 291) 



\ 



*D. - Dictionary of Military and Associate d Terms. 
•Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 3> j-972. 



. 



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